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THE 
INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



All rights reserved 



THE 

INTERPRETATION 
OF HISTORY 



BY 



L»/' CECIL JANE 

Author of " The Nations at War," etc. 




MCMXV • LONDON AND TORONTO 
J. M. DENT & SONS LTD. 
NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON y CO. 






•?^//?^J 



;&' 



?^-^ 



SIBYL 



PREFACE 

As its title may indicate, this book is an attempt to dis- 
cover some underl5dng factor, in accordance with which 
History may be interpreted and the occurrence of all 
events explained. Of the ambitious nature of this 
attempt I am fully conscious, but it appears to be well 
worth making, and any apology for having made it would 
savour of insincerity. 

Chapters I to V contain a statement of the theory that 
the factor is to be found in the existence of a mentad con- 
flict as to the means by which happiness is to be attained, 
between the idea that content is to be found in complete 
submission, " Universalism," or in complete self-asser- 
tion, " Individuahsm." It is argued that this conflict 
determines the conduct both of individuals and of those 
associations of individuals which form nations. 

Chapters VI to XI endeavour to show how far this 
theory is justified by the past history of Europe and of 
England, and in Chapter XII an attempt is made to 
interpret the tendencies of the present day. 

A detailed narrative of events hardly enters into the 
scope of the book, and I have in general confined myself 
to discussing the broad current of events, only entering 
into detail when to do so seemed to be necessary. For 
a certain inevitable allusiveness, I must therefore 
apologise. 

Since the completion of this book in the spring of 1914, 
events of paramount importance have occurred. I have 
not altered the body of the book, but have added an 
appendix, "The Conflict in the Future," in which an 

vii 



via THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

attempt is made to indicate what may be expected to 
be the ultimate influence of the present European War 
upon the future of mankind. 

I am unwilling to omit this opportunity of expressing 
my thanks to my friend, Mr. Maurice C. Blake, for his 
valuable criticisms and suggestions, and to my late 
secretary, Mrs. H. W. Rhodes, for patient and unweary- 
ing help. 

L. CECIL JANE. 

71 High Street, Oxford, 
February 1915. 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 

I. The Meaning of History . . . , i 

II. Theories of History ..... 6 

III. The Conflict in the Life of the Individual . 15 

IV. The Conflict in the Nation . , . . 3i,3,J?,33 

V. General Character of the Conflict . . 39 

VI. The Conflict in Europe: i. To the Coronation 

of Charles the Great ..... 58 

VII. The Conflict in Europe: 2. From the Corona- 
tion OF Charles to the Fall of the Hohen- 
staufen . . . . . . .74 

VIII. The Conflict in Europe: 3. From the Fall of 

THE HOHENSTAUFEN TO THE PeACE OF WEST- 
PHALIA ......... 91 

IX. The Conflict in Europe: 4. From the Peace of 

Westphalia to the French Revolution . . 1 50 

X. The Conflict in Europe: 5. From the French 

Revolution TO the Present Day . . . 209 ' 

XI. The Conflict in England .... 267 

XII. Tendencies of the Present Day , . -273 

Appendix: The Conflict in the Future: the 
War of the Triple Entente . . . 284 

Index ........ 321 



IX 






THE INTERPRETATION 
OF HISTORY 



THE MEANING OF HISTORY 

The necessary preface to the study of History must be "^ 
a correct idea of the nature of the subject to be studied. 
History may be described broadly as a record of the 
past actions of mankind and of the working of human 
institutions. It deals with all the activities of man; 
it is concerned not only with the material but also with 
the intellectual and moral development of the world. 
^ ( History, however, if it has any value, is something k^ 
more than a mere record of that which has occurred. ' 
It is of Httle profit to know that Napoleon was defeated 
at Waterloo, or that in 1832 the Reform Bill became 
law. A chronicler who narrates the bare events of a 
series of years does little to advance human knowledge; 
he contributes still less to the profit of the human race. 
But a chronicler is not an historian. The latter must 
give something more ^than a record of events. He 
must discover the connection between one event and 
another, and not only between two events more or less 
closely united in point of time, but also between events 
separated, it may be, by centuries. It is a truism to say 
that every event which occurs has a direct bearing upon 
the whole future of the human race; that there must be 
some definite connection between the battles of Salamis 



2 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

" and Trafalgar, between the careers of Julius Caesar and 
Gladstone. We often speak of events which have 
changed the world's history. But it is certain that 
had any given event not occurred, the whole subsequent 
history of mankind would have been different. Nothing 
is more certain than that if Aristides had not been 
ostracised, the history of France in the eighteenth 
century would not have been that which it was. How 
it would have been modified, whether more or less, no 
man can say, since Aristides was ostracised. It may 
even appear that to connect two such events is fanciful 
and that their relation is non-existent. Certainly the 
bearing of the one upon the other is not easily traced. 

Yet a little thought will often reveal a clear connection 
between two apparently unconnected events. To take 
but one example. The victory gained by Don John at 
Lepanto was directly responsible for the defeat of the 
Spanish Armada, and less obviously but quite as cer- 
tainly for the victories of Nelson. Lepanto was the last 
great triumph of the oared galley. It so impressed the 
Spanish naval constructors with the excellence of that 
type of vessel that they ignored the fact that it was 
unsuited for oceanic war. Thus while England produced 
a new species of ship, the frigate, Spain still constructed 
galleys, and in 1588 she paid the penalty. The fleet of 
PhiHp II was unsuited for warfare beyond the Straits; 
for the attack on England he had to employ converted 
merchantmen, and they were easily out-manoeuvred 
and crushed by the superior English ships. And the 
start which England had secured in the art of naval 
construction profited her in all the wars which followed ; 
from the fighting point of view, she had become and 
remained the foremost shipbuilding nation in the world. 
If it had not been for the victory of Lepanto, Spain 
might have built ships suited for the new warfare. As 



THE^ MEANING OF HISTORY 3 

it was, England first began to build the right type of 
vessel; when other nations imitated her, she had the 
advantage which years of practice were bound to give her. 
^ In such a case as this, the connection between the two 
events is clear. But even when it is not clear, even 
when it cannot be discovered, it must none the less exist. 
To assert that it does exist is only to assert that the 
continuity of History is a real thing, that the history of 
modern England cannot be fully understood without a 
knowledge of the history of those empires which passed 
out of existence while England was yet in a state of 

/rofound barbarism. 
This continuity of History is to-day an admitted 
fact. No one contends that the history of eighteenth- 
century England can be understood without a knowledge 
of the Anglo-Saxon period. It is just as clear that the 
Anglo-Saxon period cannot be understood without an 
appreciation of the peculiar character of the English 
conquest of Britain, without some knowledge of the 
history of the Roman Empire. And the Roman Empire 
itself was influenced by contact with Greek civilisa- 
tion; Greek civiUsation was in its turn modified by 
contact with Persia and the East. Hence from the 
study of English history in the eighteenth century we 
are led back by insensible degrees to the study of 
the remotest ages of antiquity; History becomes one 
continuous whole. 

6 It is almost useless to study the history of one nation 
to the exclusion of that of other nations. It is still more 
useless to study the history of one century without 
reference to the centuries which precede and follow it. 
As the ultimate causes of any event may be traced back 
through the centuries, so the ultimate effects of any 
event may be traced onwards. The results of the 
sixteenth-century Reformation are felt to-day; they 



4 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

will be felt in a.d. 3000, as long as the world endures. 
History has no end. We who are now alive are watch- 
ing the working out of events which occurred a thousand 
years ago. We are, as it were, actors in a drama, im- 
perfectly acquainted with the scenes which have been 
already acted, knowing less of the purpose of the scenes 
which are in progress, and almost wholly ignorant of the 
final development of the plot. 

And if History possesses any value, it lies in this, that 
it may supply some clue as to what the future will bring 
forth. It is commonly said that from History states- 
men may derive guidance, be warned of those things 
which they should avoid, saved from error and pointed 
to the right path. It is the function of the historian 
to make known the lessons of the past, and in doing so 
to reveal so much as he can of the future. 

The imperfection of human nature, the real paucity 
of human knowledge, makes it impossible that the 
future should be wholly known. But the signs and 
warnings are there, waiting to be read. By careful 
consideration of the past many errors may be avoided. 

If, however, the historian is to fulfil his function, if 
he is to wrest from the future some of its secrets, he must 
be more than a mere chronicler. It is not enough that 
he should bring to his task diligence and accuracy, that 
he should record truly the events of the past. That 
he should, as far as possible, do all this is no doubt 
necessary, but he must do more. He must be competent 
to analyse causes and results, to estimate characters 
and motives. And as History is a drama, he must also 
be gifted with something of the dramatic instinct. That 
instinct will aid him to discover the connection between 
events divided by centuries of time, to take a wide view 
of the past, to grasp that which is really essential, to 
discard that which is really trivial. 



THE MEANING OF HISTORY 5 

f But though possessed of all these qualities, the 
historian will yet fail, if he has no principle of interpreta- 
tion, if he discovers no explanatory factor enabling him 
to reveal the plot of the drama. He must find the true 
cause which has determined human conduct in the past, 
which will determine human conduct in the future, which 
has led and which will lead nations to pursue a particular 
course. If this explanatory factor can be discovered, 
the historian may hope to gain some clear idea of that 
fate which the future has in store for us. Without such 
an explanatory factor, his quest will of necessity be vain. 



6 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



II 



THEORIES OF HISTORY a, ,. livu 

The need for some such explanatory factor, has been ^^ 
generally recognised. Optimists have sought for it in a 
theory of consistent progress; pessimists in a theory of 
consistent retrogression. To one theorist every age is 
better than that which preceded it ; mankind advances 
out of darkness into Hght; there is hope that perfect 
happiness will be ultimately attained. To another, the 
condition of the world grows constantly more evil as 
the race falls ever further away from an original golden 
age; the increase of wickedness promises that the 
wholesale destruction, foretold by some, will be richly 
deserved. 

The optimist draws attention to the wider diffusion 
of political power, the increase in the material well- 
being of mankind, the spread of civihsation. But if it^/i 
may be readily admitted that self-government is in 
general preferable to despotism, it must also be admitted 
that self-government is liable to degenerate into bureau- 
cracy, and that the tyranny of a corrupt and selfish 
clique is at least as deadening and oppressive as the 
tyranny of a single man. Again, material prosperity > 
has been bought at a price. Men tend more and more 
to herd together in great towns, there to live in an 
atmosphere so unnatural and so unhealthy that the 
physique of the nation deteriorates and only by means 
of improved sanitation and increased medical skill are 
appalling plagues prevented. The exodus from the 
country has ciroused the gravest fears in the minds of 



THEORIES OF HISTORY 7 

statesmen. Improved means of communication have 
largely destroyed the original simpUcity and quiet of 
rural Ufe. The growth of civilisation has produced new 
economic wants; it has produced also new forms of 
disease more insidious, if less deadly, than the older 
plagues with which medical science has successfully 
contended. One of the characteristics of the present 
day is the prevalence of nervous diseases; that pre- 
valence is justly attributed to the strain of modern Ufe. 
If progress has been made, it has not been without its 
accompanying evils. He would be a bold man who 
should assert that the world is really happier to-day than 
it was a century ago. 

And any consideration of History makes it clear that 
there has been nothing in the nature of consistent 
progress. It is assuredly untrue to say that one century 
has been even generally superior to that which preceded 
it. The golden age of Greece was certainly a period of 
greater intellectual and material well-being, of greater 
happiness, than the vicious period of the successors of 
Alexander. The age of the Antonines was a happier 
time than that of Diocletian and Constantine; in the 
Dark Ages men looked back with legitimate regret even 
to the period of the decUning Roman Empire. If it be 
asserted that since the world emerged from the Dark 
Ages, progress has been consistent, it is easy to quote 
instances to the contrary. In England, there was 
certainly a marked deterioration in the Lancastrian 
period from the period of the Plantagenets. It may be 
contended that in most things which go to make for the 
good of the nation, the Stuart period was inferior to the 
Tudor. In France, the progress of the country was 
retarded by the Wars of Religion ; the age of Louis XV 
shows a marked decHne from that of Louis XIV. Two 
centuries hardly suf&ced to enable Germany to recover 



8 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

from the miseries inflicted by the Thirty Years' War. 
In Italy, the degradation of the seventeenth and eigh- 
teenth centuries compares unfavourably with the age 
of Lorenzo de Medici. Russia had half emerged from 
barbarism when she was hurled back into misery by the 
L ime of the Troubles. In no country has there been any 
semblance of consistent progress. The rule has rather 
been that progress up to a certain point has been followed 
by deterioration, even if that deterioration has culmin- 
ated in renewed progress. And only a shallow observer 
would argue that because progress has been more or less 
consistent for a century or so, therefore the days of 
deterioration have passed, that there is to be no further 
interruption in the peaceful development of mankind. 

The obvious flaws in the theory of consistent progress 
perhaps served to produce the theory of consistent 
deterioration. But this theory is even more obviously 
false. It is absurd to deny that advance has been made 
and is being made in all the arts of civilisation, that 
material progress has occurred and is occurring. And 
if more regard is to be paid to moral than to material 
considerations, it is certain that human sympathy has 
deepened, that the present age is at worst less openly 
cruel than that which preceded it. The tortures of the 
Middle Ages, the cruelties of the Spanish Inquisition, are 
an impossibility at the present day. Even the pessi- 
mists themselves admit that some progress has been 
made. They are inclined to fix the period at which the 
supposed deterioration set in at some fifty, one hundred 
or two hundred years ago. They refer generally to their 
childhood or to the days of their fathers as the golden 
age, and each successive generation advances the date 
at which the " good old times " ended. 

And if the theory of progress is not justified by His- 
tory, still less is the theory of deterioration. A trivial 



THEORIES OF HISTORY 9 

instance will serve to show that the " good old times " 
existed largely in the imagination. At the present da37 
nothing is more common than the assertion that domestic 
servants have become familiar, lazy and improvident, 
whereas some fifty years ago they were models of all 
that could be desired. But writing in the early eigh- 
teenth century, Defoe complains of exactly those evils 
which are lamented by the modern mistress. He alsu 
found that domestic servants were too elaborately 
dressed, were impertinent, and were ready rather to 
lose their situations than to submit to any correction. 
He too longed for servants such as he had known in his 
childhood. And no doubt Defoe's father and grand- 
father made precisely the same complaints. 

It would be absurd to deny that the world has lost 
something of its original simplicity and honesty. Adva.nr - 
ing civilisation does tend to destroy certain virtues which 
are found among the savage races. But those virtues, ex- 
aggerated in themselves, were counterbalanced by vices 
now equally extinct; and at the same time there has 
been a distinct increase in the comforts and amenities 
of life. Indeed, the " good old times " are not improb- 
ably all the better because they exist only in memory. 
The most convinced pessimist would perhaps regret 
his fate if he found himself suddenly compelled to live 
in those conditions, the disappearance of which he so 
much deplores. 

Nor is there any ground for supposing that the limit 
of advance has been reached or is about to be reached. 
Whatever evils may be discovered in the existing 
political system of any country, there is no doubt that 
open tyranny is becoming yearly less possible. In 
almost every state the government is forced to submit 
its policy to the criticism of its subjects, and though 
it is true that those subjects may be deceived, the dictrmi 



10 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

of Abraham Lincoln is also true, " You can fool all the 
people some of the time, and some of the people all of 
the time, but you cannot fool all the people all of the 
time." Justice is also more widely diffused; it is on 
the whole less possible for the guilty to escape or for 
the innocent to be condemned. Probably at no period 
of the world's history have the weak been so efficiently 
protected against the aggression of the strong. Every 
day some new advance in material prosperity has to be 
recorded; some new invention serves to increase man's 
power over the forces of nature. It may be admitted 
that the present is no golden age, that it has in it evils 
unknown in the past. But it must also be admitted 
that it certainly approximates quite as nearly to the 
golden age as has any other period; that there are many 
evils which were rampant a hundred years ago which 
have to-day ceased to exist. 

To both the optimistic and the pessimistic theory, 
'lowever, the most serious objection is that they are 
ilike untrue to human nature. Any view of History 
which disregards human nature must be unjust. A 
state cannot be considered apart from its members. 
its very existence depends upon their consent, its laws 
rv d institutions are expressions of their will, and if the 
|)olicy of the state varies, that variation must be the 
lesult of a variation in the ideas of the citizens. It is 
i t ue that the opinions of the citizens do not always, or 
even normally, find immediate expression; but it is also 
true that no government, no law, no institution can 
, ndure, no line of policy be long pursued, save with the 
consent of the members of the state. No theory of 
History which ignores the individual can supply the 
true explanatory factor. 

And the life of the individual is no record of persistent 
progress or persistent deterioration. We escape from 



THEORIES OF HISTORY ii 

the ignorance of childhood by sacrificing its innocence; 
moral loss is the price paid for intellectual gain; " he 
that increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow." Abso- 
lute progress and absolute deterioration are alike un- 
known. In any given course of action there is alike 
good and evil; we have to balance the good and evil, 
making our choice with such skill as we may. Our life 
thus becomes a conflict; we are perpetually weighing 
pros and cons, striving to choose the lesser of two evils, 
often failing. This conflict is the determining factor 
in the life of man. And since nations are but aggrega- 
tions of individuals, united in a certain special manner, 
the determining factor in the life of nations also is 
this same conflict. If the nature of that conflict can 
be accurately determined, the factor explanatory of 
History will be discovered. 

There is nothing new in the conception of the life of 
man, and of History, as a conflict. Those who have 
recognised the falsity of the optimistic and pessimistic 
theories have sometimes suggested that History is a 
record of a struggle between the forces of progress and 
those of reaction. But a question at once arises as to 
the meaning of " progress " and " reaction," and this 
question is often too arbitrarily answered. It is, for 
example, frequently taken for granted that progress 
has been made when political power is more widely 
diffused, the argument being that greater liberty is thus 
secured to the individual, and with greater liberty, 
greater justice and greater happiness. 

But the rule of the many may be as tyrannical as that 
of a single man or as that of a section of the community. 
Legislation which penalises the rich is not uncommon 
where political power has been secured by a majority, 
and such legislation is as unfair and as pernicious as any 
legislation penalising the poor. In a debased democracy, 



12 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

-"^corruption and jobbery are at least as rife as in an 
oligarchy or a tyranny. It may be doubted whether a 
jSystem under which legislation depends upon bribery, 
open or concealed, is an advance upon a system under 
which legislation depends upon the caprice of a despot 
or the interest of a governing class. Yet in every case 
where the legislative power is in the hands of men 
dependent on the will of an electoral majority, bribery 

i is almost inevitable. In England to-day no sane man 
believes the professions of disinterestedness put forward 
by political candidates. No sane man believes that the 
would-be M.P. kisses babies from love of those babies, 
or subscribes his guinea to the funds of a local cricket 
club from genuine interest in that club's welfare. The 
kisses and the guinea, and the golden promises in the 
election address, are all a form of bribery. The candi- 
date is concerned to persuade the electorate that they 
will profit individually if they elect him. They know 
that he wants something from them, and they hope to 
be paid in some manner for giving him that something. 
And as for the measures which he so vigorously supports 
and condemns, it would be the height of absurdity to 
imagine that the candidates, put forward by any political 
party, sincerely believe their own assertions, or that they 
hold all measures advocated by their side to be good, 
all those advocated by their opponents to be bad. 

In the days prior to the Reform Bill, votes were 
bought openly, constituencies sold themselves to the 
highest bidder. To-day the electorate is larger; open 
bribery is forbidden by law, and is in any case too 
expensive to be practised. Candidates are forced to 
resort to indirect bribery. They pay the debts of 
chapels in the constituency which they hope to re- 
present; they promise to patronise local tradesmen; 
they entertain largely, not as candidates, but as holders 



THEORIES OF HISTORY 13 

of some municipal office. There is here a system of 
indirect bribery, coupled with a large measure of hypo- 
crisy; and it is not easy to see that the new method 
is any great advance upon the older and more direct. 
Nor does the House of Commons at the present day 
contain a better type of member than it did in the early 
years of the nineteenth century. It is at least arguable 
that it does not represent the true opinion of the country 
any more thoroughly than it did prior to the Reform Act. 

And a wider diffusion of political power may result, ^" 
and often has resulted, in anarchy. In such a case, 
it is difficult to contend that progress has been made 
from earlier conditions when, if power was in the hands 
of a few, a settled government at least guaranteed 
security of life and property. It is equally difficult to 
contend that there has been any retrogression when 
the anarchy is ended by the concentration of power 
in the hands of one man or of a small minority. In 
England during the Lancastrian period there is no doubt 
that parliament had a far greater share in the govern- 
ment than it had possessed under Edward I or Edward 
III. But if progress had therefore been made, it had 
been made at the cost of good order; it had certainly 
not increased either the happiness or the prosperity 
of the people. Under the Tudors, the executive was 
strengthened ; the powers which parliament had secured 
under Henry IV were taken from it. Yet few will be 
found to assert that the age of Henry VIII and Elizabeth 
shows a deterioration from that of the Lancastrians. 

In short, though a greater diffusion of political power ^ 
may be and often is a sign of progress, it is not so / 
invariably. On occasion the most real progress may/ 
consist in a limitation of the share of the people in their ^ 
own government. The progress of one age may be the 
reaction of the next; that which one man regards as 



14 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

reaction may to another appear to be progress. It is, 
perhaps, not too much to say that this must be so, that 
progress and reaction are merely relative terms. 
XI To describe History, therefore, as a record of a conflict 
between the forces of progress and those of reaction 
is in effect to say nothing. In every age there is both 
advance and decline; there is also a constant conflict. 
But the nature of that conflict has yet to be determined, 
and it can be determined only by consideration of the 
individual man. It is in the conflict which makes up 
the life of the individual, which determines his conduct, 
that the explanatory factor in History must be found. 
For the life of the nation is in reality a replica of the life 
of the individual, and that conflict which is found in the 
life of each man will be found also in the life of each 
state. 



CONFLICT IN LIFE OF INDIVIDUAL 15 



III 

THE CONFLICT IN THE LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 

Those who have regarded the Hfe of man as a conflict 
would seem to have been led into error as to the nature 
of that conflict. There is an apparent contrast between 
the animal and spiritual sides of human nature, between 
what are described as the higher and lower instincts. 
And it has therefore been concluded that the conflict 
is between these two sides of man's nature, between 
instincts which are practically those of the brute beasts 
and instincts which belong to a somewhat higher plane. 
Theologians especially have insisted upon this conflict. 
They have argued that in so far as man gives rein to his 
physical passions, he sinks to the level of the brute; 
that in so far as he restrains and masters those passions, 
he raises himself towards the divine level. The re- 
straining motive is divine. If man does curb his natural 
passions, his success is attributable to the grace of God 
working in him. From this it follows that what may 
be described as animal instincts are evil, what may be 
described as truly human instincts are good. And the 
conflict in each man is between the good and evil 
instincts which alternately sway him. 

Up to a certain point, all this is admittedly true. Man 
assuredly should exercise some measure of restraint over 
himself. If he does not do so, he certainly sinks below 
the human level. But it is not in a struggle between 
these two instincts that the true conflict which makes 
up man's life is to be found. 



i6 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

In the first place, the so-called animal instincts are 
not wholly evil. A man who had so curbed them that 
they had become extinct would be only an imperfect 
man; as Gibbon says, ** The virtues of the clergy are 
sometimes more dangerous than their vices." The end 
to be desired is not extinction but reasonable restraint. 
Nor are the animal and spiritual sides of man necessarily 
in conflict with each other. It is frequently the case 
that a man's intellect, all his alleged higher qualities, 
are utilised to gratify his animal passions. And there 
are many men in whom the animal instincts are so weak 
that no real conflict can be said to exist. 

But the most fundamental objection to this view of 
the life of man is that it ignores the fact that man's 
distinguishing characteristic is his possession of reason. 
An individual may cease to use his reason, but at the 
moment when this occurs, he practically ceases to be a 
man ; he becomes a mere brute. And it is only on very 
rare occasions that a man does allow his reasoning 
faculties to become dormant. It is, therefore, in a 
mental conflict that the struggle which makes up man's 
life is really to be found. The conflict between reason 
and passion is not a mental conflict. It is a contest 
between the mind, that is, between the humanity of a 
man, and instincts which are only quasi-human. Such 
contests do not make up a man's life; they occur only 
when he has almost ceased for a while to be a man. The 
real conflict is to be found in the mind, in those forms 
of mental activity by which man is most profoundly 
moved. 

And of all the activities of the mind, religion and love 
are certainly those by which a man is most profoundly 
influenced. It has always been for religion and for 
love that men have been most ready to die, to make 
the most supreme sacrifices. If, therefore, it is possible 



CONFLICT IN LIFE OF INDIVIDUAL 17 

to discover the motives which determine a man's 
attitude towards religion, which induce him to give 
his love, it is possible also to discover the true nature 
of that conflict which makes up his hfe. ^, X .'. \. Ju 

it has been said that if God did not exist, it would be 
necessary to create Him; in other words, mankind has 
always experienced the need for guidance by some 
higher power. Men shrink from the responsibility of 
facing the problems of life unaided; they would almost 
rather submit to a despotism than assume the burden 
of absolute private judgment. And there are many 
who, feeling the littleness of man in comparison with 
the immensity of the Universe, the brevity of human 
life in face of eternity, are driven to seek consolation 
in the belief that some deity orders their life and shapes 
them for some greater destiny than existence for a few 
short years on one small planet, whirling, they know 
not whither, in the boundless realms of space. 

Dogmatic religion owes its existence and its vitality 
to man's reahsation of his true insignificance. " What v 
is man that Thou art mindful of him, or the son of man ^ 
that Thou so regardest him? " This is the keynote of ' 
all religion. It cannot be that the Universe, that all 
the wonders of nature, exist by some chance ; that man, 
whose intellect even if developed to its highest capacity 
still cannot comprehend a billion years, is the most 
highly developed being. Rather it seems inevitable 
that above and beyond all else there is a supreme Being, 
a God, to Whom men must yield complete and unques- 
tioning obedience. And the peculiar gift of man is 
that he can realise his limitations, reahse that there is 
One far above him, in Whom he " lives and moves and 
has his being." Man does not lose, but gains by admit- 
ting his inferiority to God, by recognising the obligation 
of obedience. He finds the perfection of his own nature 

B 



i8 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

in the realisation of its limitations ; he is most truly man 
when he accepts the guidance of that Being to Whom he * 
owes his very existence. God the Creator is worshipped 
before God the Saviour ; the Deity Who guides us in this 
life is more real and vital than the Deity Who is to give 
us an existence when this world has passed away. 

The reality of this desire for guidance, for control, is 
seen especially in the vitality of the Roman Church. 
The creed of that Church denies explicitly the right of 
the individual to judge for himself, and in that very 
denial lies its strength. Men feel that they cannot face 
the problems of everyday life unaided, that they are 
still less able to face the problems of eternity. And to 
such the Catholic Church brings a message of great 
comfort. " Only believe " has been that Church's 
motto; " all things are possible to him that believeth." 
Here is the solution of every difficulty which might 
trouble the mind of man ; all can cast themselves on the 
Church, and the Church will guard and guide them. The 
desire to be controlled, to submit, is gratified to the 
fullest extent. 

And only in so far as a Church gratifies this desire 
can it have vitality. In the sixteenth century, the right 
of private judgment was asserted ; men were bidden to 
cast away the shackles of authority, to choose for them- 
selves. New Churches arose, and in them the law of 
hberty was to prevail. Yet it was not long before the 
very opponents of authority themselves asserted the 
right to guide. Calvin was hardly less dictatorial than 
the Pope whom he attacked; Protestants have coerced 
the heretical as readily as have Catholics. Such was^;^ 
the necessity of the case. Those who became Lutherans 
or Calvinists were not less desirous of guidance than 
those who held to Rome. If denied that guidance, they 
would have drifted back to the Church from which they 



CONFLICT IN LIFE OF INDIVIDUAL 19 

had parted. Dogmatic religion must gratify the desire 
to be ruled. 

At the same time, there have always been some who 
have prized the right of private judgment above all 
things, who have resented even divine interference 
with their absolute liberty of thought and action. The 
mythology of all nations bears witness to the permanence 
of this desire for freedom. It led Eve to eat of the Tree 
of Knowledge; it led Prometheus to snatch fire from 
the sun. And when we pass from the age of myth to 
that of History, the basic force in all resistance to an 
organised Church, the origin of all heresy, has been the 
reluctance of the individual to surrender his freedom 
of thought. He desires to be equal to his spiritual 
guides, to be equal even to the Deity; he seeks to be 
master of his own fate. It is for this reason that the 
doctrine of transubstantiation has always been selected 
for attack by the enemies of the Catholic Church. 
That doctrine places the priest in a position far superior 
to that of any of his flock; they may be powerful in 
this world, but he alone can perform the daily miracle 
of the Mass. Those who would assert their freedom, 
who would refuse obedience, are forced to deny first of 
all the exceptional position of the priesthood. Only so 
can they justify their demand to be allowed to judge 
for themselves; only so can they satisfy their desire 
to rule. \ 

Irreligio5i is no more than the expression of that 
desire. Those men are irreligious who do not feel the 
need for guidance from without. They prefer rather 
to rely upon themselves and to fall into error, than to 
surrender their intellectual liberty and be led along the 
right path. To them it seems better to die in a state 
of mental freedom than to live in a state of mental 
servitude. They aspire to be as Go4; they find a 



20 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

certain inspiration in the thought that if they fall they 
fall in battle against an almighty power; that if they die, 
they at least die free. 

When, therefore, man approaches the consideratioivi 
of religion, he is faced with two logical alternatives, r 
He may render that complete submission which Catholi- * 
cism demands, or he may assert that complete indepen- 
dence which Agnosticism claims. Anything short of 
complete submission or complete independence is a 
compromise, and as such lacks both combative force 
and vitality. Protestantism has succeeded just in so 
far as it has partaken of Catholicism. The negations 
of Luther would not have secured the permanence of 
his protest; it was the dogmatism of Calvin which in 
reality prevented the complete triumph of the Counter- 
Reformation. 

And it is indeed clear that no Church can accept the 
logical outcome of the right of private judgment. If 
it did so, it would fall forthwith into a state of anarchy 
and its extinction would be inevitable. Lutherans, 
Zwinglians, Calvinists were alike forced to become 
illogical. Denying on the one hand the authority of the 
Catholic Church, they on the other hand asserted the 
authority of the Bible, of the Bible as interpreted at 
Wittenberg, Zurich or Geneva. And only by gratifying 
in this way the desire to be ruled, did Protestantism 
maintain its existence ; only, that is, by ceasing to admit 
that right of private judgment which had been the 
watchword of the original resistance to Catholicism. 

The fact is that Catholicism is one logical position; 
the only logical alternative to it is Agnosticism. The 
one position gratifies the desire to be ruled to the fullest 
extent; the other gratifies the desire to rule. There 
never has been, and, unless human nature changes 
entirely, there never can be a time when the whole race 



CONFLICT IN LIFE OF INDIVIDUAL 21 

either accepts or rejects dogmatic religion. There must 
always be revolt against mental servitude; the right 
of private judgment must always find its champions. 
And yet it is, perhaps, those who assert this right most 
emphatically who are also most prone to seek relief 
from the responsibility which they have assumed. In 
other words, men waver between their desire for external 
guidance and their desire for freedom from all control, 
and because they so waver Catholicism and Agnosticism 
must always exist, gratifying as they do two deep and 
enduring desires. 

It is probable also that between these two there will 
always lie a body of uncertain opinion. Those who are 
passing from one extreme to the other rest for a time 
in an illogical via media; the success of the Anglican 
Church is evidence of the large number of men who 
are passing through the transitional stage. Yet the 
tendency in mem^bers of such Churches will be to move 
in either one direction or the other; some will approxi- 
mate more and more to Catholicism, others to Agnosti- 
cism. And it may be noted that Anglican ecclesiastics 
themselves readily admit that a very large percentage 
of the professed adherents of their Church are in fact 
" indifferent," that is, are in reality Agnostics. This 
is exactly what might be expected. A middle course 
satisfies neither the desire to be ruled nor the desire to 
rule; it is, therefore, less able to command devoted 
support than Catholicism or Agnosticism. It is hardly 
too much to say that in reality the world is divided 
between the two logical opinions; that many are un- 
conscious Catholics or unconscious Agnostics, while 
professing allegiance to some middle Church. 

A consideration of religion, therefore, brings to light 
a definite mental conflict in the mind of mankind. That 
conflict is between the desire to rule and the desire to 



22 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

be ruled, and the attitude which any individual adopts 
is determined by the degree to which he seeks or rejects 
external guidance. And whenever one desire has been 
fully gratified, almost before it has been so gratified, a 
natural reaction sets in. It is well known that the 
convinced Agnostic is not unreadily converted to Catholi- 
cism ; the most sturdy rebel is liable to become the most 
devoted subject. Recent converts have always tended 
to become the most violent of persecutors. And it is 
equally true that the convinced Catholic tends to revert 
to Agnosticism. Those revolts against Catholicism, 
which have attained the largest measure of success, 
have in general been led by men once devoted adherents 
of the Church which they afterwards laboured to destroy. 
The reaction when it occurs is violent. Men turn from 
one extreme to the other, the human intellect failing 
to grasp and hold fast the golden mean of moderation. 

As religion is one of the great mental activities of man, 
so love is certainly another. By that emotion, whether 
existing between the sexes or between members of the 
same sex, the mind is profoundly moved. And if the 
determining factor in human life is to be discovered, 
the means by which man is influenced to give or to with- 
hold love must be discovered first. 

Yet this quest may well appear to be hopeless. The 
sentiment of love seems to be too elusive, too un- 
reasoning, to be brought under any rules. It arises 
without adequate cause, endures when every argument 
opposes its endurance, ceases as inexplicably as it 
begins. It resembles a disease ; it defies all attempts at 
analysis. And in a measure it is physical rather than 
mental; the product not of the brain but of that vague 
something which, for want of a better word, men call 
" heart." Only those who have never loved, it may 
seem, would attempt anything so impossible as to ex- 



CONFLICT IN LIFE OF INDIVIDUAL 23 

plain what love is, how it comes into being, by what 
means it is either maintained or destroyed. 

But it will also be admitted that there is a certain 
kinship between love and religion. In early times, love 
was constantly . deified ; Christianity itself asserts that 
" God is love.'"^' A man's devotion to his mistress may 
be unreasoning, unquestioning, bhnd. Yet it is little 
more unreasonable than the pietist's devotion to his 
Deity. Indeed, the popularity of the worship of god- 
desses, the introduction of sex into the religion of most, 
if not all, races, almost suggests that men and women 
have often found in their religion the satisfaction of 
their natural craving for love. And the existence of 
this community between the two emotions makes it 
possible, if not probable, that the motives which govern 
a man's attitude towards religion govern also his 
attitude towards love. In other words, there may be 
in love the same conflict between the desire to be ruled 
and the desire to rule. 

On the one hand, a man desires to submit his will 
to some external guidance. He may find that guidance 
in some conception of a Deity. But there are some 
who need more obvious, more palpable guidance than 
that afforded by an unseen being. Their faith is weak; 
they long to touch and handle the being to whom they 
will submit. In such cases, a man inclines to deliver 
himself over to the control of another human being, 
whether of his own or of the opposite sex. He finds 
that peace and happiness, which is the goal of his 
desires, in obeying the lightest wish of some other 
mortal. For him love takes the place of religion, and his 
devotion to his deity is possibly the more real because 
he feels that his god is a being of like passions with 
himself. 

Or again, the assertion of the right of private judg- 



24 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

ment towards the Deity is not enough to gratify man's 
desire to rule. Even if the very existence of God be 
denied the longing is still unsatisfied, since men wish 
to have authority over some being that they can see. 
They long to feel that their assertion of independence 
is against some one who would control them ; they long 
to compel obedience from some other mortal. And in 
love they find the desired subject; they find scope for 
the exercise of their power, whether positively, that is, 
by compelling obedience, or negatively, that is, by re- 
fusing to obey. 

It is well known that love between husband and wife 
has greater strength than love between brother and 
sister. This may be attributed to the fact that in the 
former instance the sense of possession is more fully 
gratified. There is a feehng of certainty which cannot 
exist so long as it is realised that at any time possession 
may cease. In other words, the more fully an object 
is possessed, the more fully will the desire to be ruled 
and to rule be gratified. And even in the case of physical 
love, the determining factor is the sentiment of posses- 
sion, except perhaps in the case of merely transient 
passion which cannot justly be regarded as love at all. 
A man desires to possess, to control some beautiful 
object; or he desires to be enslaved by that object. 
There is still the same root motive, the desire to be ruled 
or to rule. And the only difference between the more 
physical and the more mental forms of love is that the 
exciting cause of the emotion is in one case the body and 
in the other the mind. It matters little whether it is 
the contemplation of a beautiful form or of a beautiful 
nature which serves to arouse the desire to be controlled, 
or the desire to control. 

The origin of love, then, is to be found in the contact 
of two natures, which happen for the time being to 



CONFLICT IN LIFE OF INDIVIDUAL 25 

satisfy the dominant desire in each other. One seeks 
to be ruled, the other seeks to rule : the would-be ruler 
finds a suitable subject, the would-be subject a suitable 
ruler; and love results. The emotion is also naturally 
fickle. The gratification of any desire leads to satiety. 
Men weary of being ruled or of ruling; they turn from 
the person who has fully gratified the one desire to find 
a person who will fully gratify the contrary desire. It 
has been generally recognised that complete identity 
of tastes and of opinions is as unsatisfactory a basis 
for love as is complete dissimilarity. Constant friction 
will certainly destroy affection; a complete absence of 
friction will destroy it almost as readily. Love, indeed, 
is only enduring in those rare instances where two 
natures are so attuned to each other that satiety occurs 
simultaneously in each case, when the one who has been 
ruling wearies of rule at precisely the moment when the 
one who has been ruled wearies of subjection. 

Ahke in religion and in love, then, there is a perpetual 
conflict between the desire to be ruled and the desire 
to rule. This conflict makes up the Ufe of man; his 
conduct is determined by the predominance of one or 
other of these two desires. Men are met by the necessity 
of making a choice. They may seek that peace which 
is bom of submission to external guidance, or they may 
seek the satisfaction to be derived from consciousness 
of mental independence. But the peace secured by 
submission tends to become irksome; the stress in- 
volved in the constant exercise of private judgment 
grows wearisome. Upon the gratification of either 
desire, a natural reaction ensues. Those who have 
given implicit obedience turn hastily to the other 
extreme and refuse to give any obedience at all. Those 
who have ordered their lives without external aid are 
eventually oppressed by the weight of responsibility 



26 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

which they have assumed, and seek rehef in complete 
subjection. 

The reaction from one course to the other is often 
startHngly rapid. A man who has surrendered his will 
to the guidance of a Church or of an individual suddenly 
finds that the degree of submissiveness demanded is 
more than he can give. At once, he begins to question 
the perfection of his guide ; no sooner is that question 
asked than faith in the guide is weakened, and the revolt 
which thus begins will be the more violent in proportion 
as the submission was the more complete. Or again, 
a man who has prided himself on his independence, who 
has scorned even divine guidance, is often moved by 
some great calamity to abandon entirely the right which 
he once so zealously asserted. Faced by some insoluble 
problem, a man naturally seeks advice; brought into 
conflict with the untamed forces of nature, he finds his 
only hope of safety in an appeal to the Deity, Whose 
very existence he has perhaps denied. And if it be, 
as it so often is, that he secures real or apparent relief 
from his appeal for help, he is led to surrender entirely 
that independence in which he formerly found satisfac- 
tion if not content. 

But the reaction may also be gradual. Many a man 
has fallen little by little under the control of some 
external power, hardly realising that he has surrendered 
anything of his original independence, until he has 
already fallen into a position of servitude. The process 
of conversion to belief in a particular creed is constantly 
extremely slow; the habit of reliance upon the judgment 
of others develops insensibly. And the converse is 
equally true. Those who have been devoted members 
of the Church come gradually to neglect that Church's 
commands, until at last they find that what was once 
all-important has sunk into a mere form. Children 



CONFLICT IN LIFE OF INDIVIDUAL 27 

slowly learn to free themselves from the control of their 
parents. Those, who are no longer children, insensibly 
emancipate themselves from the guidance of some once 
trusted friend. 

Whether, however, the reaction be rapid or gradual, 
it is not the less inevitable. Men seek happiness per- 
petually; they never attain it. To the generality of 
mankind, perfect happiness appears to lie in the mean 
between the two extremes, in a judicious combina- 
tion of submission and liberty. The submission should 
not become servitude; the liberty should not become 
anarchy. To accept direction is in some cases mani- 
festly wise ; to assert independence of thought and action 
is in some cases also wise. But human nature is im- 
perfect, nor do men succeed in maintaining so exact 
a balance between the gratification of the two desires. 
A man who has suffered from submission tends to refuse 
all submission. A man who has unwisely rejected 
direction tends to distrust his own judgment in all 
things. We hasten from one extreme to the other; 
our life remains a never-ending conflict. 

And that conflict is intensified by the fact that there 
are never wanting some who advocate extreme courses. 
Believing that while human nature remains what it is, 
its imperfection renders the search for happiness vain, 
they seek to modify human nature. They look for 
such modification through the medium of the complete 
gratification of one or other of the two desires. Some 
trust that the most complete assertion of independence 
will produce the wished-for result; they attribute all 
unhappiness to men's lack of confidence in their own 
judgment. Others believe that happiness is to be found 
in complete resignation of their own will to that of the 
Deity, that the extreme of self-abnegation will root 
out the seeds of misery, misery being no more than the 



38 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

result of man's failure to accept the all-wise guidance 
of his Father in Heaven. And thus every man, who has 
experienced sorrow as the result of submission or of 
assertion of independence, finds at least some among 
his feUow-men ready to encourage him to pursue that 
extreme reaction to which his very nature inclines him. 

But whether or no an eventual change in hiunan 
nature may be effected, while it remains as it is, neither 
desire can ever secure a complete victory. The extreme 
of submission and the extreme of independence alike 
weary men. A passionate courtship rarely, if ever, 
culminates in a happy marriage. A convinced Agnostic 
is never unlikely to be converted to Catholicism. There 
is nothing stable in the life of man ; the search for happi- 
ness never ceases because it is never successful; death 
overtakes each one of us still vainly struggling to find 
perfect content. 

Special stress has been laid upon the existence of this 
conflict in religion and in love, since they are the two 
great mental activities of man, since by them man is 
most profoundly moved. But the same conflict of 
desire appears in every relation of life. Men offer a 
more or less instinctive opposition to whatever hampers 
their freedom of action; even the most sober-minded 
feel occasionally that " stolen waters are sweet, and 
bread eaten in secret is pleasant." To forbid trespass is 
often to induce it; the defrauding of a public body is 
almost universally regarded as venial. There is probably 
no one who has never felt a desire to free himself from 
the cramping fetters in which society holds him, who 
has not, that is, desired complete independence. 

Nor is the longing to live in a state of anarchy restrained 
solely by acquired habits of submission or by a fear of 
pains and penalties. Obedience is often the outcome 
not of compulsion, but of incHnation. There is no 



CONFLICT IN LIFE OF INDIVIDUAL 29 

reason for supposing that immunity from punishment 
would in all cases produce crime. It is rather true that 
men at times deHght in the surrender of their self-will. 

And since the conflict of desire is perpetual, since man 
is, as it were, in a constant state of reaction from one 
extreme to the other, his attitude is frequently incon- 
sistent. A man who loyally obeys a Church is not 
necessarily also controlled by his wife; one whose 
public life is marked by independence of attitude may 
well be most subservient in his private life. But though 
this is the case, it is also true that at any given moment 
a man is tending either towards a more complete sur- 
render of his will to the guidance of others, or towards 
a more complete assertion of his independence. He is 
constantly moving towards one extreme or the other, 
and the inconsistency which appears is due mainly to 
divergence between his public and his private life. His 
attitude towards each tends to become the same. If he 
is an advocate of complete submission to a Church, he 
will probably tend also to be guided more readily by his 
friends. But though the tendency is towards assimila- 
tion, it is also true that at any given moment the 
divergence may be great. 

To each desire, indeed, there is a dual aspect. Many, 
who are content to submit to external authority in all 
their relations with others, insist upon their independence 
of thought. Others, believing that content of mind 
can be attained only by submitting their very thoughts 
to direction, are reluctant to exercise their private 
judgment in any relation of life. And the dual character 
of the two emotions is seen even more clearly in the 
desire to rule. Men wish to determine their opinions 
without regard for others. But action is the expression 
of opinion; without action, opinion seems hardly to 
exist. And since the life of an individual can never 



30 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

be entirely isolated from the lives of other individuals, 
no sooner does action begin to correspond with opinion 
than men are brought into contact or into conflict with 
their fellows. A man's desire to rule himself develops 
into a desire to rule others ; to the internal aspect of the 
desire, an external aspect is added. 

Finally, the conflict of desire is largely sub-conscious. 
It is not to be supposed that men are always, or even 
generally, aware of the real motives for their conduct. 
That conduct seems to be irrational, determined by 
trivial causes, as often as not traceable to no particular 
cause. But the true motive is always the conflict of 
desire. Men are able to detect this fact in others ; they 
are often inclined to ignore or to deny its existence in 
their own case. A Catholic will easily attribute the 
attitude of the Agnostic to his wish to be even as God; 
he will with more difficulty appreciate the fact that his 
own conduct is determined by his longing for guidance. 
The Agnostic will be equally alive to the fact that the 
Catholic is prone to submission; it will not be so clear 
to him that he himself glories in his sense of revolt. 
But it is only in accord with human nature that men 
should be more able to detect the motives and the 
faults of others than to analyse correctly their own con- 
duct. They are not the less swayed by the conflict of 
these two desires because they are unconscious of the 
fact. 



THE CONFLICT IN THE NATION 31 



IV 

THE CONFLICT IN THE NATION 

Whatever view may be taken of the origin of society, 
whatever character may be assigned to the state, it is 
certainly true that all states are aggregations of indi- 
viduals. And since this is so, the conduct of states is 
ultimately regulated by that factor which regulates the 
conduct of individuals. History, the record of a nation's 
life, is, then, also the record of a conflict between the 
desire to be ruled and the desire to rule. Every state, 
like every individual, enters upon the search for happi- 
ness, and in that search is driven to make its choice 
between the alternatives of submission and inde- 
pendence. 

That choice has to be made both in the settlement of 
the internal organisations of the state and that of its 
external relations. At home, the alternatives are self- 
government and despotism; abroad, splendid isolation 
and inclusion in a commonwealth of nations. There i? 
certainly the mean between the two extremes, but that 
mean is the ideal, and as the individual fails to secure 
the ideal, so the aggregation of individuals fails. All 
states search vainly for the perfection of happiness; 
no state has achieved that perfection. They are fore- 
doomed to failure by reason of the very fact that they 
are aggregations of human beings, because human nature 
is in its essence imperfect. 

For this reason, the internal history of any state is 



32 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

characterised by a constant rearrangement of the balance 
of political power. That rearrangement may be almost 
insensible, as it has been in England; it may be rapid, 
the outcome of violent revolution, as it has been in 
France. But whether it be gradual or sudden, it is none 
the less always occurring. If at any given time a state 
is a despotism, there is present in it a tendency towards 
a wider diffusion of political power. The executive will 
be gradually weakened, until at last it has become so 
weak that it can no longer perform its original function 
of maintaining order, and anarchy supervenes. From 
this state of anarchy, there will be a necessary reversion 
towards despotism, and so the life of nations proceeds 
in a never-ending cycle. Like individuals, states pass 
from extreme to extreme. Convinced of the evils of 
despotism, they seek refuge in anarchy; weary of 
anarchy, they look for relief in despotism. The convic- 
tion that one system of government is bad produces a 
more or less violent reaction towards its antithesis. And 
though perhaps aware that happiness lies in the mean, 
nations are as unable as individuals to secure that 
mean. ^ ^j ^^p^^^^fMnl^^^ 

History abounds with obvious illustrations of the 
working of this law. Under the ancien regime, France 
experienced all the calamities attendant upon the 
possession of unfettered power by a single individual. 
The Revolution occurred, and jealousy of the executive 
served to produce anarchy. From that anarchy, from 
the evils attendant on the lack of all settled government, 
the country was rescued by Napoleon. But he estab- 
lished an absolutism probably more real and more 
complete than that which had been destroyed by the 
men of 1789. In the period which elapsed between the 
meeting of the States-General and the establishment of 
the Empire, France passed rapidly from one extreme 



THE CONFLICT IN THE NATION 33 

to the other and back again to the starting-point. There 
are possibly few examples of equally rapid changes, 
but in reality France merely err- vded into a few years 
the inevitable experience of many 

In the external relations of states, the same proces5 
is observed. Choice has to be made between the 
acceptance or refusal of inclusion in a corporation of 
nations. On the one hand, a state may recognise its 
obligations to consider not merely its own interest, but 
also that of the world at large. On the other hand, it 
may deny this obligation. When the disadvantages 
of international entanglements are experienced, an 
isolated attitude is adopted; when the peril of isolation 
is realised, safety is sought in some alliance, and the 
advantages of inclusion in a corporation of states are 
once more appreciated. Here, as in internal policy, 
the problem is to choose between two ideals, between 
that submission which will give peace and that inde- 
pendence which will prevent the action of the state from 
being hampered by considerations alien to it. 

It is this persistent conflict which makes up History. 
Nations seek happiness and in doing so fly to extremes ; 
experiencing the evil of one extreme, they turn to the 
other. The apparent triumph of one desire is rather 
anticipated than followed by a reaction in favour of the 
gratification of the contrary desire. History is a record 
of oscillation, of a vain and unending search for political 
happiness. The explanatory factor in History, the 
factor which reveals the true motive for the conduct 
of nations, is to be found in the recognition of this 
conflict between the desire to be ruled and the desire 
to rule. 

If a term be sought to describe this desire to be 
ruled, it ma}^ at first sight appear to be found either in 
" Cosmopolitanism " or " Socialism." But there are 

c 



34 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

objections to the employment of either of these two 
terms, objections which become apparent when the im- 
pHcations of the two terms are considered and compared 
with the imphcations of the phrase " the desire to be 
ruled." 

Cosmopolitanism is the term applied to a certain 
attitude adopted by the members of one state towards 
the members of other states. It suggests a breaking 
down of the barriers between nations. The interest of 
any given state is subordinated to that of the world at 
large. Questions even of national honour are to be 
submitted to some arbiter, since the sacrifice of the 
individual community is preferable to the infliction of 
distress upon many peoples. 

All this will be the outcome also of the gratification 
of the desire to be ruled, since the corporate nature of 
human society is regarded as axiomatic. But the term 
" Cosmopolitanism " suggests no special relationship 
between the government of a particular state and the 
citizens of that state. It is concerned only with external 
relations. On the other hand, the gratification of the 
desire to be ruled does involve a very definite relation- 
ship between ruler and subject; it implies the complete 
subordination of the individual. 

To the use of the term " Socialism " there are even 
more serious objections. Above all, Socialism has 
become a word used in current political controversy, 
and suffering the fate of all such words has acquired a 
sinister meaning to some, a specialised meaning to others. 
As used generally to-day, it contains the idea not only 
of the subordination of the individual to the community, 
but also that of resistance to the arbitrary government 
of a single man. It suggests a particular economic 
policy; it upholds the superior political right of one 
section of the productive communit3^ 



TKF CONFT ^CT IN THE NATION 35 

But the desire to be niled, though it may be gratified 
under an oHgarchy or under a democracy, may be and 
has been equally gratified under a despotism. And 
though the desire to be ruled does not preclude the 
organisation of society upon a collectivist basis, neither 
does it preclude the organisation of society upon .!. 
capitalistic basis. 

There is no doubt that a state, in which the acoue to 
be ruled holds sway, will tend to be cosmopolitan in its 
attitude towards external affairs, and sociahstic in its 
attitude towards internal affairs. But much is implied 
by " Socialism " which does not necessarily result from 
the desire to be ruled; much results from the desire to 
be ruled which is not implied by " Cosmopolitanism." 
No term in general use, indeed, exactly connot:s tlie 
desire to be ruled, and for this reason a term, " Uni- 
versalism," may be used in an arbitrary sense to cover 
all that is implied by the desire to be rulec. 

Universalism has an external and in internal aspect. 
Externally, it implies the subordination of the interest 
of any particular state to that of the world at large. All 
nations are regarded as members of one corporation; 
they recognise some common superior. That superior 
may be definite or indefinite. In the Middle Ages, it 
was found in the Holy Roman Emperor or in the Pope; 
more recently, it has been f^und in international law 
or in the Hague Tribunal. ^''The degree of intimacy in the 
relationship of state with state will vary directly with 
the authority of the recognised superior. But to that 
superior some ultimate obedience must be paid, even if 
it be at the cost of some limitation of national indepen- 
dence. And since nations are at least united in a species 
of loose confederation, the arbitrament of war will tend 
to be replaced by the arbitrament of some individual 
or of some tribunal, war being nothing more than the 



36 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

result of the pursuit by a state of its own interests with- 
out regard to the interests of humanity in general. 

Internally, Universalism implies the subordination 
of the individual to the communit}^ The province of 
government will be extended. Education and the con- 
ditions of labour will be the care of the state. Pushed 
to its logical extreme, Universalism will entrust the 
ruler with the direction of the most private activities of 
his subjects. Government will tend towards despotism; 
liberty will be valued less highly than the complete 
organisation of civic life. 

The despotism, however, will not necessarily be that 
of a single man. Universalism really implies the 
possession of absolute power by the state, which may 
tind its embodiment in one man, or in the few, or in the 
many. The truly necessary implication in the theory 
IS the wide extension of the province of government; 
there is no necessary/ implication as to the form of that 
government. The universalist has no preconceived ideas 
as to the organisation of the executive or legislative 
power; he demands only that the individual should be 
controlled by the community, and that the interest of 
all should be considered as in every case of paramount 
importance. 

As a term has been created to cover all that is implied 
by the desire to be ruled, so a term must be created to 
cover all that is implied by the desire to rule. Those 
who would gratify this desire insist upon the importance 
of the individual state as against the whole human race, 
of the individual citizen as against the whole community. 
And the desire to rule may therefore be described as 
" Individualism." But it must be observed that the 
term is used in an arbitrary sense to connote ideas which 
it does not normally connote. It covers not only the 
relations of citizens with the community, but also the 



THE CONFLICT IN THE NATION 37 

relations of communities with one another. Like Uni- 
versalism, Individualism has an external and an internal 
aspect. 

Viewed in its external aspect, Individualism implies 
the adoption by a state of an entirely independent 
attitude towards other states. Nations are " in a state 
of nature." They deny, or at least disregard, the cor- 
porate character of human society; they assert their 
own sovereign power; they recognise no common 
superior. They will make peace and war as seems best 
in their own eyes. International law will be observed 
onty in so far as it seems to accord with the private 
interests of a particular state. If alliances are made at 
aU, they will be as between equals, involving no sacrifice 
of ultimate liberty of action. Even the idea of such an 
alliance is perhaps antipathetic to the truly individuaUst 
state, since any alliance imposes some external obligation 
upon the contracting parties. 

Internally, Individualism implies the restriction of the 
province of government within the narrowest possible 
limits. The citizens mil be left free to order their own 
lives. Logically, education and the conditions of labour 
should not be regulated by the state. If a man desires 
to live in complete ignorance, if he wishes to sell himself 
into slavery, the state should not interpose its veto. 
Only if the liberty of the individual threatens the 
dissolution of the commonwealth, will the interference 
of government be justifiable. 

There are, indeed, some individualists who hold that 
in no circumstances should the citizen be coerced. They 
preach a creed of anarchy. But inasmuch as anarchy 
clearly destroys all state-organisation, it may be dis- 
regarded. The vast majority of mankind, differing 
widely as to the true limits of the province of govern- 
ment, are yet agreed in believing that some government 



38 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

is necessary, and therefore that there must be some 
coercion of the individual. The real dispute is as to 
whether that coercion should be applied only when it is 
absolutely unavoidable, or should be the rule rather than 
the exception. The individualist practically holds that 
coercion by the state is a necessary evil, justifiable only 
in the last resort. 



GENERAL CHARACTER OF CONFLICT 39 



V 

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE CONFLICT 

History would be a far simpler subject, far more 
readily understood, if nations adopted at any given 
time a consistently nniversalist or consistently indi- 
vidualist attitude. But in actual fact, nations are as 
inconsistent as individuals ; their conduct is as wavering. 
Such, indeed, must be the case, since they are aggrega- 
tions of human beings. And so it is frequently, almost 
always, the case that a state which is universalist in 
one aspect is individualist in the other. An extension 
of governmental authority at home is normally coupled 
with the adoption of an independent foreign policy; 
the admission of obhgations towards foreign states is 
normally accompanied by an assertion of the rights of 
the individual citizen as against the community. 

The most perfect example of internal Universalism 
is possibly afforded by a complete despotism, but it is 
abundantly proved that such a despotism is very far 
from generally admitting any external control of its 
policy. During the Middle Ages, when the theory of 
the universal sovereignty of the Emperor or of the Pope 
was most widely admitted, the internal organisation of 
states was generally individualist in character. The 
central government was too weak to meddle with the 
course of life in the districts under its nominal control, 
and the citizen was left very largely to provide for his 
own safety. And when resistance to the claims of 
Emperor or Pope began, it came first from those states 
which at home had become universalist. As the power 



40 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

of the cenirai government in any country was increased, 
as the sphere of that government was extended, so 
obedience was more and more reluctantly accorded to 
rhe external power, the corporate character of human 
society was more and more disregarded. The last 
traces of the old mediaeval conception of the unity of 
Christendom were destroyed in England by Henry VIII 
and Elizabeth, by the very sovereigns who most widely 
extended the limits of state interference at home. The 
Act of Supremacy was followed b^^ the Poor Law and 
the Act of Apprentices. 

It is also often the case that the party in a state which 
most zealously champions the rights of the individaal is 
also most eager to submit all external disputes to some 
arbiter. The members of the Peace Society in the 
Victorian age were recruited mainly from sturdy indi- 
vidualists who objected even to such apparently neces- 
sary interference as was seen in the Factory Acts. And 
in the past, the churchmen who preached the doctrine 
of the universal supremacy of the Pope asserted with 
equal vigour their own individual rights ; Becket stood 
quite as much for his own liberty of action as for the 
abstract principle of the freedom of the Church from all 
secular control. 

At the same time, there is always in every state a body 
of opinion favouring the acceptance of Universalism or 
of Individualism to the fullest extent. The gratifica- 
tion of the desire to be ruled in one aspect produces a 
general spirit of submissiveness ; the gratification of the 
desire to rule produces a general spirit of independence. 
Peoples who have cast off a foreign yoke tend to organise 
their government upon a popular basis. Switzerland, 
the Dutch Republic, and the United States are instances 
of the internal result of a war of liberation. When an 
internal despotism has been destroyed, there is an 



GENERAL CHARACTER OF CONFLICT 41 

immediate tendency towards self-assertion as against 
foreign states; a struggle for mere independence is not 
infrequently followed by a war of aggression abroad. 
The history of France aQ:er 1789 supplies the most 
remarkable instance of this fact; other examples may 
be discovered in the case of Sweden under the Vasas 
or in that of the Dutch Republic after the final deliver- 
ance from Spain. 

It seems to be equally true that a despotism is on the 
whole ultimately less able to resist foreign aggression. 
The despotism exists only by reason of the prevalence 
of the desire to be ruled. Where that desire has attained 
ascendancy, though the government may pursue an 
independent policy, the people tend to be indifferent, 
careless whether or no they fall under the foreign yoke. 
The cities of Greece which had successfully resisted 
the Persian invaders accepted the Peace of Antalcidas 
after their spirit had been crushed by Lacedaemonian 
harmosts. The Italian republics which had defeated 
Frederic Barbarossa at Legnano offered little opposition 
to the Valois and the Habsburgs after they had fallen 
under princely government. The opposition to French 
aggression, whether under the Bourbons or after the 
Revolution, came generally from those states which 
had rejected internal Universalism. 

Every state, therefore, tends to become wholly 
universalist or wholly individualist. But it never 
actually reaches the logical conclusion. The extreme 
of Universalism is despotism at home and subjection 
abroad; the extreme of individualism is anarchy at 
home and unceasing war abroad. The evils of these 
extremes are obvious ; they are in general soon realised, 
so that no sooner does the state approach the complete 
gratification of one desire than a reaction begins in 
favour of the gratification of the contrary desire. The 



42 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

nearer a nation has approached to complete Universalism 
the more violent will be the reaction towards complete 
Individualism; the nearer a state has approached to 
anarchy the more thorough will be that despotism by 
which the anarchy will eventually be subdued. 

The history of France strikingly exemplifies this truth. 
Louis XIV could declare with considerable justification, 
" L'etat, c'est moi"; he aspired to acquire an ascend- 
ancy over Europe, and France seemed to be wedded to 
the idea of internal Universalism. The reaction, which 
set in during the reign of Louis XV, culminated in the 
Revolution. The absolute monarchy was replaced by 
an executive so weak as to be unable to curb the most 
exaggerated licence. The policy of armed aggression 
was for a moment abandoned; instead, an altruistic 
crusade was undertaken to deliver all nations striving 
to be free. The violence of the French Revolution was, 
in short, proportionate to the completeness of the 
despotism which it shattered. And an interesting 
contrast is afforded by the English Revolution of 1688. 
Then it was not necessary to overthrow an established 
S57stem ; it was merely necessary to prevent the modifica- 
tion of that system into an absolutism. Consequently 
the Revolution of 1688 was orderly and calm, unattended 
by any of those excesses which a century later heralded 
the birth of the new France. 

' In all countries and at all times two tendencies are at 
work ; the gratification of one desire inevitably produces 
a reaction towards the gratification of the contrary desire. 
At any given moment one desire is more powerjEul than 
the other. But as one attains the mastery, that mastery 
is undermined by the appearance of the other. In the 
interplay of these two desires the conflict which consti- 
tutes History is found, the secular conflict betweer 
Universalism and Individualism. 



GENERAL CHARACTER OF CONFLICT 43 

As individuals seem to oppose instinctively whatever 
hampers their entire freedom of action, so states are 
moved to seek complete liberty. They chafe at the 
limitation of that liberty by treaties, regarding any 
advantages which may be derived from the acceptance 
of some obligation as being more than counterbalanced 
by the evil of a certain measure of external control. 
They are restless under the curb of international law. 
They are reluctant to subordinate their own interest 
to that of the generality of mankind. They desire to 
rule. And those sacrifices which are commonly de- 
scribed as having been made in the cause of national 
prestige or of national self-sufiiciency have in reality 
been made at the call of Individualism. 

The conduct of nations, however, is often actuated by 
the desire to be ruled. One of the most remarkable 
phenomena in the internal history of all countries is the 
fact that no strong government has yet had to face 
a revolution. The Stuart and Bourbon monarchies 
had become weak before they were seriously attacked; 
Metternich was successful until he lost his grip of 
affairs; the strength of the Empress Dowager long post- 
poned a probably inevitable outbreak in China; Abdul 
Hamid was secure on his throne till premature old age 
crept upon him. Even tyranny secures voluntary and 
disinterested support, if that tyranny is not merely 
the capricious assertion of authority by a power con- 
scious of its real weakness. An absolutism begins to 
tremble on that day on which it learns to pardon; the 
worst crime in a despot is a readiness to make amends. 
Amiability has frequently been the saHent characteristic 
of rulers who have met their death at the hands of 
a ^revolutionary mob, or who have experienced the 
destruction of their absolute power. Louis XVI was 
essentially virtuous and essentially weak; he paid the 



44 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

penalty of weakness. At the present day, Nicholas II 
is certainly inspired by a sincere zeal for reform; during 
his reign the autocracy of the Tsar has been impaired 
and the very existence of Tsardom has been imperilled. 
Nor can the ready obedience given to strong government 
be explained by Rousseau's dictum that *' a slave loses 
everything in his bonds, even the wish to escape from 
them " , it is too widespread, too permanent. 

This inclination to obey is not confined to the sphere 
of internal politics. In the Middle Ages, nations sub- 
mitted to many inconveniences rather than sacrifice 
their ideal of a united Christendom. Even in the 
midst of the Becket controversy, Henry II shrank from 
joining Frederic Barbarossa in the recognition of an 
i.nti-pope. The ending of the Great Schism was wel- 
comed throughout Europe, even though it was clear 
enough that a pope with an undisputed title would be 
loetter able to check the growing liberty of national 
Churches than a pope with a rival at Avignon. After 
1815, even England only broke with reluctance from the 
Quadruple Alliance, and Alexander I was ready to risk 
his throne and life rather than disturb the concert of 
Europe by independent action in the Eastern Question. 
More recently, the strength of the wish for that concert 
of Europe has been illustrated in the policy adopted by 
the great powers towards the Balkan problem. It is, 
indeed, a fact that the desire to be ruled is a sentiment 
ingrained in mankind, and therefore ever-present in 
nations, no less than the desire to rule. 

Whether the relations of state with state, or of the 
state with its members, be considered, it will be found 
that Universalism and Individualism always have their 
advocates. There will always be some eager to limit, 
some eager to extend the province of government. 
While some will always be ready to sacrifice everything 



GENERAL CHARACTER OF CONFLICT 45 

in the cause of national independence, some will always 
find that independence too dearly purchased at the 
cost of even the most moderate defensive precautions. 
Liberty and subjection each gratify one side of human 
nature. If men glory in freedom, they glory also in 
self-abnegation. The conflict of desire is secular. 

And the intensity of that conflict is increased because 
the gratification of either desire can be readily justified. 
Some subordination of private interest to the public 
good is essential ; only an extreme anarchist will contend 
that murder and theft should go unpunished. If the 
state is to exist at all, it must exist to perform certain 
functions, and even if those functions are restricted 
to the mere safeguarding of life, limb and property, 
their performance will yet destroy the absolute liberty 
of the individual. But if it be once admitted that some 
state interference is not only legitimate but actually 
necessary, it can be claimed that the limits of such 
interference are indefinable. The universalist can 
accuse his critics of attempting to draw an arbitrary 
distinction between liberty and licence. 

And the same accusation can be brought against 
the universalist himself. There is probably no one 
who believes that the state is able to deal with every 
conceivable circumstance, who denies that something 
must be left to private effort. If citizenship is not to 
degenerate into servitude, a _ certain liberty must be 
allowed to the individual; even Hobbes left him the 
right of self-preservation. But the term " self-preserva- 
tion " is susceptible of widely different interpretations. 
To some it may connote the bare right to exist; to 
others, the right to an existence in which the highest 
faculties can be developed. The universalist, therefore, 
may be charged v/ith drawing an arbitrary distinction 
when he a,ttempts to define the degree to which the 



46 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

state is bound to respect the passions and prejudices 
of its members. 

The gratification of either desire can thus be defended 
on the ground of necessity. It can be defended also 
on the ground of intrinsic excellence. Universalism 
regards all nations as members of one corporation ; they 
must unite to promote the general well-being of mankind. 
Altruism becomes the guiding principle in international 
politics. And from the citizens of each state a like 
altruism is demanded. The individual must so order 
his life as to cause no injury to his fellows; he must 
even do more, and seek their welfare rather than his own. 
The interest of the community is preferred to that of 
any of its members; the function of government is to 
make the good of all the care of each. 

Such a conception could hardly fail to win support. 
The imagination is almost necessarily fired by the thought 
of a world united in pursuit of one lofty ideal, of nations 
forgetting their mutual jealousies at the call of a high 
mission, of the citizens of every state abandoning the 
pursuit of their petty interests to adopt an enlightened 
patriotism. To many, the conception makes an especi- 
ally strong appeal. Those who recoil from the horrors 
or who deplore the economic waste of war see a vision 
of mankind delivered from so great and so unnecessary 
a scourge. Those who lament the prevalence of misery 
and want, or who are disgusted by the spectacle of 
advance retarded by selfish opposition or misdirected 
effort, find hope of rapid progress through the agency 
of state control. A dream of universal altruism will 
delight the enthusiast. Self-sacrifice is admittedly 
meritorious in private life; it seems unreasonable to 
suppose that in public life it is altogether evil. Uni- 
versalism, the apotheosis of political unselfishness, 
should rather be regarded with respect and admiration. 



GENERAL CHARACTER OF CONFLICT 47 

as benefiting the world at large and ennobling the 
individual. 

But the gratification of the desire to rule appears to 
be equally ennobling ; Individualism also makes a strong 
appeal to the imagination. There is something magnifi- 
cent in the thought of a single state, standing alone, 
defying all the world. And while the corporate con- 
ception must tend to destroy patriotism, in the accepted 
sense of that word, Individualism fosters patriotism, 
since it regards nothing as more important than the 
prestige and prosperity of a particular state. Internally, 
a spirit of self-reliance is encouraged in the people; 
they are saved from the danger of becoming " a spoon- 
fed generation." 

Nor are there wanting those who feel that a victory 
gained by external aid is almost as harmful as a defeat, 
who believe that the best interests of a nation are served 
by complete release from all foreign entanglements. 
And at home, the obvious evils of grandmotherly legisla- 
tion supply an argument against all state interference. 
It is suggested that the evils which it has sought to 
remedy are the result of human nature, and that human 
nature cannot be changed by Act of Parliament. It is 
contended that true progress has always been the out- 
come of private initiative, that every limitation on the 
right of the individual to stand alone reduces his power 
of doing so. Initiative may well be cramped or even 
destroyed by state interference. And the loss thus 
sustained will tend to be absolute rather than relative, 
since the action of government is often blind and only 
too frequently vitiated by care for the interest of a 
particular section of the community or by attention 
to the immediate needs of some political party. 

Universalism and Individualism are thus equally 
capable of defence, equally open to attack. Since only 



48 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

a minority of mankind believes either in a complete 
despotism or in a state of complete anarchy, the logical 
application of either theory produces an impossible 
situation; no state could ever exist permanently upon 
a wholly universalist or wholly individualist basis. So 
it is that the conflict between the two desires, in any 
case inevitable and eternal, is rendered more vigorous 
and more intense. 

The permanent factors in the conflict between 
Universalism and Individualism are found in human 
nature. But in the conflict there are also occasional 
or historical factors, predisposing circumstances which 
at any given time incHne men towards the gratification 
of one or other of their two primary desires. While 
these circumstances are produced by the prevailing 
tendency in the human mind, there is still a certain 
interaction. Men are inclined to give rein to a particular 
desire; they establish institutions which favour the 
accomplishment of their wishes. Those institutions 
fulfil their purpose and by so doing increase the desire, 
since up to a certain point appetite is whetted by gratifi- 
cation. But presently that point is reached at which 
gratification produces satiety, and then reaction follows. 
The order of life is conflict ; cessation of conflict would 
be death. Whenever, therefore, the complete triumph 
of one desire appears to be imminent, a reaction in 
favour of its antithesis begins. The conflict is renewed 
with increased vigour, that renewal being, as it were, 
compelled by the very instinct of self-preservation. 

Thus there are factors which normally assist the growth 
of Universalism ; there are factors which normally assist 
the growth of Individualism. But there are not, and 
there cannot be, factors which invariably assist the 
growth of either the one or the other. The very institu- 
tions which men create to gratify a particular desire 



GENERAL CHARACTER OF CONFLICT 49 

tend at the last to quell that desire; they accomplish 
their purpose too effectually, they gratify the desire 
too completely. The desire to be ruled produces a 
despotism and by that despotism is fostered, until the 
exaggeration of despotism leads to a reaction towards 
anarchy, and the desire to rule gains ground at the 
expense of the desire to be ruled. 

Among those factors which normally assist Univer- 
saJism, the first place must be assigned to simphcity of 
mind, which naturally favours the desire to be ruled. 
Those who possess this simplicity seek guidance and are 
eager to obey. Averse from debate, they tend to sup- 
port despotism, the absolute rule of one man being the 
least complex form of government, since uiider it no 
question as to the rights of subjects or the ultimate 
seat of authority can arise. It is not without reason 
that poUtical education has been discouraged in despotic 
monarchies. Nothing can be more valuable to a despot 
than that his subjects should be unable to discover any 
ground for resisting his unfettered rule. 

Simplicity of mind favoured the estabUshment of 
despotism in the earliest times and the eventual domina- 
tion of the world by the Roman Empire. That Empire 
itself was the second great historical factor making 
for Universalism. The whole civilised world was, or 
appeared to be, under one government; that govern- 
ment repeatedly defeated attempts to destroy it. It 
therefore made a deep impression on the human mind, 
such an impression that even when the work of destruc- 
tion had been accomplished, men were very slow to 
realise what had occurred. The barbarians could not 
imagine an order of things in which universal dominion 
had no place ; they conquered provinces and established 
kingdoms, but they were overwhelmed by their very 
success. It was incredible to them that an institution, 

D 



50 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

for centuries victorious over all its enemies, the very 
mirror of ordered stability, should have passed away 
like a dream of the night. The Roman Empire, in fact, 
survived its own death. 

But the opinion that the Roman Empire was eternal 
did not owe its prevalence solely to the depth of the 
impression which that Empire had made on the minds 
of the barbarians. The same opinion was also zealously 
propagated by the Christian Church. From the moment 
when St. Paul declared that the creed which he preached 
knew no distinction between Jew and Gentile, Chris- 
tianity had become essentially cosmopolitan in character ; 
it could not be identified with any one tribe or nation. 
And while dogmatic religion necessarily inculcated 
habits of obedience, since it owed its very existence to 
willingness to obey, the doctrine of the Church demanded 
that converts should recognise their unity as children 
of one Father in Heaven. The Teutonic races were 
turned from the worship of gods, peculiar to particular 
tribes, to the worship of one God, common to all man- 
kind. And in the process of conversion, they learnt 
also to disregard the barriers between states, to believe 
that all Christians were ultimately subject to the rule 
of the Roman Emperor, the vicegerent of the Almighty. 
Presently, it is true, the West found it hard to recognise 
in the ruler of Constantinople the lord of the world. 
But the Church devised a way of escape from this 
difficulty; the creation of the Holy Roman Empire 
and later the gradual elaboration of the doctrine of 
papal supremacy served to maintain the ascendancy 
of Universalism. 

Without, however, an entire modification of human 
nature, it was impossible that continued gratification 
of the desire to be ruled should not produce a reaction. 
As time passed, doubts arose as to the actual excellence 



GENERAL CHARACTER OF CONFLICT 51 

of a system which had once seemed to be ideal. And 
these doubts were increased by every error which the 
Emperors or their representatives committed. Among 
the causes which contributed to weaken the hold of 
Universalism on the human mind, a prominent place 
must be assigned to the faulty system of taxation 
under the later Empire. The curials, tax-collectors, 
were reduced to starvation ; they inclined to hope that 
the imperial government was not eternal, to question 
whether a government which inflicted such misery on 
them was indeed necessary to the world. And though 
they failed to put their new ideas into practice, though 
they still bowed to authority, they were not the less 
ready to give rein to their desire to rule, to discover 
hitherto unsuspected virtues in a condition of anarchy . 

Even the barbarians themselves showed traces of this 
spirit of resistance. If the majority humbly accepted 
the political theory of the Church, some regretted that 
freedom of action which they had enjoyed as pagans amid 
the forests of Germany. They were moved to regret the 
loss of gods whose care it had been to promote the welfare 
of a particular tribe. They were reluctant to beheve that 
all those ancestors, whose deeds they had been taught 
to admire and emulate, were burning for ever in Hell. 
Some at least felt that they would rather suffer torments 
with the heroes of old times than share in the joys of a 
Heaven which seemed to be suited only to weaklings 
and women. They were disincUned to subordinate their 
interests to those of the Emperor; martial spirit led 
them to despise a monarch who cowered behind im- 
pregnable fortifications, whose mercenary armies they 
could invariably defeat. Individualist ideas were not 
wholly destroyed even by the combined influence of 
imperial prestige and ecclesiastical authority. Among 
the barbarians, the Vandals never accepted Universalism ; 



53 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

ail tended occasionall}^ to render mere lip-service to it; 
the spirit of nationality survived; the conflict did not 
cease. 

And when, after the establishment of the Holy Roman 
Empire, Individualism seemed to be well-nigh extinct, 
it was revived by the force of necessity. Threatened 
by the raids of the Northmen, districts were compelled 
to provide for their own defence. There was no hope 
that an appeal to the Emperor would bring effectual 
help; there was no time to seek imperial sanction for 
such measures as had to be taken. Left to their own 
resources, the provinces tended more and more to forget 
everything except their own immediate interests, and 
this growth of local sentiment was encouraged by the 
increasing difficulty of communication between the 
different parts of the Empire. 

Nor did the Church entirely oppose the resultant de- 
centralisation. When the Papacy had been degraded 
by the vices of the Popes and by the undue influence 
of notorious women, those bishops who sincerely desired 
the advancement of religion could hardly turn to Rome 
for encouragement or guidance. The princes of the 
Church began to pursue an independent policy. But 
by doing so, they necessarily assisted the progress 
of Individualism, of that " political heresy " which 
officially they condemned. 

Nothing indeed is clearer than the fact that the 
operation of those agencies, which tend normally to 
favour the gratification of one desire, is frequently 
confused. Simplicity of mind generally fosters Uni4 
versalism, increased intellectual activity generall}! 
fosters Individualism. But it would be entirely in- 
correct to assert that the individualist is necessarily 
either more intelligent or better educated than the 
universalist. Rather is it true that, when once a certain 



GENERAL CHARACTER OF CONFLICT 53 

point has been reached, the same result is produced by 
education and lack of education. A man simple in mind 
readily submits to guidance; a people simple in mind 
is peculiarly susceptible to external influence and so 
inclined to obedience. But it is equally true that a man 
whose mind is highly developed is painfully conscious 
of his own limitations and therefore also ready to seek 
direction; that a nation which has attained a high 
degree of civilisation will often sacrifice something of 
its independence in order to avoid war, which it feels 
to be a crude and extravagant method for attaining a 
given end. Though increasing civilisation, any intellec- 
tual development, tends at first to favour Individualism,, 
it tends ultimately to produce a reaction towards 
UniversaHsm, which had made a potent appeal in the 
origmal penod of ignorance and barbarism. 

"Again, the conception of the Roman Empire, on the 
whole, promoted the desire to be ruled and was opposed 
to the spirit of nationality. But the Universalism which 
prevailed under the Empire was external rather than 
internal; local independence was rather strengthened 
than crushed. On the other hand, when the spirit of 
nationality developed, royal power developed simul- 
taneously ; that is, the growth of external Individualism 
was accompanied by an equal growth of internal 
Universalism. 

Even the influence of the Church was not whoUy on 
the side of the desire to be ruled. Among the causes 
which led to the definition of Individualism, a foremost 
place must be assigned to the quarrel between the 
Empire and the Papacy. There are not wanting 
instances of the clergy resisting external Universalism; 
in every dispute with the Popes, kings found some 
ecclesiastics enlisted on their side. And the Popes 
themselves, by supporting suffragans against their 



54 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

metropolitans, did something to sap the strength of 
internal Universalism. That very development of free 
thought, which was so opposed to the political theory 
of the Church, in one aspect assisted the desire to be 
ruled. Only with the help of a strong monarchy could 
local clergy hope to assert their independence against 
the might of the Papacy, and accordingly those who 
most vigorously opposed Universalism abroad were 
often driven to preach that theory at home. 

The complexity of the conflict is extreme ; the action 
of the different factors is frequently most obscure. 
One illustration of this may be given. Commerce 
normally favours the growth of Universalism, externally 
because it tends to break down the barriers between 
nations, internally because its prosperity so largely 
depends upon strong and efficient government. But 
war is an expression of Individualism, and the most 
frequent cause of war has been commercial rivalry; 
the assertion of national independence has often been 
principally due to the economic evils resulting from 
alien rule. And since nothing affects commerce more 
disastrously than that irregularity of taxation, which is 
constantly the outcome of arbitrary government, the 
commercial class has frequently been the first to 
advocate resistance to that strong central authority 
which at an earlier date it had most assisted to 
create. 

This complexity is natural. Human nature is ad- 
mittedly complex, and the conflict between the desire 
to be ruled and the desire to rule is the outcome and 
expression of human nature. Men are swayed by feelings 
over which they have little control, the meaning of 
which they hardly understand. Those aggregations of 
men, which we call states, are swayed by similar feelings 
and understand them no better. History, the life-story 



GENERAL CHARACTER OF CONFLICT 55 

of nations, can never be simpler than the hfe-story of 
each individual man. 

As might be anticipated from its very complexity, the 
conflict between Universalism and IndividuaUsm follows 
no immutable course. It would be idle to assert that 
the gratification of the desire to be ruled abroad is 
invariably accompanied by the gratification of the desire 
to rule at home; it would be equally idle to assert that 
the converse is invariably true. It is altogether im- 
possible to define absolutely the lines along which the 
reaction against the dominant theory will proceed; aU 
that can be said is that the reaction wiU infallibly occur. 

But at the same time, if every allowance be made for 
numerous exceptions, it is perhaps possible to indicate 
what may be described as the normal course of the 
conflict. That course the conflict generally foUows, 
though by no means invariably. For as there is infinite 
variety in the nature of the individual man, so there is 
infinite variety in the history of that conflict which 
makes up man's life. And there is the same variety 
in the history of aggregations of men; the conflict no 
more pursues an invariable course in the case of states 
than it does in the case of an individual. 

Certain probabilities may, however, be suggested. A 
state which is as nearly as possible entirely universalist 
will generally adopt external before internal Individu- 
alism. For the assumption of an independent attitude 
towards foreign powers, a strong government at home 
is almost essential, so that the existence of such a 
government often encourages the inauguration of an 
isolated foreign pohcy. The premature gratification 
of the desire to rule at home, before independence has 
been asserted abroad, will not infrequently either per- 
petuate or produce a state of subjection to some external 
power. 



56 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

On the other hand, in a state which is as nearly as 
possible entirely individualist, the reaction also tends 
to begin externally. The ultimate evil produced by 
the exaggeration of Individualism is anarchy, and the 
ultimate consequence of anarchy is normally foreign 
conquest. But foreign conquest supplies a complete 
gratification of the desire to be ruled, so that ex- 
ternal Universalism follows upon that inability, whether 
material or mental, to resist foreign aggression, which is 
produced by too extreme gratification of the desire to 
rule. The history of Poland supplies a striking illustra- 
tion of this fact. 

Such may be described as the normal course of the 
conflict. But there are certainly numerous instances 
of the conflict pursuing a different course. Internal 
Individualism has often fostered a love of independence 
so intense as to render a nation proof against all attack; 
internal Universalism has sometimes so deadened the 
spirit and cramped the energies of a people as to render 
that people an easy prey to foreign aggression. The 
slightest comparison of the history of the Swiss Con- 
federation with that of the ecclesiastical states on the 
Rhine will suffice to supply evidence of this truth. A 
state which has become entirely individualist has often 
begun the reaction by ending a condition of anarchy pro- 
ductive of every evil short of foreign conquest ; such was 
the work of Gustavus III in Sweden. A country which 
has become wholly universalist has often first destroyed 
the despotism which hindered all free development. 
After the Congress of Vienna, the overthrow of the 
Mettemich system was accomplished rather by the 
revolt of peoples than by any reversal of the foreign 
policy of governments. 

The utmost, therefore, that can be said is that there 
appears to be a normal course which the conflict in 



GENERAL CHARACTER OF CONFLICT 57 

nations follows, though deviation from that course is 
frequent. And it must always be remembered that the 
process of reaction from one extreme to the other may 
proceed so evenly in external and internal relations as 
to make it morally impossible to decide where the 
reaction first began or where it first attained completion. 



58 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



VI 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE! I. TO THi;/ CORONATION 

OF CHARLES THE GREAT 

/ 

The struggle between Universalism and Individualism 
dates from the moment at which man became man, and 
will continue until human nature is changed out of 
all recognition. But in its earher stages the conflict 
was hardly apparent; it existed but was not defined. 
Desire is always felt long before it is expressed, such 
expression demanding a relatively high level of inteUi- 
gence. Particularly is this true of anything in the nature 
of political desire, and it would have been indeed sur- 
prising if primitive man had possessed the intellectual 
capacity necessary for the enunciation of a theory. 

And when jpolitiral ideas began to find verbal expres- 
sion, at first Universa-lism alone was clearly defined. It 
is a theory easily stated and positive in character, 
whereas Individualism is essentially negative and ren- 
dered more difficult of exposition by its very insistence 
upon the right of private judgment. The theory of 
subjection had thus an initial advantage as against the 
theory of independence. 

That advantage was increased by the character of 
primitive man. His mind was receptive rather than 
active. He was prone to superstitious reverence, re- 
luctant to assume the burden of pers^onal responsibility; 
he was incUned by nature to obey those upon whom 
ability or good fortune had conferred a real or apparent 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 59 

superiority. Absolute monarchy was therefore the \, 

earliest form of settled government; in the first ages of 
/ mankind, the desire to be ruled was far stronger than 
the desire to rule. And this fact is almost sufhcient 
in itself to account for the apparent absence of conflict 
in the remotest period of History. 

Even Universalism itself long remained undefined. 
The subjects of the ancient monarchies of the East were 
as devoid of all initiative as are their modem representa- 
tives, the inhabitants of Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt. 
Xh.eiiL half-developed minds could eyolve nothing .in the 
nature of a political theory. Oriental despotism was 
the only form of government which they could under- 
stand; jhey obeyed their rulers because they could 
hardly realise the possibility pf disobedience. If some 
objected to the practical slavery in which they lived, 
their objections took the form of somewhat purposeless 
revolt; a victory for the malcontents merely resulted 
in the substitution of one despot for another. Political 
debate remained unknown to the peoples of the East, 
until long after they had fallen under the influence of 
western civilisation; such traces of poHtical institutions 
and theories as are found among them to-day have bee^ 
recently imported from Europe. 

The Greeks were cast in a different mould. The^; 
virile genius early prompted them to discuss the science 
of politics, and they formulated the uni versalist theory 
as the true solution of the problem of the relationship 
between the state and the individual. They carried 
that theory, indeed, to an unusual extreme. Nowhere 
is the province of government so widely extended as 
in the ideal polities of the Greek philosophers. Plato 
and Aristotle, differing in many respects, agree in com- 
mitting to the care of the state the regulation of the 
whole life of the citizen ; the government is to them the 



6o THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

agency by which men are to be guided to that higher 'ft'M 
life, for the attainment of which poHtical society ^ 
exists. 

On the other hand, there are comparatively few 
traces of a conception of external Universalism ; the 
policy of the Greek republics was individualist in spirit. 
Certainly the Hellenes did regard themselves as one 
people; non- Greeks were rigorously excluded from 
participation in the Olympic or Isthmian games. They 
even professedly recognised a species of common 
superior in the Amphictyonic Council. But the auth- 
ority of that body was only nominal, and though signs 
of a corporate spirit may be detected in the centuries 
which elapsed between the semi-mythical days of the 
siege of Troy and the period of the expedition of Alex- 
ander, yet Individualism was certainly in the ascendant 
so far as external relations were concerned. A widely 
extended empire was generally identified with bar- 
barism. Almost compelled by the physical geography 
of their country to live in small and isolated communities, 
the Greeks foijnd in the city-state the only possible 
existence for civilised man. Internal Universalism 
alone really attained definition in ancient Greece. 

A new situation was created by the victories of Rome. 
For all practical purposes, the whole civilised world was 
brought under a common government. Roman citizen- 
ship was gradually extended until Caracalla granted it to 
all his subjects. And since the advantages of law could 
be enjoyed only within the Empire, it was not unreason- 
ably held that beyond the imperial frontiers men were 
little better than brutes. If the large measure of local 
self-government granted to the provinces and cities 
somewhat impaired the ascendancy of internal Uni- 
versalism, that of external Universalism was established. 
The deification of the Emperor was no more than the 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 6i 

emphatic expression of man's reverence for the embodied 
majesty of world-wide dominion. 

But the continuance of that reverence was speedily 
imperilled. The deified Emperor was, after all, only 
one among a crowd of gods and goddesses, and a form 
of worship which the virtues of the Antonines rendered 
popular and almost legitimate became absurd in the 
age of their successors. The imperial office suffered 
in reputation when it became the prize of successful 
intrigue, when it was disputed or shared by rival claim- 
ants. The vices of some Emperors, and the incapacity 
of others, seemed to destroy their claim to be the embodi- 
ment of the imperial idea. And an almost fatal blow 
was struck at the whole system when Elagabalus 
attempted to make personal an apotheosis which had 
in reaUty been the apotheosis of an office. Diocletian 
laboured to restore the prestige, which had been lost, 
by shrouding the person of the Emperor in mystery. 
But the elaborate ceremonial of his court caused as 
much offence as it did admiration; his colleague Maxi- 
minian failed to work cordially with him, and the failure 
was completed by the civil wars which followed his 
abdication. 

At this critical moment, however, Christianity inter- 
vened ta complete the work which the armies of the 
Roman Repubhc had begun. The Church laid down the 
proposition that God rules the world through a human 
vicegerent, and found that vicegerent in the Emperor. 
His authority was held to have received the explicit 
sanction of Christ and of the apostles. The former had 
issued the command, " Render unto Caesar the things 
which be Caesar's." St. Peter had coupled obedience 
to earthly rule with the service of God. St. Paul had 
condemned resistance to constituted authority, and had 
not hesitated to appeal to the judgment of Nero. The 



62 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

Empire, too, was almost co-extensive with civilisation 
and with Christendom. If some converts dwelt beyond 
its frontiers, their numbers and importance were slight, 
nor would they have seriously disputed the assertion 
that all Christians were subjects of Rome; rather they 
regarded themselves as exiles in a barbarous land. 

From the very first, the Church taught the duty of 
obedience even to a persecuting Emperor, so long as 
that obedience did not involve the denial of Christ. 
And when the conversion of Constantine had removed 
this obvious danger, Christian theologians hastened to 
develop their political theory on essentially imperialist 
and therefore universalist Unes. The Emperor was 
degraded that he might be exalted. He was deprived 
of an unconvincing divinity to be endowed with a new 
supremacy as the chosen representative of the Almighty, 
and the imperial of&ce gained all, or more than all, that 
its immediate holder lost. Those who might have been 
revolted by the idea of an imperfect god accepted their 
subjection to a veiled theocracy, the sanctity of which 
could not be impaired by any deficiencies in a human 
lieutenant. And into a veiled theocracy Christianity 
converted the Roman Empire. It was regarded as a 
divine institution, co-eternal with the world. The end 
of imperial rule would be the end of all human govern- 
ment, the prelude to the Second Advent and the personal 
reign of Christ. 

During the period of the Greek republics and of the 
Roman Empire, Univefsalism thus appeared to have 
secured not only definition, but also an unquestioned 
supremacy. That supremacy, however, was in reality 
incomplete; the inevitable conflict existed, and its 
existence was only concealed because Individualism 
was undefined. It would be manifestly absurd to sup- 
pose that at any time all men preferred subjection to 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 63 

independence, and, as might be expected, examples of 
individualist tendencies are not lacking in this period. 

It has been already suggested that the Universalism 
of ancient Greece was almost entirely confined to the 
relations of the community with its members; the 
external pohcy of the Greek republics was conceived 
in the contrary spirit. Even during the crisis of the 
Persian wars, Thebes and other states were found to be 
ready to support the invader. This willingness to submit 
can hardly be regarded as an example of universalist 
ideas, since there was no community of sentiment, nor 
corporate feeling, between the civilised Greeks and the'r 
barbarous neighbours. It was rather an assertion of 
Individualism. The Medising cities rejected the idea 
of subordination to the leadership of Lacedsemon and 
Athens, and hoped for greater freedom of action when 
those aspiring states had been crushed by Darius or 
Xerxes. The same individualist spirit found expression 
in the constant resistance offered to any state which 
attempted to control or to unify the Hellenic race. 
Athens, Lacedaemon and Thebes alike failed to establish 
a permanent supremacy in face of the persistent opposi- 
tion of the majority of the other cities. And other 
illustrations of the prevalence of external Individualism 
in Greece are suppUed by the almost perpetual isolation 
of Argos, by the refusal of the Lacedsemonians to share 
in the expedition of Alexander, and by their later 
resistance to Philopoemen and the Achaean League. 

Nor was internal Individualism wholly unknown. 
With the doubtful exception of Lacedsemon, there io 
no trace of a " constitutional '* opposition in Greece, 
and the extant political writers unanimously preach 
Universalism. But the frequency of seditions in the 
majority of the Greek cities shows that the spirit of 
resistance to government was by no means dead; it 



64 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

may well be that the stability of the Lacedaemonian 
constitution was in some measure due to the fact that 
in Lacedsemon alone was the necessary safety-valve 
suppHed. The individuahst theory, too, appears to have 
found support even from political thinkers. The con- 
tempt poured by Plato upon extreme democracy, 
" where horses and asses have learned a wonderfully 
free and magnificent way of walking," suggests the 
existence of a school of individualists so extreme as to 
be practically anarchists. And Aristotle's eagerness to 
prove that the state is natural, the defence which he 
offers for slavery and ostracism, indicate that internal 
Universalism had been assailed and that the contrary 
theory had obtained at least verbal expression. 

Individuahsm, however, made httle progress in the 
period following the age of Plato and Aristotle. At 
first the authority of those philosophers justified 
sufficiently the control of the citizen by the state; 
presently, a certain mental weariness seemed to over- 
come the world. Patriotic zeal was lessened by the 
very magnitude of the Roman Empire ; the character of 
the imperial government hindered or prevented political 
discussion. The edict of Caracalla vulgarised, and hence 
reduced the value of, Roman citizenship; the chief 
privilege of the citizen became the obligation to pay 
taxes. 

At the same time, men ceased to find the expression 
of their highest development in political association. 
The Stoics and the Epicureans agreed in recommending 
men not to turn aside from the pursuit of their private 
interest. To one school, society was hardly worthy of 
a philosopher's attention; to the other, the cares of 
citizenship were little more than a hindrance in the 
pursuit of happiness. Aristotle had found the highest 
form of existence in membership of a state, the truest 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 65 

joy in the activities of political life. Marcus Aurelius 
admits that those who are called upon to share in the 
task of government must labour to do their duty; he 
seems to regret that any one should be so called, to envy 
those who are freed from the cares of public life. And 
this political melancholy is characteristic of the age in 
which he lived. A tendency to distinguish between the 
citizen and the individual appeared, and if deliberate 
criticism of the universalist theory was still practically 
unknown, the ground was yet being subtly prepared 
for the assertion of Individualism. 

Nor was this work of preparation altogether hindered 
by the Church. While the Empire was pagan, full 
citizenship was almost impossible for the sincere Chris- 
tian; he could not perform those sacrifices on the altar 
of the Emperor which were the recognised test of 
allegiance. Even after the conversion of Constantine 
the dif&culty did not entirely disappear. Idolatry was 
no longer demanded, but the favour shown to Arianism 
by the imperial government served to alienate the 
orthodox from their rulers. Indeed, during the reigns 
of Const antius II and Valens, the hostility of a large part 
of the clergy towards the government produced a situa- 
tion not far removed from civil war; the persecution 
of Athanasius severely taxed the loyalty of the Church. 

Ecclesiastics, too, not unreasonably dreaded a conflict 
between religion and patriotism. They laboured to 
fix the thoughts of their disciples upon the world to 
come, and by so doing they tended unwittingly to under- 
mine an institution to which they both professed and 
felt loyalty. Under their guidance, men learnt to care 
more for the salvation of their own souls than for the 
preservation of the Empire. Monasticism and asceticism 
became popular; they were alike inimical to true 
citizenship, since those who turned aside from the 

B 



66 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

pleasures of an active life could hardly be expected to 
perform its duties. Despite the arguments put forward 
by Augustine in the De Civitate Dei, there is no reasonable 
doubt that the triumph of Christianity did accelerate 
the collapse of imperial power in the West. Had as 
many Roman citizens embraced the military as embraced 
the monastic profession, a far more serious opposition 
might have been offered to the barbarian invasions. 
Had the soldiers of the Empire displayed that degree 
of self-sacrifice and enthusiastic devotion which was 
exhibited by the hermits of Egypt or the pillar saints 
of Asia Minor, it is more than probable that the invaders 
would have been hurled back into the forests from which 
they emerged. 

Yet even the cataclysm of the fifth century did'not 
destroy the ascendancy of external Universalism. The 
barbarian invaders had come into contact with Rome 
before they passed the Rhine and Danube. They had 
been profoundly impressed by the law and order of the 
Empire, by its recuperative power and by its apparent 
perpetuity. Accustomed to the social and political 
vicissitudes of a migratory life, they were astonished at 
the spectacle of organised government and enduring 
institutions ; their desire for plunder and their contempt 
for the imperial army were sensibly modified by a feel- 
ing of respectful wonder. Service under the Emperor 
became almost more honourable than victories gained 
over him; titles granted by the Emperor were prized 
as highly as trophies won on the field of battle. 

This inclination towards respect and obedience was 
intensified by the conversion of the barbarians to 
Christianity. Though the missionaries who laboured 
among them were for the most part Arians, they none 
the less instilled into the minds of those whom they 
converted to doctrinal heresy the orthodox political 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 67 

theory of the Church. The influence of superstition 
increased the existing reverence for the Empire. The 
barbarians felt their inabihty to destroy an institution, 
in which they found the perfection of human wisdom 
and in which their spiritual masters taught them to 
recognise the working of the mighty hand of God. There 
is an oft-quoted saying of Athaulf, king of the Visigoths, 
to the effect that he aspired to be the foremost defender 
of that Empire which he had once hoped to destroy. 
Athaulf did no more than express the sincere longing of 
the maj ority of his fellow Teutons. The invaders eagerly 
adopted external Uni versaUsm ; with the inevitable zeal 
of recent conversion, they became its most passionate 
supporters. 

Thus, while the provinces actually became the seat 
of new monarchies, they remained theoretically part of 
the Empire. With the exception of Gaiseric the Vandal, 
each king secured imperial recognition and based his 
claim to the obedience of the provincials upon some 
commission granted by the Emperor. It was held 
that the deposition of Romulus Augustus by Odovacar 
meant nothing more important than the recognition in 
the West of the sole rule of the Emperor Zeno. Even 
Theodoric the Ostrogoth accepted the position of ar 
imperial lieutenant in Italy, as WaUia the Visigoth had 
done in Aquitaine and as Gunthar the Burgundian did 
in the Rhone vaUey. If Chlodovech ruled the Franks 
as a national king, he would himself have been the first 
to admit that he ruled the Gallo-Romans by virtue oi 
the vague gift of *' the ornaments of the consulship,' 
which he had received from the Emperor Anastasius. 
Accomplished facts were indeed ignored; it was held 
that nothing had changed. By some strange political 
alchemy, barbarian tribes were converted into Roman 
armies, barbarian kings into Roman proconsuls. It 



68 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

was universally believed that the extent of the Empire 
was undiminished, the power and authority of the 
Emperor unimpaired. :::i%,«a«.Cift'^,^ *.«^ 

And however harassed that Emperor might be, he 
never even mentally abdicated his lordship of the world. 
No sooner did an opportunity arise for the practical 
reassertion of dormant rights, than every effort was made 
to bring facts into accordance with theory. During the 
last agony of the Empire in the West, Marjorian, in place 
of consolidating his position in Italy, preferred to attempt 
the restoration of his authority in Gaul and Spain, and 
the recovery of Africa. Anthemius allied with Leo I 
in order to overthrow the Vandals. And after the 
abdication of Romulus Augustus, the resources of the 
Empire in the East, which even the careful government 
of Anastasius had hardly rendered adequate for the 
defence of such lands as remained to the ruler of Con- 
stantinople, were expended lavishly in an attempt to 
regain the provinces of the West. Justinian, rather 
compelled by a sense of duty than actuated by mere lust 
of glory, despatched Belisarius to Africa and Italy. His 
efforts were crowned with partial success ; the kingdoms 
of the Vandals and Ostrogoths were overthrown, that 
of the Visigoths was shaken. Imperial prestige was 
revived; external Universalism acquired additional 
strength. 

And since the supremacy of the Emperor seemed to be 
hardly inconvenient and unlikely to be more definitely 
asserted, there was little inducement to formulate a 
theory in which that supremacy should have no place. 
So accustomed had mankind become to the universalist 
idea that, though the conflict continued, the assertion 
of external IndividuaHsm was fitful and inconclusive. 
Of those barbarian kingdoms which inclined to deny 
imperial claims, the Vandal and Ostrogothic were 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 69 

destroyed, the Visigothic weakened and a prey to con- 
stant civil war. The Franks remained. But though 
they at first both attacked the imperiaHsts in Italy and 
set an example of independence by coining money not 
bearing the Emperor's head, their kingdom in a manner 
owed its eventual permanence to a denial of its own 
existence. 

While, however, external Universalism thus main- 
tained the ascendancy which it had acquired, internal 
Individuahsm made rapid progress. The Roman Empire 
had never been a highly centralised state; its decline 
and fall served to increase that local independence 
which the imperial government had rather fostered than 
attempted to crush. Districts were driven to provide 
for their own defence. The Venetian and " Armorican " 
republics, the curious autonomous state which seems to 
have existed in Auvergne, and the short-lived" kingdom " 
of Syagrius are examples of the new organisation of 
states upon individualist principles, since in every one 
of these instances membership of the Roman Empire 
was not only admitted but also prized. 

The barbarian states, too, had this characteristic in 
common, that they allowed a large measure of self- 
government to their subjects. The Roman provin- 
cials were accorded their own law and, when once the 
conquerors had settled in their midst, suffered little 
interference beyond the obligation of paying taxes. 
Over their Teutonic subjects the kings had but a 
limited authority. A ruler of marked personaHty was 
perhaps sometimes absolute, but a ruler of less capacity 
was hardly more than president of a council of turbulent 
warriors. Even the ablest monarchs were often driven 
to conciliate rather than to command ; the story of the 
vase of Soissons is typical of the relationship between 
the barbarian kings and their subjects. In some other 



70 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

cases, royal authority was far more restricted than it 
was among the Franks. At least after the conversion 
of Reccared, the government of the Visigoths rested 
practically with the synods of the Church; the great 
ecclesiastics in Spain were all-powerful. The period 
was, in short, a period of external Universalism and 
internal Individualism. 

This ascendancy of external Universalism was assisted 
by the rise of a new power. It was only natural that 
the Popes, as bishops of the imperial city, should enjoy 
a pre-eminent position in the Christian hierarchy, and 
from an early date they claimed spiritual supremacy 
over the provinces of the West. It was asserted that 
St. Peter had been specially entrusted with the care of 
his Master's disciples, that the Popes had inherited the 
plenitude of the Apostle's power, and that they were 
therefore Vicars of Christ, the ecclesiastical counter- 
part of the Emperor. These claims had been already 
admitted to a great extent when circumstances almost 
compelled the entrance of the Pope into the domain 
of secular politics. The recovery of Italy by Justinian 
was soon followed by a new invasion; the greater part 
of the peninsula was occupied by the Lombards, and 
their control of the passes of the Apennines practically 
cut off Rome from such other districts as still acknow- 
ledged the authority of Constantinople. Neither the 
Emperor nor his immediate representative, the Exarch 
of Ravenna, was able to afford much assistance to the 
ancient capital of the Empire. The city was forced 
to provide for its own defence, and the Popes to supply 
the place of an imperial governor, adding the character 
of diplomatist, and even of general, to that of bishop. 
Rome, threatened by the Lombards, was probably 
saved from capture by the peace which Gregory the 
Great concluded with Agilulf. The service thus ren- 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 71 

dered was gratefully acknowledged by the Italians, who 
thenceforward looked rather to the Papacy than to the 
Exarchate for help and guidance. Had the Popes so 
inclined, they might almost have destroyed the last 
traces of imperial authority in their city. But they 
possibly feared to attack the accepted political theory 
of the Church, and they were in any case wedded to 
external Universalism by the very nature of their of&ce. 
Christianity is a cosmopolitan religion; the head of 
western Christendom could have no part in national 
life, and any open assertion of independence towards 
the Emperor would at that date have involved the 
creation of a national, externally individualist state in 
Italy. 

Hence, even when the Lombards abandoned Arianism 
and accepted orthodoxy, thus removing one possible 
objection to union between themselves and the Papacy, 
the Popes still continued to maintain a hostile attitude 
towards them. They continued to profess their alle- 
giance to Constantinople, despite the fact that they 
were alienated from the Emperor by the Iconoclastic 
Controversy. Even when they called upon Pippin to 
deliver them from the increasing power of the Lombards 
under Aistulf, the request for help was so ambiguously 
worded as to leave room for the opinion that the Frankish 
king was only invited to act as an imperial Heutenant. 
The Popes, in fact, remained consistent champions of 
external Universalism. 

That theory soon came to need powerful advocacy. 
Irene blinded her son. Const antine VI, and usurped the 
throne of Constantinople, assuming the title of Empress 
and by implication claiming to be as much the vice- 
gerent of the Almighty as any of her predecessors had 
been. The idea of feminine rule was unfamihar; such 
women as Pulcheria and Martina, who had practically 



72 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

governed the Empire, had cloaked their authority under 
the name of some male relative. Consequently, even 
the East was disturbed by the conduct of Irene, and 
though she was for a while recognised, that recognition 
was hardly given with enthusiasm. The political con- 
science of the West was still mor^ profoundly shocked. 
The imperial throne was considered to be vacant, and 
the duty of supplying that vacancy was held to devolve 
upon those subjects of the Empire who were not so dead 
to shame as to accept a woman's rule. 

This opinion, however, would probably have failed 
to secure definite expression, and still more probably 
have failed to effect definite results, if it had not been 
adopted by the Pope. As it was, that ingenuity which 
had recently produced an autograph letter from St. 
Peter to Pippin was now employed to profit from the 
usurpation of Irene. Already attracted towards the 
CaroHngians by benefits received and the hope of further 
advantage, the Pope proceeded to deny the capacity 
of a woman to rule. The crimes and sex of Irene were 
declared to have created a vacancy in the Empire ; by a 
convenient fiction, the right to fill that vacancy was 
conferred upon the mongrel population of the papal 
city, who were announced to be the senate and people 
of Rome. The one candidate upon whom the choice 
could reasonably fall was opportunely present; he ap- 
peared before a mob excited by the progress of a great 
religious festival. On a memorable Christmas Day, 
Charles, king of the Franks, already Patrician of the 
Romans, was hailed as Emperor by the intoxicated 
congregation at St. Peter's, and the Pope at once 
recognised the voice of the people as the voice of God. 
Leo III placed the imperial crown upon the head of his 
friend and benefactor; the Holy Roman Empire came 
into being. 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 73 

The coronation of Charles might well have destroyed 
the supremacy of external Universalism. In the West, 
many who had yielded obedience to an Emperor whose 
wishes could be ignored with impunity, were moved to 
resist an Emperor whose commands were reinforced by 
overwhelming mihtary strength. Already the power of 
Charles had excited revolt in Aquitaine and in Bavaria; 
now Venice and Beneventum alike attempted to assert 
their independence. In the East, the deposition of 
Irene and the accession of Nicephorus weakened the 
constitutional ground upon which the theory of a vacancy 
had been based. Two rival claimants to the lordship 
of the world appeared, each declaring himself to be the 
legitimate successor of Augustus and Constantine VI, 
each stigmatising the other as an usurper. Mankind 
received an embarrassing invitation to make its choice 
between them, and the rejection of both would not have 
been surprising. But the desire to be ruled was still 
stronger than the desire to rule. The arguments and 
influence of the Church prevailed ; external Universahsm 
rather gained than lost by the accession of Charles, since 
the theory was once more brought into closer accordance 
with fact. 



74 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



VII 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE : 2. FROM THE CORONATION 
OF CHARLES TO THE FALL OF THE HOHENSTAUFEN 

Not only did external Universalism survive the corona- 
tion of Charles, but for a time after that event even 
internal UniversaHsm made some progress. Already 
the displacement of the Merovingians by Pippin had 
been accompanied by an increase of royal power in 
the Prankish kingdom. Charles the Great directed his 
energies towards a further strengthening of the central 
government. Though the very extent of his dominions 
compelled the delegation of authority over the provinces 
to dukes and counts, he attempted to secure the sub- 
ordination of these Heutenants. Hunold in Aquitaine, 
Tassilo in Bavaria, were reduced to obedience. The 
missi dominici were instituted, officials of the court sent 
at intervals through the Empire to supervise the local 
administration and to check any tendency towards 
independence in the provincial governors. But the 
system was short-lived. During the reign of Lewis the 
Pious, the missi received or usurped the position of 
counts; life officers were made hereditary, occasional 
appointments became permanent posts, and in the more 
distant districts of the Empire practically independent 
principalities were gradually established. This decen- 
tralising process was hastened by the civil wars between 
Lewis and his sons, and by the incapacity of successive 
Emperors. The day of internal Universalism had not 
yet dawned. 

On the other hand, external Individualism did not at 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 75 

once develop even as a result of that political maelstrom 
into which the western world was plunged by the weak- 
ness of the Carolingian dynasty and the attacks of 
Saracens and Northmen. The Treaty of Verdun has 
often been regarded as one of the epoch-making events 
of History. In reahty, the recognition of the titular 
supremacy of Lothar is more remarkable than the 
acquisition of actual independence by Lewis the German 
and Charles the Bald. The document marks not so 
much the birth of Germany and France as the postpone- 
ment of the death of the imperial conception in those 
two countries. The position of Emperor remained the 
highest reward of successful ambition, the vain prize for 
the sake of which every king was ready to neglect his 
immediate duties and his true interest. The reunion 
of all the Prankish states under Charles the Fat shows 
how slight was the belief in national monarchies, nor 
is it too much to say that if the Emperors of the ninth 
century had possessed the ability of an Otto the Great, 
the Treaty of Verdun would have remained entirely 
unexecuted. External Universalism gratified the world 
despite the destruction of imperial prestige; external 
Individualism struggled very slowly towards recognition. 
For this continued ascendancy of the desire to be 
ruled, the Church was in great measure responsible. 
Kings, unable to protect their own immediate dominions 
from Northmen and Saracens, secured and degraded the 
imperial office; their utter weakness emphasised the 
unreality of the Empire, and the provinces, driven 
by that weakness to provide for their own defence, 
might well have forgotten the conception of the unity 
of Christendom. But at the moment when society 
appeared to be fast tottering to dissolution, the Popes 
effected new spiritual conquests. Britain was reunited 
with Europe; the rudest barbarians were softened by 



76 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

the gentle influence of the Christian faith; the untamed 
fierceness of the Northmen was subdued by the devoted 
zeal of unarmed priests. The Church produced a unity 
more real than that which had been forced upon re- 
luctant tribes by the military prowess of Charles the 
Great; in the West, the Popes reigned without a rival. 
But they were inevitably cosmopolitan, forbidden to 
sympathise with national aspirations by the very nature 
of their office. Denying the right of private judgment 
in religion, they were prohibited from favouring it in 
politics. They were compelled to champion external 
Universalism, of the merits of which they had become 
the only exponents. 

Nevertheless, the Popes were ultimately instrumental 
in securing the definition of external Individualism. 
As their prestige increased, they remembered that Leo 
had placed the imperial crown on the head of Charles, 
and they claimed the right to dispose of that prize for 
which earthly monarchs so eagerly contended. In the 
garden of Gethsemane, St. Peter had produced two 
swords; these swords were now declared to symbolise 
the temporal and spiritual powers, to indicate the dual 
headship of the Christian world. If the Emperor were 
supreme in secular affairs, the Pope was supreme in 
ecclesiastical; there was at least equality between the 
two vicegerents of God. 

This hypothesis at first presented no difficulty. The 
Emperors were too weak to interfere with the interests 
of the Papacy ; the city of Rome was in reality indepen- 
dent. On the other hand, despite such cases as the 
intervention of Nicholas I in the matter of Waldrada 
and the consequent excommunication of Lothar II, the 
Popes in general could not yet aspire to dictate even 
to a feeble monarch. They lacked material force; 
their strength depended upon moral prestige. And at 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 77 

this period the Papacy became not less degraded than 
the Empire. The tiara was a gift with which dis- 
reputable women gratified their lovers, and in such 
circumstances there was no likelihood of a conflict 
arising between the two heads of Christendom. Each 
was too weak to attempt any effective assertion of 
authority over the other. It seemed infinitely more 
probable that both Emperor and Pope would disappear ; 
that mankind would revolt against a theory which 
exalted into the position of vicegerents of the Almighty 
an Italian princeling and an immoral bishop. 

External Individualism, in fact, began to develop 
from the moment when Charles the Fat proved his utter 
unworthiness to be the successor of his great namesake. 
His deposition was followed by the foundation of several 
independent monarchies, and in the vacancy of the 
imperial throne only a dubious homage was rendered 
to Arnulf of Germany, as the possible heir to the dormant 
title. But the desire to be ruled, the sense that the 
Christian world should have some determinate head, 
produced a remarkable reaction in favour of external 
Universalism. For a while, the Emperors were obscure 
nonentities, and the abler rulers found their energies 
sufficiently employed in combating the attacks of the 
Northmen. Yet when Henry the Fowler had restored 
a measure of order to Germany, when Otto had crushed 
his rebellious nobles and given at least transient stabihty 
to his kingdom, the first use made of the new power 
thus acquired was to attempt the revival of the Holy 
Roman Empire. In place of completing the consoHda- 
tion of a national state. Otto followed the example of 
Justinian. He entered Italy and received the imperial 
crown at Rome. His action is evidence of the continued 
influence of the universalist theory ; his personal capa- 
city and the mihtary strength of Germany made the 



78 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

Emperor once more a real factor in the affairs of all the 
states of western Europe. 

And the first use which was made of the revived 
imperial power by Otto and his successors was to effect 
the reform of the Papacy. A series of Popes, nominated 
or practically nominated by the Emperor, restored 
that reputation which the vices of the lovers and son of 
Marozia had well-nigh destroyed. But the reformed 
Papacy forgot its obhgations to the Empire. Realising 
their strength and the potentialities of their position, 
the Popes resented the idea that they had any earthly 
superior; they became unwilling to admit even that 
they had an equal in the person of the Emperor. They 
insisted on the superiority of spiritual over temporal 
power. They argued that since the imperial crown 
could be received only at Rome and from their hands, 
they created Emperors and that the created must be 
controlled by the creator. Such claims naturally 
roused opposition; a contest which fills the history of 
the Middle Ages began between the secular and ecclesias- 
tical heads of Christendom. And this contest was 
nothing more than the inevitable reaction against the 
long-continued ascendancy of external Universalism. 
For though the two principals were alike universalists, 
their allies and helpers were in a measure conscious or 
unconscious exponents of Individualism. 

In the struggle the Papacy possessed certain con- 
spicuous advantages. Though the Empire was in 
conception extra-territorial, its power rested ultimately 
upon the German people; it could hope for little or no 
support from France or England or Spain. The Church, 
on the other hand, extra-territorial and cosmopolitan in 
its very essence, was able to draw strength from every 
nation in the West, and in the first stages of the quarrel 
the advantage thus possessed was increased by the piety 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 79 

or policy of Hildebrand. Celibacy was enforced upon 
all the clergy, who were thus converted into a species of 
papal army. Divided from the mass of mankind, freed as 
far as possible from those cares which served to distract 
the generality of the human race, the clergy were the 
more devoted to the cause of that institution to which 
they had given themselves so completely. And though 
hope of earthly honour, or a sincere conviction of the 
superiority of the imperial cause, gained some ecclesias- 
tical support for the Emperor, the Popes had on the 
whole a remarkably loyal and single-minded body of 
adherents to carry on the struggle. 

And the Popes of this period were themselves equally 
single-minded. Though both the imperial crown and 
the papal tiara were elective, there was a fundamental 
difference between the two cases. The Emperors 
laboured constantly to found a dynasty; family am- 
bition distracted their pohcy; their partial success 
produced all the weakness and disorder practically 
inseparable from minorities in an age of personal rule. 
The Popes, on the other hand, succeeded as full-grown 
men, often well trained in the art of statesmanship prior 
to their accession. They had no natural heirs for whom 
they might labour to provide; they could found no 
dynasty. Consequently, each successive occupant of 
the papal chair was devoted only to the promotion of 
the interest of the Papacy; each was actuated by an 
unselfish and impersonal zeal for the cause of which he 
was the official champion. 

A marked advantage also was derived by the Popes 
from the character of the age in which the struggle 
occurred. The Emperor was compelled to rely mainly 
on material strength. Only by gathering a powerful 
army could he win his way to Rome and to the imperial 
crown. His election at Aachen was but the first step 



8o THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

towards the final goal of his ambition, and the reluctance 
of German princes to accord him their support was a less 
formidable obstacle than the mosquito-ridden Campagna. 
An army, laboriously collected in Germany after months 
of mingled cajolery and threats, as often as not dwindled 
to nothingness after a few weeks in the fever-stricken 
environs of Rome, and the Emperor, deprived of all 
compelling power, was driven to abandon the fruits of 
his arduous toil and to escape as best he might across 
the Alps. 

The Popes, on the other hand, possessed no material 
strength. But the character of the age made the fact 
that they were driven to rely upon moral weapons 
almost a source of positive advantage to them. Spiritual 
censures, to which an earlier or a later generation would 
perhaps have been indifferent, constituted a very real 
menace to the superstitious mediaeval mind; fear of 
excommunication constantly proved a far more effective 
means of persuasion or compulsion than the most 
formidable host. And whereas the Emperor had to rely 
on his ability to overawe or to persuade his vassals in 
order to gather together an army, the thunderbolts of 
the Lateran were at the free and absolute disposal of 
the Vicar of Christ. 

All these factors contributed to secure the eventual 
success of the Papacy in its struggle with the Empire, 
but the greatest asset of the Popes was the fact that 
the Emperors were brought into more direct conflict 
with the growing spirit of Individualism. It has been 
already pointed out that the dominant characteristic 
of the internal organisation of states was at this period 
individualist. After the death of Charles the Great, 
his universalist ideas were abandoned so far as internal 
government was concerned, owing to the weakness of 
his successors. The missi dominici became counts; 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 8i 

they and the dukes of the more outlying districts 
asserted their local independence; offices which had 
been temporary became hereditary, and the authority 
of the central government was reduced to a mere 
shadow. And this decentralising process, of which the 
origin may be traced to the incapacity of Lewis the 
Pious, was accelerated by the peculiar conditions of 
the age. 

Charles the Great was hardly dead before that system 
which he had so laboriously endeavoured to construct 
was shattered, and ample proof was afforded, if proof 
were needed, of how much his dominions had owed 
to his personal capacity and prestige. Issuing, as it 
were, from the Cimmerian darkness of Scandinavia, the 
Northmen swept, a devastating flood, over the lands of 
western Europe. Distracted by their private quarrels, 
the successors of Charles were rendered doubly incapable 
of combating a danger which their lack of abihty utterly 
unfitted them to meet. From the Emperor the pro- 
vinces had nothing to hope ; as had been the case in the 
age of the barbarian invasions, they were driven to 
defend themselves or perish. The calamities of the 
period forced the individual man to care for himself 
rather than for the community; forced local districts 
to care for themselves rather than for the whole Empire. 
The distant central authority was forgotten or ignored ; 
society, under compulsion, reorganised itself upon a 
feudal basis. 

Feudahsm was not a system. It originated rather 
from necessity than from choice ; it expresses rather an 
attitude of mind than the calculated working of human 
wisdom. In its earliest form, it was the outcome 
of the spirit of internal Individualism. Men almost 
dissociated themselves from the state, which could do so 
little for them, to gather themselves into semi-isolated 

F 



82 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

groups under the protection and leadership of some lord, 
who might at least save them from death. But the 
development of these small groups undermined the 
ascendancy of external Universalism. The theory of 
imperial or papal supremacy was not indeed denied; 
at no period, perhaps, was the conception of the common 
headship of the Christian world more lucidly or emphatic- 
ally expressed; the ideal of a united Christendom 
received much lip-service. When, however, the crisis 
had passed and the Emperor attempted to reassert his 
universal lordship, it was remembered that in the time 
of trouble he had not come to the help of his people. 
The conduct of an Odo compared only too favourably 
with that of a Charles the Fat. The numerous cases in 
which some local magnate had driven off the invaders, 
or had at least died fighting for his men, were remem- 
bered to the prejudice of the imperial idea. And these 
local magnates themselves, having enjoyed a generous 
measure of independence when external help even if 
coupled with external control would have been most 
welcome, were more than reluctant to sacrifice anything 
of that independence at the very moment when they 
seemed likely to derive some profit from their hberty. 
They questioned, and were supported by their people 
in questioning, the validity of any claim made to their 
obedience by an external power ; admitting the corporate 
character oi human society in theory, in practice they 
denied it. They became external individualists. 

It is clear that this new spirit must come into conflict 
with both Emperor and Pope. But at first it was 
against the former only that it struggled. The human 
mind, long accustomed to accept as axiomatic the 
existence of a divine vicegerent, could not immediately 
rid itself of the habit of obedience. Nor,, indeed, were 
men altogether eager to be free; naturally they were 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 83 

less eager to deny moral than material obligations. 
Hence, the Emperor first suffered from the growth of 
Individualism. He was more obviously in opposition 
to it, since he demanded material sacrifices on the altar 
of external Universalism, whereas the Papacy demanded 
little more than a formal recognition of its authority. 
The Emperor required men and money; the Pope 
required only those men who would by inclination 
devote themselves to the service of the Church, and only 
those comparatively moderate contributions which in 
so pious an age seemed to be but the legitimate due of 
spiritual guides. In the quarrel between the Empire 
and the Papacy, therefore, the latter received for a 
while the support of the individualists. The newly 
developed kingdoms rejected the imperial claim to 
universal dominion ; the princes of Germany unwillingly 
supplied the support which the Emperor demanded for 
the prosecution of the struggle to maintain that claim. 

The history of the Middle Ages is in a great degree the 
history of this decline of external Universalism. Even 
at the height of the Holy Roman Empire, its authority 
had not been recognised in England, and after the death 
of Charles the Great it was equally disregarded in the 
rising Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula. 
Charles the Fat was the last Emperor to secure even 
nominal recognition in Gaul; Otto II was the last Emperor 
even to attempt to secure such recognition. The Capetian 
dynasty organised the French monarchy on a basis of 
external Individualism, and the explicit acceptance of 
imperial authority was early confined to the German 
and Italian lands. 

Even in those countries, though explicit recognition 
was for some centuries longer accorded, the actual 
authority of the Emperor suffered constant diminution. 
As long as they were threatened by the aggression of 



84 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

the nobles in their districts, the ItaHan cities welcomed 
the presence of an imperial army in their midst. But 
when their growing wealth and importance had delivered 
them from this danger, they began to regard the passage 
of the Alps by their overlord with mingled anger and 
alarm; they became less and less ready to render 
obedience to him, less and less ready to assist him with 
either men or money. Frederic Barbarossa attempted 
to re-establish his authority over the republics of the 
Lombard plain; his attempt was finally defeated at 
Legnano. From that moment, if the Emperor could 
still count on some support from the Italian cities, he 
owed that support rather to the mutual jealousies of 
those cities than to any affection borne by them towards 
himself. If he gained the adherence of some former 
enemy, it was generally at the cost of the hostility of 
some old ally. Allies, not subjects, indeed, had the 
Italian cities become. Where Frederic Barbarossa had 
commanded, Frederic II entreated and cajoled. The 
spirit of external Universalism lingered still in Italy, 
but it was too weak to give effectual support to the 
Emperor in his quarrel with the Papacy. 

Nor was the imperial position in Germany much more 
satisfactory. Otto the Great had crushed the rebellions 
of the dukes and had effected the temporary establish- 
ment of a strong monarchy. But his successors were 
speedily involved in difficulties more serious than those 
which had embarrassed the first Saxon Emperor. The 
existing spirit of internal Individualism was enhanced 
by the occurrence of minorities and by the quasi- 
elective character of the monarchy. The first resulted 
in feebleness of the executive. The second led each 
king to bid for the support of the nobles, the more so 
because he was concerned in an attempt to secure the 
establishment of his own dynasty. The permanent 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 85 

strength of the monarchy was sacrificed to the immediate 
interest of the monarch. And further concessions to 
local independence were occasioned by the fact that the 
German king was also Emperor; they were the price 
which he paid for the support of his vassals in those 
Italian expeditions which were essential for the actual 
attainment of the imperial crown, or which were under- 
taken in the hope of preserving imperial rights in the 
Peninsula. 

Soon the princes of the Empire discovered a plausible 
justification for their turbulence. Theoretically, the 
Emperor was lord of the world; all kings were his 
vassals. The German magnates therefore claimed that 
the rights of their king had been extinguished by his 
accession to a higher office; that they, no less than the 
various rulers of western Europe, were tenants-in-chief 
of the Empire, and that it would diminish imperial 
dignity if they were degraded to any position lower than 
that occupied by, for example, a king of France. Such 
obedience as the Capetians rendered, they would render; 
and since the Capetians were entirely independent, 
the German princes claimed entire independence also. 
They laboured to exalt the Emperor into impotence. 
It is true that the strength of the Salian and Hohen- 
staufen dynasties prevented the magnates from realising 
their ambition, but they none the less possessed an 
argument which served to justify practical rebellion 
and which the universalists themselves found it hard to 
refute. 

The Popes hastened to avail themselves of the advan- 
tages thus offered. As exponents of external Uni- 
versalism, they could readily accept the theory put 
forward by the German princes of their relation to 
the Emperor. They encouraged the growth of local 
independence, supported insurrections, and urged the 



86 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

nobles to insist upon the alienation of crown lands. 
It gradually became habitual for the electors to demand 
such alienation as the price of their recognition; it was 
the design of the princes to secure that the king should 
not have demesnes sufficiently extensive to supply him 
with power to refuse their demands. If a Henry III 
or a Frederic Barbarossa proved equal to the task of 
curbing the turbulence of his vassals, it was still only 
at the cost of civil war; such civil war became the 
normal state of affairs in Germany. In short, the 
attempt to combine the Roman Empire and the 
German kingdom failed to give strength to the former 
and strangled the latter in its birth. 

The Popes enjoyed a special advantage in their 
interference in the affairs of Germany. The archbishops 
of Mainz, Koln, and Trier were great territorial mag- 
nates ; their influence, both as churchmen and as nobles, 
was considerable. But being ecclesiastics, though they 
might at times adopt an attitude of hostility towards 
the Papacy, they were ultimately its natural allies. 
The fact that the imperial crown was elective made their 
support doubly important, and assisted the Pope in the 
exaltation of rival Emperors. Claiming that it was part 
of the papal prerogative to supervise the conduct of the 
man upon whom the imperial crown had been conferred, ^ 
the Papacy, from the time of Henry IV, frequently | 
decreed the deposition of an Emperor hostile to it and 
the transference of his title to another. Nor did the 
German princes hesitate to transfer their allegiance to a 
papal nominee ; from his weakness or from the consequent 
embarrassment of the legitimate Emperor, they might 
always win some new concessions, some fresh immunities. 
The spirit of internal Individualism ranged a large party 
m Germany on the side of the Pope. 

At the same time, the Emperors were unable to 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 87 

retaliate successfully by the creation of anti- popes. 
Originally, there had been an imperial veto on papal 
elections, but that veto was lost after the reign of Henry 
III, arid soon even imperial recognition was no longer 
admitted to be essential. Whereas an imperial corona- 
tion could take place only at Rome, and the Popes were 
thus in a measure acknowledged to have at least some 
share in the choice of an Emperor, that Emperor had 
no similar share in the choice of a Pope. An anti- 
emperor was assured of a following among the princes 
of Germany; their Individualism impelled them to 
seize any opportunity for weakening the imperial 
position. But universalists and individuahsts alike 
tended to refuse recognition to an anti-pope. The 
clergy dreaded the possible disruption of the Church; 
those laity who were not actuated by the same dread 
feared the effects of an increase of imperial power, which 
threatened that hberty so dear to them as individualists. 
It is small wonder, then, that the Papacy triumphed; 
its triumph was the first great victory gained by the 
forces of Individualism, little as that appeared at the 
time. With the death of Frederic II and the fall of the 
Hohenstaufen, the struggle came to an end. The Great 
Interregnum followed; the world learnt that it could 
dispense with an Emperor. On the other hand, papal 
supremacy was admitted by all ; its recognition, indeed, 
seemed to be more complete than ever, since there 
was now no rival claimant to universal dominion. In 
reality, however, the ascendancy of external Univer- 
salism was impaired. During the contest between 
Empire and Papacy, mankind had been perplexed by 
the necessity of choosing between the two parties. 
If the verdict had been given for the Pope, this was the 
result largely of the fact that for the time the forces of 
IndividuaUsm were enlisted on his side. This did not 



88 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

prevent the casting of doubts upon that theory which 
had hitherto been almost unquestioningly accepted. 
And now when the Empire was practically suspended, 
further doubts arose; men began to ask whether there 
was indeed any human vicegerent of Christ. Serious 
resistance to papal claims followed immediately upon 
the too complete victory of the Papacy. 

Once more, that victory was but the expression of the 
reaction which was occurring in the human mind. The 
theory of external Universalism had for centuries been 
generally accepted; now the contrary theory began to 
gain ground, and the closing stages of the quarrel between 
the Empire and the Papacy are marked by a growing 
disregard for the unity of Christendom. It is not a 
mere coincidence that the fall of the Hohenstaufen 
occurred at the very moment when the Crusades came 
to an end. There has never been a more remarkable 
expression of the corporate conception of human society 
than that which was supphed by the expeditions sent 
out for the rescue of the Holy Sepulchre. Western 
Europe poured out its blood and treasure for the attain- 
ment of an ideal; the early crusaders were inspired to 
forget all national and racial distinction, that they 
might combine to rescue Jerusalem from the infidel. 
Such was the spirit of the First Crusade ; such was the 
chord in the human heart which responded to the appeal 
of Urban II at Clermont. Men forgot all, save the fact 
that they were Christians and brothers, that they must 
unite to avenge the wrongs of their Saviour. 

But to the enthusiastic altruism of the First Crusade 
there presently succeeded a far different spirit. Philip 
Augustus, in the Third Crusade, pursued his own in- 
terest rather than that of Christendom ; even Richard I 
was not above suspicion of selfishness. The Fourth 
Crusade was little more than a mercantile adventure; 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 89 

it turned aside from Palestine, since there seemed to be 
greater profit to be gained from an attack on Constanti- 
nople. The expeditions, which still proceeded to the 
Holy Land, were principally dictated by a wish to keep 
open the eastern markets for the maritime republics of 
Italy; they resemble the expeditions of London mer- 
chants to the Iberian Peninsula rather than that which 
Godfrey of Bouillon had led to Jerusalem. The spirit 
of Universalism was gradually giving place to that of 
Individualism. 

And it was both significant and appropriate that the 
last Crusade should have been led by Frederic II. In 
him the spirit of external UniversaHsm found its true 
embodiment. Brilliant, cultured, brave, he was not 
unworthy to occupy the throne of the Caesars. A law- 
giver and a poet, the founder of a university, he pos- 
sessed almost all the qualities which might i&t a man to 
be the representative of the human race. By birth a 
German, by education an Italian, by policy almost a 
Saracen, he was essentially cosmopolitan ; he would have 
been hampered by the possession of mere territorial 
sovereignty. He was veritably " the Wonder of the 
World," the last true mediaeval Emperor. And it is 
equally significant that his Crusade should have been 
carried out despite a papal decree of excommunication 
against its leader; the Papacy, pursuing its apparent 
interest, had become almost individualist in spirit. 

Henceforward a Crusade was an impossibility. Ex- 
ternal Individualism had gained too great a hold on 
mankind for them so to forget their private cares as to 
adventure their lives and money for the sake of establish- 
ing Christian rule over the grave of the Founder of the 
faith. The Papacy had shattered its rival, but it had 
done so only at the cost of shaking men's belief in that 
theory on which the papal, no less than the imperial. 



90 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

position rested. The world, so long desirous to be 
ruled, now conceived the desire to rule; excess, as 
always, brought its own retribution. And the effects 
of the reaction which they had encouraged were soon 
felt by the Popes; Frederic II was avenged by Philip 
the Fair, by Hus, and by Luther. 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 91 



VIII 

THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE: 3. FROM THE FALL OF THE 
HOHENSTAUFEN TO THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA 

The faU of the Hohenstaufen marks an important epoch 
in the history of the world. To all seeming, a decisive 
victory had been secured by the Papacy, the supremacy 
of which appeared to be established beyond all dispute, 
since the Empire for a while practically ceased to exist. 
In reality, however, the victory was rather a defeat ; it 
had been gained at the cost of weakening that sentiment 
upon which the power of the Papacy ultimately rested. 
For papal, no less than imperial, supremacy was only 
the expression of the corporate conception of himian 
society; it depended for its vitality upon the strength 
of the desire to be ruled, upon the ascendancy of external 
Universalism. But in the course of the struggle the 
Popes had consciously or unconsciously availed them- 
selves of the existence of the contrary sentiment. They 
had urged men to refuse obedience to the Emperor, had 
denied his claim to universal dominion, had reviled 
and degraded the imperial office. They failed to 
reahse that by adopting this poHcy, though they might 
accomplish the defeat of their rivals, they were bound 
at the same time to inflict irreparable damage on them- 
selves, to weaken permanently their own position. 
Once taught to gratify their desire to rule, men naturally 
proceeded to the rejection of all external authority, to 
the fullest satisfaction of that desire. 

For a time, the spirit of external Individuahsm found 
a useful ally in the Pope; the Emperor was more 



92 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

obviously and immediately in a position of hostility to 
that spirit, since he demanded material and not merely 
moral obedience. But the alliance could only be 
temporary. When the Emperor had ceased to be a 
danger, Individualism found its enemy in the Pope, and 
the very completeness of the papal triumph made an 
attack upon papal supremacy both more inevitable 
and more vigorous. After the fall of the Hohenstaufen, 
not only did the intoxication of victory lead to the 
putting forward of exaggerated claims by the Papacy, 
but, further, the utter humihation of their rivals led 
the Popes to appear clearly as the only barrier against 
the complete realisation of the ideal of external In- 
dividualism. 

Even before the conclusion of the struggle between 
the Empire and the Papacy, the theory of papal supre- 
macy had been at least tentatively called in question. 
The Roman populace never submitted readily to the 
rule of their bishops; seditions were frequent, and the 
authority of the Pope was constantly threatened. 
Among these seditions, that organised by Arnold of 
Brescia possesses a special significance. Not content 
with advocating the restoration of the Republic, he went 
further and denied the right of the Pope to intermeddle 
with secular affairs. This amounted to an assault on 
the doctrine of papal supremacy, since, though the Vicar 
of Christ was primarily the spiritual head of Christendom, 
he claimed also a definite superiority over all temporal 
rulers. On the authority of the alleged Donation of 
Constantine and of the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, it 
had been asserted that at the time of the foundation of 
Constantinople the government of the western provinces 
of the Roman Empire had been committed to the Pope, 
and if that grant had been a tribute to his ecclesiastical 
pre-eminence, it none the less conveyed with it some 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 93 

secular power, Arnold of Brescia, on the contrary, 
contended that a bishop should confine himself to the 
services of the Church, nor did he urge the maintenance 
of impisrial government. Admitting that a formal 
recognition of the Emperor was either expedient or 
necessary, he supported the practical assertion of local 
independence; he denied in effect the existence of any ^ 
human vicegerent of Christ. 

Arnold had contented himself with attacking the 
secular side of papal supremacy. The Albigenses assailed 
the whole papal position. Politically, they denied the 
right of the Pope to interfere with the government 
and conduct of the count of Toulouse. Doctrinally, 
they asserted the right of private judgment, questioned 
the exceptional position of the priesthood, and even 
denied the vital dogma of transubstantiation. All the 
factors which eventually produced the Reformation 
may here be discerned, if only in embryo ; the Albigenses 
resisted all the implications of that theory of the divine 
government of the world upon which papal authority 
depended. They failed in their revolt against external 
Universalism, but their importance cannot well be 
overestimated. That it was recognised at the time is 
sufficiently indicated by the fact that the expedition 
against them was described as a " crusade," a term 
hitherto applied only to the holy wars against the 
professed enemies of the Christian religion. 

And the Friar movement itself, the most emphatic 
expression of the rehgious spirit during this period, 
contributed eventually to the decline of papal influence. 
At first, the devotion of the disciples of Dominic and 
Francis revived the waning reputation of the Church 
and riveted afresh its hold upon the human intellect. 
But this was only the immediate result of the work of the 
Friars. Themselves professing and preaching apostolic 



94 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

poverty, they rebuked by implication, and even ex- 
plicitly, the wealth and luxury of the monks and of 
the episcopate. They crystallised a certain vague dis- 
approval of ecclesiastical riches, and supphed arguments 
against abuses, the existence of which had long been 
deplored. In this way, they discredited all sections of 
the clergy except themselves. For the moment, their 
own popularity counterbalanced the unpopularity of 
the bishops and monks, and the Church as a whole 
gained rather than lost. 

But the Friars themselves soon became guilty of the 
very vices which they had so eloquently denounced, and 
ecclesiastical credit was forthwith seriously impaired. 
Mankind had learnt to express its hatred of clerical 
abuses; open expression consolidated opinion, and a 
demand for reform was heard. The Pope, as head of 
western Christendom, was invited to satisfy this demand; 
he refused, and revealed plainly that apostolic poverty 
was an ideal unwelcome to the successor of the Prince 
of the Apostles. The Friars Observant, who held 
strictly to the original constitution of their Orders, 
were silenced, since they had insisted too strongly upon 
the original status of the founders of their Faith. But 
when once criticism had found expression, it could not 
be subdued by a papal non possumus ; so far from 
ceasing, it turned to the theory of the supremacy of the 
Pope, which it had at first left unassailed. The abuses 
resultant from gratification of the desire to be ruled 
fostered the desire to rule. In existing circumstances, 
reform was impossible without papal sanction and 
support; since that sanction and support were not 
forthcoming, it appeared to be questionable whether a 
complete change in the whole scheme of ecclesiastical 
polity was not desirable. 

The Friars, moreover, in face of the natural opposition 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 95 

which their coming had aroused in the monastic orders, 
had been obliged to rely upon papal support against 
the clergy of those countries in which they laboured. 
They became an essentially international body, the 
very exemplar of external Universalism. So long as 
they retained their popularity, the Papacy benefited 
from this fact ; it appeared as the champion of the only 
body of clergy which merited and received the respect 
and affection of mankind. But as soon as they had 
become corrupt, their very cosmopolitanism increased 
the disUke with which they came to be regarded. They 
found themselves in direct opposition to the spirit of 
external Individualism, and by their faults they fostered 
the growth of that spirit. They were considered as 
alien intruders; only by papal influence could they 
maintain themselves in any country. Consequently, 
a large measure of their unpopularity was transferred 
to their patron; the power of the Pope was held to be 
a bar to the accomplishment of salutary reforms, and 
the advantage of papal supremacy seemed more than 
ever dubious. 

That doctrine of apostolic poverty which the Friars 
preached also reflected upon the Pope. Successive occu- 
pants of the papal chair found it necessary to rebuke 
the exuberant zeal of the Observants. The rigid 
asceticism of the early Dominicans and Franciscans, in- 
deed, did no small disservice to the papal cause, since the 
Papacy had accumulated wealth from the piety and 
superstition of western Europe, and the continued 
possession of that wealth was threatened by the doctrine 
that true Christianity disdained or shunned all earthly 
things. The external individualists had already lamented 
the transference of so much wealth into alien hands. 
Now they seized eagerly on the arguments against 
ecclesiastical riches with which the Friars presented 



96 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

them, and their original regret was intensified or con- 
verted into anger when they had been taught that the 
holding of temporal property was incompatible with the 
sincere following of Christ. 

The ultimate cause of the decline of papal ascendancy 
is to be found in the growth of individualist ideas, and 
in this period more especially in the development of 
external Individualism. Yet nothing more forcibly 
illustrates the complexity of the conflict of desire than 
the interaction of the two contrary emotions during the 
later Middle Ages. While external Individualism made 
progress, internal Universalism made progress also; 
the growth of the one assisted that of the other, nor is 
it too much to say that by the growth of the one that 
of the other was made possible. The western world 
tended towards internal Universalism because it was 
tending towards external Individualism also ; the increase 
of internal Universalism in turn made that of external 
Individualism more rapid. 

It has been pointed out already that in the period 
following the barbarian invasions the internal organisa- 
tion of states was individualist. For this fact, the 
contemporary prevalence of external Universalism was 
largely responsible. Rulers were turned from the task 
of consolidating their immediate dominions by the hope 
of seizing the phantom of the imperial crown. Actuated 
by the same desire, they aspired to increase the area of 
their nominal possessions that they might thus appear 
more worthy of that higher dignity at which they aimed. 
And as the Emperor was content with bare recognition 
in a large part of the Empire, so kings tended to be 
satisfied with a similar position. Their states were 
large and loosely knit together; the exercise of control 
by the central government was neghgible or spasmodic, 
and anarchy was the rule rather than the exception. 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 97 

But this anarchy made resistance to external in- 
fluences less possible, and if the Emperor failed to 
maintain his authority, that was due not so much to 
the strength of local resistance as to his own extreme 
weakness. 

Presently, however, the ineffective character of the 
central government in each state produced an intolerable 
situation. Western Europe was exposed to and suffered 
from the attacks of Saracens and Northmen, and the 
reaction in favour of external Individualism was en- 
couraged by experience of the practical evils resulting 
from the contrary system. But the individualists 
themselves, perhaps unconsciously, recognised that the 
most pressing necessity was a strengthening of the 
government to which they yielded immediate obedience ; 
without such strengthening, there could be neither 
deliverance from anarchy nor salvation from foreign 
enemies. Society, therefore, was gradually reorganised 
in smaller units, internally universalist in character. 
Nobles who had undertaken the defence of their neigh- 
bours developed into kings of the districts in which they 
lived and which they protected; even if they did not 
assume the royal title, they at least enjoyed practically 
royal power. Cities, which had been compelled to work 
out their own political salvation, asserted their right to 
^ measure of local self-government which amounted 
to independence; if they admitted the nominal over- 
lordship of some external ruler, they became in reality 
free republics. Western Europe presented the spectacle 
of large states over which the authority of the ruler was 
almost non-existent, and smaller communities, often 
without definite legal status, in which the government 
was all-powerful. 

This result was in a measure the outcome of the growth 
of feudal ideas, though those ideas were encouraged by 

G 



98 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

the existing condition of society. Feudalism regarded 
the individual rather than the community; each man 
must have his lord, and to that lord the obedience of 
each man was due. A community might owe some 
service to its overlord, but that service was performed 
by a duke or count or bishop, the representative, as it 
were, of the people. It was not performed by all the 
members of the community. It was to a mediate, not 
to the ultimate, lord that the mass of the population 
rendered obedience; the vassals of a king of France 
admitted no direct obligations towards the Emperor, 
the vassals of a duke of Normandy admitted no direct 
obligation towards the king of France. All kingdoms 
were practically subdivided into extremely small units. 
This state of affairs was certainly the outcome of 
external Universalism ; the organisation of the theoreti- 
cal provinces of the Empire was modelled upon that of 
the whole. But it also gratified the external Individu- 
alism of the age. The central government was more 
powerful in the new small units than it had ever been 
in the old larger units, and with the strengthening of the 
central government, resistance to external interference 
was more possible. The growth of individualist ideas 
produced, as its initial result, a growth of internal 
Universalism. 

That growth was, however, very slow. The concep- 
tion of the unity of Christendom was too powerful to be 
destroyed readily, and that conception stood perpetually 
in the path of a national state, hampering its develop- 
ment at every turn. Abstinence from territorial 
aggrandisement has rarely been a characteristic of 
absolute rule; a despot will generally wage wars of 
aggression; what may be called political self-denial is 
the rarest virtue of a crowned head who not only reigns 
but also rules. And in the Middle Ages, this particular 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 99 

virtue was especially rare, especially dif&cult of attain- 
ment. The dream of the Empire hovered always before 
the fevered eyes of kings, the conception of world-wide 
dominion inflamed the coldest minds, and rulers and 
subjects alike were stirred to abandon the arduous toil 
of internal consoHdation to pursue the dazzUng pros- 
pect of extended dominion and an imperial crown. It 
seemed almost shameful to devote much attention to a 
mere national state, when the lordship of the world was 
the reward of successful ambition. So Otto the Great 
turned aside to visit Rome ; so even the statesmanlike 
Henry II and the calculating Phihp Augustus, both of 
whom listened unmoved to the story of the fall of Jeru- 
salem, were credited with no sHght longing to wear the 
crown of Constantine and of Charles. 

And the result was that the natural development of 
mankind was impeded. External UniversaUsm had 
enjoyed a long ascendancy; from that ascendancy the 
world had benefited. But the order of human life is con- 
flict ; the hour for a salutary reaction had now sounded ; 
external Indi\ddualism was bound to displace the 
contrary theory. Men, however, would not or could 
not so easily forget their old ideals; they hesitated to 
enter that wilderness of doubt into which the casting 
away of the dominant theory seemed bound to lead them. 
Nations strive always to attain happiness; they grope 
for ever towards the Promised Land. They may be 
counted happy if they attain some Pisgah from which 
a glimpse of the distant plains may be secured ; such 
glimpses, but no more, are at times vouchsafed to them. 
In the Middle Ages, at the very moment when the summit 
had been attained and the weary eyes of the traveller 
were refreshed by a sight of the Promised Land, a dark 
cloud ever arose to obscure the view; some force, the 
mighty influence of external UniversaUsm, hurled man- 



100 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

kind back into the Valley of Shadow from which they 
had so painfully emerged. 

The history of the centuries following the death of 
Charles the Great is largely a history of lost opportunities, 
of a weary sacrifice of the real upon the altar of a vain 
ideal. Incalculable evils resulted from the fatal journey 
of Otto, since by it hope was revived that the Roman 
Empire might once more dominate and unify western 
Europe. Germany and Italy were condemned to cen- 
turies of disunion; endless wars were waged, countless 
lives sacrificed. The prestige of the Church was re- 
duced, her reputation damaged, and the conception of 
Christian brotherhood degraded by use as a political 
asset by the Emperor or the Pope. 

The history of France possibly affords even clearer 
evidence of the disasters resultant from the attempt to 
maintain external Universalism ; there, if anywhere, 
may be seen the dreary cycle of misery to which mankind 
was condemned. The heirs of Chlodovech had enlarged 
their borders only to become rois faineants, only to be 
driven to delegate all power to their Mayors of the Palace. 
Those Mayors had ascended the Prankish throne with 
Pippin, had attained the imperial crown with Charles. 
But forthwith delegation of power once more became 
necessary ; the Carolingian Empire fell by its own weight. 
The Capetian dukes of France developed into " Mayors 
of the Palace," while their kings shrank trembling in 
the palace at Laon; Hugh Capet avenged the last 
Merovingian and accepted the dictum of Pope Zachary 
that " he who holds the power should possess the title 
of king." And at once Hugh's successors repeated the 
errors by which the Carolingians had been destroyed. 
The temptation of mere territorial increase overpowered 
them ; the measure of their nominal authority grew, and 
they paid the price when they cowered before their 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE loi 

overmighty subjects. William, duke of Normandy, 
might admit the legal suzerainty of the French king; 
he could afford to smile at the angry threats of his 
overlord, the harassed ruler of the Capetians* narrow 
patrimony. 

And as good fortune or capacity united the great fiefs 
to the demesne, those fiefs were almost immediately 
granted away to cadets of the royal house; each king 
seemed to labour to undo the work of his predecessor. 
But this apparent anomaly is readily explained; it was 
the natural result of external Individualism. Such 
delegation of power as territorial expansion made in- 
evitable would not have been incompatible with strong 
government if the sentiment of national identity had 
been widespread. But that sentiment was localised 
by difficulty of communication. An inhabitant of 
Blois regarded an inhabitant of Paris as a foreigner; 
the rule of a distant king was foreign rule, and by 
force of the spirit of external Individualism, it was 
therefore reduced to the merest shadow. A strong 
central government was really impossible except in 
small units; the permanent increase of those units 
could result only from a breaking down of the intense 
localism of the age. In short, just as in one period 
external Universalism had retarded the development 
of national states by keeping alive the conception of 
a world Empire, so in the next period external Indi- 
vidualism produced a similar result by hindering the 
recognition of real geographical and ethnical unity in 
large areas. 

Nevertheless, the age was one of increasing internal 
Universalism, of the gradual formation of national 
states. Everywhere the power of government tended 
to grow, and the area accepting the real control of that 
government to grow also. The royal demesnes were 



102 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

slowly extended, though districts laboriously welded 
together seemed to separate almost before they had been 
united; the gathering of districts, geographically one, 
under a single ruler is a feature of the period. In 
France, the alien government of English kings was 
gradually extinguished; in Italy, the republics secured 
control of the districts lying round them. Even in 
Germany, the Hanseatic towns, the free imperial cities, 
practically escaped from the anarchical rule of the 
decaying Empire. But most significant of all, the 
Emperor and the Pope adopted a territorial policy; 
they cared less for their theoretical lordship of the world 
than for such measure of practical authority as they 
could gain over the territories more immediately under 
their control. Even Frederic II gave more attention 
to his Sicilian kingdom than to his imperial position; 
his quarrel with the Papacy partakes of the nature of a 
private war for the possession of southern Italy. After 
the Great Interregnum his successors became more 
and more unlike the earlier Holy Roman Emperors; 
they approximate more and more to the princes of 
Germany in their ambitions and policy. Henry VII 
was little moved by the eloquent appeal of Dante ; the 
De Monarchia proved to be a vain attempt to revive 
in the Emperor a sense of his position as temporal head 
of Christendom and of the duties attaching to that 
position. Nor did the contemporary Popes escape the 
suspicion of caring more for their Italian interests than 
for the good of the Church. The bitterness of Gregory 
VII against Henry IV might be at least colourably 
attributed to zeal for the cause of spiritual power; the 
bitterness of Gregory IX against Frederic II was almost 
too obviously the result of fear of Sicilian aggression 
upon the temporal power of the Papacy. 

It is clear that when an individualist policy was 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 103 

pursued by those whose position made them the pro- 
fessed exponents of external Universalism, the ascend- 
ancy of that theory was necessarily imperilled. And the 
events which followed the death of Frederic II were at 
once an indication of the growth of external Individu- 
aUsm and an agency promoting that growth. Boniface 
VIII attempted to profit from the defeat of the Hohen- 
staufen to reassert and to advance to an extravagant 
point aU the claims of the Papacy. He aspired to humble 
kings more effectually than even an Innocent III had 
done; to free the Church from aU obligations to the 
state, to bring it under his own absolute and unfettered 
rule. But he had mistaken the temper of the age in 
which he lived. At all points the spirit of external 
Individualism rebuffed him; he failed in England and 
in France; he could not even dominate that creation 
of papal pohcy, the Angevin kingdom in Naples. It is 
an interesting commentary on his claim to be the lord 
of emperors and kings that he fell a victim to the in- 
veterate hostihty of a single Roman family, the Colonna. 
His death in a frenzy of impotent rage and cursing marks 
the fall of the universal dominion of the Papacy ; hence- 
forth no fictions of apostolic or imperial donations 
served to prevent states from pursuing a policy of 
external IndividuaHsm. It was no longer a question of 
complete papal domination; it had become a question 
whether any such domination should exist. The re- 
action had occurred ; the history of the succeeding period 
was to determine the extent of that reaction. 

At first it seemed probable that this reaction would be 
complete. The failure of Boniface VIII was something 
more than a mere defeat; it amounted to a positive 
disaster. For its direct consequence was the humihation 
of the Papacy before PhiHp the Fair, the transference 
of the papal court to Avignon and the " Babylonish 



104 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

Captivity." While one claimant to the lordship of the 
world had sunk almost to the level of his nominal 
vassals, the other now became little better than a servant 
of the French king. Nothing illustrates more graphically 
the result of the residence at Avignon than the attitude 
of England towards the Papacy during the Hundred 
Years' War. Hitherto in all disputes the Pope, as 
spiritual head of Christendom, was assured of a respect- 
ful hearing if he offered his mediation ; now the English 
rejected such an offer with contempt, roundly declaring 
that they would not entrust the decision of their cause 
to the puppet of their enemies. 

A severe blow, therefore, had been struck at external 
Universalism ; presently that theory sustained a second 
and even more serious shock. Gregory XI had returned 
to Rome, to the great discontent of many of the cardinals 
who not unnaturally preferred the health and tran- 
quillity of the Rhone valley to the malaria and tur- 
bulence of the Romagna. As a result, a double election 
occurred at the next papal vacancy ; Urban VI at Rome, 
Clement VII at Avignon, alike claimed to be apostolic 
Pope. So weakened was the sentiment of external 
Universalism that neither party would give way; the 
Great Schism began, and the world was scandalised or 
amused by the vigorous anathemas of two Vicars of 
Christ. Attempts to heal the quarrel merely served to 
embitter it ; the abortive Council of Pisa is more impor- 
tant as illustrating the callous disregard of the clergy 
for Christian unity than as a proof of any genuine 
desire to end the period of disunion. 

Nor could it be expected that the growth of external 
Individualism should not have been encouraged by the 
troubles of the Papacy. It has been already pointed 
out that heresy is one of the most obvious expressions 
of individualist ideas, and the period of the Babylonish 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 105 

Captivity and of the Great Schism is marked by heretical 
or quasi-heretical movements. The unity of Christendom 
became an ideal of ever-decreasing potency; in place 
of it, there is found the newer ideal of the liberty of 
national Churches. And this ideal secured the larger 
following because it gave expression to another phase of 
external Individualism, that conception of nationalism 
which had been slowly struggUng to Hfe through the 
ages. 

Between heres}^ and nationalism there is an inti- 
mate, if not an inevitable, connection. To the ideal of 
authority, the heretic opposes the right of private judg- 
ment; to the Universalism of the orthodox, he opposes 
his individualist ideals. But inasmuch as the conception 
of the unity of Christendom impHes some breaking down 
of the barriers between nations, it follows that this 
conception must make less appeal to those who regard 
such barriers as both necessary and admirable. The 
nationalist will tend in the direction of heresy, at least 
in so far as orthodoxy impUes the admission of some 
measure of external control. And so it appears that 
in all the heretical movements of the Middle Ages the 
opponents of the orthodox faith were also champions of 
the pohtical distinction of that district in which they 
lived. The schism between the Eastern and Western 
Churches owed its origin and permanence less to any 
enthusiasm for the Filioque Clause than to the antipathy 
existing between the Greeks and Latins. The Albigen- 
sian movement was less the result of sincere belief in 
and admiration for Paulician doctrines than of the racial 
and linguistic divergence between northern and southern 
France. Many, like the younger Bertrand de Born, 
whose religious views were at least obscure, showed 
bitter anger at the attack of the alien king of France 
upon the local independence of the country of Toulouse. 



io6 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

Nowhere, however, does this association of heresy 
with nationaUsm appear more clearly than in the 
Hussite movement. Before Hus began to preach, the 
University of Prague had been the scene of a violent 
controversy between the Slav and German students ; the 
former objected vigorously and successfully to the 
academic domination of the latter. And when Prague 
had been converted from a centre of Germanising 
influence to a Slav stronghold, the teaching of the 
reformer won the more ready acceptance because it 
gratified the national spirit of Bohemia. The clergy 
of that land were largely aliens and considered to be 
representatives of the authority of an Italian prelate. 
They were placed in a position of admitted superiority 
by the doctrine of communion in one kind, which gave 
to the foreign priest a privilege denied to the native 
layman. It was this very doctrine that Hus most 
definitely assailed, and his attack upon it received the 
eager support of all who felt within them the stirring of 
Slav national spirit. It was less that the Bohemians 
were afflicted by the spiritual injustice of the denial 
of the wine, than that they deplored the temporal 
injustice of the stigma placed upon their race. 

Nor was the resistance to papal supremacy confined 
entirely to heretics or nationalists, or even to advocates 
of external Individualism. Many universaUsts reahsed 
the abuses resultant from the uncontrolled authority 
of the Pope. They saw that the unity of Christendom 
was threatened by something far more serious than the 
mere occurrence of a temporary schism, and they 
imagined that they had found an effective solution of 
the crisis which they recognised. In the early days of 
Christianity the perils by which the infant creed was 
threatened had been successfully encountered by means 
of General Councils of the Church; the decisions of these 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 107 

Councils had been accepted and had been regarded as 
of equal validity with the most definite pronouncements 
of the Fathers and even of the Apostles. Some of the 
most important dogmas had in this way secured their 
final recognition; to the Council of Nicaea was due the 
definite assertion of Christ's divinity; to that of Chalce- 
don the settlement of the momentous question of the 
two natures. 

And when the Church, owing to the vices or incompe- 
tence of its temporal head, was once more threatened 
with imminent danger, it seemed to many ecclesiastics 
of indubitable doctrinal orthodoxy that the time had 
come to effect a constitutional revolution. The Pope 
appeared to them to have failed in his task, to require 
assistance in the spiritual government of mankind. 
And as in the past General Councils had successfully 
combated the assaults of heretics, so now a similar body 
might carry through certain necessary changes and defeat 
the attacks of those who were so vigorously assailing 
the position of the Church. The leaders of the so-called 
Conciliar Movement proposed to substitute for the 
absolute monarchy of the Pope a species of episcopal 
oligarchy. At regular intervals a General Council 
should meet; its decrees should have the force of law, 
and its power should extend, if necessary, to the deposi- 
tion of its president, the Pope. 

But this suggestion, though originating with those 
who beUeved in external tJniversaUsm and in the 
existence of a single authority over the whole Christian 
world, was in effect not only revolutionary but also 
evidently calculated to promote external Individualism. 
The basis of universalist ascendancy was the acceptance 
of the theory that Christ had committed the government 
of the world to some human vicegerent. The Pope 
might claim that position as the canonical successor of 



io8 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

St. Peter; it was difficult to contend that Christ had 
instituted a numerous council to be the inspired re- 
pository of His will. The Conciliar Movement could not 
fail to encourage the growth of external Individualism 
when it admitted in effect the falsity of the whole 
theory upon which the contrary doctrine was so largely 
based. 

Throughout western Europe, then, the period of the 
Great Schism was marked by a tendency towards the 
complete rejection of external Universalism. But that 
theory, inevitably eternal because the expression of one 
of man's permanent impulses, was still powerful enough 
to make headway against the growing Individualism 
of the age. The meeting of the Council of Constance 
was greeted with unfeigned enthusiasm ; its success in 
closing the Great Schism was heartily applauded. Even 
the probability that the reunited Papacy would in some 
measure recover an authority which had become un- 
welcome and distrusted did not greatly qualify the 
sense of relief and delight that the unity of Christendom 
had been restored. The election of Martin V was rather 
considered to be the dawn of a new golden age for the 
Church. 

It did not herald any such dawn, but none the less 
the Council of Constance, like the death of Frederic II, 
marks an epoch in the history of mankind. Over its 
deliberations the Emperor Sigismund had presided. He 
had secured the rejection of John XXII and the accept- 
ance of the Council's nominee, Martin V; he had ap- 
peared, if only for a moment, as the temporal head of 
Christendom. And the unexampled opportunity, which 
the Great Schism and the Council appeared to afford 
him, had moved Sigismund to attempt to recover some- 
thing of the lost imperial power. He hoped that the 
revival of universalist ideas, resultant from the restora- 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 109 

tion of unity to the Church, might profit the Empire 
and lead to an equivalent restoration of prestige and 
authority to the Emperor. 

But no sooner did he attempt to realise these hopes 
than he met with strenuous opposition. Any extension 
of secular power over the Church was anathema to the 
papal party; one section of the external universalists 
became his enemies. The external individualists were 
equally hostile. They would not admit the assertion 
of imperial authority within the borders of states which 
had gained independence since the days of Otto the 
Great. At Paris, Sigismund roused alarm and hostility 
by knighting a bastard on French soil. When he 
visited England, heralds rode into the sea and refused 
him permission to land, until he had disclaimed any 
intention of exercising jurisdiction in the island. Nor 
was Sigismund himself a single-minded universalist. 
Much of his attention was devoted to the creation of a 
territorial monarchy for the House of Luxemburg, and 
this design amounted to a tacit contradiction of his 
schemes for the revival of the Empire. His significance, 
indeed, lies really in his failure. He was the last Emperor 
to attempt the restoration of the old mediaeval system, 
to attempt to base his power upon external Universalism. 
And he was the first Emperor to conceive the idea that 
his imperial position might be utilised to assist the for- 
mation of a territorial monarchy, of a dominion founded 
upon individualist principles. Sigismund emphasised 
the failure of the Hohenstaufen ; he suggested the 
success of the Habsburgs. 

At the same time, a decided modification appears in 
the policy of the Popes. Boniface VIII had deliberately 
attempted to make good his claim to universal dominion ; 
he had proudly declared that he was Caesar and Emperor. 
His successors, after the return from Avignon and still 



no THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

more after the Council of Constance, were content to 
pursue far humbler schemes. Martin V would perhaps 
have been well pleased if he could have imposed his 
authority upon the Romagna ; to reduce the Patrimony 
to obedience became the primary object of every Pope. 
Papal policy assumed an increasingly Italian character; 
local territorial aggrandisement was its goal. But such 
territorialism was peculiarly injurious to the cause of 
papal supremacy. The field of action was limited, the 
interests at stake somewhat petty; success and failure 
appeared to be alike contemptible. An Innocent III, 
struggling for the mastery of Europe, the humiliator of 
Emperors and kings, extorted the admiration of those 
who most bitterly opposed him. There was a certain 
pathos even in the picture of Boniface VIII dashing 
his head against the narrow walls of his cell, bemoaning 
a fate which had made the rival of kings the victim of 
his own turbulent subjects. The spectacle of Martin V 
triumphant over an insignificant noble of the Romagna, 
the thought of the intrigues and plots in which he 
engaged to win some few acres of malarial desert, could 
arouse neither admiration nor sympathy. If some might 
be found to regret that a power which had humbled 
the mighty Hohenstaufen was so reduced, had fallen so 
low, more could be found to marvel that the world had 
so long trembled before the menaces of one who now 
seemed to be but an impotent Italian bishop. 

And if the sentiment of external Universalism suffered 
from the mere territorialism of the Papacy, it suffered 
stiU more from a feature of that territorialism which 
excited anger as well as contempt. After the time of 
Martin V, nepotism became the keynote of papal policy. 
The exaltation of penurious relatives became the darling 
ambition of almost every Pope, and to that ambition 
were sacrificed the interest of the Church and the 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE in 

reputation of its temporal head. A cynical generation 
viewed sceptically the paternal affection with which 
Popes regarded their nephews; even before the days 
of Alexander VI, the sons of celibate bishops afforded 
a source of scandalous amusement to the profane. If 
the pursuit of purely Italian interests had weakened the 
hold of the Papacy upon the imagination of mankind, 
the nepotism of successive Popes almost destroyed such 
respect for the papal office as had survived the degrada- 
tion of the Babylonish Captivity and the calamitous 
disunion of the Great Schism. 

It is clear that in such circumstances even the spiritual 
authority of Rome could hardly fail to suffer a certain 
diminution. As a matter of fact, the Popes themselves 
displayed a certain carelessness for the maintenance of 
that authority; the pressing need of defeating the 
Conciliar Movement led them to deviate still further 
from the universalist path. That movement owed such 
strength as it possessed to the growth of nationalism 
and to the desire for independence on the part of local 
Churches. English, French and German ecclesiastics 
hoped that the transference of nominal authority to an 
international General Council would secure to them 
practical liberty. They cared less for the projected 
reform of abuses, or for the theoretical limitation of 
papal power, than for the special and private advantages 
which they trusted would accrue to themselves from the 
permanent establishment of a Council as the ultimate 
sovereign of the Church. 

At the same time, the Popes recognised that the 
creation of such a body would infallibly reduce them 
from an autocratic position to one of servitude to a 
probably hostile and certainly jealous tribunal; the 
conduct of the Council of Basle indicated what would be 
the outcome of a victory for the conciliar party. Euge- 



112 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

nius IV therefore decided that at all costs a statutory 
limitation of papal supremacy must be avoided, and he 
adopted the obvious course of sowing dissensions among 
his enemies. While the Fathers of Basle pressed for 
the fulfilment of the pledges given, or alleged to have 
been given, by Martin V at Constance, Eugenius con- 
cluded separate agreements with the clergy of various 
countries. National Churches were induced to accept 
as a papal gift all that they had hoped to secure from 
the General Council. Immediate success crowned the 
efforts of the Pope. In a short while, the Conciliar 
Movement was not merely dead but damned, and no 
fear remained that unwelcome reforms would be imposed 
upon the Papacy, the absolute ultimate authority of 
which was definitely admitted. 

But the policy of Eugenius was fraught with serious 
peril for the future. Practically it amounted to a 
partial abdication of that spiritual headship which had 
been so toilsomely created by the great Popes of the 
Middle Ages. The vast pretensions of a Boniface VIII 
could no more be asserted; it had been implicitly con- 
fessed that such pretensions were exaggerated. And 
ultimately the victory of Eugenius was still more 
disastrous to the Papacy. It was upon the desire to be 
ruled that papal power really rested; that desire had 
been weakened in mankind by the abuses attendant 
upon its gratification, and with the failure of external 
Universalism to produce a Utopia, external Individu- 
alism gained ground. This reaction in favour of the 
desire to rule could be checked only by proving that the 
abuses, to which objection was taken, could be remedied 
under a universalist system; that they were, in fact, 
not the necessary concomitants of gratification of the 
desire to be ruled. But the leaders of the Conciliar 
Movement were pledged to attempt reform, their 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 113 

opponents had denied the need for reform. When, 
therefore, the Pope had triumphed, he was unable or 
afraid to admit the justice of the complaints against the 
Church. All reform from within was prevented; the 
abuses continued, and the individualist reaction was 
proportionately hastened. The Reformation was an 
event bound to occur; the particular form which the 
Reformation assumed was due largely to the conduct 
and apparent success of Eugenius IV. 

And even in the period which saw the supposed vic- 
tory of Eugenius, the weakness of the Papacy was 
made apparent. Concessions to national Churches of 
unblemished doctrinal orthodoxy were followed by 
concessions to declared heretics. During the initial 
enthusiasm aroused by the Council of Constance, John 
Hus had been condemned and burned; the assertor of 
individualist ideas had paid the penalty of his daring; 
the accepted theory had been vindicated. But so far 
from being quelled by the death of its originator, the 
Hussite movement increased in vigour and its sup- 
porters became the more determined to resist coercion. 
The people of Bohemia rose in arms against the two 
custodians of external Universalism. They rejected 
alike the political claims of Sigismund and the spiri- 
tual claims of Martin; Ziska and Prokop, in a series 
of campaigns, successfully repelled the attacks of their 
orthodox and Teutonic enemies. So victorious were 
the Hussites that the Papacy was eventually reduced 
to the necessity of compromise; the demands of the 
Utraquists were conceded, and alone of all western 
Christians the Czechs were permitted to receive the cup. 
Nor was the grant of communion in both kinds to the 
laity of Bohemia a trivial event. It struck at the 
exceptional position of the priesthood ; it declared that 
the right to rule did not rest with the clergy alone. 

H 



114 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

A further diminution of the influence of external Uni- 
versalism thus characterised the epoch of the Council 
of Constance. Though reunited, the Papacy failed to 
regain the prestige and moral force lost during the 
Babylonish Captivity and the Great Schism; papal 
power was for ever reduced by the fact that the theory 
upon which it was ultimately based had sustained 
irreparable damage. Pius II, able and brilliant though 
he was, could not undo the work of the years previous 
to his accession. His solitary vigil at Ancona, as he 
waited for the crusaders to receive his blessing and set 
forth on their great mission, illustrates graphically the 
decline of the old conception of Christian unity. 

Nor did the Empire profit from the efforts of Sigis- 
mund. If imperial leadership had for a moment been 
accepted, this was due to the accidental circumstance 
that the healing of schism was advantageous to the 
individualist cause. Churches which desired conces- 
sions to their local prejudices and interests naturally 
preferred that those concessions should be made by a 
universally acknowledged Pope rather than by a Pope 
of dubious catholicity. And the successors of Sigis- 
mund recognised the true explanation of that Emperor's 
brief triumph. They quietly abandoned all attempts 
to assert their imperial authority ; they ceased even to 
believe in that external Universalism to which the Holy 
Roman Empire owed its being. With Frederic III, 
the last traces of mediaeval imperialism disappear. It 
is true that he journeyed to Italy and was crowned at 
Rome. But his journey was hasty and apologetic; he 
seemed only too eager to renounce any possible claims, 
to abdicate any possible authority which he might still 
possess in the Peninsula. During his reign of half a 
century, his whole attention was absorbed in laying or 
strengthening the foundations of Habsburg power; he 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 115 

was, in fact, a typical statesman of the period, and by 
no means the least able. 

It is significant that the most dangerous enemies 
of Frederic were neither Popes nor German princes, 
but national leaders. George Podiebrad and Matthias 
Corvinus almost succeeded in creating a powerful Slav 
state in Hungary and Bohemia ; the Emperor was even 
driven from Vienna. But though Vladislav of Poland 
for a time asserted the cause of his race, he eventually 
made peace with Frederic, on terms which really 
sacrificed the Slavs to Teutonic supremacy. The aim 
of these leaders was national; they alike failed. Yet in 
their failure Europe still learned perhaps what was to be 
the basis of the new order of society. Mankind was slow 
to recognise the coming change; the human mind was 
reluctant to free itself from the domination of the desire 
to be ruled. The mediaeval Empire died with Frederic 
II, the mediaeval Papacy with Boniface VIII. Yet 
it was not until the Peace of Westphalia that either 
fact received explicit recognition; the victory of ex- 
ternal Individualism at Constance was real rather than 
apparent. 

The reluctance with which men permitted individuahst 
ideas to gain control over them is abundantly illustrated 
in the career of Charles the Bold. Perhaps the most 
typical man of the age, his life reflects clearly the vigour 
of the mental conflict which absorbed mankind. Nothing 
could have been more entirely individualist than his 
conduct towards Louis XI; in his quarrel with the 
Valois he was disturbed by no scruples of duty. Yet, 
at the same time, Charles was largely universalist. He 
disregarded geographical and ethnical obstacles in his 
attempt to weld into a kingdom lands divided by race 
and language, historical associations and economic 
interest. It almost seemed as if he beheved that 



ii6 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

because Lotharingia had once existed, it could exist 
again. And eagerly as he desired the kingly title, he 
was too much obsessed by universalist ideas to assume 
it without imperial sanction. He sought it at the hands 
of Frederic III, recognising that the lord of the world 
alone could create a legitimate king, and when the 
Habsburg cheated or deceived him, he still refrained 
from denying the rights of the Emperor. It is curious 
that Charles the Bold should have shown less indepen- 
dence of action than did Boso of Provence or Rudolf of 
Burgundy in the days of Charles the Fat ; the fact may 
perhaps be explained as due to the stereotyping of 
human ideas during the long ascendancy of external 
Universalism. 

Meanwhile, internal Individualism almost held its own. 
Difficulty of communication and the lack of compelling 
power in the central government still combined to 
maintain the strength of local feeling. Nor did the 
external individualists at first appreciate the necessity 
of making some concessions to internal Universalism 
if they were to preserve their liberty against foreign 
aggression. The two agencies from which such aggres- 
sion might be expected were obviously powerless to 
coerce. The Emperor could no longer control even 
Germany and Italy, and if the Pope were still able to 
exercise spiritual authority, he had ceased to be a 
political danger. Those opposed to foreign influence 
therefore failed to realise that for the success of their 
opposition a measure of submission to authority was 
essential, while their intense localism led them to 
regard as foreigners all who were not inhabitants of their 
own immediate districts. The evils of invasion and 
conquest had to be experienced before the limitations 
upon gratification of the desire to rule could be under- 
stood. In no other way could men learn to adopt a 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 117 

wider view of national identity; in no other way could 
they learn that real independence was impossible in 
units too small to withstand foreign aggression. 

The force of necessity, however, produced a gradual 
change of opinion. In every country the extreme of 
internal Individualism produced a condition of in- 
stability akin to anarchy; in many cases this semi- 
anarchy led to disastrous foreign wars. From the 
calamities which thus befell them, men learned to seek 
political salvation by entrusting greater power to the 
central government; their very external Individualism 
led them to become in a sense internal universaHsts. 
Hence it is that this period witnessed the establishment 
of despotism, open or veiled, in the Italian cities; the 
Visconti secured control of Milan, the Medici of Florence; 
Venice fell under the rule of the Council of Ten. In 
Spain, Castile and Aragon were united; Ferdinand and 
Isabella, having rescued their land from civil war and 
having conquered Granada, began the formation of a 
centralised monarchy. The Burgundian dukes laboured 
to destroy the liberties of the Flemish cities, repressing 
sedition with a firm hand. Even in Germany there 
were signs of consolidation; it was in this period that 
the various German states, such as Brandenburg, began 
to attain a measure of definition. 

But the stages by which internal Universalism secured 
acceptance are nowhere so clearly discernible as in the 
history of France. That country had been handed over 
to the ravages of the English by the rivalry of the great 
feudatories; the Burgundians and Armagnacs forgot 
everything except their mutual hatred, and each felt 
that no price was too heavy to pay for the destruction 
of the other. The masses were as unwise as the nobles. 
Aiming at the removal of certain abuses, they failed to 
realise that the initial step must be a strengthening of 



ii8 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

the central government against external attack; the 
Jacquerie and the Cabochins, in effect, strove to remedy 
anarchy by increasing it. 

The disasters of the Hundred Years' War, however, 
taught France the needed lesson. It was at length 
recognised that governance was necessary, and the 
French, with characteristic volatility, abandoned their 
excessive Individualism to fly to the contrary extreme. 
Not content with giving the king sufficient power to 
ensure the defeat of the foreign invader, the States 
General deliberately granted Charles VII a permanent 
revenue and army; they supplied him with the pre- 
requisites of despotism instead of the mere essentials 
for national defence. The English were expelled, and 
the king turned to the taming of those nobles whose 
turbulence had caused the disasters of their country; 
the defeat of the Praguerie may be regarded as the first 
step towards the accomplishment of that work which 
was eventually completed by Richelieu. Louis XI 
continued his father's policy, and though the end of his 
reign found his task unfinished, yet France by that 
date almost supplied Europe with an example of a 
unified state. 

A series of notable victories had thus been gained 
by internal Universalism, though those victories were 
partially the result of the Individualism of the age. 
Submission to government had been recognised as 
necessary in every state, not so much because the desire 
to be ruled was predominant, as because such submission 
appeared to be the lesser of two evils to those who were 
filled with the desire to rule ; the despotism of a fellow- 
countryman was preferable to that of an alien. While 
external Individualism constantly gained ground, internal 
Individualism was in reality only checked for a moment. 
Its power was great, and in the next age it contended 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 119^ 

vigorously with the universaHst system which it had 
accepted from necessity. 

And the Individualism of the period was soon forcibly 
illustrated in the Renaissance. At the time when the 
Papacy was sapping the foundations of its own power by 
destroying that of the Empire, there had been a revival 
of learning in Europe. By its very occurrence, the 
quarrel between Pope and Emperor imperilled the 
dominion of external Universalism. And as the two 
parties deliberately or accidentally encouraged the 
development of criticism, the resultant increase of mental 
activity produced political heresy. Growing indepen- 
dence of thought necessarily favoured the growth of 
Individualism. The exercise of the critical faculty was 
bound to lead some men to abandon the gratification 
of the desire to be ruled and to cause them to fall under 
the influence of the desire to rule. 

But the so-called " First Renaissance " was not 
openly or entirely individualist in spirit. Dante, its 
most noted representative, was largely a universalist. 
He looked for the salvation of society in a revival of 
imperial power, and the De Monarchia is no more than 
an eloquent appeal to the Emperor to perform the higher 
duties of his office. Yet, if only subconsciously, Dante 
himself protested against the dominant theory, and aided 
the development of Individualism. Among the obstacles 
to any complete establishment of external Universalism, 
the lack of a common language is not the least important. 
During the golden age of mediaeval Universahsm, Latin 
was in a measure the general language of mankind; it 
was the medium of worship and of diplomacy. Any 
disuse of Latin was bound to emphasise the divergence 
between states, and thus to encourage men to regard 
their immediate or local interest rather than the general 
welfare of the human race. Hence the most noteworthy 



120 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

protests against papal supremacy came naturally from 
districts in which there was a vigorous and national 
language. The Albigensian movement flourished in the 
Provencal-speaking districts of France; the language 
of the Hussites was Czech. 

Dante seems almost to have appreciated the importance 
of Latin as an agency for the maintenance of external 
Universalism. His De Monarchia was written in that 
language, the true medium in which to express convic- 
tion of the blessings of imperial rule. Nevertheless, he 
assisted to weaken still further the system for which he 
pleaded. The fragment De Vulgari Eloquentia praised 
the writings of the Provengal poets; it discussed and 
at least by implication advocated the creation of an 
Italian language from the dialects commonly spoken 
in the Peninsula. And the Divina Commedia was 
composed in the " vulgar tongue," thereby proving 
that the disuse of Latin would not render impossible 
the attainment of a high degree of literary excellence. 

But the attack of the First Renaissance upon Univer- 
salism was negative rather than positive ; the movement 
was not primarily individualist. The fifteenth-century 
Renaissance, however, was essentially individualist, 
ahke in spirit and influence. The movement was not 
the result of the transference of manuscripts from 
Constantinople to the West, or of a wider diffusion of 
classical learning, or of the labours of a few scholars; 
even the invention of printing was an effect rather than 
a cause. The Renaissance was produced by the satiation 
following upon extreme gratification of the desire to be 
ruled ; it was the first explicit declaration of a sentiment 
always existent in mankind, the expression of the desire 
to rule. It was the natural outcome of the palpable 
failure of external Universalism ; it was a revolt against 
authority, literary, artistic, musical, religious and 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 121 

political. When Laurentius Valla doubted the authen- 
ticity of Livy, when Martin Luther denied the validity 
of papal indulgences, they alike expressed man's im- 
patience of dogma, his resolve to test and to criticise. 
In a sense, a new epoch opened in the intellectual 
history of the world, and yet the Renaissance did no more 
than call into vigorous activity an emotion inherent 
in the human mind. 

The movement necessarily threatened both external 
and internal Universalism. It was directed to free men 
from all submission not grounded upon conviction 
reached after the exercise of private judgment, and it 
could only be that from many no submission would be 
received. In some, the desire to be ruled would doubt- 
less retain its ascendancy; in others, the desire to rule 
would destroy all inclination to accept any form of 
guidance. And since the tendency was in favour of 
a reaction against a hitherto dominant theory, the 
probability was that the majority of mankind would 
refuse obedience, would be profoundly influenced by 
the ideas of the Renaissance. Such was indeed the 
case, though the actual influence of the movement was 
limited by the divisions among its adherents. 

For the Renaissance had two distinct sides. It was 
largely a literary and artistic movement, not concerned 
with the principles either of politics or of religion. So 
far as it did touch politics, it was conservative rather 
than revolutionary, universalist rather than individualist. 
Writers and painters profited from the munificence of 
princes ; they inclined to accept and to praise the abso- 
lute rule of their patrons, from which such obvious 
benefits accrued to them. And the attitude of the 
Renaissance towards religion was, so far as its literary 
and artistic side was concerned, one of practical in- 
difference. The Church had consistently condemned, 



122 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

or at least discouraged, the study of classical literature ; 
it had attempted to divert art into purely religious 
channels. Moreover, the early Fathers, headed by 
Augustine, had declared that the divinities of Greece 
and Rome were real beings, daemons employed by Satan 
to tempt and to perplex the elect. And if, in the course 
of ages, saints had found cause to regret the declining 
activity of their tempters, and if the belief in their 
existence had markedly declined, it was still existent. 
The result was that the literary and artistic side of 
the Renaissance tended almost to produce a revival of 
paganism. Polytheism has always attracted a section 
of mankind; the invocation of saints appeared to have 
given a polytheistic character to Christianity itself. 
When the discovery of classical manuscripts spread 
the knowledge of classical mythology, there were not 
wanting those who, in their admiration for Greece and 
Rome, inclined to revive the belief in the reality of the 
ancient di\'inities, to substitute Venus for the Virgin, the 
gods of Olympus for the apostles and saints. Their 
enthusiasm, however, was slight, and the chief result 
of this side of the Renaissance was not hostility, but 
indifference to the Church. Even so, a further spread 
of external Individualism resulted. Men who had 
become cold in their devotion to Christianity were not 
likely to be ardent in their support of the ideal of 
Christian unity; to them the continued existence of 
Christendom tended to appear as a matter of trivial 
importance. Few regrets were caused by the fall of 
Constantinople. The extinction of a Christian empire 
seemed to be a less momentous event than the recovery 
of some lost author or the printing of some classical 
work; the reverse sustained by religion was almost 
neutralised by the advantage to learning resultant from 
a still wider dispersion of classical manuscripts. 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 1^3 

It is, however, perhaps true to say that the permanent 
importance of the Renaissance lies in the poHtico- 
rehgious revolution which, ,to a certain extent, it 
inaugurated. While many of the leaders of the move- 
ment were practically indifferent to religion, some were 
eager to utilise their increased knowledge in the service 
of Christianity. A fuller acquaintance with the original 
of the New Testament appeared to them to be the 
greatest and almost the sole benefit derivable from the 
new learning; Greek was the language of Paul rather 
than of Plato. And these men, though indubitably 
Christian, were yet out of sympathy with the Church 
as it then was. Their knowledge of the New Testament 
supplied them with grounds for an attack upon current 
abuses and with arguments in favour of the reforms 
which they suggested; they urged the adoption of 
measures similar to those which the leaders of the Con- 
ciliar Movement had advocated. And like the Friars 
of an earlier date, they gave expression to the general 
discontent felt towards the existing system. The 
criticism of Erasmus reflected the feelings of most lay- 
men, and were far more dangerous to the Church as 
constituted than was the almost frankly avowed paganism 
of Laurentius Valla. It soon became clear to all who 
had eyes to see, that a religious revolution could only 
be avoided by the immediate removal of the more 
flagrant abuses. 

To papal supremacy, this agitation for reform was 
fraught with grave peril. It was hardly consistent with 
the theory of the Papacy that guidance should be ac- 
cepted from the general body of Christians, and that 
theory would therefore have been endangered, even if 
the Popes had been ready to reform, if they had 
been men of obvious sincerity and unblemished virtue. 
The danger was substantially increased by the actual 



124 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

character of the occupants of the papal chair. Since 
the time of Martin V, nepotism had steadily increased; 
each Pope seemed to make the exaltation of his family 
the keystone of his policy. And to this political error, 
grave faults of character had been added. Alexander 
VI has attained notoriety in the annals of vice ; Julius II 
was greater as a general than as a bishop; Leo X was 
almost a typical product of the pagan Renaissance. 
From such men it was idle to expect the inauguration 
of reforms, and since the Holy Father would not hear 
the prayers of his children, those children were gradually 
driven to revolt. Criticism which had been friendly 
became hostile; a tendency to question dogmas ap- 
peared; a readiness to accept external Universalism in 
spiritual matters was replaced by advocacy of external 
Individualism. In short, the Christian Renaissance 
developed into a movement almost identical with the 
Reformation. 

That identity, however, was by no means complete. 
Abuses of practice had been attacked by the leaders of 
the Christian Renaissance, but those same leaders had 
preserved the strictest doctrinal orthodoxy. Erasmus 
was disliked and possibly feared by the hierarchy whose 
errors he exposed, but he was in no sense a heretic ; he 
has been regarded as the precursor of Luther, but he 
was more truly the original apostle of the Counter- 
Reformation. More pleaded for greater simplicity of 
worship and for the abandonment of ignorant supersti- 
tion ; but he died rather than deny the doctrine of papal 
supremacy. The leaders of the Reformation were more 
logical or less scrupulous. Luther was not content with 
denouncing the abuse of indulgences; he denied the 
doctrine upon which the issue of indulgences was based. 
Calvin was not content with indicating the vices and 
supporting the reform of episcopal government; he 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 125 

demanded the abolition of the institution. The religious 
sides of the Renaissance and the Reformation were 
indeed rather expressions of a particular sentiment than 
identical movements, nor did the one develop from the 
other, despite the interaction between them. 

During the Middle Ages, authority had been generally 
admitted. It was not usual to doubt the written word ; 
the dicta of Aristotle, of the Fathers, of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, were accepted almost without question. In 
art, literature and music, in politics and in religion, 
certain canons were held to be inviolable. As a result, 
though restriction and guidance at first made deve- 
lopment possible, eventually that development was 
hampered; the desire to be ruled had been too fully 
gratified, and extreme gratification produced the evils 
inseparable from excess. Hence, the inevitable reaction 
occurred. Upon a readiness to submit to authority 
in all things, a refusal to submit at all followed; and 
of this reaction the Renaissance is one expression, the 
Reformation is another. The two movements are 
allied, but the occurrence of each was independent of 
the other. Between them there was even a certain 
hostility; the culture and moderation of the Renais- 
sance were antipathetic to the relative crudity and 
violence of the Reformers. 

To the Reformation there was a religious and a pohtical 
side, both of which were essentially individualist. On 
its religious side, the movement consisted primarily in 
the assertion of the right of private judgment. Men 
had, during the Middle Ages, subordinated their judg- 
ment to that of the Church, which they regarded as 
infaUible, upon which they rehed to guide them and to 
determine their conduct. The doctrine of justification 
by works arose; the Church ordained what should be 
done to acquire eternal salvation. At first, this doctrine 



126 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

was readily accepted. But the Church lost the con- 
fidence of manldnd, and implicit reverence turned to 
deep mistrust. Men no longer felt that the clergy 
could inform them with certainty what to believe and 
what to do. They regarded the Church as fallible in 
many respects ; they suspected that the works ordained 
to be done might be either wholly inacceptable to God 
or at least insufficient to preserve from damnation. 
Another doctrine of justification became necessary; 
the right of private judgment, already applied to the 
practice of the Church, was still further exercised. 
And as there was no longer any body the guidance of 
which could be implicitly accepted, as the Bible itself 
could not be put forward, owing to its need of interpreta- 
tion on some points and its silence upon others, the 
doctrine of justification by works was abandoned, and 
the doctrine of justification by faith introduced. The 
religious Reformation was thus wholly individualist. The 
individual was to judge for himself ; he was to enter into 
direct, personal relationship with God. A freedom of 
opinion bordering upon anarchy was to be permitted; 
the desire to rule was to be gratified to the fullest extent. 
Nor was the political side of the Reformation less 
individualist than the religious, of which it was partially 
the outcome. It was directed in the first instance 
towards the destruction of papal supremacy. The 
Popes had always insisted upon the infallibility of 
the Church. They had demanded complete submission, 
and were therefore altogether opposed to the exercise 
of private judgment and to the doctrine of justification 
by faith. The Papacy, moreover, appeared to have 
produced and to maintain ecclesiastical abuses. Its 
supremacy was essentialty universalist, alien in con- 
ception and in spirit from that Individualism of which 
the Reformation was an expression. 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 127 

But though the poHtical side of the movement was at 
first directed against papal supremacy, its scope was 
soon extended. The rulers of many states were them- 
selves ecclesiastics ; they realised that their own author- 
ity was intimately associated with that of the Pope. 
Nor were secular princes without alarm as to the con- 
sequences of the rejection of papal supremacy. An 
individualist movement was not unlikely to lead to a 
revival of those centrifugal tendencies which had been 
suppressed in the previous age; it was noticeable that 
in France Protestantism secured most adherents in those 
districts which had displayed the greatest reluctance to 
submit to rule from Paris, ReUgious heresy was felt 
to be liable to produce political heresy. As unity of 
reUgion was a factor favouring unity of government, so 
religious disunion might be the prelude to political 
disunion. Rulers, therefore, came into conflict with 
the Reformation less on account of the orthodoxy of 
their own beliefs than from motives of policy; the re- 
sultant persecutions were in a majority of instances less 
religious than political. Francis I was hostile to the 
Huguenots; yet his dubious Catholicism was indicated 
by his alliance with the Turks, at a moment when the 
aggression of Suleiman threatened still further to limit 
the domain of Christianity in south-eastern Europe. 
Henry H inaugurated the era of persecution in France ; 
he also allied with the German Protestants against the 
Catholic Habsburgs. 

And the answer made by the Protestants to persecu- 
tion was also political. Just as ecclesiastical opposition 
to the exercise of private judgment had produced the 
doctrine of justification by faith, so royal opposition to 
the same theory produced an attack upon the basis 
of poHtical authority. It must, however, be admitted 
that an individualist movement was bound to lead to 



128 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

a questioning of internal Universalism. Even in those 
countries of which the rulers supported the Reformation, 
the reformers did not normally preach absolutist doctrines. 
They advocated obedience to the crown, but they tended 
to make that obedience depend on the continued good- 
will of the king towards themselves, to substitute a 
species of limited monarchy for the prevalent despotic 
system. 

The Reformation, therefore, inclined towards the 
attainment of a degree of Individualism productive of 
anarchy, intellectual and political; such anarchy was 
the logical result of the full exercise of the right of 
private judgment. This tendency of the movement 
appears clearly in the history of the period. In Germany 
the preaching of Luther was followed by the outbreak of 
the Peasants' War. That rising the reformer emphatic- 
ally condemned, nor can it be contended that his teach- 
ing was directly responsible for it. Luther owed much 
to the friendship of the Elector of Saxony ; his political 
theories reflected his sense of obligation, and he was 
the champion rather of absolutism than of anarchy in 
secular affairs. Nevertheless, the Peasants' War was 
closely associated with the Reformation. Those who had 
preached the rejection of papal authority could hardly 
be very convincing advocates of submission to royal 
authority ; that which their teaching gained in practical 
merit, it lost in logical excellence. And as must always 
be the case, there were many who either could not 
or would not appreciate the limitations of a theory. 
Private judgment had been exalted; it was a refinement 
to limit its exercise to religion. So it was that the 
Reformation assisted to produce popular outbreaks, 
despite the efforts of its leaders to check such outbreaks. 
Even such extremists as the Anabaptists, preachers of a 
communistic republic and free love, were only the logical 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 129 

product of the theory that the individual was all- 
important, that he should submit to no restraint save 
that which he chose to impose upon himself. 

Far more im.portant than such occasional ebulUtions 
as the Anabaptist outbreak and the Peasants' War was 
the new political theory put forward by the Huguenots. 
The idea had gradually arisen that kings held their 
office by divine right, that they were responsible to God 
alone, and that resistance to them partook of the nature 
of sin. But when the authority of government was 
employed against the right of private judgment and 
for the persecution of those who deviated from the 
orthodox path, the Protestants were driven to resist 
and to attempt a justification of their resistance; the 
desire to be ruled was quenched in them, and for a time 
the desire to rule gained an ascendancy over their minds. 
They produced a new theory of politics, basing the 
authority of kings not upon a divine commission, but 
upon a social contract. The king was regarded as being 
merely the heutenant of his subjects, bound to perform 
certain functions, removable in event of failure. Mon- 
archy was no longer considered as the sole legitimate 
type of government ; a republic was equally admissible. 
And the judge of royal conduct was the people. 
The theory was thus individualist, since the people 
consisted of many individuals, each one of whom had 
the privilege of settling his own opinions. It was the 
application of the right of private judgment to politics, 
and its logical outcome was anarchy, an anarchy based 
upon a complete political theory. 

The same individualist spirit appeared in most of the 
political movements of the age. Even the capture of 
Constantinople failed to unite the Christian powers ; the 
foremost champion of Europe against Mohammed II was 
Scanderbeg, an obscure Albanian chieftain of dubious 

z 



130 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

orthodoxy. At first sight, the poHcy of Venice may 
appear to have been directed to maintain the cause of 
Christendom, but this was due to the accidental identifi- 
cation of that cause with the economic interests of the 
RepubHc in the Levant. For the rest, an era of hitherto 
unparalleled selfishness dawned. The Emperor Maxi- 
milian I imitated his father, Frederic III, in his pursuit 
of the dynastic ambitions of the Habsburgs to the 
exclusion of all other considerations. Of the Popes, 
Pius II preached a crusade, to be beguiled by promises 
and to die broken-hearted at Ancona. His successors 
cared only for the establishment of their authority over 
the Patrimony and the exaltation of their families. If 
they advocated common action against the Turks, their 
appeals were heard with sceptical amusement,, and the 
true motive for them sought in some project for the 
advantage of a papal nephew. France and Spain 
contended for the mastery of Italy, and such inter- 
mission of their hostility as occurred became the occasion 
for unscrupulous bargaining concerning the spoils of 
the Peninsula. The contemporary maxims of inter- 
national morality are revealed by Machiavelli. For 
the first time, self-interest was openly admitted to be 
the true guiding principle determining the policy of a 
state. All idea of a commonwealth of Christian nations 
seemed to have disappeared; external Universalism 
seemed to be dead and buried. 

Internally, a similar Individualism prevailed, if less 
completely. Centralised governments had developed 
from the necessities of national self-preservation, but 
such governments were now held to have fulfilled their 
function. The period was one in which anti-monarchical 
ideas gained a wide currency. Despite the praises 
lavished by the Renaissance writers on Lorenzo de 
Medici, and on other princely patrons of the arts, the 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 131 

" tyrannies," into which the city repubHcs of Italy had 
been converted, were generally unpopular. The Medici 
were expelled from Florence. The Aragonese dynasty 
at Naples and the Sforzas at Milan owed their rapid 
fall before the French invader to the alienation of their 
subjects. In Spain, the rising of the Comuneros was a 
protest against the centralising policy of Ferdinand and 
Isabella, and somewhat similar unrest appears in the 
dominions of the House of Habsburg. 

But the order of human life is conflict, and there was 
conflict in the age of the Reformation. The ascendancy 
of the desire to rule was not more, but rather less, com- 
plete than had been the previous ascendancy of the 
desire to be ruled. The leaders of the Reformation 
themselves were not wholly individualist. Luther's 
work, it is true, was little more than destructive; 
primarily the champion of private judgment, he was 
unable in any real sense to organise a Church. Admis- 
sion of coercive power must be the ultimate basis of 
any ecclesiastical society, no less than of any political 
society; if the priesthood possesses no superiority over 
the laity, religious anarchy is the inevitable result. But 
logically the Reformation disclaimed coercion. By im- 
plication it advocated the destruction of every form 
of rule, since all men were €qual in the sight of God, all 
equally fitted to judge of that which was requisite for 
salvation. Even Luther, however, was not entirely 
consistent. He frankly defended the theory of passive 
obedience in temporal matters. In things spiritual, 
his insistence upon the doctrine of justification by faith, 
his condemnation of papal supremacy and of papal 
dogmas, suggested a limitation of private judgment. 
He was, in fact, the victim of that necessity which com- 
pels thinkers to build where they have destroyed, to 
be positive as well as negative. No man can divest 



132 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

himself of one side of his nature. Those who most 
emphatically assert their desire to rule, who most strenu- 
ously urge others to gratify that desire, tend at the same 
time to limit its gratification. They demand authority 
over their fellows, since they claim to deny to others 
the right to submit. In the mind of every man, 
the two desires exist always side by side, engaged 
in an eternal conflict. The inconsistency of Martin 
Luther was little more than the measure of his 
humanity. 

Yet he was, perhaps, the most logical of the reformers. 
In his hands, the movement was mainly negative, and 
as such, though it might win converts, it was unlikely 
long to retain their allegiance. This was realised to the 
full by John Calvin, and he forthwith supplied the need- 
ful constructive leadership. While accepting in theory 
the two great principles of the right of private judgment 
and justification by faith, in practice he denied both. 
The Bible was admitted to be the sole standard of human 
conduct, but it was the Bible as interpreted at Geneva. 
Faith alone was needed to save men from damnation, 
but it was the faith of Geneva. No Pope ever repressed 
heresy or silenced hostile opinion with greater vigour 
than did this champion of spiritual liberty. If the 
Catholic Church condemned to death those who rejected 
transubstantiation, Calvinism made life impossible for 
those who declined to believe that they were eternally 
predestined either for Heaven or for Hell. The Calvin- 
ists evolved the doctrine of the social contract. They 
were prepared to justify rebellion and even tyrannicide, 
if any ruler were unfavourable to them. But at the 
same time they showed that if possessed of authority, 
they would use it with vigour and effect. They realised 
that their own preservation depended upon some 
enforcement of discipline; they discovered that a high 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 133 

degree of internal Universalism was not incompatible 
with their individualist principles. 

The Universalism of the reformers, however, may be 
regarded as accidental, the product of necessity and fear, 
and the universalist theory received far more positive 
and deliberate support. The growth of Individualism 
provoked earnest resistance. While Luther preached 
the right of private judgment and thundered against 
papal claims, Charles V stood forth as a new champion 
of authority and order. But he was a practical states- 
man. He realised that the mediaeval system was a thing 
of the past, that it was impossible to revive the ascend- 
ancy of the old imperial ideal. Even a Frederic Bar- 
barossa had been driven to rely upon material as well 
as upon moral force; such reliance was infinitely more 
necessary in the era of the Reformation. It was idle 
to hope that the outworn dogma of universal lordship 
would win acceptance when every theory was being 
subjected to the fiercest criticism. 

No such idle hope inspired or deluded the Emperor 
Charles V. For him, the imperial position was only 
a means to an end. No doubt he did much to revive 
imperial power and prestige. He forced the German 
princes to show unwonted respect for their nominal 
overlord. During his expeditions to Tunis and Algiers, 
he did appear for a moment in the traditional role of 
his great namesake, as the champion of the Cross against 
the Crescent. Yet for the Empire in the truest sense, 
for the ideal of a united Christendom, he cared not at all. 
To extend the power of the Habsburgs was his ambition ; 
Spanish military power was the means upon which he 
relied for the attainment of this ambition. He elaborated 
the tentative ideas of his predecessors; he almost 
evolved a new theory of empire. His authority was to 
be based, not upon mankind's acceptance of a political 



134 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

ideal, but upon their recognition of material necessity. 
If he aspired to be no less lord of the world than Charles 
the Great had been, if his success would have produced 
an actual unity of Christendom, yet his lordship would 
have been akin to that of territorial rulers, the unity 
dynastic rather than imperial. 

The attitude of Charles towards the imperial office 
displayed his indifference to the formerly accepted 
theory of the Empire. In the Middle Ages, the title of 
Emperor had only been assumed after the imperial 
coronation at Rome. Maximilian I had supplied a 
precedent for disregarding the rite of coronation by 
assuming the title of Emperor-Elect. Charles, following 
this example, assumed the title of Emperor without 
qualification. And if he did eventually undergo the 
ceremony of coronation by the Pope, this was intended 
rather to signalise his Italian triumph than to be a 
tardy concession to the practice of his predecessors. 
Charles V was an external universalist, but his Uni- 
versalism was not that of the mediaeval Emperors. 
They had aspired to a moral supremacy ; he relied upon 
force. They had conceived of themselves as the first 
servants of the Christian Church ; he aimed at founding 
a European dominion in the House of Habsburg. 

Charles V failed in his design. Certain causes of his 
failure may be readily discovered. France was in- 
veterately hostile ; other European states were extremely 
jealous. The dominions of the Habsburgs were hetero- 
geneous in the extreme, and their ruler was embarrassed 
by Turkish attacks and by the disaffection of the 
German Protestants. Ferdinand, to whom the Emperor 
had handed over the immediate government of the 
Austrian provinces, hardly concealed his hostility and 
dislike towards his brother. And throughout his reign, 
Charles was constantly handicapped by lack of men 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 135 

and money ; even the strongest armies which he raised 
suffered from that indisciphne which is the inevitable 
result of lack of pay. 

But the real cause of Charles' failure lies in the 
Individualism of the period. The time had passed when 
nations would submit to alien rule without resistance; 
they refused to permit the sacrifice of their own interests 
to dynastic ambitions. Internally, the efforts of Charles 
to increase his authority and to produce a measure of 
centralisation met with opposition upon all sides. In 
earlier ages, the government of the Roman Empire had 
been accepted because the desire to be ruled dominated 
mankind, because that nationality which is the outcome 
of the desire to rule was hardly existent. By the time 
of Charles V, the desire to rule had gained strength. 
An acute observer of the age could have gauged from 
those events which had occurred 8.nd were occurring the 
impracticability of the Emperor's schemes. 

Philip II of Spain was sufficiently acute partially to 
realise these facts. He understood that, in view of the 
determined external Individuahsm of a great part of 
Europe, the imposition of universal rule by force alone 
was impossible. It was his object, therefore, to dis- 
cover means which would enable him to persuade where 
he could not compel, and he believed that in religious 
conformity he had discovered such means. During the 
Middle Ages, the general acceptance of external Uni- 
versalism had been favoured by the existing identity of 
religious belief. Philip II argued that a restoration of 
such identity would produce a revival of external 
Universalism. To a certain extent his opinion was 
justifiable. But he failed to appreciate the fact that 
identity of opinion was itself the product of the desire 
to be ruled; he did not realise the interaction between 
that desire and its product; he tended to mistake the 



136 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

effect for the cause. Herein lay the secret of his failure. 
He laboured to produce a unity of Christendom based 
upon the material strength of Spain and the moral 
power of orthodoxy. But the former was unequal to the 
task of compulsion and the latter failed to command 
general assent in an individualist age. The desire to 
rule was stronger than the desire to be ruled. 

Indeed, the very attempt to establish a moral basis 
for his dominion contributed to his defeat. Not content 
with the promotion of external Universalism, he strove 
also to establish internal Universalism. His system 
demanded that he should have power to coerce the 
opinions of his subjects. Hence he aroused the greater 
opposition ; to foreign war, rebellion was added. In the 
path of his universalist policy abroad stood Elizabeth 
of England, the very incarnation of the spirit of external 
Individualism. In the path of his universalist policy 
at home arose the Dutch Republic. The movement 
which produced the revolt of the United Provinces 
aimed originally at local self-government. It gained 
strength from the circumstance that Philip's system 
was not confined to the enforcement of political con- 
formity, but extended to the enforcement of mental 
conformity. Philip II did not fail because he was a 
bigot or a persecutor. His bigotry was not so intense 
as to prevent him from treating the Pope as cavalierly 
as any Protestant might have done. He could advocate 
toleration when persecution seemed likely to defeat his 
political ends. He failed because he was so well able to 
grasp the necessities of his age, so unable to grasp them 
fuUy. Essentially just in his belief that a moral basis 
for his dominion was necessary, he missed the truth that 
the greatest danger to that dominion lay in mankind's 
dislike of the particular moral basis which he projected. 

The policy of Charles V and Philip II was universalist, 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 137 

but its spirit was alien from that of mediaeval Universal- 
ism ; their efforts were directed to promote the interest 
of a particular dynasty. At the same time, there was a 
movement towards the restoration of something akin 
to the mediaeval system. The Counter-Reformation 
may be described as an attempt by the more thoughtful 
universalists to rectify those evils which they deplored, 
and which afforded the best justification for Individual- 
ism. The leaders of the movement grasped the point 
which Philip II missed. They saw that if unity were 
to be given back to the Church, the desire to be ruled 
must be revived. They further appreciated two im- 
portant facts. They realised that the desire to rule had 
been promoted by the internal disorder of the Church; 
that the restoration of unity and of ecclesiastical 
supremacy depended upon the effecting of certain 
requisite reforms in the practice of the Church. More- 
over, they realised that the Reformation was largely 
the result of men's incHnation to speculate upon all 
topics, that many had been led to indulge in speculation 
rather from ignorance of the orthodox view than from 
any actual heretical leanings. They saw that it was 
not enough to forbid debate; it was necessary to make 
it clear that those who debated were in grave danger 
of falling into heresy. In short, the leaders of uni- 
versalist opinion wished to give the Church greater 
purity of life and practice, greater clarity of doctrine, 
that the rule of Universalism might be restored. 

The Counter-Reformation was an attempt to supply 
these requisites. The Council of Trent, perhaps origin- 
ally assembled with some faint hope of reconciling 
the Protestants with the Church, became an almost 
violently Catholic body. It proposed to effect the 
doctrinal extinction of Protestantism ; for this purpose, 
it defined the fundamentals of orthodox belief in un- 



138 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

mistakable terms. No one could any longer pretend 
that communion with Rome was compatible with the 
holding of Lutheran or Calvinistic doctrines; no one 
could excuse his heresy by pleading inability to discover 
the actual dogmas of the Church. 

Simultaneously, the foundation of new religious 
orders, such as the Theatines and the Ursulines, con- 
verted the Church once more into an agency making 
for the uplifting of mankind. The clergy were brought 
again into close touch with the people. The lives of 
Popes and greater ecclesiastics ceased to be a source 
of scandal; they became models of Christian virtue. 
Moral turpitude could no longer be regarded, even by 
the most bigoted Protestants, as a necessary character- 
istic of Catholicism. It was incont est ably proved that 
gratification of the desire to be ruled was consistent 
with the maintenance of the most lofty standards in 
private life. Virtue ceased to be the monopoly of 
Protestant reformers. 

But the success of the Counter-Reformation was 
ultimately due less to the internal changes effected in 
the Church and to the definition of doctrine than to 
the labours of the Society of Jesus. The members of 
that Society fought the Protestants largely with their 
own weapons. The Reformation stood for personal 
service and devotion; it attracted many because it 
demanded a willingness to face peril, to bear all persecu- 
tion for the sake of truth. The Jesuit missionaries set 
an example of hitherto unparalleled self-sacrifice; they 
gave their wealth, their lives, their very wills to the 
service of their Order and of the Catholic Church. In 
a measure, the Reformation was the outcome of the 
intellectual activity of the age; it attracted many by 
offering them the right to increase their knowledge. 
The Jesuits undertook the education of the world. 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 139 

They gratified mankind's desire for knowledge, proving 
both by example and precept that a high measure of 
mental development could be attained within the 
Church no less than without it. They turned the 
learning of the age into channels which would make it 
flow to the profit of Catholicism. They inculcated the 
habit of submission to authority by the indirect method 
of secular instruction; they trained generations to find 
in them the best guides to every branch of knowledge. 

The Reformation asserted the right of private judg- 
ment; many had welcomed it because they made their 
mental liberty an excuse for the freer gratification of 
their sensual desires. The Jesuits did not assert the 
right of private judgment; they did not burden men 
with the necessity of finding for themselves the true path 
to happiness in this world and in the world to come. 
But they eagerly accepted the work of hearing con- 
fessions, and in this capacity they emphasised rather 
the tolerance of the Church to her faithful children than 
her determination to dominate the minds of her subjects. 
Their penitents were impressed by the fact that reproba- 
tion of their sins did not preclude an easy pardon, that 
the punishment imposed upon them was duly propor- 
tioned to the frailty of their natures, that from the 
Catholic Church they could receive a complete absolution 
which elsewhere they might seek in vain. Luther bade 
sinners repent and make their own peace with an aveng- 
ing God ; the Society of Jesus also bade sinners repent, 
but would mediate their peace. The Jesuits were 
prepared to assure men of the acceptance of their 
repentance by Him Whose name the Society had 
adopted; the sinner was condemned only to perform 
some simple act in proof of his sinceritj/. And as the 
Jesuits became the most popular confessors, they were 
the more able to confirm the faith of waverers. They 



I40 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

found themselves able to admit that those who remained 
within the Church and accepted her authority might be 
allowed much divergence of private opinion. 

The Jesuits, indeed, turned Individualism itself to 
serve their own purposes. The most stalwart champions 
of Universalism, they yet enunciated a political theory 
hardly dissimilar from that of the Calvinists. They i 
advocated resistance to heretical governments; they 
admitted the frequent legitimacy of tyrannicide. And 
their influence was the greater since their organisation 
was military, their obedience implicit; because the 
whole Society acted according to the will of one absolute 
general. And they had the additional advantage of 
believing themselves to be justified in the use of any 
means for the attainment of their ends. 

In their skilful hands, the Counter-Reformation was 
largely successful. Their subtlety enabled them to 
avail themselves to the uttermost of man's attachment 
to the old. All those who desired to remain within the 
Church, but desired also some intellectual activity, were 
won back from heretical opinions. All those who had 
drifted rather than deliberately turned from the orthodox 
path were reclaimed. 

But the Counter-Reformation was not entirely vic- 
torious. Its success was limited by the existence of 
the desire to rule. Individualism had attained definite 
expression; it could in no wise be entirely crushed or 
silenced. Many were not beguiled even by the ingenuity 
of the Jesuits; many peoples would in no case tolerate 
any reassertion of that external Uni-versalism expressed 
in the theory of papal supremacy. If Ireland and 
southern Europe were held to their allegiance, if Poland, 
the Habsburg dominions and much of southern Germany 
returned to the communion of Rome, yet England, 
Scotland, Scandinavia and northern Germany remained 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 141 

obstinately Protestant. And in the presence of so great 
a hostile force, the supremacy of the Pope had of neces- 
sity to be exercised with moderation and discretion. 
Mediaeval external Universalism was gone, never to 
return. 

Internally, there was an equally bitter conflict between 
the two desires. Gradually and laboriously, during the 
later Middle Ages, the internal Individualism of most 
countries had been subdued ; royal power had been 
extended, the triumph of centralised monarchy seemed 
to be assured. But, as ever, the moment of triumph 
was the moment of defeat. Men had, as it were, prepared 
to submit to governance, to acceptance of the existing 
order, when the Renaissance urged them to retain at 
least their mental liberty. And upon the Renaissance 
followed the Great Discoveries. During the Middle 
Ages, the unquestioning acceptance of certain supposed 
geographical facts had hampered private enterprise 
and had impeded the development of Individualism. 
But the growth of a critical spirit produced an inclina- 
tion to dispute the truth of the oldest and apparently 
most proven beliefs. Men dared to doubt the validity 
of current theories of geography, and from this doubt 
resulted voyages of adventure culminating in the Great 
Discoveries. 

Those discoveries in turn reacted upon the human 
mind. At this distance of time, and when the entire 
surface of the globe has been measured and mapped with 
approximate accuracy, it is impossible to realise the 
sensation caused by the sudden appearance of new 
continents, a sudden apparent increase in the area of the 
world. But the results of that sensation may be clearly 
discerned. Doubt, and the courage to act upon doubt, 
had led to the opening up of possibilities undreamt of in 
any previous age, to the acquisition of untold wealth 



142 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

in new lands of fabulous extent and fertility. It was 
not to be expected that men who had braved, and 
braved so successfully, the dangers of the physical un- 
known world would be readily terrified by the more 
remote dangers of the spiritual unknown. Among the 
causes productive of that rejection of ecclesiastical 
authority which was found in the Reformation, the 
encouragement to doubt afforded by the Great Dis- 
coveries must hold a foremost place. It is true that the 
pioneer explorers, the Portuguese and Spaniards, held 
to their original orthodoxy ; they were absorbed in the 
pursuit of material wealth, and gold seemed to deaden 
their intellectual spirit. But those peoples who entered 
later into the field of adventure, the EngHsh and the 
Huguenots, the Dutch and the Scandinavians, became 
the natural champions of a new rehgious creed, the most 
zealous enemies of ecclesiastical domination. Nor were 
they more ready to accept without dispute the prevalent 
theories of government and politics. The Great Dis- 
coveries resulted from the Renaissance spirit; they 
aided that spirit in producing an atmosphere of 
unrest. 

That unrest found expression in civil commotions in 
France, the Low Countries and Germany, in the so- 
called Wars of ReHgion. In those struggles, religion 
was certainly a factor ; it was not the only or most potent 
factor. In France, it supplied the most obvious line 
of division between the two parties; it was probably 
responsible for much of the bitterness of the conflict. 
But other lines of division may be easily discovered. 
Between north and south there was a long-standing 
rivalry, born of divergence in race, language and tradi- 
tion. Between the great families there were long- 
standing feuds. The Bourbons were jealous of the 
Guises; the older nobles hated the newer. The adop- 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 143 

tion of Huguenot opinions may in many cases be traced 
to personal antipathies. 

None of these facts, however, supply the ultimate 
cause of the civil war. That cause is to be found in the 
growth of individualist ideas; the conflict was a phase 
in the eternal struggle between the desire to be ruled 
and the desire to rule. On the one hand, the supporters 
of Catherine de Medici, of the Guises and of the Poli- 
tiques aimed at some increase in the control of the state 
over its subjects, though they advocated different means 
for the attainment of this end and though they desired 
the same end for different reasons. A wish to pro- 
duce religious conformity played but a small part in 
the conflict. Catherine de Medici was prepared upon 
occasion to grant a wide toleration; the Politiques 
would gladly have shelved all religious questions in the 
interest of national unity. The massacre of St. Bartholo- 
mew was the result rather of jealousy than of religious 
conviction ; the crime of Coligny was not his heresy but 
his ascendancy over the mind of Charles IX. If the 
Guises relied more definitely upon Catholicism, the 
explanation of this fact was that they were aliens and 
could find no other basis of power. 

Nor were the Huguenots purer in their opinions or 
aims. They represented the centrifugal tendencies of 
the south ; they were the champions of anti -monarchical, 
and even of republican, ideas. Their cities aimed at 
local independence; the essential principle of their 
conduct is to be found in their desire to be free from 
control. At a later date, when they came into conflict 
with the centralising policy of Richelieu, they were 
ready to ally with Spain, the supposed champion of 
Catholicism; they would not accept religious tolera- 
tion unaccompanied by practical local independence. 
Throughout its history, the Huguenot movement was 



144 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

little more than the championship of internal In- 
dividualism against universalist tendencies in govern- 
ment. It found its chief support in those districts 
which were least French, which were traditionally 
opposed to the rule of Paris. The conflict culminated 
in the triumph of internal Universalism. The con- 
solidation of despotism followed naturally upon the 
defeat of the advocates of an individualist political 
theory. 

It is, indeed, a feature common to the conflicts of this 
period that while external Universalism was normally 
defeated, internal Universalism on the whole triumphed. 
No movement, perhaps, was more essentially directed 
against external Universalism than the rising of the 
Dutch; no movement was more clearly individualist 
in its internal aspect. It was a direct attack upon 
the centralising, despotic system of Philip II. It was 
produced by his destruction of municipal liberties, his 
attempted reform of the bishoprics, his employment 
of Spanish ministers, and his enforcement of religious 
conformity. It was no more an entirely religious move- 
ment than were the French Wars of Religion. The wish 
of the nobles to retain their position and the power to 
provide for their younger sons, the wish of the burghers 
to preserve their liberties and to avoid taxation, operated 
to combine in defence of Protestantism many who were 
Catholics by inclination and even by conviction. The 
enemies or victims of Spain were not invariably heretics. 
Egmont's orthodoxy was beyond dispute; William the 
Silent's heresy was long dubious. Had Philip been the 
very pattern of religious tolerance, the revolt of the 
United Provinces might have lost some of its bitter- 
ness ; it would none the less have occurred. The Dutch 
were wedded to the idea of Individualism, external and 
internal. 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 145 

Yet even here the triumph of IndividuaHsm was not 
complete. A republic, a loose federation, was theoretic- 
ally created by the Union of Utrecht; the constituent 
states were theoretically granted as large a measure of 
local independence as was consistent with safety. They 
were, perhaps, theoretically granted more than was 
consistent either with safety or with the permanence 
of the state. But in practice the Union of Utrecht was 
revised. A single Stathalter was created in place of 
many; he secured a degree of power not contemplated 
in the framing of the original constitution. The wealth 
of the state of Holland, its control over foreign affairs, 
reduced the independence of the other provinces to 
little more than a shadow. The confederation became 
rather a veiled monarchy than a republic. Internal 
Universalism secured a notable triumph. 

Internal Universalism, though perhaps to a lesser 
degree, triumphed also in the Thirty Years' War. There 
is a marked similarity between this conflict in Germany 
and the Wars of Religion in France. In each, religion 
appears as the most obvious cause of dispute; in each, 
there may be found the same strife between local and 
national interests, between Universalism and Indi- 
vidualism. Ferdinand II, Maximilian of Bavaria and 
Wallenstein were alike champions of centralised power 
rather than of religious uniformity. The Emperor 
aimed at the reassertion of almost obsolete imperial 
rights in the interest of his family ; Germany was to be 
united in religion, that it might be united also under 
Austrian government. The same conception of unity 
appealed to Maximilian of Bavaria; it was to attain 
unity that the Catholic League was formed. But 
between Ferdinand and Maximilian there was one point 
of fundamental divergence. The latter proposed that 
the House of Wittelsbach should assume the position 



146 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

which the former assigned to the House of Habs- 
burg. 

Wallenstein was equally an exponent of unity, though 
he paid no regard to the dynastic interests either of 
Ferdinand or of Maximilian. He seems to have aimed 
at a restoration of imperial power. His desire was 
certainly to be the indispensable minister of the Emperor, 
but he did not care whether that Emperor was or was 
not a Habsburg. He would appear to have been actuated 
by a curious, almost altruistic, attachment to the abstract 
principle of imperialism. Yet, however greatly the three 
leaders of the Catholic party differed in their aims, they 
were agreed in championing German unity, in being 
exponents of internal Universalism. 

On the other hand, the resistance offered to the 
Catholic League was largely the result of jealousy of the 
Habsburgs and of rivalry between the two branches of 
the Wittelsbachs. Maximilian of Bavaria regarded the 
attainment of the electoral dignity as a first step towards 
the establishment of his ascendancy in Germany. His 
relative, Frederic, Elector Palatine, feared that the vic- 
tory of Bavaria would destroy his own position. And 
the Calvinist princes in general dreaded the result of 
Habsburg success. Their support of the Bohemian 
malcontents, their resistance to the exercise of the 
Bohemian vote in the imperial election, were alike due 
to their wish to maintain their local freedom. 

To the same fear of domination may be attributed the 
hostility aroused by the Edict of Restitution ; the right 
to secularise ecclesiastical lands implied an increase 
of princely independence. Nor were John George 
of Saxony and George William of Brandenburg, the 
apostles of the status quo, less opposed to any unitary 
schemes. They were resolved to prevent either an 
extension of imperial power or the entire overthrow of 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 147 

the Emperor. They wished to conserve a system under 
which they had acquired so large a measure of indepen- 
dence, and their vacillating attitude towards the struggle 
was the result of their determination to prevent any 
change in the existing Germanic constitution. They 
always opposed the party by which that constitution 
appeared to be threatened. 

Even Gustavus Adolphus himself, the great protagonist 
of Protestantism, was actuated by individualist motives. 
Sweden needed above all things a field for expansion. 
The Polish war secured for her the control of the Baltic 
Provinces. The German expedition was necessary for 
the completion of the work begun in Poland. Wallen- 
stein threatened to establish in Pomerania a new power 
which would threaten Swedish control of the Baltic, 
and Gustavus Adolphus invaded Germany to prevent 
the complete undoing of that which he had already 
half done. His policy was dictated rather by affection 
for Sweden than by any special love for his German 
co-religionists. 

And after the death of Gustavus Adolphus, the decisive 
intervention of Richelieu was determined by the actual 
or supposed necessities of France. A Catholic and a 
cardinal saved German Protestantism from destruction, 
because a divided Germany was an advantage to the 
House of Bourbon. In short, the Thirty Years' War, 
rightly regarded, was but another phase in the secular 
conflict between Universalism and Individualism. 

And as in the French Wars of Religion, so in the 
Thirty Years' War, the victory lay with internal Uni- 
versalism, though the peculiar circumstances of Germany 
tend to obscure this fact. The attempt to secure unity, 
whether under the Habsburgs or under a branch of the 
Wittelsbachs, was defeated. But this defeat may be 
attributed to the traditional association of the Emperor 



148 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

with the mediaeval idea of external Universalism, the 
day for which had passed, and to the fact that Germany 
was rather a conglomeration of states than in any real 
sense a single state. It was external Individualism 
which triumphed at Westphalia. The destruction of the 
last vestiges of the old imperial power facilitated and was 
followed by a development of internal Universalism in 
the constituent provinces of the Empire. The right of 
princes to pursue an independent foreign policy was 
recognised ; their right to determine the religion of their 
subjects admitted. It was inevitable that such conces- 
sions should be followed by an increase of the power of 
the ruler in each state, since those rulers were no longer 
limited on two important points by theoretical sub- 
ordination to the Emperor. The appearance of such 
sovereigns as the Great Elector was the natural result 
of the settlement reached in the Treaties of Westphalia. 

Those treaties mark a definite epoch in the history 
of the world. The old type of external Universalism 
ceased to exist. The Holy Roman Empire had in 
reality died with Frederic II; its moribund condition 
was now recognised. The world - dominion of the 
Papacy had passed away with Boniface VIII; the 
recognition of this fact by Europe was emphasised in 
the contemptuous disregard of papal opposition to the 
terms of the Peace of Westphalia. And the old type 
of internal Individualism equally disappeared. The 
assertion of local independence by petty nobles was no 
longer possible. The day of centralised monarchies had 
dawned, and resistance to those monarchies, to be suc- 
cessful, had to be something more than the ambitious 
self-assertion of an individual or of a faction. 

But the nature of man precluded all possibility of a 
permanent, or even of a temporary, cessation of conflict. 
Externally and internally, the struggle had of necessity 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 149 

to continue. Externally, men soon perceived the danger 
of perpetual war; the reaction towards a species of 
Universalism antedated the assurance of Individual! sm's 
victory. That reaction was foreshadowed by Grotius; 
his De Jure Belli et Pads was an initial step towards the 
discovery of a new justification of external Universalism. 
Internally, unrest was hardly stilled, though in a 
sense the victory of internal Universalism was more 
complete than that of external Individualism. In the 
Dutch Republic, the overthrow of the House of Orange 
marked a reaction against the growing strength of the 
central power. In France, Marie de Medici almost 
succumbed to the turbulence of the nobles; Richelieu 
was forced to reduce La Rochelle before he could pursue 
his designs abroad. After his death, Mazarin was faced 
by the outbreak of the Fronde, an expression not only 
of the unwillingness of the nobles to submit to control, 
but also of the more widespread feeling that despotism 
was an imperfect t5^pe of government. The pretensions 
of the Parliament of Paris to exercise the powers of a 
representative body were crushed by Louis XIV, but 
though his reign was marked by almost complete 
political silence, discontent still muttered. At rare 
intervals, signs of resistance appeared, even during the 
height of the ancien regime ; Vauban found that system 
imperfect. Generally speaking, however, the limita- 
tions upon internal Universalism were more real than 
apparent. Such expressions of unrest as the hostility 
to Christina in Sweden and the rebellion of Massaniello 
at Naples only served to emphasise the almost uni- 
versal existence of superficial peace. The Treaties of 
Westphalia, in short, may be described as marking 
the triumph of external Individualism and internal 
Universalism. 



150 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



IX 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE : 4. FROM THE PEACE OF 
WESTPHALIA TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

At first sight, the conflict ended by the Peace of West- 
phalia appears to have lain between those who desired 
to restore the lost doctrinal unity of Christendom and 
those who desired to perpetuate the work accomplished 
by the Reformation. But a further consideration of the 
character of the period makes it clear that divergence of 
religious opinion was not the sole cause of the struggle, 
that it does not afford a complete explanation of the 
divisions of western Europe. Catholic France allied 
with Protestant Sweden ; her policy, which had favoured 
the growth, secured the permanence of Lutheranism 
and of Calvinism in Germany. In the foreign policy of 
Richelieu, there is little trace of devotion to the Papacy ; 
the cardinal never forgot that he was a Frenchman, he 
seems never to have remembered that he was a prince of 
the Church. Nor were the great protagonists of the 
rival faith more single-minded. William the Silent 
accepted the reformed creed with apparent reluctance. 
Gustavus Adolphus was perhaps a paladin of Pro- 
testantism, but he was far more obviously the exponent 
of a short-sighted conception of Swedish imperialism. 

Indeed, to explain the so-called Wars of Religion in 
France or the Thirty Years' War as being a strife of 
creeds is to omit all explanation. It is still necessary 
to account for the fact that any given nation was 
Catholic or Protestant ; to discover, in fact, the ultimate 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 151 

cause which leads an individual or a people to accept 
and to adhere to a particular form of religious belief. 
That cause lies in human nature. It is to be found 
in the secular conflict between the two fundamental 
emotions of man, the desire to be ruled and the desire 
to rule. Of these two desires, the first is gratified by 
Catholicism, which in its true conception is no more 
than the reHgious aspect of Universalism ; the second 
is equally gratified by Protestantism, the religious 
aspect of Individualism. Catholicism is cosmopolitan in 
essence. Protestantism is national. Catholicism urges 
submission to authority, Protestantism urges the asser- 
tion of the right of private judgment. The one is the 
creed of law and order, tending towards despotism ; the 
other of independence, tending towards anarchy. And 
both possess a permanent place in the intellectual life 
of the world; each gratifies to the fullest extent one 
paramount emotion ; neither can ever cease to exist. 

The Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years' War, 
therefore, were not struggles in which the existence of 
Catholicism or of Protestantism was at stake. It would 
be idle to pretend that the spiritual power of the Papacy 
was not imperilled, that the creeds bom of the Reforma- 
tion were not in danger of extinction. The immediate 
success of the movement inaugurated by Luther did 
threaten the withdrawal of all Europe from papal 
allegiance; the progress of the Counter- Reformation 
did promise the restoration of all the lands lost to that 
allegiance. But Catholicism was not created by the 
Papacy nor Protestantism by Martin Luther, and the 
preservation of neither depended upon the fate of the 
Vicar of Christ or of believers in the Augsburg Confession. 
The Pope might have been destroyed; Lutherans, 
Calvinists, Zwinglians, might have been exterminated. 
But Catholicism and Protestantism were bound to 



152 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

endure while man retained his fundamental characteris- 
tics ; their extinction could not have been accomplished 
without the simultaneous accomplishment of a complete 
revolution in human nature. Universalists must always 
be Catholics; individualists Protestants. That some 
universalists have rejected papal supremacy, that some 
individualists profess adherence to the Roman com- 
munion, is merely accidental, the result either of past 
training or of real religious indifference. It is impossible 
that a true believer in the desire to be ruled should be 
also a sincere advocate of the right of private judgment. 
It is certain that those who desire to rule cannot sin- 
cerely assent to that surrender of their power of initiative 
which the Catholic Church demands from her faithful 
children. 

And it follows that the attitude adopted by any 
individual or nation towards religion has always been 
and always must be determined by their attitude towards 
the conflict of which religion is one expression. The true 
conflict in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was 
something much more permanent than any mere quarrel 
as to the way of salvation; it was part of the eternal 
struggle between Universalism and Individualism. 
Where internal or external Universalism prevailed, 
Catholicism retained or recovered its ascendancy ; where 
internal or external Individualism prevailed. Protestant- 
ism was victorious. Spain, aiming at the headship of 
Europe and inclined to accept despotism at home, was 
loyal to the Papacy. The Dutch, eager to free them- 
selves from the Spanish yoke, turned to the new national 
creeds. Paris aspired to dominate France; the south 
resented the dictation of the capital; the former was 
Catholic, the latter Protestant. During this period, 
the mediaeval conception that Europe might be united 
as a Christian confederation, that a government must 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 153 

be in close accord with the Church and control the 
religious beliefs of its subjects, continued. Philip II 
pursued the policy which Charles the Great had pursued ; 
he persecuted as a political necessity, because, alike 
in his external and internal policy, he believed Pro- 
testantism to be an obstacle to the realisation of his 
aims. And in general, those who were externally 
wedded to the old idea of political organisation, those 
who internally wished to consolidate their power, were 
Catholics; those who believed in national and local 
independence were Protestants. 

Nor are the apparent exceptions true exceptions to 
this rule. It may be admitted that the Lutheran princes 
of Germany were aiming at strengthening their authority, 
but they aimed also at freeing themselves from imperial 
control, and at first their external Individualism was a 
greater passion than their internal Universalism. The 
natural result was that dehverance from the Emperor 
should be followed by a reversion to Catholicism. In 
some cases, as in that of Saxony, this reversion occurred. 
In those cases in which it did not occur, the permanence 
of Protestantism may be explained either by the exist- 
ence of such difficulties as that of Polish suzerainty pre- 
sented in the case of Brandenburg, or by the danger of 
absorption by larger. Catholic neighbours which was 
feared by the smaller states. In the history of Sweden, 
the determination of religion by political considerations 
appears clearly. Christina, aiming at absolutism, aban- 
doned the Lutheranism of her father; the Swedes, 
always hostile to despotic rule, clung to the reformed 
faith and secured the abdication of their crypto-Catholic 
queen. 

But the Peace of Westphalia proved that the old 
mediaeval conception of external Universalism and 
internal Individualism required revision. Imperial 



154 THE INTERPRETATION DF HISTORY 

power was reduced to less than a shadow. The princes 
of the Empire, already practically independent within 
their own territories, received the right to conduct their 
foreign affairs without regard to the Emperor. Germany 
became a collection of sovereign states united only by 
the most formal tie. And for the first time, the limits 
of the Holy Roman Empire were specifically circum- 
scribed in a public document; the Swiss and Dutch 
Republics were declared to be beyond its borders. At 
the same time, the Papacy lost both influence and pres- 
tige. It entered a protest against the signature of the 
Treaty of Westphalia bj^ Catholic rulers ; its protest was 
ignored, and Europe thereby declared its rejection of the 
papal claim to intervene authoritatively in temporal 
matters. The recognition of the doctrine cujus regio, 
ejus religio further struck at the root of that conception 
of Christian unity upon which the supremacy of the Pope 
ultimately rested. 

Nor did mediaeval internal Individualism survive the 
period of stress. The evils of the civil wars convinced 
men of the necessity of law and order. They realised 
that the attempt of each town and village to assert its 
practical independence would lead to a paralysis of 
government, which could culminate only in anarchy or 
in subjection to some foreign power. To avoid these 
evils, not only the internal universalists but also the 
external individualists permitted or assisted the develop- 
ment of royal authority. The calamities which had 
resulted or which were expected to result from lack 
of governance produced centralised monarchies. The 
epoch of the Peace of Westphalia saw the abandonment 
of the mediaeval conception of external Universalism 
and internal Individualism. In this fact lies its inter- 
pretation and its importance. 

But the order of human life is conflict; the struggle 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 155 

between Universalism and Individualism is eternal. 
The Peace of Westphalia, therefore, was not and could 
not be followed by a cessation of strife. It was, perhaps, 
no longer possible to advocate the union of Europe into 
a Christian commonwealth, based upon religious ortho- 
doxy, or the subdivision of kingdoms into minute 
particles. But neither the external universalists noi 
the internal individualists abandoned their ultimate 
beliefs, because a particular expression of those beliefs 
happened to have been discredited. Advocacy of some 
form of international unity, of somxe limitation on abso- 
lute power, persisted ; the change was merely that of the 
basis of this advocacy. Mediaeval conceptions were 
abandoned, but in the inevitable reaction against the 
too complete domination of external Individualism and 
internal Universalism, new conceptions were discovered. 

Externally, just as the triumph of Individualism was 
the more complete, so the reaction was the more rapid. 
And it was hastened by the character of the new cen- 
tralised monarchies. Universalist at home, their foreign 
policy was intensely individualist. That disregard for 
the claim of the Emperor or Pope to exercise European 
authority, which had prevailed since the days of 
Frederic II and Boniface VIII, was accentuated and 
developed into a disregard of the claims of any state 
even to its own national existence. But just as the 
extreme of internal Individualism would produce 
anarchy at home, so the extreme of external Individual- 
ism threatened to produce perpetual war. Some curb 
on the foreign policy of states had to be discovered, 
some principle devised to replace that which had been 
lost in. the fall of the mediaeval Empire and Papacy, if 
the world were not to pass into practical barbarism by 
the path of international anarchy. 

The need for some such curb had been felt ever since 



156 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

the mediaeval system had begun to break up, and the 
search for an expedient antedates the Peace of West- 
phalia. But the search had been spasmodic and had 
produced no very tangible result. In the first place, 
the world was as yet unconvinced of the futility of the 
older expedient. There was a possibility that the Pope 
or some sovereign, representing the temporal power of 
Christ's Vicar, might win acceptance as an international 
arbiter. Such had been the hope of Philip II, the dream 
of Ferdinand II. But the end of the Thirty Years' War 
saw the determination of two problems in such a manner 
that the creation of an arbiter of this kind became an 
impossibility. It was then decided that the work of 
the Reformation was to be permanent, and, as a corollary 
to this, that Europe should henceforward be divided 
between Catholics and Protestants. 

In the second place, the duration of warfare and its 
intensity had been alike increased. During the Middle 
Ages, the existence of feudal relationships between king 
and king, and between the vassals of different kings, 
tended to hamper all hostile operations, while the short 
period of service owed by feudal hosts led to constant 
interruption of such operations. Even when the use 
of mercenary troops had become general, a lengthy 
campaign was still often rendered impossible by the 
mere poverty of rulers. The Italian Wars afford abun- 
dant illustration of the difficulties to which sovereigns 
were reduced by their inability to pay their armies with 
anything approaching regularity. But in the period 
following the Peace of Westphalia, two causes contributed 
to extend the duration of war and to increase its fre- 
quency and bitterness. All those bonds which had 
united states during the Middle Ages were swept away 
or were at least disregarded. In place of feudal relation- 
ship there was now only such unity as might result from 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 157 

interest; even the closest ties of blood between rulers 
did not contribute to maintain international peace. 
And the sovereigns of the new centralised monarchies, 
possessing absolute or almost absolute power, were able 
to raise supplies according to their will; the only limit 
upon their expenditure was the entire exhaustion of all 
sources of revenue. Hence, the search for an expedient 
by which hostile feehngs might be controlled, the search 
for a new basis for external Universalism, became 
vigorous and produced definite results. 

That the expedient when found was accepted mav 
perhaps be attributed principally to the character of 
French policy at this time. Both in his own and at the 
present day, Louis XIV has given his name to the age 
in which he lived, and justly, since he was the verv 
embodiment of its spirit. Internally, the last traces of 
opposition seemed to have vanished. Henry IV had 
defeated the Catholic League; Richelieu crushed the 
poHtical independence of the Huguenots and limited 
the power of the nobles, Mazarin completed the work 
of Richeheu, the defeat of the Fronde marking at once 
the extinction of the political power of the nobility and 
the silencing for half a century of the Parliament of 
Paris. Louis XIV assumed the government of an abso- 
lute monarchy. The States-General had ceased to meet : 
their very existence was hardly remembered. There 
were no more chief ministers. Colbert and Louvois 
were little more than efiicient clerks, owing their position 
solely to the king, acting entirely according to his will, 
referring to him the minutest details. The lack of real 
centralisation was concealed ; diversity of law, taxation 
and administration passed unnoticed. Internal Uni- 
versalism appeared to have attained its apotheosis in 
the France of Louis XIV. 

On the other hand, the foreign policy of Louis affords 



158 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

a perfect example of external Individualism. At first 
, ight, indeed, his desire to dominate Europe recalls the 
ambitions of the great mediaeval rulers. But between 
them and Louis there is an essential difference. Charles 
+he Great, the Hohenstaufen, Innocent III or Boniface 
VIII aimed not so much at the union of the continent 
into a single state, as into a confederation inspired by the 
ideal of maintaining Christian fellowship and extending 
the borders of Christendom. They were cosmopolitan, 
extra-territorial in their ideas. Even Philip II had 
something of this same spirit ; typically Spanish in many 
respects, he was in others the political heir of the 
mediaeval Emperors. Louis XIV was essentially French ; 
the first, perhaps the greatest, nationalist. He pos- 
sessed, and even in double measure, all the ambition 
which had actuated the great rulers of earlier ages. He 
would have extended the borders of France on every 
side. He dreamed of uniting the Spanish dominions 
with his own kingdom, of the creation of an empire in 
comparison with which that of Charles V should fade 
into insignificance. And over and above such extension 
of his direct rule, he aspired to control England, Sweden, 
t^oland and Turkey, as subordinate allies. But in his 
ambitions and in his policy there was nothing either 
cosmopoUtan or Christian; there was no ideal beyond 
that of the glory of France and of her king. Louis was 
no external universalist. He was rather so complete 
an individualist as to forget the very existence of any 
people save his own subjects. 

It is, indeed, in the opponents of Louis XIV that the 
contemporary external universalists are to be found. 
There was a very real danger of French domination, and 
that danger could be met only by a combination of 
states, no one power being capable unaided of offering 
prolonged and successful opposition. But the creation 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 15^ 

of a durable and effective alliance has always been a 
matter of extreme difi&culty. With no ostensible object, 
beyond self-interest, it is really impossible, and it was 
therefore necessary to discover some theoretic basis 
upon which an anti-French league might be founded. 
During the Middle Ages, such a basis had been supplied 
by Christianity; states had combined against the un- 
beHever or to effect the overthrow of an excommunicate. 
But the failure of the Crusades had illustrated the 
ine£&cacy of this principle; Macchiavelli had given 
a distinctly secular character to all political relations, 
and the Reformation, by perpetuating and intensifying 
religious disunion, had made it entirely impossible to 
found any European league upon the defence of ortho- 
doxy. Religion could not afford even a colourable 
pretext for joint political action by the powers against 
France. 

Opportunely, however, a new basis for external 
Universalism was discovered in international law. At 
the very moment when the complete breakdown of the 
imperial and papal system threatened to dissolve the 
last slender ties which bound together those units ox 
which the continent was composed, the value of certain 
broad rules for regulating interstate relations was 
suggested. It was felt that nations were '' in a state 01 
nature towards each other"; that they could not be 
subjected to the rule of any external power, but that 
they might without derogation of their entire independ- 
ence accept as the guide of their conduct propositions 
which might be regarded as " natural." Though 
anticipated in many respects by such writers as Olden- 
dorp and Winkler, Grotius was really the first to draw 
these propositions together into a species of code, and 
his De Jure Belli et Pads may be regarded as the primary 
exposition of international law. It consists, perhaps, of 



i6o THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

little more than a number of common-sense suggestions 
for the regulation of intercourse between state and state, 
and since all positive sanction was absent, the acceptance 
of these suggestions, the validity of international law, 
could depend only upon the public opinion of the con- 
tinent. Acceptance, however, was secured, and a new 
basis for external Universalism constructed. 

That this occurred was ultimately the result of the per- 
manence of universalist ideas in the human race, and of 
nothing else ; it was impossible that external Individual- 
ism should enjoy unquestioned supremacy. But the 
immediate occasion of the acceptance of the new basis 
may be found in the need for some principle of resistance 
to French aggression. Resistance to that aggression 
was intensified by the very prevalence of external In- 
dividualism ; every nation was eager to maintain its 
independence, and that desire was all the stronger owing 
to the recent defeat of the original claimants to universal 
lordship. The theory of Grotius at once justified this 
prevalent desire and supplied a principle upon which 
resistance, and united resistance, to aggression could be 
based. It was laid down that every state had an inalien- 
able right to preserve its integrity and its freedom from 
foreign control, and from this it followed that opposition 
to such states as might infringe the liberty of others was 
fundamentally justified. 

At the same time, however, it was generally admitted 
that within very wide limits a state ought to have absolute 
control over its own foreign relations, that its abstinence 
from war should be entirely voluntary, that its alliance 
should be of its own making. Only if the policy of a 
state should become so aggressive as to threaten the 
denial to others of that liberty which it claimed for itself, 
was coercion justified in the view of the exponents of 
international law. It still remained to define that degree 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE i6i 

of aggression which should pass the limit of legitimate 
pursuit of self-interest, and in that age no exact defini- 
tion applicable to all cases could be discovered. But 
a working definition was found in the conception of a 
balance of power. The new external universalist de- 
clared, explicitly or implicitly, that any disturbance of 
the existing ratio of strength among the states of Europe 
was an infringement of the rights of nations, a breach of 
international law. 

Traces of this conception may be found at a much 
€arUer date. During the period of the Italian Wars, 
occasional leagues had been formed to counteract the 
overwhelming preponderance of French or of Spanish 
influence in the Peninsula. The apparent strength of 
Charles V had led to the conclusion of alliances having 
for their object the imposition of some restraint upon 
that Emperor. But all these earlier leagues referred to 
little more than a single district ; they were not inspired 
by any theory of a balance of power as the permanent 
basis of the political organisation of Europe. It was in 
the age of Louis XIV that the original^ vague idea of 
union among the weak against the strong developed into 
a clear poHcy of preventing any one state from acquiring 
a predominant position on the continent. This policy 
then took the place left vacant by the failure of the 
mediaeval conception of the Christian commonwealth; 
it became the expression of external Universalism. 

Such, then, was that new theory of external Universal- 
ism through which the secular conflict against external 
Individualism was continued. To those states which 
claimed entire liberty of action in foreign affairs were 
opposed other states which desired to curtail that liberty 
in the interest of Europe. Alliances were formed to 
enforce observance of international law, the acceptance 
of a modus vivendi which should prevent the occurrence 

L 



i62 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

of international anarchy, a condition of perpetual war. 
Only accidentally were those alliances directed against 
France. Louis XIV happened to be the prime disturber 
of the status quo; he alone appeared reluctant to accept 
some theory of a balance of power. But the ultimate 
aim of the allies was to coerce, not the king of France or 
of Spain or of any given state, but the troubler of the 
world. No power should be allowed to infringe the 
liberty of its fellows. 

And the new external Universalism, therefore, up to 
a certain point, afforded a guarantee of external Indi- 
vidualism ; the reaction of which it was the outcome was 
gradual, not violent. Louis XIV came into conflict with 
the individualist tendencies of his age, because he was 
so typical of that age, because his own intense Individual- 
ism denied to others that liberty which he claimed for 
himself. In other words, the extreme of Individualism 
touches the border of Universalism ; there can never be 
proselytism without a tendency to coercion. Never^ 
theless, the opposition to France was primarily uni- 
versalist. It was based on the assumption that the 
various states of Europe had certain common interests, 
that they must admit a measure of control, that the 
concern of each was to a certain extent the concern of aU. 
If France were permitted to destroy the independence 
of the Dutch, the safety of other states would be en- 
dangered. Europe was no congeries of isolated units. 
It was in a sense a unit in itself, however impalpable 
might be the bond drawing its component parts together. 

Hence the new theory,^ while according liberty to all 
states, qualified its grant with the proviso that the free- 
dom of action admitted in the case of one state should not 
be used to curtail the same freedom in other states. But 
it is clear that here a certain difficulty at once arose. It 
was necessary to define what should be the limit of 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 163 

liberty in each case. At first, and in a somewhat broad 
sense, it was held that the Peace of Westphalia had 
created a balance of power which should be maintained. 
That treaty became, as it were, the basis of international 
law, and the aim of the universalists was to preserve the 
status quo therein established. 

Even so, the exponents of the theory were doubtful as 
to the exact interpretation of their own doctrine. They 
hesitated between an attempt to preserve the actual 
balance ordained by the Peace of Westphalia, and an 
attempt to preserve a vaguer balance, readjustable if 
necessary. Of these two possible interpretations, the 
first implied the maintenance of existing territorial 
arrangements, the prevention of all aggression, and 
logically the prohibition even of any rectification of 
frontiers. The second regarded the balance of power 
as indefinite rather than exact. The inevitability of 
territorial changes was admitted; a certain degree of 
aggression was almost tolerated. But at the same time, 
the disproportionate strengthening of any state was to be 
prevented; the balance was not to be destroyed, and 
even the existing balance was not to be unduly disturbed 
by the self-interest of one member of the European 
comity. From this desire to prevent the dispropor- 
tionate strengthening of any state, the idea of compensa- 
tion arose. If any country increased its power, and more 
especially if it increased its territory, all other countries 
affected by such an occurrence were held to be legiti- 
mately entitled to secure a compensating increase. An 
aggressor was only to profit by his aggression in a limited 
sense; aU other states were, so to speak, to profit from 
their abstention from aggression. The acquisitions 
made by war were to be equalled by those of diplomacy 
and of peace. War was to be rendered decreasingly 
advantageous to the power which should first take up 



i64 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

arms. The original balance was ultimately to be pre- 
served, perpetual strife to be prevented. 

This new theory of external Universalism was gradually 
evolved during the age of Louis XIV. At first, uni- 
versalist efforts were directed to the preservation of the 
existing balance in its entirety. But such efforts were 
foredoomed to failure. Externally, the spirit of the age 
was individualist, and into conflict with that spirit came 
the exponents of the new theory. For while it was 
certainly true that the states of Europe were ready to 
combine against France and to prevent such aggression 
as might be detrimental to their own interests, this was 
the limit of their Universalism. That which was re- 
garded as aggression in the case of others, they held 
to be merely lawful expansion in their own case. They 
were externally individualist, quite unprepared to 
sacrifice one iota of the advantage which they trusted 
that they might reap by breaking the Peace of West- 
phalia, by destroying the status quo which that peace 
had estabhshed. That curious altruism which appeared 
from time to time during the Middle Ages had now 
vanished almost entirely from the domain of high policy. 
John Sobieski of Poland supplies a possible exception. 
Regardless of the injuries which the Habsburgs had in- 
flicted, or had attempted to inflict, upon him, he saved 
the Emperor from the Turks, and the relief of Vienna 
recalled to mind those achievements of the eariier 
crusaders by which the mediaeval world had been thrilled, 
its imagination excited. But Sobieski was an anachron- 
ism. If he saved the Austrian capital, it was at the 
expense of Poland. The energy and genius which pro- 
tected Leopold would have been far more profitably 
expended upon the reconstruction of his own kingdom. 
His heroism was certainly greeted with due applause, 
but diplomatists smiled in secret at the folly which dis- 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 165 

sipated too scanty resources upon an exploit rather 
detrimental than advantageous to the hero and to his 
state. The day when the reputation derived from such 
an achievement would have produced a commensurate 
political benefit had already passed. Every state was 
prepared to preach altruism to its actual or potential 
rivals; no state was prepared to practise such altruism. 
Sobieski was born out of due season. 

And the prevalent selfishness of international policy 
ensured the failure of any attempt to maintain the 
settlement reached at Westphalia. Individualist states 
were in no case really prepared to sacrifice themselves 
in order to deliver Europe from the spectre of continual 
strife. The history of the wars of Louis XIV, and of 
the alliances which those wars produced, illustrates the 
failure of the first form of the new theory of external 
Universalism, and in the record of that failure gradual 
progress towards the evolution of the second form may 
be traced. The alliances were the direct product of the 
determination of France not to be hampered by any 
external considerations in her pursuit of territorial 
expansion. Europe was first roused to a sense of the 
real danger of French domination by the enunciation of 
the doctrine of " devolution," by which Louis attempted 
to apply to the whole Spanish Netherlands that law of 
inheritance which determined the succession to private 
estates in Brabant. The legal pretence under which his 
aggression was masked deceived no one; the Triple 
Alliance was created to hold France in check, to assert 
the interest of Europe in the maintenance of a balance 
of power. The allies, however, were really united in 
defence of an indefensible position. It was possibly 
feasible to attempt the restraint of France, if a certain 
measure of expansion were allowed to her. It was 
assuredly not feasible to attempt to retain within hmits 



i66 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

already reached, a state possessing great military power 
and instinct with the spirit of external Individualism. 

Accordingly, the Triple Alliance, though it secured 
apparent success, in reality failed completely. Louis 
made peace, but he did so less from compulsion than from 
deep motives of policy. The formation of a league 
against him gave warning of the possibility of an effective 
European concert; he saw how valuable a reputation 
for moderation might be to him. Still more, he was 
determined to crush the Dutch who had stood in his 
path; to have a free hand, untrammelled by the exist- 
ence of any anti-French alliance, when Charles II of 
Spain should die and the fate of his dominions become 
a question of practical politics. The authors of the 
alliance might congratulate themselves on an apparent 
victory; the short duration of the league put a period 
on those rejoicings, and if an attempt be made to dis- 
cover the ultimate importance of the alliance, it will 
perhaps be found in the fact that its ostensible success 
aided Louis XIV by encouraging his opponents to devote 
themselves to the pursuit of an impracticable ideal. 

That no lesson had been learned from the failure of 
the Triple Alliance appears in the history of the league 
formed for the defence of the Dutch Republic which 
Louis presently assailed. The root idea of that league, 
as it ultimately found expression in the Treaty of Nime- 
guen, was still the maintenance of the exact status quo. 
The Peace of Westphalia was regarded as part of the 
fundamental public law of Europe; theoretically, no 
modification of its terms was to be permitted, and the 
purport of the Treaty of Nimeguen was merely the inter- 
pretation of the earlier agreement. It is true that in > 
practice certain changes, not authorised at Westphalia, J ^^ 
were permitted, but such apparent acceptance of the 
inevitable was rendered nugatory by the determination, 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 167 

emphasised at Nimeguen, that the Hmit of change had 
been reached, that there should be no further alteration 
in the future. 

Such a determination was rendered futile by the 
character of Louis XIV, and of the French people, who 
were as resolved as their ruler not to submit to any 
dictation by foreign powers. France was intensely indi- 
vidualist so far as her external policy was concerned. 
Though indubitably Cathohc, she was at one with her 
king in resisting not merely papal aggression, but even 
the attempt of Innocent XI to preserve that minimum 
of independence, the loss of which would have been 
inconsistent with his position as a sovereign prince. 
And it was obvious that a people who would not agree 
to accord a reasonable measure of deference to the 
acknowledged Head of the Church would be even more 
unwilling to admit the right of any temporal ruler, or 
combination of temporal rulers, to set bounds upon the 
extension of French territory or of French glory and 
prestige. 

It was the existence of this pronounced external 
Individualism which led Louis XIV to disregard the 
terms of the Treaty of Nimeguen. That disregard was 
not indeed expressed deliberately; it was cloaked under 
a pretence of giving effect to the very document to which 
his opponents made most frequent appeal. A clause 
in the Peace of Westphalia had transferred to France the 
bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun, *' with the lands 
belonging to them"; the vagueness of the phrase 
afforded Louis the excuse which he desired, and the 
Chambers of Reunion were created, ostensibly to deter- 
mine what districts were lawfully attached to the three 
sees. No one credited the French king with any sincere 
wish to secure a just interpretation of the treaty. No 
one doubted that the Chambers were merely an excuse 



i68 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

for aggression, and if there had been any doubt, it would 
have been speedily dispelled by the decisions of those 
bodies. In short, the experience of the fate of the 
Treaty of Nimeguen served to prove it was at least 
extremely difficult to draft any document so accurately 
as to leave no loophole for those who wished still to 
pursue an individualist policy. A state which desired 
to be aggressive would be restrained from aggression 
only by force majeure. 

From this it followed that the maintenance of the 
exact status quo could hardly be secured unless the 
powers of Europe were ready to face perpetual war. 
There was no nation, possessed of military strength, 
which was prepared voluntarily to forego any reason- 
able chance of extending its territory and its influence. 
Only by positive proof that the chance was not reasonable, 
that any attempt to gain something would in all prob- 
ability lead to the loss of that already possessed, could 
a state be restrained from attacking the status quo. 
But such proof could be supplied in no other way than 
by the hazardous experiment of an appeal to arms; so 
long as a state was undefeated in the field, it could not 
be convinced that victory in war was an impossibility 
for it. It was, therefore, necessary to sacrifice the actual 
status quo ; to discover some alternative method by 
which peace might be maintained, the aspirations of an 
aggressive or progressive country sufficiently gratified 
to induce that country to refrain from war, by which 
and at the same time the balance of power might also 
be preserved. 

Such an alternative was found in the theory of com- 
pensation. The origin of that theory may be traced 
back at least as far as the period of the Italian Wars, 
when Louis XII and Ferdinand the Catholic arranged 
the partition of Naples, when the League of Cambrai 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 169 

was formed for the despoiling of Venice. Practically, 
however, it developed in the years following the Triple 
Alliance, and was first expressed in the agreement con- 
cluded between Louis XIV and Leopold for the eventual 
division of the spoils expected to accrue from the proxi- 
mate extinction of the male line of the Spanish Habs- 
burgs. But the theory did not immediately secure 
acceptance. Louis was too thorough an external 
individuaUst to admit the effecting of any real com- 
promise. After the Treaty of Nimeguen, he speedily 
revealed his resolve to profit to the uttermost from his 
military power and from the distraction of his enemies, 
and his continued aggression produced the League of 
Augsburg. 

That League marks a distinct advance towards the 
second interpretation of the new external Universalism. 
It was a definite attem^pt to compel France to agree to a 
permanent settlement of Europe; it was a European 
combination, and no mere alliance of two or three powers 
specially affected by the policy of Louis. The allies 
recognised that it was futile to attempt the maintenance 
of the Peace of Westphalia, except in the most general 
sense. Though they appealed to that document, though 
it was professedly taken as the basis of the Treaty 
of Ryswick, yet the aim of the powers was really to 
secure the safeguarding of their own interests. In other 
words, they admitted the impossibility of preventing 
some advance on the part of France. They were deter- 
mined that they would ensure that this advance should 
not imperil their own safetjr, that they should receive 
practical compensation for any concessions which they 
made. Thus, though Louis retained Strassburg, he 
had also to recognise William III; he was forced to 
forego his design of including England within the orbit 
of Bourbon influence, and thereby forced also to concede 



lyo THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

political and economic security to the Dutch. These 
limitations compensated Europe for the increase of 
French power recognised in the treaty. 

The idea of compensation, however, and the attempt 
to discover a satisfactory and permanent modus vivendi, 
appear less clearly in the actual terms of the Treaty of 
Ryswick than in the circumstances in which that treaty 
was concluded. Its signature was hastened by the 
posture of affairs in Spain. Charles II was dying; the 
problem of the Spanish succession held the deepest 
interest for France and for the allies. Both parties 
wished to be free to deal with the question, to be able 
to devise a settlement unhampered by other considera- 
tions. At the same time, the conflicting claims to the 
Spanish inheritance put forward by Louis XIV and the 
Emperor made it clear that renewed war would result 
from the death of Charles II, unless means were found by 
which each claimant should secure reasonable satisfac- 
tion. The diplomatic energies of Europe were directed 
to the task of inducing France and Austria to accept 
something less than they demanded and desired, to the 
discovery of adequate compensation for both parties. 

More especially, William III devoted his attention to 
this problem. He has frequently been described as the 
■ :iveterate enemy of Louis XIV ; the humiliation of the 
Bourbons has been regarded as the keynote of his policy. 
But his efforts were directed Jess to the depression of 
France than to the maintenance of a balance of power 
between her and the other states of Europe. He was, 
indeed, the first clear exponent of the doctrine of com- 
pensation. He interpreted the new external Universal- 
ism as being directed to secure, not the preservation of 
any given distribution of territory, but the preservation 
of a balance of power, by ensuring that the development 
of any one state should be accompanied by a similar 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 171 

development on the part of those states whose interests 
would otherwise be endangered. And nowhere does 
this aim of William appear more clearly than in his 
treatment of the Spanish question. He rejected at once 
the idea of ignoring French claims and aspirations; he 
recognised at once that the integrity of the Spanish 
monarchy could not be maintained. In place of putting 
himself into a position of hostility towards France, he 
hastened the conclusion of the Treaty of Ryswick that 
he might act in conjunction with Louis XIV for the 
preservation of European peace. To attain this end, 
he formulated the two Partition Treaties. Austria and 
France were to make substantial gains in consideration 
of the abandonment of their claims to the whole Spanish 
inheritance. That inheritance was to be divided as 
equally as possible, and the powers of Europe were to 
combine to secure the general acceptance of the division. 
In short, the idea of compensation was to prevail, and 
by prevailing to ensure the maintenance of the balance 
of power. 

It is not impossible that the scheme contained in 
the Partition Treaties would in any case have proved 
abortive, but it was accidental circumstances that forced 
Europe into a new war. The death of the Electoral 
Prince removed a candidate for the actual throne of 
Spain whom Louis and Leopold were alike ready to 
accept. The second Treaty gave a certain preference 
to the Austrian claim, and secured only a reluctant 
assent from the French king. In Spain, it secured no 
assent at all. Charles IPs will forced Louis, even if he 
had been unwilling, to accept the crown offered to his 
grandson, and the struggle for the Spanish inheritance 
followed inevitably. But the ideas of William III bore 
fruit. They supplied the basis upon which the Grand 
Alliance was founded. 



172 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

That Alliance may be regarded as a definite expression 
of the new external Universalism. It admitted, as the 
Partition Treaties had admitted, that France had a pre- 
scriptive right to pursue her own interest; so far it 
admitted a measure of external Individualism. But it 
was directed to prevent the danger of excessive Indi- 
vidualism, the danger of international anarchy. No state 
was to promote its own interest in such a way as to 
impair the position of other states; all reasonable 
aspirations should be gratified, but the measure of 
gratification was to be determined by a species of Euro- 
pean concert, was to be such that the balance of power 
would be preserved. In event of a refusal to accept the 
decisions of Europe, force might be used to coerce the 
recalcitrant state. Yet force was not the primary idea 
of the Grand Alliance. France was rather to be per- 
suaded by a display of military strength, than coerced 
by the use of that strength And in the view of its 
inceptors, the aim of the Alliance, and hence of any war 
which it might undertake, was the establishment of a 
durable peace. 

The Grand Alliance led to war. Louis had reluctantly 
accepted an arrangement to which he had been a party ; 
he was entirely unwilling to endure the dictation of 
a European confederacy. To induce him to abandon 
his extreme external Individualism, it was necessary to 
resort to arms, and when the war had once begun, the 
Individualism of the allies reasserted itself. If Louis 
was prepared to sacrifice Europe upon the altar of French 
prestige and power, Charles VI was equally regardless 
of all interests save his own. He aimed at the reunion 
of the Habsburg dominions, at an overthrow of the 
balance of power hardly less complete than that which 
the Alliance had been formed to prevent. The Dutch, 
moreover, were concerned with the prosecution of their 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 173 

economic interests, no less than with the original purpose 
of the league. Hence the war was needlessly prolonged. 
From a sincere attempt to attain a modus vivendi, it 
became an attempt to humiliate France and to secure 
the special interests of certain members of the con- 
federacy. But in the Treaty of Utrecht, the original 
aim of the Alliance reappears. The doctrine of compen- 
sation gained its first great triumph. France accepted, 
while the allies granted, some satisfaction in return for 
the abandonment of her fuU claims, and at the same 
time each confederate secured some advantage which 
might serve to counterbalance the possible increase of 
French power. At Utrecht, the idea of an adjustable 
balance was clearly put forward; the new external 
Universahsm received definitely the second of the two 
possible interpretations, and that creed which was in 
general to prevail during the succeeding period was novv 
really formulated. 

This fact, however, was not immediately realised. Up 
to the time of the Treaty of Utrecht, it so happened that 
European leagues had been formed only against France, 
and from this circumstance arose the idea, countenanced 
by some historians, that the object of these leagues 
was the humiliation of the Bourbons. It was supposed 
that France was a permanent menace to European peace, 
that the welfare of the continent required her coercion 
and restraint, that some intrinsic quahties in the French 
people made it essential to watch every action of the 
French government with suspicious jealousy, and pre- 
cluded any possibility of an amicable agreement with it. 
The history of the Partition Treaties might have in- 
dicated that this was not the opinion of William III. 
An impartial study of the circumstances in which those 
treaties had been disregarded by Louis XIV might have 
suggested that France was not permanently or necessarily 



174 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

irreconcilable. Yet it was only with great difficulty 
that Stanhope secured the acceptance of a French 
entente in England, so convinced were many that France 
was the one source of danger. In reality, however, 
the inspiration of the Grand Alliance was drawn from a 
iar deeper source than mere antipathy to a particular 
king or a particular dynasty. Louis XIV typified the 
external Individualism of the age ; France was the state 
at once most ready and most able to disregard the interest 
and the will of Europe. But this was merely an acci- 
dental circumstance. The history of the period follow- 
ing the Treaty of Utrecht reveals the true spirit of the 
Grand Alhance. From that history, it becomes clear 
that the powers which united against France were 
actuated less by fear of subjection than by the conviction 
that the concern of each is the concern of all, by external 
Universalism. 

For no sooner was Louis XIV dead than there ceased 
to be any anti-French alliances. It would be absurd to 
contend that the character of the French people suddenly 
changed. It cannot be asserted with even a suspicion 
of truth that the king coerced his people or that after 
the death of Louis there was so strong a popular influence 
on government that at last, and for the first time, the 
court of Versailles was driven to modify its policy in 
deference to the will of the nation. No ruler, however 
despotic, however able, can compel his subjects to 
.sacrifice their lives and fortunes in a cause of which those 
subjects really disapprove; the wars of Louis XIV were 
made possible by the external Individualism of the 
^-^Yench nation, and the unparalleled exertions which 
France made were the result of the fact that royal policy 
commanded popular approval, were the proof of that 
fact. 

But there is a limit to exertion, and the long wars of 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 175 

the seventeenth century produced exhaustion. France 
began to desire peace; Louis himself, ever the most 
typical Frenchman of his age, showed a new spirit of 
conciliation in the last years of his reign. At the moment 
of his death, the individualist tendencies of France were 
curbed by exhaustion; for the remainder of the eigh- 
teenth century, France undertook no positive war of 
aggression. Orleans and Dubois have been credited 
with the successful revolutionising of French foreign 
policy; in actual fact, they merely gave expression, as 
Louis XIV had done, to the dominant feeling of the 
French people. For a time France ceased to be exter- 
nally individuahst; she became content to satisfy her 
reasonable claims in concert with the powers of Europe. 
If she engaged in wars, it was only that she might 
defend her legitimate interests and secure adequate 
compensation. 

And the result of this modification in French policy 
was that the Universalism underlying the leagues formed 
ceased to be partially obscured ; the practical supremacy 
of the idea of compensation became apparent. It was 
realised that the ultimate aim of every European alliance 
was to prevent the occurrence of perpetual war by 
creating a modus vivendi. Thus, immediately after 
the conclusion of the Treaty of Utrecht, the attention 
of the powers was directed to Spain. There was 
certainly no danger of a Spanish domination of Europe ; 
the Triple Alliance 'was formed, not to prevent such 
domination, but to secure that the external Individual- 
ism of a single state should not be permitted to disturb 
the balance of power. At the same time, the alliance 
was not intended to preserve the exact status quo, as it 
had been established at Utrecht. Had they so desired, 
England, France and Holland could have coerced Spain, 
could have entirely ignored her aspirations. Bu' they 



176 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

attempted nothing of the kind. Alberoni, and after him 
Ripperda, was driven from office ; they had endeavoured 
to act independently of the will of Europe. Yet the 
allies who had secured their downfall proceeded to grant 
almost all for which the ministers had schemed. The 
question of the Italian duchies was settled with at least 
a due regard for the interests and claims of Spain. In 
other words, the right of a sovereign state to attempt 
expansion and the gratification of its ambitions was 
admitted. Spain was dissatisfied with the settlement 
eft'ected at Utrecht ; attention was paid to her complaints 
and the settlement was so far as possible revised to meet 
those complaints. But she was not permitted to take 
what she would or could; she was not permitted to act 
without reference to the equally recognised interests of 
the rest of Europe. She was given something with, as 
it were, the proviso that she should acknowledge the 
right of the powers to determine the nature and extent 
of the gift. 

In the decision of this question, the working of the 
theory of compensa.tion is to be seen. The states of 
Europe were primarily individualist in their external 
policy, and they felt that every country had in a measure 
the right to act independently of all other countries. 
But the danger of extreme Individualism was also 
recognised; to a certain extent, external Universalism 
prevailed. This fact led to the demand that the degree 
of satisfaction accorded to any given state should be 
determined by a concert. Such was the principle under- 
lying the Treaties of London, Seville and Vienna, by 
which the claims of Spain were met; such was the 
principle which appears in the Wars of the Polish and 
of the Austrian Succession. 

In the case of Poland, France was admitted to possess 
a legitimate interest in the disposition of the crown; 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 177 

Austria and Russia were held to have an equally legiti- 
mate interest. Hence at the end of the war, while the 
candidate of the eastern powers secured the disputed 
throne, France, defeated on the ostensible point at issue, 
received compensation in the shape of the reversion of 
Lorraine. In the whole history of the Austrian Succes- 
sion question, the same conception of national interests 
appears. Charles VI desired to secure the whole Habs- 
burg inheritance for his daughter, Maria Theresa, and to 
that end promulgated the Pragmatic Sanction. Yet he 
recognised that the claim of other states to a voice in the 
settlement of the problem was not to be ignored, and 
admitted this by seeking to obtain beforehand the assent 
of Europe to the scheme which he had devised. In 
this he was apparently successful; guarantees of the 
Pragmatic Sanction were given in return for more or 
less substantial concessions. But as soon as Charles VI 
was dead, Frederic the Great deliberately set aside the 
undertaking into which his father had entered, invading 
Silesia and openly attempting to partition the Austrian 
dominions. His conduct was not really susceptible of 
even a colourable justification; he acted as an extreme 
individualist, careless of all rights and interests save his 
own. Nevertheless, Europe recognised that he had a 
certain liberty permitting him to act as he did. The 
efforts of the peacemakers, both during the War of the 
Austrian Succession and at the Conference of Aix-la- 
Chapelle, were directed, not to punish Prussia for her 
aggression, but to induce her to accept in full satisfaction 
some part of that which she had at first implicitly or 
explicitly demanded. Frederic stole Silesia; Europe 
condoned, applauded, envied the theft. The external 
Individualism of the age had asserted itself. The 
external universalists recognised that though the inde- 
pendent action of states might be alien from their own 

M 



lyS THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

principles, yet it could only be restrained and minimised, 
not entirely prevented. 

And it was this prevalent external Individualism 
which led in large measure to the failure of the new 
Universalism, limiting its ascendancy, making its com- 
plete success impossible. It was admitted that every 
state had a certain inherent right to expand, a certain 
inherent right to receive compensation for the gains of 
its rivals. But a problem arose as to the true limits of 
expansion, the degree of compensation which was to be 
regarded as adequate. It was clear that the satisfaction 
to which the powers would in any given case assent would 
be too slight to satisfy the state seeking such satisfaction, 
too great to be acceptable to the state compelled to grant 
it. Both parties, therefore, tended to be so aggrieved 
that they were prepared to enter upon war rather than 
accept the decision given ; acceptance was generally the 
outcome of compulsion rather than of voluntary consent. 
Spain agreed to the Treaty of London only when her 
fleet had been crushed at Cape Passaro and her territory 
entered by a French army. It was the imminent danger 
of a hopeless struggle against a European coalition that 
led to the abandonment of the schemes of Ripperda and 
to the acceptance of the Treaty of Seville by Spain and 
of the Second Treaty of Vienna by Austria. France 
would not give up her support of Stanislas Leszczynski 
until she had been defeated in the War of the Polish 
Succession. Austria only relinquished Silesia after 
Frederic had inflicted crushing reverses upon her. 

And even after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle she 
remained a malcontent. The Diplomatic Revolution 
was merely the expression of Austrian and French dis- 
satisfaction at the terms which that treaty had imposed 
upon them. Maria Theresa would not accept a decision 
which deprived her of a great province. France, offended 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 179 

by the treachery of Frederic on the continent, was 
further discontented because her efforts had neither 
secured to her the Austrian Netherlands nor effected the 
destruction of Enghsh power in North America and India. 
It was found necessary to fight the Seven Years' War 
before the conclusions reached at Aix-la-Chapelle were 
accepted by the two malcontent powers, nor when the 
Treaties of Paris and Hubert sburg had been signed did 
the Habsburgs cease to seek compensation for the loss 
of Silesia, the Bourbons to desire vengeance upon the 
country which had destroyed their colonial empire. 
Wars of aggression were not prevented by the new ex- 
ternal Universalism ; the attempt to curb the prevalent 
external Individualism of Europe did not achieve com- 
plete success. Something was certainly done to limit 
the duration and extent of conflicts; the aftermath of 
hostility between belligerents was reduced. But the 
universalists, on the whole, failed reaUy to attain their 
end. 

Nor was this true only of their efforts to preserve 
peace. The basis of the new theory was the doctrine 
of the balance of power and the meeting of legitimate 
claims by means of compensation. But the compensa- 
tion sought was generally, if not invariably, territorial, 
and land is not susceptible of indefinite increase. It 
therefore followed that it was not every state which 
could receive even a limited satisfaction ; that the moder- 
ate satisfaction of one state was liable to involve ttie 
serious dissatisfaction of another. It was probable that 
the wishes of the greater powers of Europe would be 
gratified, and that this gratification would be at the ex- 
pense of the lesser powers. Such, indeed, was the case. 
In order to meet the demands of Spain, the independence 
of Parma was practically extinguished; to compensate 
France and Austria, the exchange of Lorraine for Tuscany 



i8o THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

inflicted a similar fate upon the latter district, while 
the former was soon incorporated in the Bourbon 
monarchy. 

And probably the most charatteristic feature of the 
new external UniversaHsm was that while the interests 
of the larger states were almost scrupulously regarded, 
those of the petty states were almost as generally ignored. 
To some extent, this was the natural result of the 
dominance of internal UniversaHsm, which made con- 
sistently for the increase of the area under any one 
government, for an ever greater departure from mediaeval 
heterogeneity. To some extent, it was due to the fact 
that the danger to European peace from the malcontent 
of a small state was really negUgible; complaints un- 
supported by adequate military force could be and were 
disregarded with impunity. 

But the prime cause of the neglect of the weak and the 
consideration for the strong is to be found in the change 
of conditions since the Middle Ages. Then, there had 
existed a convenient mean between complete inde- 
pendence and complete subjection, the relationship of 
feudal subordination. Few European states had actually 
possessed entire freedom; a feudal tie generally bound 
them to some other state. Thus the external Universal- 
ism of the Middle Ages, of which feudalism was a product 
or expression, really saved both the greater powers from 
humiliation and the lesser from extinction. The cities 
of Italy and the Swiss cantons secured a large measure 
of liberty, but they were content formally to recognise 
imperial supremacy. But in the period after the Peace 
of Westphalia such variation between actual and nominal 
conditions became impossible. No state would any 
longer admit even theoretical limitations on its inde- 
pendence; the reign of mediaeval fictions ended; the 
very continuance of the Holy Roman Empire itself was 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE i8i 

in the nature of an accident, the result of the entire 
absence of any vitality in the institution. 

It is true that for their own sake the larger states 
became partially universalist in their external policy. 
They sought to discover a modus vivendi ; they admitted 
that they were to some extent bound to observe the 
rules of international law. But they applied those rules 
to themselves alone. The sacrifice of smaller states 
was in no wise precluded; rather, the doctrine of com- 
pensation further imperilled their safety. For only at 
their expense could the great powers secure any reward 
for their abstention from war; only at their expense 
could the great powers make the acquisitions necessary 
for the maintenance of the balance. And this same 
doctrine of compensation led also to the formation among 
the strong of alliances having for their purpose the 
despoiling of the weak. 

Of such an alliance the fall of Poland was the result. 
Russia desired primarily to regain the provinces of which 
she had been despoiled duringthe " Time of the Troubles," 
even if she ultimately desired also to absorb the whole 
Polish state. But, in any case, Austria and Prussia 
would not agree to any extension of Russian territory 
without securing adequate compensation for themselves. 
Therefore Catherine II, who might have been content to 
leave the really Polish lands untouched, was driven to 
accept the idea of partition. In the interest of the 
balance of power, in deference to the new external 
Universalism, Poland was gradually divided between 
her neighbours. Her right to a national, existence was 
denied; her independence was extinguished. And in 
this period, if independence were extinguished, it was 
extinguished completely. No feudal superiority, no 
mere suzerainty, would content aggressive states. Over 
lands united to their dominions, the eighteenth-century 



i82 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

rulers demanded and secured entire control. The 
sacrifice of small states was one outcome of the new 
external Universalism. Power to resist constituted the 
sole right to resist ; might was the only measure of the 
right to be externally individualist. 

In the century.which elapsed between the conclusion 
of the Peace of Westphahaand the outbreakof the French 
Revolution, there was a certain reaction against that 
extreme of external Individualism which had prevailed 
at the beginning of the period. There was, indeed, no 
return to the mediaeval conception of a Europe united 
under Emperor or Pope, but there was an acceptance 
of the principle which had formed the ultimate basis 
of that conception. To Grotius, nations had been in a 
state of nature towards each other : by the close of the 
eighteenth century they had come to be regarded as 
members of a more or less definite corporation. In the 
Middle Ages, they had also been regarded as united, not 
isolated ; as members of an essentially Christian society, 
to be tended and guided by the paternal care of the 
temporal or spiritual representative of Christ on earth. 
After the Peace of Westphalia, even formal religious 
unity ceased to exist. The Christian commonwealth 
was dissolved; all things seemed to be fast degenerating 
into a condition of international anarchy. In the new 
union, devised during the following century, all thought 
of Christian brotherhood and of paternal authority 
passed away. Whereas the liberty of nations had been 
theoretically restricted by their obligations to their 
common Church, and limited as that of children by a 
father, now the only recognised restraint was the mini- 
mum essential for the preservation of any order of society. 
Into the complete external Universalism of mediaeval 
theory an individualist element was intruded. Each 
state was essentially individualist in its foreign policy. 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 183 

though an enhghtened self-interest dictated a Hmitation 
of that Individualism. The reaction was incomplete; 
the wheel had not swung full circle. 

Though more slowly and less definitely, a similar 
internal reaction occurred during this period. At the 
time of the Peace of Westphalia, there had been an 
apparent triumph of Universalism in every European 
state; mediaeval internal Individualism disappeared. 
And universalist ascendancy was strengthened and 
maintained owing to the recent experience of the evils 
resulting from weak government and civil strife. Men 
were ready to endure much that they might escape 
calamities such as had befallen France during the Wars 
of Religion, such as caused a large part of Germany 
to lie waste for two centuries after the Thirty Years* 
War. And the inevitable reaction against the gratifica- 
tion of the desire to be ruled was hindered by other 
circumstances. The extreme external Individualism of 
the age induced most countries to pursue an aggressive 
foreign policy, which served to distract attention from 
internal affairs. Rulers did not devote their energy to 
the further consolidation of their authority at home; 
subjects were generally content to commit a large 
measure of power to sovereigns who waged successful 
wars. 

But before all, the reaction was delayed because the 
necessity for it was hardly acute. Though most states 
appeared to possess centralised governments, their cen- 
tralisation was incomplete; the supremacy of internal 
UniversaHsm was rather apparent than real. France 
under, Louis XIV has often been regarded as a typical 
despotism. Yet, while there is an element of truth in 
this view, the element of error is far greater. At no 
time during the ancien regime was France a truly central- 
ised state or her king a truly absolute monarch. Some 



i84 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

Frenchmen lived under the droit ecrit, others under the 
droit coutumier. Some provinces were ruled directly 
by royal intendants, others were pays d'etats, possessing 
local estates and parliaments. The method of taxation 
varied from province to province; internal free trade 
was unknown. It was not until the time of Colbert that 
state regulation of economic conditions was really intro- 
duced. Religious conformity was not enforced until 
after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. 

And that which was true of France was true of other 
countries. Prussia long remained merely a loose aggrega- 
tion of lands, happening to own a common ruler. The 
Austrian dominions were anything except a centralised 
monarchy. Even in Spain, remnants of old mediaeval 
liberties were to be found in Catalonia and in the Basque 
Provinces. Indeed, the majority of European states 
presented a somewhat curious contradiction. The king 
was absolute in theory, almost absolute in practice. He 
could dispose at will of the public revenue ; he possessed 
the right of peace and war; he could even legislate by 
prerogative. He might sell his subjects to their death, 
as did the landgrave of Hesse, or by condemning them 
untried to perpetual imprisonment make their lives a 
veritable hell. Yet, on every side, he was hampered by 
a mass of local customs and privileges, by rights which 
he might theoretically disregard and which he was 
practically bound to respect. Not even a Louis XIV 
could dare to impose direct taxation upon the nobles. 
No Habsburg could with impunity ignore the liberties 
of the Magyars; no Spanish king could defy the Holy 
Office or deprive ecclesiastics of the right to indulge their 
inhumanity. 

This incomplete centralisation makes the history of 
the internal conflict during the period following the Peace 
of Westphalia more than usually complex. In it a dual 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 185 

movement may be discerned; to a certain extent,- 
Universalism and Indiyidualism make progress simul- 
taneously. On the Qther hand, governmental authority 
was gradually extended and consolidated. On the other 
hand, there was a growing tendency to advocate some 
limitation of the ruling power. And of these two 
movements, the first was for a while impeded by the 
prevalent external Individualism. Attention was dis- 
tracted from internal affairs by its concentration upon 
foreign policy ; frequent wars and crises threatening war 
served to hinder changes at home. Generally speaking, 
the progress towards more complete centralisation was 
very slow. It was not until the new theory of external 
Universalism had gained a measure of supremacy that 
the work was resumed, and on the very eve of the French 
Revolution there was still a distinct movement in many 
countries towards a greater degree of absolutism. 

The gradual progress of the universalist movement 
may be attributed in a measure to the belief that despot- 
ism had already been established by the end of the first 
half of the seventeenth century. The limitations on 
royal authority were rather real than apparent; rulers 
seemed to dispose at will of the lives and fortunes of their 
subjects, and the absence of resistance created an idea 
that resistance, or at least successful resistance, was 
impossible. This appears very clearly in the history of 
France. The overthrow of the Fronde seemed to have 
completed the centralising work begun by Louis XI 
and resumed after a long interval by Henry IV, Richelieu 
and Mazarin. Both by his own subjects and by foreign 
observers, Louis XIV was regarded as an absolute 
monarch. He himself held the same idea; his weU- 
known remark, *' L'etat, c'est moi," indicates his mistaken 
belief. And to this circumstance may perhaps be attri- 
buted the fact that, during his reign, no advance was 



i86 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

j made towards the real establishment of despotism, save 
! in the domain of economics by Colbert and of religion 
^ by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The infin- 
itely more vital checks upon the power of government, 
diversity in administration, taxation and law, remained 
untouched until the removal of an able, and the substitu- 
tion of a weak or incompetent, ruler made their existence 
both apparent and a menace to royal authority. Even 
the economic centralisation of Colbert was less a con- 
scious extension of the province of government than the 
adoption of certain means to attain an end. It was 
necessary to make France prosperous that she might 
pursue an aggressive foreign policy; Colbert held the 
mercantile theory, and therefore regulated industry 
and commerce in order to secure the wealth needed for 
the prosecution of war. And the Edict of Nantes was 
' revoked, the Huguenots persecuted, less as the result 
of a settled scheme of policy than as the result of the 
influence of an immoral pietist upon her superstitious 
and egoistical paramour or husband. 

Egoistical to a degree, Louis XIV failed to realise that 
there were in France any elements of successful opposi- 
tion to the royal will. Their existence became very 
apparent after his death, and in the reign of Louis XV 
some attempt was made to effect the real consolidation 
of the French monarchy. The Regent Orleans, while 
posing as an admirer of limited monarchy, endeavoured 
to create a more uniform administration. He was 
thwarted by a combination of circumstances, the in- 
capacity of the nobles, the failure of Law, and, above 
all, by the resistance of the Parliament of Paris. That 
body came more and more frequently into opposition to 
the king during the reign of Louis XV. Lits de justice, 
and the banishment of the offending lawyers, served 
rather to discredit the monarchy than to enhance its 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 187 

■power, and eventually Maupeou made a positive attempt 
to secure that uniformity of justice without which central- 
isation was a mere name. The Parliament, which he 
established, failed to achieve its dual purpose of popularis- 
ing despotism and providing an improved legal system ; ; 
Louis XVI restored the old order, and when the Revolu-- 
tion broke upon France, she was still a decentralised^ 
state. 

Nor was the supposed absolutism which reigned in 
other states any more complete than that of France. 
Spain possibly affords the best example of a highly central- 
ised monarchy. After the War of the Spanish Succes- 
sion, the work of Charles V and Philip II was resumed, 
and almost the last vestiges of mediaeval liberty were 
destroyed. Catalonia had always been a seat of internal' 
Individualism; its inhabitants had been led to support 
Charles of Austria against Philip of Anjou, feeling that 
they had more to hope or less to fear from a king brought 
up in the atmosphere of Vienna than from one educated 
in that of Versailles. The one was a member of a 
dynasty ruling a motley conglomeration of loosely- 
united territories, and might be expected to regard 
leniently the existence of local independence. The other 
was a Bourbon, a member of the supposedly most 
despotic reigning family in Europe; his grandfather 
had but recently torn up an agreement, sworn to by his 
predecessor, merely because it guaranteed to some of 
his subjects the right to worship God as they would. 
The Catalans, however, supported the losing cause; 
the majority of the Spanish people loved intolerance 
and was prone to submit to authority, social and 
political. And the triumph of the internal universalists 
sounded the death-knell of the liberties of Catalonia ; the 
first care of Philip V was to sweep away the privileges 
of his rival's most loyal supporters. Yet even so, the 



i88 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

centralisation of Spain was incomplete. The Basque 
Provinces preserved traces of their old local self-govern- 
ment, and despite the prevalence of the desire to be 
ruled among the people, royal power was subjected to 
very real limitations. It was found impossible to destroy 
the Inquisition. The efforts of Charles III to modify 
the national dress and to provide adequate street lighting 
for his capital almost produced a revolution in the most 
conservative and loyal country in Europe. 

And if signs of internal Individualism are not wanting 
in Spain, they may be found far more abundantly in other 
lands. Prussia was hardly united at all until the reign 
of the Great Elector, whose work it was practically to 
provide a common government for his dominions. 
Though centralisation and despotism made progress 
under Frederic William I and Frederic the Great, there 
was still a lack of real cohesion in the Prussian state; 
that lack of cohesion largely accounts for Prussia's 
overthrow by the arms of France and of Napoleon. 

Russia, at the time of the Peace of Westphalia, had 
hardly emerged from barbarism; she had not emerged 
at all from mediaeval decentralisation. So far from being 
absolute, the Tsar had a spiritual colleague, until Peter 
the Great abolished the Patriarchate of Moscow. Even 
at the close of Catherine IPs reign, the wide extent of 
the Russian Empire, and the extreme difficulty of com- 
munication between its different parts, left a large 
measure of local self-government to the provinces. Not 
only were the nobles almost independent princes .on their 
estates, but in the remoter districts unnoticed city 
republics preserved their existence. 

But it was in the Austrian dominions that the absence 
of real despotism was most marked. The Habsburgs 
rilled over races singularly tenacious of their local 
privileges; they long failed to create even a single, 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 189 

unified administration for their empire. Maria Theresa, 
it is true, did something to remedy this defect, but when 
Joseph II went further and attempted to destroy the 
liberties of the Magyars and of the Austrian Netherlands, 
he aroused a storm of opposition. In Belgium, an 
actual revolt took place; Hungary was on the verge 
of rebellion; before his death, the reforming Emperor 
was driven to attempt concessions. Leopold II has 
been regarded as a statesman largely because he admitted 
the futility of his predecessor's dream of a united 
Germanised monarchy. 

Nevertheless, though consolidation was nowhere 
really achieved and despotism was thus everywhere 
imperfect, there was yet a general movement towards 
both centralisation and absolutism. Even the so-caUed 
republics participated in this movement. Venice, for 
centuries controlled by the Council of Ten, became 
an extremely narrow oligarchy. HoUand accepted the 
practical sovereignty of the House of Orange. Sweden, 
long a veiled republic, was temporarily converted into 
an absolute monarchy by Gustavus III. Only in Poland 
did internal Individualism hold its own, and Poland paid 
for this by passing through a period of anarchy into a 
state of subjection to her universalist neighbours. On 
the eve of her dissolution, she had recognised the errors 
of her past ; the reformed constitution, annulled at the 
Second Partition, endowed the executive with powers 
greater than those which any Polish king had possessed 
since the extinction of the House of Jagiello. 

When, therefore, the French Revolution occurred, ) 
Europe presented no picture of uniform absolutism, but ' 
rather one of countries in almost every stage of centralisa- 
tion and decentralisation. Spain was, perhaps, as near 
a complete despotism as possible; Poland was as near 
complete anarchy as a state can be and yet continue to 



190 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

exist at all. Between these two extremes, most varieties 
of government were to be found ; monarchies masquerad- 
ing as republics, republics masquerading as monarchies ; 
countries possessing a mediaevally nebulous unity, 
countries recalling the Greek city-states in the extension 
of the functions of government. 

,. And this peculiarity of eighteenth-century Europe must 
be attributed to the fact that at this time a dual process 
was occurring. While internal Universalism was labour- 
ing to complete its triumph, a new theory of internal 
Individuahsm was being painfully evolved. Just as 
there was no return to the external Universalism of the 
Middle Ages, so there was no return to the internal 
Individualism of that time. But each dominant emotion 
found a new mode of expression, as was bound to be the 
case unless human nature changed. And just as the 
new external Universalism made some concession to the 
individualist spirit, so the new internal Individualism 
made allowance for the prevalent Universalism. 

This reaction against the supremacy of the desire to 
be ruled first appeared in the gradual evolution of the 
new theory of monarchy. During the Middle Ages, as 
soon as kingship ceased to be tribal, it became essentially 
territorial; the king was, above all, a great landowner, 
and his duties were held to be equivalent to those of a 
good landlord. His title to rule was similar to the title 
of every possessor of property; it was divine in origin, 
based ultimately upon the distinction made in the Deca- 
logue between meum and tuum. But at the time of the 
Reformation, this idea of monarchy was necessarily 
and seriously assailed. Forced to find a ground for 
resistance to government, the Protestants, not daring 
to refuse obedience to a divine institution, were driven 
to discover some human foundation for royal authority. 
The Huguenots therefore produced the Social Contract, 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 191 

formulating a theory that government is based upon an 
original agreement between ruler and subject. Kings, 
as one writer expressed it, were made by men for their; 
own convenience, " for quietness' sake, as one member 
of a family is appointed to buy the meat." The idea 
of contract, however, failed to secure ascendancy, partly 
because it could be turned to support extreme tyranny, 
partly because kings were reluctant to permit debate 
concerning the origins of their authority, partly because 
subjects were generally disinclined to enter upon such 
debates. 

On the other hand, the idea of convenience as a basis? 
of government developed and bore abundant fruit. It 
became a recognised idea that royal authority was a trust, 
that power was given to kings, not that they might 
gratify their own incHnation, but that they might pro- 
mote the welfare of their subjects. That welfare was 
commonly interpreted as consisting in the maintenance of 
prestige abroad and the promotion of material prosperity 
at home. The external influence and interests of the 
state were to be safeguarded; pubHc works were to be, 
undertaken; everything possible was to be done to- 
improve the lot of the people. Kings, no less than their 
subjects, accepted this theory of monarchy. Frederic 
the Great was only voicing the opinion of contemporary 
rulers when he professed himself to be " the first servant; 
of his people." The sovereigns of the eighteenth century 
were almost morbidly eager to recognise and to fulfil 
their obligations. 

But those obhgations did not, nor were they in any 
wise intended to, limit the absolute power of the king. 
Monarchy was to be benevolent ; it was at the same time 
to be despotic. Frederic the Great crystalHsed the 
contemporary conception of the royal office in his well- 
known phrase, " Everything for the people, nothing by 



192 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

the people " ; rule was to be autocratic, no less than 
paternal. The governed were not to be permitted any 
voice in determining the conduct of the governor; they 
were held to be incapable of deciding what was and what 
was not for their own good. No sovereigns, perhaps, 
were so entirely resolved to disregard adverse expressions 
of public opinion as were the benevolent despots of the 
eighteenth century. They seemed to feel that they 
could secure the welfare of their subjects; they laboured 
conscientiously towards that end. They seemed at the 
same time to be determined that no one else should 
undertake that task which they conceived it to be their 
duty to perform and to appropriate to themselves. 

In these circumstances, it is hardly matter for surprise 
that the enlightened despots engaged in undertakings 
not obviously fraught with advantage to their subjects, 
and of which those subjects disapproved. Generally 
speaking, they were warlike, and if some of the wars 
which they waged resulted in benefits to their people 
commensurate with their cost, others had no such 
merit. Frederic the Great's long struggle for the posses- 
sion of Silesia may be defended on the ground that it 
gave Prussia a valuable and even necessary province, and 
that it raised her to the rank of a first-class power. The 
wars of Catherine II have a similar justification. Swedish 
rivalry in the Baltic was economically dangerous; 
victory over the Ottoman Turks served to give Russia 
an outlet to the south, and was valuable as supplying 
a community of sentiment, promoting a patriotic en- 
thusiasm, by which the empire of the Tsars was welded 
into a single state. But the intervention of Charles III 
in the Seven Years' War and in the War of American 
Independence produced nothing but evil for Spain; the 
attack of Joseph II on Turkey merely served to accelerate 
the advance of Russia and to embarrass the Emperor 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 193 

still further in the prosecution of internal reforms. Few, 
if any, of the wars undertaken by Louis XIV and Louis 
XV were conceived in the best interests of France, nor 
did they result in any advantage to her sufficient to 
excuse the expenditure which they necessitated. None 
of the Bourbons, however, can be with any real justice 
included among the enlightened despots ; the selfishness 
of their foreign policy supplies a fair indication of the 
whole tenor of their conduct. Even the great public 
works, completed under the ancien regime, were designed 
largely to gratify the ostentatious vanity of the French 
kings; on the testimony of Arthur Young, they served 
no very useful purpose. 

And if the wars undertaken by the enlightened despots 
were not always advantageous to their subjects, their 
internal policy was frequently stiU less advantageous, 
stiU less in accord with the wishes of their people. 
Frederic the Great deliberately organised his kingdom 
as a camp, and if mihtary strength was essential to 
Prussia, the exaggeration of that strength was largely 
responsible for the failure to cope with the many social 
and economic evils eventually remedied by Stein and 
his collaborators. But it is in the case of Joseph II that 
the faults of enlightened despotism are best discerned. 
His measures achieved so little popularity that the agita- 
tion aroused by them shook the Habsburg throne. Him- 
self indubitably intelligent and sincere, he lacked that 
patience in face of stupidity and prejudice which is one 
of the most necessary qualities in a statesman. Enthusi- 
astic to a degree, he attempted to impose his will upon 
his reluctant subjects, to accomplish by means of a 
few edicts the laborious work of centuries. And the 
methods and errors of Joseph were those of his con- 
temporaries ; his haste was really typical of the working 
of that system of which he was perhaps the truest repre- 

N 



194 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

sentative. The enlightened despots were alike in their 
impatience of opposition, in their conviction that they 
possessed a practical monopoly of political wisdom. 
Catherine II abandoned the duma which she had called 
into existence, when she found that even a tentative 
representation might produce the expression of hostile 
public opinion. Pombal in Portugal, Charles III in 
Spain, forced through the suppression of the Jesuits, 
with little regard for the feelings of the people. 

Such disregard for the real wishes of their subjects 
on the part of the benevolent despots produced important 
results. It was admitted that government should be for 
the good of the governed. The despots claimed to be 
the sole judges of what constituted that good. ' But 
their claim was soon disputed; Joseph II received 
practical proof of the fact that his views were unaccept- 
able to his subjects. And even when no such dispute 
occurred, when the ruled were content to receive with- 
out questioning the verdict of the ruler, a difficulty still 
arose. If the majority of sovereigns sought, to the best 
of their ability and knowledge, to promote the welfare 
of their people, all did not do so. The benevolence of 
the government of Louis XV was at least dubious ; the 
malevolence of that of Hesse, whose landgrave sold 
his subjects to fight in wars in which they had not the 
least interest, was beyond doubt. And the existence 
of unenlightened despots produced a corollary to the 
original thesis. If government was to be for the good 
of the governed, there must be some sanction by which 
such an employment of authority might be secured. A 
ruler who misused his position must be liable to adverse 
criticism and eventually to deposition, as having failed 
to fulfil the duties imposed upon him by his office. 

But though this corollary seems to follow logically 
from the original hypothesis, it did not secure immediate 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 195 

enunciation. The theory of benevolent despotism also 
imphed submission by the ruled, and upon this aspect 
emphasis was laid owing to the prevalence of internal 
Universalism. Mankind was in general inchned to 
obedience; it was necessary to destroy or at least to 
impair the ascendancy of the desire to be ruled before 
men could be led to consider either the possibiUty or the 
advisabihty of resistance to constituted authority. And 
it is in the gradual growth of criticism of the estabUshed 
order that the second stage of the reaction against 
internal UniversaHsm is to be found, in the intellectual 
movement which characterised the latter half of the 
eighteenth century. 

The inclination to accept authority, to bow to the 
decisions of all estabUshed powers, extended not only 
over the realm of poUtics, but also over those of religion 
and economics. In every direction the human intellect 
was cramped and confined to certain recognised channels. 
The task of the internal individuaHsts was therefore the 
harder; they were forced to induce the minds of their 
contemporaries to break the shackles of convention, as 
well as to brave the anger of governments and to con- 
vince the world that the supposed danger of anarchy was 
unreal. They were obHged to run counter to all accepted 
theories ; it was their task to convert mankind to a new 
mode of thought. And their success was the more 
difficult since the agencies created by the prevailing 
desire to be ruled were powerful, the defences of internal 
Universahsm strong. Those defences would indeed have 
been impregnable if it had not been that the human 
mind is easily satiated by gratification of one or other 
of the two paramount emotions. As it was, the triumph 
of the individualist reaction might be delayed; it could 
not be permanently prevented. 

A certain weakness in the universalist position 



196 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

facilitated the individualist victory. During the Middle 
Ages, the bondage of the human intellect had been well- 
nigh complete, because men upon one important topic 
dared only to debate even with themselves in secret, 
in fear and in trembhng. Dogmatic rehgion possessed a 
strong hold upon the world ; men were hardly unorthodox 
in their own minds. Kings might be powerful and 
impious, powerful and clear-headed; they still shud- 
dered before the prospect of excommunication, of con- 
demnation by the Church. Nor was it merely that they 
dreaded the political consequences of such an event, 
calculated as those consequences were to give pause to 
the boldest statesman. They trembled also, and sin- 
cerely, for their eternal welfare; the flames of Hell 
blazed brightly before the minds of mediaeval rulers. 
And their subjects lived in a condition of equal dread 
of ecclesiastical censures; they held fast in terror to 
a body which claimed to control the only path to 
Heaven. 

That there were sceptics in the Middle Ages is in- 
deed certain. Agnosticism is no less permanent than 
Catholicism, nor has there been any period in which all 
men have been ready to modify their conduct merely 
because a given course of action might be displeasing 
to a distant and unseen Being. But mediaeval heretics 
could with difficulty discover those who thought with 
them; they were not strengthened in their hostility to 
the existing system by the knowledge that this opposi- 
tion enlisted wide sympathy. The Church had secured 
a practical monopoly of the written word ; her censorship 
was severe and effective. Only by public preaching 
could heterodox views be popularised, and it was no 
very arduous task to silence a few preachers. Hence 
the heretical movements of the Middle Ages always 
failed; the Albigenses, the Hussites, and all other 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 197 

assertors of individualist religious opinion were crushed 
more or less effectively by the dominant Church. 

The invention of printing, however, made the dis- 
semination of any opinion infinitely easier, and from that 
moment heresy grew apace, until its progress culminated 
in the Reformation. Individualism was at last generally 
preached; the enunciation of the doctrine of private 
judgment marks an important stage in the assertion of 
the desire to rule against the desire to be ruled. ReHgious 
bodies, other than the CathoHc Church, sprang into 
existence. Those whom fear of excommunication had 
deterred from the expression of their secret convictions 
were now able to console themselves with the hope that 
there might be byways to Heaven, even if the road 
which they had been taught to follow was closed to them. 
A critical spirit developed; a tendency appeared to 
reject the accepted because it was accepted. But the 
individualist triumph was wholly incomplete . Uni verscd- 
ism had enjoyed a prolonged ascendancy; its influence 
remained extremely powerful. Not only did Catholicism 
regain much of the ground which it had lost, but Pro- 
testant Churches proved to be, or became, equally 
universalist in their principles and their organisation. 

Indeed, it was not until the latter half of the eighteenth 
century that the work of the Reformation was completed. 
At that time the internal individualists realised the 
prevalence of superstition and of dogmatic opinion. 
They saw how this hampered them in every way; they 
came to appreciate the fact that they could not hope to 
attain their object unless and until they succeeded in 
training the human intellect to question accepted ideas. 
Above all, they grasped the necessity of combating 
dominant religious creeds, and especially of combat- 
ing the Roman Church.^, CathoHcism has always been 
primarily logical. It has offered consistent opposition 



198 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

to all free expression of opinion, realising that if liberty 
of thought were conceded in one direction, a first and 
probably a fatal step would be taken towards the admis- 
sion of a similar liberty in the domain of theology. The 
condemnation of Galileo was not due to any special 
ecclesiastical objection to the rotation of the earth round 
the sun ; it was a measure necessary for the safeguarding 
ot the theory of St. Peter's keys a^d tljg dogma of 
transubstantiation. And while the, Catholic Church 
controlled education and possessed a practical censorship 
over profane literature, the cause of Individualism could 
make but little progress; the association between the 
extreme of dogmatic religion and the maintenance of 
universalist ascendancy over the human mind was at 
once intimate and inevitable, since dogmatic religion is 
nothing but one expression of the desire to be ruled. 

Hence, it was against dogmatic religion in general, 
and against the Catholic Church in particular, that the 
first efforts of the eighteenth-century individualists were 
directed. Two circumstances combined to encourage 
their attack. In the first place, the age was rather 
superstitious than religious. Obedience to the Church 
was the product of fear, not the outcome of love; the 
tendency to follow the promptings of fear was sedulously 
encouraged by the clergy. The more influential laymen 
were retained in communion with the Church largely by 
the extreme tact of their confessors. The indulgence of 
an inclination to infringe every provision of the Deca- 
logue was punished by the most moderate penalties; 
the most profligate princes and nobles were never 
refused the consolations of religion, and their mistresses 
were often among the most favoured daughters of the 
Church. Towards the masses, no doubt, the attitude 
of ecclesiastics was more severe, but even the God of 
the Many was found to be most tolerant of any specially 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 199 

popular vice. Nor were the Protestant clergy more 
sincere in their obedience to the creed which they pro- 
fessed. In England, courtly bishops were ready to 
compliment the reigning beauty without regard to her 
morality; a drunken clergy were prepared to laugh with 
appreciation at the broad jests of the local squirearchy, 
and to marry the discarded mistresses of their patrons. 

In the second place, the Catholic Church was character- 
ised by grave faults both of theory and of practice. As 
education and learning increased, men abandoned many 
beliefs countenanced by ecclesiastical authority; the 
universal deluge and the Biblical account of the creation 
were questioned, while the Copemican view of the solar 
system was accepted. If such unorthodox opinions were 
at first not openly proclaimed, this was only because a 
superstitious and cynical age deemed it to be expedient 
as well as possible, to hoodwink the Deity, if indeed He 
existed, and His ministers, if indeed those ministers were 
not themselves equally heretical. 

The faults in practice were still graver. The richer 
benefices were practically the perquisites of the cadets 
of noble families; pluralities abounded, non-residence 
was rather the rule than the exception. The higher 
clergy were commonly unfitted for spiritual office; the 
lower clergy were frequently too uneducated to minister 
effectively to the needs of their flocks. All the ill- 
consequences of enforced celibacy were apparent among 
ecclesiastics, whose serious emplojTment was pohtics 
and whose recreation was vice. The undoubted devotion 
of the few was forgotten in the irreligion of the many. 

But the degeneracy of the Society of Jesus most of all 
contributed to facilitate the individualist assault upon 
the Church; and upon that Society it fell to bear the 
first brunt of the attack. The Jesuits had been mission- 
aries of noteworthy zeal and efficiency, educationists 



300 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

of marked capacity; they had deserved and had secured 
a wide popularity. But corruption is the fate of most 
religious orders; they generally decline from their 
original perfection, and the Society of Jesus afforded no 
exception to this rule. They came into contact with 
politics at home, entering with zest into every intrigue; 
abroad they developed into merchants of dubious 
honesty. As a result, their dictum that the end justifies 
the means, which had been pardoned or overlooked while 
their work was full of benefit to the human race, began 
to provoke more or less vigorous criticism. As long as 
they had conscientiously fulfilled their purpose they had 
been forgiven much; when they had ceased to do so 
they were credited with faults of which they were guilt- 
less. The Jansenist movement was directed primarily 
against the Jesuits, nor did the Society ever recover 
entirely from the attack made upon it in the Provincial 
Letters of Pascal. 

And the teaching of Port Royal prepared the way for 
the final assault, which was based upon the political 
and economic conduct of the Order, but which would 
have failed if that Order's reputation had not been already 
undermined in other respects. As it was, Pombal*Was 
enabled to set the example of expelling the Jesuits. 
They had interfered with his foreign and internal policy ; 
they were therefore driven from Portugal. And his 
example was followed in other Catholic lands. The 
bankruptcy of La Valette afforded the occasion for the 
suppression of the Order in France; in Spain, Austria 
and the Italian principalities, the welfare of the state 
supplied the formal justification. Eventually, Clement (f^^ 
XlV, by the Bull, Dominus et Redemptor, declared the 
dissolution of the Society, and the growing Individualism 
of the age achieved a remarkable victory. 

For the suppression of the Jesuits was an event of no 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 201 

ordinary importance in the history of the world. What- 
ever emotion may from time to time be ascendant in the 
human mind leads to the creation of agencies to secure 
and to maintain its ascendancy, and of the agencies so 
produced by the universalist spirit the Society of Jesus 
was one of the most notable and effective. Its members 
had undertaken the education of the world; they had 
been successful in this work and had trained their pupils 
in habits of obedience. Hence, they had also done much 
to ensure the supremacy of that emotion to which they 
really owed their origin. It was their success in induc- 
ing submission which secured them a welcome from 
Frederic the Great and from Catherine II, when Catholic 
rulers had expelled them ; those who were endeavouring 
to estabUsh autocracy could wish for no better helpers 
than the Jesuits. But this very fact made their formal 
suppression all the more valuable to the cause of Indi- 
vidualism. Their place as educationists had to be sup- 
pUed; it was supplied by men inspired rather by the 
desire to rule than by the desire to be ruled. It is no 
mere coincidence that the French Revolution, in one 
aspect an individualist movement, found its most 
typical leaders in men of that generation which had 
received its education after schools had ceased to be 
controlled by the Society of Jesus. 

Nor was this the only importance of the fall of the 
Jesuits. The event involved a defeat for the Pope, the 
great exponent of UniversaHsm; the prestige of the 
Papacy almost reached its nadir at the moment when 
Clement XIV was compelled to abandon the most able 
defenders of the Holy See. And the victory which 
Individualism had achieved in this case encouraged the 
opponents of the constituted ecclesiastical system; the 
first success in the reaction against Universalism led 
to further efforts. Accepted theories were generally 



302 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

attacked. Montesquieu by implication criticised the 
government of France in his Persian Letters ; the En- 
cyclopaedists questioned almost every recognised belief, 
Diderot, in particular, preaching a practical agnosticism. 

But it was Voltaire who really expounded that gospel 
of disbelief which inspired the individualists to break 
away from the past entirely. He was by nature devoted 
to the desire to rule. He hated all dogmas, save those 
which he himself propounded; he was the enemy of all 
intolerance, save intolerance of intolerance ; he was the 
opponent of all superstition, save the superstition that 
the human intellect is perfect. He was eager to subject 
all things to the cold light of reason, and his great 
literary gifts, his wit and his satirical power, made him 
a peculiarly formidable opponent of prevailing beliefs. 
In him, the work of the Refonuation reached its logical 
conclusion. Luther had asserted the right of private 
judgment, but had anathematised those who dared to 
exercise it upon such questions as the authenticity of 
the Bible or the dogma of justification by faith only. 
Voltaire asserted the same right, and to him nothing was 
too profound, nothing too sacred, to be submitted to the 
test of human reason. Himself a deist, he taught his 
contemporaries to dare to deny the existence of God, 
necessary as he supposed the Deity to be; he taught 
them, in short, to dare to be complete individualists. 

Voltaire appealed to a relatively limited audience; 
his chief importance lies in the fact that he made it the 
fashion to attack the Church, to question dogmas and 
to despise superstition. It was the work of Rousseau 
to popularise anti-clericalism; he appealed to a wider 
public, and brought his ideas home to the many by the 
very exaggeration of his language. Upon that exaggera- 
tion, upon the self-contradiction of which he was guilty, 
his opponents seized eagerly; they hastened to apply 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 203 

exact meanings to phrases probably inexact by intention, 
nor, when arguments failed them, did they refrain from 
descending to more or less scurrilous abuse. His success 
may be gauged from the violence of the opposition to 
him. The anger which he aroused in the minds of the 
universahsts is evidence that they realised how vital a 
force the individualist creed had become in his hands. 

And the fact that Rousseau compelled an answer, 
compelled a counter-attack, was of no slight assistance 
to his cause. Voltaire, though he had not entirely 
escaped persecution, had yet found admirers among those 
who rejected his opinions, and the resultant hushing of 
controversy really subserved the interest of the dominant 
theory. By provoking debate, Rousseau extended the 
knowledge of his views, and increased knowledge of the 
individualist theory meant an increase in the number of 
those who adhered to that theory. For though Indi- 
vidualism, no less than Universalism, is a passion in- 
herent in man, it is less susceptible of clear, expression 
than the contrary ideal, and hence for it to make progress, 
to come as near as may be towards attaining an ascen- 
dancy, there is almost need for some written, and even 
for some graphically written, exposition of its nature. 
But no sooner has such an exposition been secured than 
many who had merely felt a vague discontent with 
things as they were, a vague distrust of Universalism, 
reaUse that Individualism is the creed which they have 
subconsciously professed. Voltaire and Rousseau to- 
gether, therefore, did much to hasten the reaction which, 
though it could not have been prevented, might yet 
have been longer delayed. Much as they differed from 
each other, they were ahke individuaUsts, and as such 
contributed to undermine the ascendancy of the Church, 
to make irreligion both fashionable and popular, to 
encourage the rejection of all hitherto accepted ideas. 



\ 



ao4 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

to ensure the emphatic assertion of the desire to 
rule. 

In this weakening of the Church, a definite advance 
towards a complete reaction is to be found. Education 
had been altogether in the interests of dogmatic rehgion ; 
its spirit had been wholly universalist. If it did not 
become less dogmatic, the dogma was changed ; it was 
no longer the duty of obedience that was taught, but 
the obligation to rebel. Whereas in the past men had 
learned that certain things were beyond criticism and 
beyond question, now they learned to reject every 
standard save that of their own reason, to hold nothing 
too profound or too sacred to be debated. And the 
removal of the long-standing barrier against free discus- 
sion of religion paved the way for the free discussion of 
all topics, and more especially, for the free discussion of 
pontics. The Church was closely allied with the crown 
in every state ; the power of priest and king went hand 
in hand ; ecclesiastical political theory was almost always 
monarchical. The decHne of the Church therefore led 
to a decline of royal prestige ; the growth of free thought 
tended to produce the limitation or destruction of 
monarchy. 

Nor was it the ascendancy of dogmatic religion alone 
that the individualists attacked, though it was into that 
channel that their first efforts were really directed. 
Economic and political, no less than religious, liberty 
was denied by the prevalent Universalism. The 
mercantile theory had been everywhere adopted; the 
government claimed the right and professed the duty of 
regulating the industrial life of the community in the 
real or supposed political interest of the state. But this 
doctrine was called in question during the eighteenth 
century. The Physiocrats preached the freedom of 
industry; their ideas were elaborated by lat^r political 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 305 

economists, who taught a completely individualist creed. 
All restraints upon trade were condemned; freedom of 
contract between man and man, whether citizens of the 
same state or no, was applauded; the dogma of laissez- 
faire was promulgated. A definite individualist reaction 
occurred in the sphere of economics, or at least of 
economic thought. 

That same reaction eventually extended to the region 
of political theory. Absolute monarchy was criticised 
at first by implication. Montesquieu and Voltaire 
admitted their admiration of the EngHsh constitution, 
and such admiration could only be construed as a ten- 
tative condemnation of unrepresentative government. 
Rousseau went further. The Social Contract declared 
in vivid phrases the inalienable right of peoples to 
choose and to remove their rulers; the divine basis 
of royal authority was ridiculed rather than seriously 
attacked. And the immense popularity which Rous- 
seau's essay secured armed individualist opinion for the 
contest against internal Universalism. It became, so 
to speak, the gospel of the desire to rule. 

But the theory of internal Individualism, evolved in 
the eighteenth century, differed widely from that which 
may be found in the Middle Ages. Mediaeval Indi- 
vidualism lacked systematisation. It amounted to 
little more than a claim by every district to exist in a 
state of anarchy, a denial of the right of the central 
government to perform the elementary function of pre- 
serving law and order. The internal Individualism of 
the eighteenth century was a clear theory, carefully 
based upon certain fundamental facts or assertions. 
It declared the excellence of human reason, denying 
entirely the theory of a divine moral code and the idea 
that any person or class was specially quaUfied or em- 
powered to teach morality. Man had a right to order 



2o6 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

his intelleetual life as he saw fit; he possessed an 
identical right so to order his economic and political 
life. The relationship between the state and the 
individual could be legitimately determined only by 
those individuals of whom the state was composed. 
No one had any prescriptive right to rule ; all sovereigns 
were limited by the inclination of their subjects. To the 
thesis that government is for the good of the governed, 
the new internal Individualism added the corollary that 
rulers who failed so to rule as to promote the welfare 
of their people might be and should be removed from 
their office. 

On the eve of the French Revolution, then, there was a 
general reaction against the conclusions which had been 
reached in the Peace of WestphaHa. Externally, In- 
dividualism was losing ground. A new Universalism, 
based upon the conception of a balance of power, had 
been evolved, and the maintenance of that balance was 
to be secured by the combination of such states as 
individualist aggression might threaten. Expressions of 
this idea are to be found in the alliances formed from 
time to time to resist the isolated expansion of a single 
state. The theory underlay the Armed Neutrality, 
designed to oppose the claim of England to disturb the 
commerce of the world in her own interest. It produced 
the intervention of France, Spain and Holland in the 
War of American Independence, a league which proposed 
to readjust the balance held to have been disturbed by 
the colonial successes of Great Britain in the Seven 
Years' War. It led to the Fiirstenbund, a union of the 
smaller German states under the auspices of Frederic the 
Great, to defend the status quo in the Holy Roman 
Empire from the danger to which it was exposed by the 
ambition of Joseph II. 

But perhaps the most complete expression of the new 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 307 

external Universalism is to be found in the Triple 
Alliance of England, Holland and Prussia. Originating 
from the restoration of the House of Orange to the 
stathaltership by a Prussian army, this alliance attempted 
to secure a preponderating influence on all European 
affairs. It imposed an armistice upon ^ Sweden and 
Russia, when the former seemed to be threatened with 
conquest. When Catherine II and Joseph II combined 
to inflict upon Turkey the recent fate of Poland, the 
allies intervened with effect, and it was the mobilisation 
of a Prussian army in Silesia, the imminent threat of 
war, which led Austria and Russia to conclude the treaties 
of Sistova and Jassy. And it was the Triple AUiance 
which determined the conditions upon which Leopold II 
should be permitted to restore his authority in Belgium. 
It had, indeed, become clear that any dehberate aggres- 
sion would cause the formation of a European league, 
that external Individualism was limited by compulsory 
regard for the interests of at least the greater powers. 
The UniversaUsm of the last years of the eighteenth 
century recalled the ordering of Europe by mediaeval 
Emperors and Popes; the reaction would have been 
complete, if the alliances had been permanent instead 
of occasional, if a definite concert had been created. 

Internally, there was an equivalent reaction against 
that Universalism which had been established at and 
after the time of the Peace of Westphalia. Absolutism 
and centralisation had never been perfectly secured; 
throughout the eighteenth century, rulers were endeav- 
ouring to consolidate their power while subjects were 
evolving a new principle of resistance. But, at the end 
of the period, it had almost become clear that the 
ultimate victory would not he with the universalists, 
that they had already attained the highest point of their 
success. Joseph II failed to impose his reforms upon 



2o8 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

his dominions; the Belgian Revolution indicated that 
there was a definite limit to the submission of peoples 
to their sovereigns. Gustavus III, who had been handi- 
capped by the individualist predilections of his subjects, 
established a despotism ; his triumph was brief, and after 
his assassination Sweden became once more a limited 
monarchy. In France, Louis XVI found himself obliged 
to restore the Parliament of Paris, and was forthwith 
handicapped in his support of Turgot's reforms by the 
factious opposition of a privileged bureaucracy. 

In general, the reaction was evident, though incom- 
plete. Nothing appears more clearly in the history of 
the eighteenth century than the permanence of the 
secular conflict between Universalism and Individualism. 
The triumph which one or other of the two seems to have 
gained proves to be essentially unreal ; the reaction ever 
anticipates the completion of the victory. At the time 
of the Peace of Westphalia, the destruction of imperial 
and papal authority promised the beginning of an era 
in which nations should be unimpeded in the pursuit of 
their own interests; the crushing of internal disorders 
promised the consolidation of every state, the end of 
all resistance to government. At the outbreak of the 
French Revolution, the general acceptance of the balance 
of power as the ultimate basis of international relations 
evidenced the vitality of external Universalism; the 
growth of criticism and of resistance to government 
evidenced the vitality of internal Individualism. All 
expectations were falsified save that of the enduring 
nature of the struggle between the desire to rule and 
the desire to be ruled. 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 209 



X 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE: 5. FROM THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT DAY 

No great event in history is susceptible of and has re- 
ceived so many different and contradictory interpreta- 
tions as has the French Revolution. Some have regarded 
the movement as being essentially directed against 
absolutism; some have held that it was designed to 
secure unity and centralisation. But it is easy to show 
that the French government under Louis XVI was less, 
rather than more, autocratic than had been the govern- 
ment at any other time during the ancien regime. The 
Parliament of Paris successfully resisted the royal will; 
Turgot and Brienne were alike thwarted by its oppo- 
sition. And the Revolution did not develop until the 
king, by summoning the States-General, had implicitly 
abdicated any claim to dispose at his pleasure of the 
lives and fortunes of his subjects. Nor does the fact 
that the Revolution culminated in a highly-centralised 
and despotic system prove that to create such a system 
was the original design of the movement or of its leaders. 
On the contrary, the weakening of the executive by the 
Constitution of 1791, the subsequent disappearance of 
the king, the delegation of power to the commune, the 
reluctance with which the republican legislature con- 
sented to part with its absolute control over the adminis- 
tration, and, above all, the definitive assertion of popular 
rights, indicate that the Revolution was not wholly a 
unitary ^and centralising movement. 



310 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

Objection may equally be taken to the view that it 
was intended only to sweep away intolerable political, 
religious, social and economic abuses. The government 
of Louis XVI had displayed its anxiety to remedy all 
that called for remedy ; the nobles and clergy voluntarily 
surrendered the privileges which had been cause for 
complaint, and the way had already been prepared for 
a thorough reform before the Revolution had finally 
developed, since not until after the flight to Varennes 
was the cause of limited monarchy irretrievably lost. 

Nor, again, was the Revolution an uprising of the 
masses against the classes. Only for a brief moment 
did it create a franchise without a property qualification ; 
universal manhood suffrage was hardly advocated even 
by the most extreme revolutionaries. The leaders of 
the movement were drawn from various walks of life. 
Mirabeau was a noble, Sieyes was an ecclesiastic; 
Robespierre, Danton, Marat, can hardly be described 
with any justice as men of the people. And finally, 
the Revolution is not to be degraded into a mere 
disturbance organised by a dissatisfied middle class 
anxious to appropriate to themselves that political power 
from which they had been excluded under the ancien 
regime. Apart from the inherent improbability that 
an event fraught with such tremendous and enduring 
consequences should have been the work of selfishly 
discontented politicians, it is clear that the people at 
large favoured the Revolution, that at no time did 
they really withdraw that favour. And the dictum of 
Abraham Lincoln is true: ** You cannot fool all of the 
people all of the time." 

The truth is that no one of these explanations is 
satisfactory. In each of them there is an element of 
justice; each, as a complete interpretation, is unjust. 
The French Revolution was all these things, all and more 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 211 

also. To appreciate it, the true nature of History must 
be realised,)' the true character of man and of nations. 
Men are both individualist and universalist ; their life 
is made up of an endless conflict between their two para- 
mount emotions. One or other may attain a momentary 
ascendancy; that ascendancy is ever momentary, the 
reaction always inevitable. The most human man, 
perhaps, is one in whom the desire to be ruled and the 
desire to rule are most evenly balanced, and in such a 
man's life periods of reaction are most frequent and most 
violent; he turns most readily from one extreme to 
the other. And nations resemble individuals. There is 
always and must always be an opposition to the existing 
system in every state, be that system what it may. 
Reaction from Universalism to Individualism, or from 
Individualism to Universalism, wiU occur with more or 
less frequency, and it will occur most frequently in the 
le^st stolid race, the most human race. 
( Of aU nations upon earth, the French is the most 
essentially human. They embrace with enthusiasm; 
they spurn with equal enthusiasm; they are almost 
feminine in their moods. " A dancing nation, fickle and 
untrue," characterises them from a hostile standpoint. 
More friendly criticism recognises their generous tempera- 
ment, their idealism, their gifts of imaginative construc- 
tion, their sense of the poetry of politics. During the 
period of the Revolution, the French people acted more 
typically than ever before or since. Under the ancien 
regime there had been too large a measure of Universal- 
ism to satisfy the individualists, too large a measure of 
Individualism to satisfy the universalists. Both parties 
were therefore eager to alter the existing system ; each 
in turn secured a passing ascendancy. The movement 
thus became complex in character; its variations of 
aim and attainment were numerous. So violent, indeed, 



ai2 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

were those variations that France during the Revolu- 
tion resembles some passionate maiden, storm-tossed 
by alternating gusts of love and hate. 

This interaction of Universalism and Individualism, 
the momentary triumph of each, appears alike in the 
external and internal history of the French Revolution. 
At the outset of the period, and in their attitude towards 
foreign affairs, the French people were captivated by the 
ideahsm of the desire to be ruled. They disclaimed, and 
disclaimed sincerely, any wish to break the peace ; they 
would not imitate the vices of the ancien regime by waging 
wars of aggression. They were rather inspired by love 
for their fellow-men, even though their love was some- 
what impatient and this impatience at times produced 
a violence of affection closely resembling hatred, at 
least in its results. The Revolution would perhaps not 
have led to war at all if it had not been for the uncon- 
ciliatory attitude adopted by the powers of Europe. 

That attitude was partly the result of the reaction 
towards external Universalism which had marked the 
eighteenth century. It had become a political postulate 
that the concern of each was the concern of all, and in 
accordance with this supposition the internal changes 
in France were held to be matter for the attention of 
other states. In particular, Austria and Prussia claimed 
that the French should not be allowed to settle their 
government without reference to Europe. They were 
led to take up this attitude partly by the prevalence of 
internal Universalism, since the individualist tendency 
of the Revolution appeared dangerous to such as were 
actuated by the desire to be ruled. France was thus, 
in a sense, driven to defend her existence as a sovereign 
state, her right to determine her own internal concerns. 
Excuses were certainly put forward by the allies to 
justify their intervention; the Habsburgs became 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 213 

suddenly solicitous for the welfare of the imperial 
princes, the Hohenzollerns for the safety of the Bour- 
bons. But such excuses were too unreal to hide the 
underlying motive of the two powers. Just as the Triple 
Alliance had vetoed Joseph IFs Belgian pohcy, so the 
new coalition proposed to veto the Constitution of 1791, 
to annul the work of the National Assembly, to restore 
the ancien regime. 

Even so, the revolutionaries were eager to preserve 
peace. Their determination to do so was explicitly 
announced in an article of the Constitution, and when 
war had broken out, it did not at first become aggressive 
on the side of France. The cosmopolitan view of foreign 
politics still held sway. If France proclaimed her willing- 
ness to assist all nations striving to be free, she equally 
proclaimed her resolve to exact no recompense for the 
good which she proposed to do. The revolutionaries 
repudiated all idea of hostility towards the inhabitants 
of the lands invaded by their armies. They warred 
with rulers, not with subjects. They adopted a self- 
denying ordinance, prohibiting them from doing any- 
thing which might offend the sacred brotherhood of man. 
They would annex no territory, they would reap no 
profit save the abstract reward of virtue, the conscious- 
ness of probity. Even the Girondists, who advocated 
war from less pure and more political motives, did not , 
attempt to reinforce that advocacy by any proposal to 
secure the territorial prizes of victory. Revolutionary 
France at first held fast to external Universalism. 

But not all Frenchmen were altruists, not all external 
universalists. Though few, if any, dared dispute the) 
dogma of international fraternity, an individualist view 
of foreign policy gradually secured adherents. The 
allies were defeated, the war proved costly. These two 
facts combined to assist the development of an external 



214 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

Individualism in France. Adopting the Pauline dictum, 
that " those who preach the gospel should live of the 
gospel," the revolutionary armies proceeded to levy 
contributions on the lands in which they had sown the 
spiritual things of liberty. The French Republic per- 
mitted or persuaded, and eventually compelled, the 
districts occupied by its troops to desire incorporation 
with it. When some of these districts declined to receive 
so great a benefit, an excuse for their annexation was 
speedily found. Louis XIV had established the Cham- 
bers of Reunion to cloak or to facilitate his aggression. 
The external individualists of the Revolution produced 
the doctrine of the natural frontiers. They claimed 
that they were doing no more than giving to France that 
which Nature herself had accorded. 

The natural frontiers, however, were partially un- 
natural. The Rhine proved to be less a boundary and 
a barrier than an ever-open door into Germany, the 
existence of which encouraged advance in place of pro- 
ducing the satisfaction of achievement. When the pro- 
jected goal had been attained, it was found that it was 
of necessity merely the prelude to further effort. The 
frontiers had to be defended. Such defence was sus- 
ceptible of facile justification, and the idea of buffer 
states for the protection of the frontiers was easily 
adopted even by those who had viewed with apprehen- 
sion the original annexation of territory. But from 
the formation of such artificial barriers it was but a 
small step to proceed to open aggression. By degrees, 
all pretence of an appeal to natural rights was aban- 
doned. As under the ancien regime, the interest, real 
or supposed, of France became the sole determining 
principle of French foreign policy. 

Napoleon, in effect, resumed the work of Louis XIV. 
He completed it and went further; at the height of his 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 215 

power, his empire recalled that of Charles the Great, to 
whose example he made a conscious or subconscious 
appeal. The annexation of the Illyrian Provinces marks 
the entire rejection of the original principles of revolu- 
tionary policy. It could not be contended that lands 
beyond the Adriatic Sea were attached to France by 
any natural right, that France had indeed any title to 
possess them other than that conferred upon her by 
victory in war, the right of the strong to despoil and to 
oppress the weak. At the same time, the substitution 
in the client states of monarchical for . prof essedly re- 
publican government marked the abandonment of the 
revolutionary crusade for the spread of liberty, for the 
delivery of mankind from the tyrant's yoke. Spain 
may have been ruled badly by her Bourbon kings. The 
attitude of the Spanish people, when Joseph Bonaparte 
was substituted for Charles IV, shows that the change 
of ruler was not in accord with their wishes, suggests that 
it was not conceived in a spirit of anxious consideration 
for their good. And Napoleon's cynical repudiation of 
his original championship of Italian unity, his treatment 
of Germany and his entirely political attitude towards 
the Poles, were only the logical development of his 
adoption of French nationality and interests as the key- 
note of his conduct. At the time of the Preliminaries 
of Leoben, he had rejected revolutionary idealism by 
arranging the partition of Venice. His later policy ful- 
filled the promise given at the close of his first Italian 
campaign. And that policy was popular in France. 
The nation had soon wearied of unselfishness; having 
wearied, she became more entirely selfish than any other 
state had ever been. From the extreme of external Uni- 
versalism, she reverted to that of external Individualism ; 
the v/heel swung full circle. 
An equivalent variation appears in the internal policy 



2i6 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

of the French Revolution. At the outset of the period, 
though France was imperfectly centralised, though 
despotism was qualified, yet the executive was powerful 
and irresponsible, the king at least theoretically absolute. 
Nor was this absolute power at first very antipathetic 
to those who became the later revolutionaries. When 
the States-General met, men were ready to commit the 
leadership of the nation to Louis XVI; it was to his 
beneficence that they trusted to secure such changes 
and reforms as they desired. They believed implicitly 
that the king would judge rightly as to what constituted 
the good of his people; their spirit was universalist. 
Even the preaching of liberty, equality and fraternity 
was primarily little more than an assertion of the brother- 
hood of all Frenchmen under a paternal ruler. Re- 
publican or democratic doctrines were hardly known; 
Individualism was almost silent. 

But among the most marked characteristics of the 
French people is love of logical conclusions. The 
internal universaHsts of the revolutionary period were 
typically French, and therefore were lacking in modera- 
tion. They aimed at the preservation of the ancien 
regime ; they regretted the most necessary and salutary 
changes. And this fact enabled internal IndividuaHsm 
to gain converts; it hastened the reaction. Many who 
would have been content to support a reasonable measure 
of Universaiism were forced or induced to embrace the 
contrary creed, and the folly or blindness of the king, 
the lack of organisation of the conservative elements in 
France, completed the work which the violence of the 
internal universaHsts had begun. The demand for a 
definite constitution was an initial victory for the forces 
of Individualism ; the Constitution of 1791 was a triumph. 
Logical, because French, it adopted the extreme con- 
trary to that which had prevailed under the ancien 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 217 

regime. Prefaced by a declaration of the Rights of Man, 
itself an assertion of the privileges of the individual, the 
Constitution established a weak executive, reducing the 
king to the position of a shadowy figurehead for an 
almost anarchical state. In place of a theoretical right 
to legislate by prerogative, Louis XVI was granted 
merely a suspensive veto. Election everywhere took 
the place of royal appointment or hereditary succession. 
The ministers of the crown ceased to be able to impose 
their will on the nation; they were instead forced to 
attempt the carrying out of laws in the making of which 
they had no voice. 

Even so, the internal individualists were not satisfied. 
They pushed forward to the logical conclusion of their 
theory, and the destruction of kingship was followed by 
an attempted establishment of anarchy under the guise 
of a pure republic. The Constitution of 1793 did more 
than sweep away the few remaining vestiges of the 
ancien regime. Executive power shared the fate of 
monarchy. The popular assembly itself was distrusted ; 
though permitted to suggest laws, it was prohibited 
from enacting them. The right of legislation was given 
to the people at large, and, that no regulations of which 
they disapproved might possess validity, they were dis- 
couraged from obeying even the laws which they had 
themselves ordained. A clause of the Constitution 
insisted not merely upon the right, but also upon the 
duty, of rebellion ; every Frenchman was urged to deter- 
mine for himself the degree of obedience which he would 
render to constituted authority. Not even in Poland 
had legalised anarchy been more completely proclaimed, 
had internal Individualism approached more nearly its 
logical conclusion. The Constitution of 1793 established 
the private judgment of every man as the sole standard 
of his political conduct. 



2i8 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

It is, however, in the relations between the Revolution 
and the Church that the effects of the individualist side 
of the movement can be most clearly seen^^. Dogmatic 
religion is based upon the desire to be ruled ;Xatholicism 
gratifying that desire more completely than does any 
other creed, is essentially the creed of the universalist. 
The Roman Church denies to its members the right to 
criticise the Vicar of Christ, or even to judge the priest- 
hood. The conscience of the individual is in the care 
of his spiritual father; to that father he must yield 
implicit obedience. But whatever else popular govern- 
ment may imply, it implies a certain exercise of private 
judgment. The individual must possess the right of 
security from oppression, the right to criticise the con- 
duct of his rulers. Without the existence of such rights, 
liberty is a mere idle name, a mere phrase coined the 
better to conceal the reality of tyranny, i^d for this 
reason it is in truth impossible for a sincere, (Catholic to 
be also a sincere believer in democratic rulQ; or for 
popular government to exist in any sincerely VCalholic 
land. 

So far, therefore, as the French Revolution was 
directed against absolutism, so far as it involved cham- 
pionship of the right of the people to govern themselves, 
championship of the desire to rule, it was bound to come 
into conflict with the Catholic Church. The disciples 
of an Ignatius Loyola and those of a Rousseau were 
fundamentally in disagreement. Conviction of the merit 
of entire submission and conviction of the iniquity of 
such submission could not exist in harmony; conflict 
between the two theories of happiness and right-doing was 
inevitable. And the intensity of the necessary conflict 
was bound to increase in exact ratio to the increase in 
the strength of the individualist side of the movement ; 
its bitterness afforded a satisfactory index of the degree 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 219 

of ascendancy possessed by the apostles of the desire 
to rule. 

At the beginning of the French Revolution, this con- 
flict was rather real than apparent. All, save such as 
battened on corruption, were ready to agree that the 
regulation of the Church was a necessary measure. The 
abuses of the existing system were too patent to be 
ignored, too great to admit any real apology. No one 
could conscientiously defend clerical privilege, the gross 
inequalities between the incomes of the higher and those 
of the lower clergy, the faulty character of ecclesiastical 
appointments, the prevalence of non-residence and 
pluralities. The most sincere adherents of the Church 
and her bitterest enemies united to effect certain reforms. 

And, indeed, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was, 
up to a certain point, in the nature of a compromise. 
Those who wished to maintain the institution assented 
readily to the destruction of certain obvious abuses in 
it; even the establishment of state control over the 
Church was hardly a measure antipathetic to the 
Gallican Catholics. But the Civil Constitution went 
further. The elective principle was applied to ecclesi- 
astical, no less than to civil, offices; the clergy were 
brought directly or indirectly imder the control of the 
laity. Whereas the, Catholic Church had always insisted 
that the priesthood was responsible to God and to His 
earthly representative alone, a certain responsibility to 
the people was now introduced. j^This change was alien 
from the historical attitude of the Church; it struck at 
the desire to be ruled. And it was followed by the 
establishment of toleration for all creeds, the state 
refusing to declare an absolute preference for any 
particular form of religious belief. 

But such toleration was insufficient to satisfy the 
individualists. All religious creeds are universalist to 



220 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

a greater or less degree; all insist upon a measure of 
submission to authority; all depend for their vitality 
upon the degree to which they gratify the desire to be 
ruled. Dogmatic rehgion, in its very essence, is hostile 
to Individualism. That theory rejects authority and 
upholds the right of every man to work out his own 
salvation or damnation. Logically, it decHnes to admit 
the control of a Deity, no less than it declines to admit 
the control of any man or of any human institution. 
And to this logical conclusion the French individualists 
tended. They regarded the recognition of mere equality 
between the various creeds as at best a half-hearted step 
towards the recognition of the truth. They were ill- 
content that the state should professedly admit the 
existence of a Deity Whose wisdom transcended that 
of man; that the Declaration of the Rights of Man, 
prefixed to the Constitution of 1791, should be said to 
have been drawn up "in the presence and under the 
auspices of the Supreme Being." 

The individualists, therefore, continued to expound the 
cult of Reason. They advocated the doctrine that there 
was no external power to which the will of the individual 
should, or indeed could, be subordinated. And just as 
they secured the legal establishment of practical anarchy 
in civil affairs, so they secured a momentary triumph 
in ecclesiastical affairs. Christianity, and thereby all 
dogmatic rehgion, was abolished. The Feast of the 
Goddess of Reason was the final victory of those who, 
pushing their theory to the uttermost, denied the exist- 
ence of any moral code other than that which each 
individual might devise for himself. There was a 
certain significance in the selection of a beautiful and 
abandoned actress to personify the presiding genius of 
the human intellect; such a goddess would never be 
likely to enjoin restraint of incHnation. In worshipping 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 221 

the embodiment of beauty and of vice, men were accept- 
ing slavery only to their own passions, and such slavery 
has, perhaps, never been regarded as impairing perfect 
liberty. The identification of human reason and human 
appetite marked the climax of the individualist trixmiph. 

But such an orgy of gratification of the desire to rule 
as appeared in the Constitution of 1793 and in the Feast 
of Reason necessarily produced an early reaction. The 
very completeness of the individualist trirunph hastened 
the revival of the contrary theory, and the more rapidly 
because the logical character of the French people 
induced revulsion from one extreme to the other. In 
face of grave external dangers, the Constitution of 1793 
was never actually put into operation ; government was 
entrusted to Committees of Public Safety, and the rule 
of these committees tended to become increasingly 
autocratic. The period of the Convention was not one 
of a weak executive. Nor did the victory of Individual- 
ism in the Feast of Reason fail to produce its retribution. 
Immorality became almost a political offence, at least 
in theory. The Hebertists were guillotined, and the 
Festival of the Supreme Being announced to the world 
that the governing party in the French Republic was 
convinced that unrestrained licence was incompatible 
with the existence of civiHsed society. 

Indeed, the constitutional and religious history of 
France, from the fall of the Hebertists to the establish- 
ment of Napoleonic despotism, is a record of the gradual 
revival of internal Universalism. Executive power was 
restored in the Committee of Public Safety ; the Consti- 
tution of 1793 was annulled almost at the moment of 
its creation. The idea of direct popular control over 
legislation was abandoned in the Constitution of the 
Year III. A second chamber was created; an executive 
of five was established to secure freedom from sudden 



222 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

change such as had resulted from the caprice of a despot 
or of a despotic assembly. The Directory failed, but its 
failure was due to the fact that the reversion to the old 
order was incomplete, not to the fact that there was a 
certain reversion. 

At an earlier date, the statesmanlike warnings of 
Mirabeau had been disregarded by the dominant indi- 
vidualist party. The French people had declined to 
admit the possible fallibility of their chosen representa- 
tives; the doctrines of Rousseau had prevailed. The 
result had been anarchy, from which the nation had 
painfully emerged by passing through the nightmare of 
the Terror. And the lessons of the period of the guillo- 
tine had been learned if anything too thoroughly. The 
complaint against the Directory was that it did not 
approach more nearly to the old order, that it was a 
compromise between monarchy and a pure republic, 
that it therefore offended the French love of logical 
conclusions. Nor were the framers of the constitution 
blind to their lack of popular support. They insisted 
on the re-election of a percentage of their own party 
sufficient to secure their control of the new legislative 
bodies; they declined to submit the system which they 
created to the verdict of the nation. But though they 
were possibly able to hinder the reaction they were 
unable to prevent it. The Directory was a period of 
incessant disturbance, of frequent coups d'etat. It 
culminated in the most complete victory ever gained by 
internal Universalism in France. 

The results of that victory were crystallised in the 
Constitutions of the Year VIII and of the Empire, the 
latter of which merely emphasised the absolutism estab- 
lished by the former. Alike in religious and in secular 
affairs, there was a definite return to the past. Catholi- 
cism was declared to be the religion of the majority of 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 223 

Frenchmen under the Consulate; under the Empire, 
the conclusion of the Concordat marked the definite 
restoration of the Roman Church. Napoleon rightly 
interpreted the opinion of France ; his government was 
made possible by the new prevalence of the desire to be 
ruled, and to that desire the fullest possible rein was 
given. Legislative power was entrusted to a nominated 
body ; if the forms of popular government were retained, 
popular influence on the administration was reduced 
to a minimum. The First Consul was exalted to the 
position of a king; the Emperor was more powerful than 
any king of France had ever been. The advocate of 
centralisation triumphed; the universalist side of the 
revolutionary movement gained the ascendancy. If it 
had not been that the abuses of the ancien regime were 
finally swept away, the Revolution might seem to have 
been effected in vain. But equaHty before the law was 
established, even though it was an equaHty of subjection ; 
uniformity of administration and of law was secured, 
privilege died for ever. The internal Universalism which 
had secured the victory was inspired by a different 
spirit from that which had inspired the Universalism of 
the Bourbon monarchy. If it gratified the desire to be 
ruled, and gratified it to the fullest extent, it had in it 
also an individualist element; it accepted the doctrine 
that government should be for the good of the governed. 
Externally and internally, therefore, there was a 
universalist and an individualist aspect of the French 
Revolution. Robespierre and Napoleon were alike 
typical products of the movement; each embodied the 
spirit of the Revolution. In his attitude towards foreign 
affairs, the former represented the extreme of Universal- 
ism. A firm believer in the essential brotherhood of 
man, he was an earnest and sincere opponent of war. 
Even when the conflict had begun he deprecated the 



224 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

idea that France should profit from victory to promote 
her private interest. He refused to gain such advantage 
as might have been derived by giving assistance to the 
PoHsh revolt, because the private and political character 
of the Poles, in his opinion, debarred them from the 
privilege of alliance with a pure republic. 

In his attitude towards internal affairs there was 
an identical spirit of idealism. Robespierre was a pro- 
nounced individualist, the champion of decentralisa- 
tion, the advocate of direct popular government. His 
apparent inconsistencies were nothing more than the 
measure of his intense conviction. His share in the 
establishment of the Reign of Terror, his restoration 
of religion in the Festival of the Supreme Being, only 
illustrate his Individualism. In his view, and in that 
of the party which he led, the French people had been 
crushed under a tyranny, stupefied by long gratification 
of the desire to be ruled. They were to be roused from 
their stupor, taught to be free. But some, like Circe's 
swine, loved their degradation and gloried in their 
shame. Such must learn the error of their ways, or die, 
lest their evil example should corrupt the very elect. 
Nor were any to be permitted to degrade their freedom 
by abandoning themselves to licence; such must learn 
the perfect Hberty of self-control, and recognise their 
obligation to obey the divine instinct of their individual 
consciences. The guillotine was set up, a regime of 
compulsion applied to the recalcitrant. Those who 
refused to accept the blessings of liberty should be 
threatened with, and in the last resort should suffer, 
the utmost penalty that human government can inflict. 
Yet it was not that France might learn to obey that 
Frenchmen were put to death. They died that by their 
death their brothers might learn to live, to live the only 
true life, the Hfe of liberty; that the desire to rule might 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 225 

triumph. It was true that the extreme Individualism 
of Robespierre tended to become extreme Universalism, 
Such, however, must always be the case. The strongest 
advocates of the gratification of the desire to rule must 
always tend to deny to others the right to gratify the 
desire to be ruled. 

And, owing to this connection between the two 
extremes, between the logical conclusions of the two 
theories, a curious apparent kinship exists between the 
ideas and methods of Robespierre and those of Napoleon, 
the exponent of the external Individualism and internal 
Universalism of the Revolution. In reality, however, 
they were entirely divorced. If, at the outset of his 
career, Napoleon preached nationality in Italy, if he 
could later urge the " lUyrians " to be free, he was 
nevertheless essentially an external individualist. His 
appeal to the altruistic sentiments, which the idealism 
of the Revolution had invoked, was insincere, designed 
to cloak or to support selfish, non-altruistic designs. 
He was the political heir of Louis XIV. He aimec .^t 
the establishment of a French dictatorship over Euro^j^a. 
He would have revived the territorial empire of Charles 
the Great, but the inspiration of that dominion would 
have been no conception of a Christian commonwealth ; 
it would have been the Bourbon conception of the glorj^ 
and interest of France. 

Internally, Napoleon was as determined as Robes- 
pierre had been to destroy aU who differed from his viev. 5, 
as determined to crush aU opposition. But his motive 
was no ideal of a pure state, no resolve to make men 
virtuous whether they would or no. Rather, he recalled 
the memory of Louis XIV, was actuated by the sanle 
principles and carried out the same ideas with greater 
success. He established that centralised absolutism 
towards which the Bourbon kings had striven and to 

p 



226 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

which they had failed to attain. His word was law, 
since the legislative body was composed of his pliant 
nominees. He attempted even to mould literature 
and art according to his will. The press was severely 
censored; no one might write anything, no one might 
say anything, which should detract from, or even fail to 
exalt, the glory and reputation of the Emperor. The 
Church was restored that it might promote the desire to 
be ruled and thereby support the imperial system. By 
the Concordat, France was reconciled with the Papacy, 
but the reconciHation lasted only so long as the Pope 
subserved or appeared to subserve the interests of 
Napoleon. The clergy were to preach Bonapartism 
rather than Christianity ; the Napoleonic Catechism was 
to supply the matter of their sermons. They might 
direct men's consciences and save their souls, provided 
always that they taught their disciples to place their 
lives at the disposal of the Emperor. Nothing was to 
exist in France which did not contribute to the main- 
tenance of Napoleonic imperialism. 

That interaction of Universalism and Individualism 
which appears so clearly in the French Revolution 
appears also in every episode in the secular conflict 
between the two desires; to every episode there is a 
dual aspect. But in other cases the interaction is less 
evident. The sixteenth-century Reformation appears, 
at first sight, to have been individualist throughout; 
above all things, it was the assertion of the right of 
private judgment. But the episode of the Reformation 
is only completed in the Counter-Reformation, in the 
reaction from the ascendancy of the desire to rule towards 
a revival of the desire to be ruled. And the same is true 
of all the great movements of History. It is not in the 
fact that it possessed this dual aspect that the interest 
of the French Revolution lies, or that its peculiarity is 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 227 

to be found. It is rather in the rapidity of transition 
from extreme to extreme. Violent reaction produced 
an equally violent counter-reaction. Externally, France 
passed from Individualism through a period of Universal- 
ism to Individualism once more. Internally, she had 
been universalist when the States-General met ; she be- 
came intensely individualist, bordering upon the extreme 
of anarchy. And when the movement culminated in the 
Napoleonic empire, she was universalist once more. Into 
the space of a single generation the changes of centuries 
were concentrated. The French Revolution is a veritable 
epitome of History. 

Nor was the French Revolution reaUy an isolated 
event. Though it actually occurred in France, it might, 
but for accidental circmnstances, have occurred in 
almost any European country; the ideas from which 
it was bom were current throughout the continent. 
And the history of other countries during the revolu- 
tionary period displays a series of reactions, external and 
internal, similar to those which appeared in France. At 
the beginning of the epoch, Europe was possessed by the 
spirit of Universalism. Externally, the ascendancy of 
that spirit had been exemplified in the Triple Alliance; 
England, Prussia and Holland had attempted to regulate 
the affairs of the continent. And consequently, when 
the Revolution occurred, the affairs of France were held 
to be of international importance; a change in the 
internal organisation of the French monarchy might 
disturb the peace of Europe and overthrow the balance 
of power. Austria and Prussia allied to watch over 
their own interests and to secure that there should be 
no undue interference with the political welfare of other 
states. The exponents of external UniversaHsm re- 
garded the altruism of the revolutionaries with suspicion. 
They refused to accept their professions of disinterested- 



228 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

ness, and by this refusal they gradually produced an 
individualist reaction ;ii^ France, enabling those who 
disbelieved in cosmopolitanism as the basis of foreign 
policy to emphasise their objections. The revolution- 
ary war thus early became a contest between French 
Individualism and the Universalism of the allies, be- 
tween a nation resolved to shape its own destiny and 
nations resolved that the affairs of Europe should be 
settled by some species of European concert. The 
coalitions formed against France were all directed 
primarily to maintain the balance of power, and ulti- 
mately to compel the acceptance of the doctrine of 
compensation. 

The coalitions failed. French victories broke up 
league after league, and this ill-success of external 
Universalism prepared the way for a revival of external 
Individualism. The reaction was begun by Prussia 
when she concluded the Treaty of Basl^ under practical 
compulsion, her example was followed by other states. 
And the resultant Individualism was more extreme than 
had been that of any other age. Institutions which had 
survived the conflicts of centuries fell to the ground; a 
complete breach with the Middle Ages was effected. 
The Holy Roman Empire, which had prolonged its 
moribund existence despite the Reformation and despite 
the Peace of Westphalia, finally passed away. The 
venerable character of the Venetian Republic did not 
suffice to save it from extinction. The temporal power 
of the Papacy, after having escaped unscathed the many 
revolutions of Italy, was for a while extinguished. 
Nothing was sacred from the destroying hand of the new 
Individualism; nothing was permitted to stand in the 
way of the gratification of self-interest. 
' But the failure of the European concert, and the 
growth of external Individualism, consequent upon that 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 229 

failure, produced no cessation of opposition to France. 
It rather led to the evolution of a new and individualist 
principle of resistance. Nationality is primarily the 
claim of a nation to exist ; alike in its internal and in 
its external aspect, it is individualist. It opposes any 
attempt to subject a nation to foreign rule; it opposes 
also any attempt at the exercise of control over a nation 
by a concert of states. During the revolutionary period, 
France set the example of championing the idea of 
nationality. She refused to order her internal affairs 
according to the will of foreign powers ; she asserted the 
right of all peoples to freedom. She declared that she 
herself would not impair that freedom, would not coerce 
or repress nationalities. Thus, even when her foreign 
policy was most emphatically universalist, it had an 
individualist basis ; her very cosmopolitanism, the very 
theory of international fraternity, was the outcome of 
the desire to rule. And the actual conversion of her 
external attitude from one of Universalism to one of 
Individualism was a triumph for the national idea. It 
was the result of her enthusiastic championship of 
French nationality. 

And when the coalitions had been dissolved, when 
the attempt of the concert to dictate to France, or even 
to restrain her Individualism, had failed, nationality 
became, for a time, the governing factor in the poHcy 
of the powers. That policy became externally indi- 
vidualist, partly because Universalism had achieved no 
success, partly because the danger of subjection to 
France had become both evident and acute. In most 
lands, this fear of conquest produced a spirit of resist- 
ance; the extreme of Universalism led to the natural 
reaction. It was no longer merely a case of preventing 
the destruction of the balance of power. External and 
internal affairs became inextricably blended; countries 



230 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

adopted an attitude of hostility to France, lest the con- 
tinued success of French arms should effect their annihila- 
tion. However illegitimate the aggression of Napoleon 
may have been, the struggle against him partook of the 
nature of rebellion rather than of that of war. 

France, therefore, was successively attacked by states, 
acting upon individualist principles. Afte^ concluding 
the Treaty of Basle, Prussia had deliberately dissociated 
herself from the other powers. She had declined to join 
any coalition ; she had preserved the strictest neutrality. 
But the very Individualism which had inspired her to 
adopt a neutral attitude led her to resent the cynical 
contempt with which she was treated by Napoleon. At 
the time of Austerlitz, she had threatened France ; her 
indecision exposed her to renewed insults. Eventu- 
ally her patience was exhausted. Without waiting for 
Russian aid, she entered upon war, and her precipitancy, 
the measure of her Individualism, involved her in the 
disaster of Jena. 

Though the fact is somewhat obscured, it was out- 
raged Individualism which moved Prussia to attempt her 
deliverance from the thrall of Napoleon; the spirit of 
nationality inspired her policy. But it is in the later 
resistance of Austria and Spain to France that the 
new individualist principle appears most clearly. The 
Habsburgs had consistently opposed the Revolution, 
had consistently championed the balance of power. 
Their external Universalism, however, had brought upon 
them nothing but disaster; provinces had been torn 
from their rule, and the position to which they had been 
reduced by the Peace of Pressburg was one in which the 
very existence of their empire was imperilled. Fear 
of subjection produced its inevitable result; the indi- 
vidualist element was aroused. Stadion, the exponent 
of this reaction, preached the gospel of nationality; he 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 231 

appealed to the desire to rule, that his country might 
be dehvered from the French. But his preaching was 
necessarily ineffective. The Habsburg dominions were 
united only by political bonds ; Individualism was 
so far weak within them. Conquest seemed to mean 
nothing but a change of masters ; to peoples impregnated 
with the desire to be ruled, freedom was an idle word. 
The very circumstances which made the existence of 
the Habsburg monarchy a possibility ensured the failure 
of Stadion's crusade. The desire to be ruled was at 
once the salvation and the temporary destruction of the 
Austrian Empire. 

Nor was the national resistance in Spain much more 
successful. It may be admitted that it did, in a measure, 
prevent the complete reduction of the country by 
Napoleon. But the resistance to the French was only 
that of guerilla bands ; such resistance has never attained 
permanent success, and, unaided, the Spaniards would 
have been defeated. As it happened, at the critical 
moment, an English army landed, and if, indeed, it did 
not turn the scale against the invaders, it at least served 
to readjust the balance. Nationality inspired the original 
resistance of Spain to Napoleon; it saved Spain from 
immediate conquest. But having achieved such nega- 
tive results, it proved to be incapable of securing positive 
results also; it could not drive the French across the 
Pyrenees. The individualist movement in Spain was 
only rendered successful by the introduction into it of 
a universalist element. 

It was this general failure of the national wars, of 
isolated resistance to Napoleon, that enabled Universal- 
ism to regain its influence, and that influence was all the 
greater since the need of coalition was so clearly realised. 
The defeat of external Individualism produced a soli- 
darity of Europe. In face of the common danger, the 



232 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

powers reconciled their differences ; by a true European 
concert Napoleon was eventually overcome^ Victory, 
even in the War of Liberation, that imagined triumph of 
nationalism, was really the result of universalist ideas 
and policy. The French were at least holding their own 
when the intervention of Austria proved decisive. But 
that intervention was secured at the price of the abandon- 
ment of the national crusade. The treaties between the 
powers were conceived in a universalist spirit; their 
inspiration was the desire to maintain the balance of 
power, not to further nationalism. As in Spain, so in 
Germany, nationality, an assertion of internal Indi- 
vidualism, supplied the motive for the original resistance 
and gave the will to oppose subjection. But the current 
universalist ideas afforded the necessary material strength 
to them, the power to prevail was due. Stein led his 
countrymen to dream of possible deliverance; the 
decisive intervention of Metternich secured the realisa- 
tion of this dream. At the time of Leipsic, Europe 
resumed that devotion to the balance of power from 
which she had momentarily strayed; her devotion was 
increased by the emphatic Individualism of the supposed 
arch-disturber of peace, the alleged enemy of the human 
race. A temporary alliance between the forces of ex- 
ternal Universalism and internal Individualism effected 
the downfall of Napoleon; the fruits of victory were 
garnered by the exponents of the desire to be ruled. 

And the domestic history of European states during 
this period reveals the same fluctuations in the strength 
of the two contending emotions. When the French 
Revolution began, the desire to be ruled held a general 
supremacy, and induced a certain carelessness of foreign 
conquest, which weakened the opposition to French 
aggression. But in most countries, individualist ten- 
dencies were also both powerful and evident, and those 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 233 

tendencies served to convert many from an attitude 
of negative indifference to one of positive friendliness. 
Revolutionary ideas spread rapidly. In most of the 
lands which they invaded, the French were at first 
regarded rather as deliverers than as enemies ; a cordial 
welcome was extended to the apostles of liberty. In 
Belgium and in the Rhine provinces, in the districts of 
northern Italy, the inhabitants offered no voluntary 
resistance to the invaders. 

But the welcome, never universal, was everywhere 
short-Hved. From the very first, the violence of the 
Revolution produced a revival of internal Universalism 
beyond the French frontiers. In Russia, Catherine II 
was able to abandon her tentative reforms. In England, 
Pitt exchanged a liberal policy for one of severe repres- 
sion. Generally, those who held and expressed indi-^ 
viduaHst views were regarded as " Jacobins," suspected 
of a predilection for wholesale murder. And as France 
gradually abandoned her original cosmopolitanism, the 
ascendancy of Universalism was further enhanced. The 
continent appeared to be threatened with subjection, 
and the very individualists themselves began to fear 
the consequences and results of their own theory. 
Whereas the revolutionary armies had been welcomed, 
they came to be regarded with hatred and aversion. 
Districts which had applauded now cursed their self- 
styled liberators, when they learnt that no choice of 
ruler was to be conceded to those lands which had once 
accepted French government, or even to those which 
had once been occupied by French armies. And in 
those lands which were as yet free from invasion the 
strengthening of executive power was advocated by all 
parties. In such a measure seemed to he the only safe- 
guard against the last calamity of foreign conquest. An 
immediate development of internal UniversaHsm was a 



234 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

primary result of the aggressive policy of revolutionary 
France. 

At the same time, the critical nature of the situation, 
especially after the forced dissolution of successive 
coalitions, tended to produce a certain atmosphere of 
conciliation. If the individualists were prepared to 
accept strong government as a necessity, the universalists 
were in turn prepared to make concessions to their 
opponents. Both parties recognised the need for union 
against the external enemy; they were ready to make 
common cause that they might avoid comnion destruc- 
tion. Individualists realised that anarchy would result 
from too complete gratification of the desire to rule, 
and that subjection would follow upon anarchy. Uni- 
versalists realised that too complete gratification of the 
desire to be ruled would render them less capable of 
resistance to aggression from ^vithout, would fit them for 
subjection to a foreign power. The very extremes to 
which French policy tended seemed for a moment to 
open the eyes of mankind to the evils of extremes. 

Accordingly, while the reaction in France produced 
the consolidation of Napoleonic despotism, a contrary 
reaction developed, within certain limits, in other 
European countries. At an earlier date, Leopold II 
had abandoned his brother's centralising policy, largely 
owing to his prescience of coming French aggression ; the 
concession of local liberty to the Magyars appeared to 
him to be a less evil than the complete overthrow of the 
Austrian Empire. Faced by a crisis hardly less acute 
than that which had existed at the death of Joseph II, 
Stadion adopted a similar conciliatory policy. He even 
dared to preach nationality in the heterogeneous 
dominions of the Habsburgs. In Prussia, Stein and his 
collaborators undertook reforms, the underlying principle 
of which was the extension of liberties to the people. In 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 235 

Spain, the Constitution of 1812 was a definitely indi- 
vidualist document ; the organisers of opposition to the 
French were champions of limited monarchy, and, 
indeed, of monarchy so limited that it was almost 
anarchy. It may be asserted that the very despotism 
of Napoleon encouraged this tendency to concession in 
the countries hostile to him ; his enemies were no longer 
the champions of internal Universalism, but rather of 
internal Universalism blended with Individualism. 

All the concessions made, however, were yet made 
rather in a universalist than in an individualist spirit. 
There was no clear assertion of the right of self-govern- 
ment; no deliberate enunciation of popular rights, no 
democratic propaganda. If the individual acquired 
some increase of liberty, that increase was the result 
rather of the consideration of the ruler than of any 
recognition of the right of the ruled to order their own 
lives. The concessions amounted to little more than an 
acceptance of the theory of the benevolent despot, of 
the idea that government should be for the good of the 
governed. To the ruler stiU belonged the right or duty 
to decide in what that good consisted. Internal Uni- 
versalism was really maintained; if anything, it was 
stronger at the end than at the beginning of the revolu- 
tionary epoch. For, whatever consideration might be 
given to the welfare and interest of the subjects, it was 
still realised or supposed that weak government had 
destroyed the Bonrbon dynasty, it was still regarded 
as axiomatic that at all costs weak government must 
be avoided. Fear of revolution served to hamper the 
development of internal Individualism, to maintain in 
the minds of the majority of mankind the ascendancy 
of the desire to rule. 

The general result of the revolutionary period, there- 
fore, was to strengthen that ascendancy of the desire to 



236 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

be ruled which had existed when the period began. A 
longing for permanent peace, and the hope that such 
peace might be attained by the creation of a satisfactory 
balance of power, inspired the settlement of Vienna and 
determined the decisions of the Congress. To avoid a 
renewal of war, every effort was made to satisfy the 
aspirations of the great powers, every care was taken 
that each should receive adequate compensation for any 
gains made by its rivals. Even the ambitions of the 
lesser states were not wholly disregarded, though, since 
their dissatisfaction offered a slighter menace to the 
duration of peace, they naturally did not receive the 
same consideration as did their more powerful fellows. 
The balance of power thus established was also to 
be safeguarded. In place of the loose and occasional 
leagues of the eighteenth century, the Quadruple Alli- 
ance was formed; by the renewed Treaty of Chaumont, 
England, Austria, Russia and Prussia agreed to unite 
that they might " watch over the repose and prosperity 
of nations." An attempt was made to secure a per- 
manent and effective concert, which should give to the 
existing order the supreme guarantee of invincible 
military force. And internally, absolutism was in 
general restored, and restored to a position of increased 
strength, because fear of revolution dominated the 
human mind, producing a desire for peace at any price, 
intensifying the desire to be ruled. 

As might have been anticipated, this intensification 
of the desire to be ruled found expression in a revival 
of the Catholic Church. During the eighteenth century, 
the reaction against internal Universalism had originated 
in an attack upon dogmatic religion. The prestige of 
the Papacy, shaken by the Reformation and by the 
Peace of Westphalia, had declined still further, until it 
reached its nadir when the Pope had been forced to 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 237 

suppress the Society of Jesus. A cjniical attitude 
towards Christianity became a marked characteristic 
of hterature both in CathoUc and in Protestant countries. 
But at the close of the revolutionary epoch, the revival 
of internal Universalism involved an equivalent revival 
of Catholicism, that revival finding expression in the 
Romantic Movement and in the growth of Ultra- 
montanism. The reign of Pius VII gave renewed 
influence to the Papacy. He had dared to withstand 
Napoleon ; he had suffered for his daring. His sufferings 
inspired sympathy and respect ; he appeared as the true 
Vicar of Christ, the champion of conscience against the 
tyranny of the world. His return to Rome was hailed 
with genuine delight; it secured the approval even of 
the Protestants. And the coincident re-estabhshment 
of the Society of Jesus afforded a measure of the revived 
power and prestige of the Papacy. At the same time, 
in place of that cynical deism which Voltaire had 
popularised and Rousseau vulgarised, the respectful 
devotion to orthodoxy, inculcated by Chateaubriand, 
became the fashionable attitude. A general desire for 
peace, for relief from the wearying exercise of private 
judgment, became apparent. Dogmatic religion re- 
covered its former strength; Catholicism after the fall 
of Napoleon was perhaps more powerful in Europe than 
it had been since the Reformation. Universalism, if 
regard be paid both to its external and internal aspect, 
secured an ascendancy more complete than at any other 
period of History. 

Nevertheless, general as was the longing for peace, 
prevalent as was the desire to be ruled, the ascendancy 
of Universalism was incomplete. At no period is the 
eternal nature of the conflict between man's two emotions 
more vividly illustrated than in the period immediately 
following the Congress of Vienna. Europe was weary 



238 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

of war, weary of all change. She had experienced to 
the fullest extent the evils of international anarchy ; she 
had witnessed in France the calamitous results of too 
ardent gratification of the desire to rule. Yet she would 
not admit the absolute triumph of the gOspel of peace. 
No misfortune sufficed to effect a modification in human 
nature, and without such modification the complete 
victory of the desire to be ruled was impossible. A 
tendency to reaction persisted ; the desire to rule claimed 
its exponents and adherents. 

Externally, that concert for which the universalists 
strove proved to be unattainable. Even in the first 
enthusiasm of their joint triumph, the allies disputed as 
to the division of the spoils. It was perhaps only the 
return of Napoleon from Elba that prevented a new 
European war ; England, Austria and France had formed 
a separate alliance to prevent the accomplishment of 
Russian and Prussian designs in Poland and Saxony. 
After the episode of the Hundred Days, it was found 
advisable to abandon all attempts to solve the Eastern 
Question; the tentative efforts of Metternich to effect 
a solution had almost destroyed the Quadruple Alliance. 
The powers, indeed, were mutually distrustful of one 
another. Each laboured to discover sinister designs of 
self -aggrandisement, cloaked beneath the others' pro- 
fessions of friendship. When Alexander 1 suggested 
that all states should declare their union in the bonds of 
Christian brotherhood, and that international relations 
should be ordered according to " the principles of Christ's 
holy religion," his idealism was greeted with mingled 
suspicion and contempt. The Holy Alliance, when not 
considered to be the mere project of a madman, was 
believed to be intended to conceal some nefarious plan 
for aggression in the Near East. 

But real harmony between the powers could in no 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 239 

circumstances exist. Every state contained within it 
an individualist no less than a universalist element, and 
if, owing to fear of revolution and dread of renewed war, 
the desire to be ruled had secured a general supremacy, 
the desire to rule, the resolve to pursue self-interest, was 
not the less existent. Austria was the most determined 
champion of international unity, of the concert of Europe. 
But Austria would not agree to submit the ordering of 
Italy to the Quadruple Alliance; she demanded that 
she should be allowed to act as the mandatory of the 
powers, and that as mandatory she should possess the 
fullest liberty of action. She was not less distrustful 
of Russian or French intervention in Spain. Russia 
wavered between an individualist inclination to favour 
liberalism and a universalist wish to create a sincere 
union of hearts among the states of Europe. But what- 
ever else she might desire, she hardly wavered in her 
resolve that her right to protect her special interests in 
the Ottoman Empire should not be questioned by her 
allies. England might be eager to preserve peace, but 
she was wholly disinclined to accept the theory, put 
forward by the eastern powers, that peace depended 
upon the maintenance of absolutism. The aims of the 
greater states were, in fact, very divergent; the estab- 
lishment of a perfect concert was impossible. European 
solidarity was an idle dream, born of the failure of the 
universalists to recognise the permanence of any theory 
save their own. 

Nor was the ascendancy of internal Universalism 
really complete. In most countries, indeed, the expo- 
nents of the desire to be ruled prevailed, but in some 
they failed to do so. The internal Individualism of the 
Revolution was not utterly extinguished. In France, 
the downfall of Napoleon served to produce a govern- 
ment far less absolute than that of the Empire. The 



240 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

Royal Charter established a Umited monarchy, and 
during the Hundred Days the Emperor himself expressed 
in the Acte Additionel his recognition of the fact that the 
French Revolution had in reality overthrown absolutism. 
In the new kingdom of the United Netherlands, indi- 
vidualist ideas equally prevailed; the rights of the 
Belgians were at least safeguarded on paper. Certain 
of the South German states hastened to avail themselves 
of the ambiguous Article XIII of the Constitution of 
the Federation, interpreting it as permitting and even as 
enj oining the establishment of representative government. 

But the ascendancy of the desire to be ruled was far 
more seriously and permanently impaired by the fact 
that the French Revolution left an aftermath of violence. 
For a generation, the strife of parties had been vigorous, 
acute. For a generation, compromise had been con- 
sistently rejected, and its acceptance, when the period 
of external war had ended, was improbable, if not im- 
possible. The universalists, apparent victors, regarded 
their triumph as incomplete; they desired to crush 
their opponents more utterly, they dreamed even of 
an undoing of the past. The individualists, apparently 
vanquished, refused to despair; they declined to believe 
their cause to be hopeless. And since the two parties 
were thus malcontent with the existing situation, their 
strife was unceasing. Here again the permanence of the 
conflict appears. Those who believe in the desire to be 
ruled, and those who believe in the desire to rule, alike 
strain ever towards the logical conclusion of their theory; 
they cannot learn moderation, since the very imperfec- 
tion of human nature makes the retention of the golden 
mean impossible. 

The French Revolution had proved the evil of anarchy ; 
universalists laboured to avoid anarchy by delivering 
themselves over to despotism. The rule of Napoleon had 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 241 

illustrated the calamities consequent upon the estabhsh- 
ment of unfettered despotism ; the individualists laboured 
to avoid despotism by delivering themselves to anarchy. 
Neither party displayed any readiness to accept a com- 
promise, and the conflict was only less violent than in 
the most violent days of the revolutionary period. It 
did not for a moment cease. Peace might be the rule, 
but it was a disturbed peace. 

The period following the Congress of Vienna, indeed , 
was marked by the constant recurrence of disturbances 
in different parts of the continent; nowhere was the 
dominion of Universalism unquestioned. And these 
disturbances gradually increased in intensity. Of the 
factors promoting the desire to be ruled, fear of revolu- 
tion was the most potent. Men could remember, or 
at least had learned from their fathers, the violence oi 
the Reign of Terror. The extent and duration of tha.t 
violence was certainly not minimised by m-emory, and 
for a while and in the minds of the majority revolution 
was inseparably connected with spectacles of unreasoning 
barbarity and senseless atrocity. It was merely neces- 
sary for a government to brand its opponents with the 
epithet "Jacobin"; forthwith, the sentiment of fear 
rallied the bulk of the communitv to the side of law and 
order, to the side of absolutism and even of tyranny. 
Any movement towards reform, any project for political 
change, had to contend not only with the natural force 
of universalist opinion, but also with a special hostility 
resultant from the character of one period in the French 
Revolution. 

But this fear gradually diminished ; it was at no tim.e 
universal. From the verv first, a section in everv 
country was sceptical as to the danger of revolution, 
or callously indifferent to it. Revolutionary ideas had 
permeated the armies of many states, partly because a 

Q 



242 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

long period of licence had fostered the desire to rule in 
the minds of the soldiers, partly because more intimate 
contact with Frenchmen and with French ideas had 
produced a more favourable opinion of the Revolution 
than that so zealously propagated by the chancelleries 
of Europe. And in the ordinary course of nature, a new 
generation came to birth, without memory of Jacobin 
proscriptions or even of Napoleonic despotism. More 
especially, the German university students, sentimental 
like all their race, enthusiastic with the vague enthusiasm 
of imagined intellectuahsm and extreme youth, eagerly 
embraced individuahst opinions. They resented the 
repressive conduct of the dominant party ; they became 
ardent, if somewhat unwise and ineffective, champions 
of the desire to rule. 

Disturbances, therefore, early occurred, and increased 
in importance and extent, as ever wider areas came under 
the influence of the reaction. But the movements were, 
in the main, at first unsuccessful. The majority of man- 
kind were still wedded to the idea of peace ; the revolts 
of the minority were powerless to effect any permanent 
change in the existing system. Even when a passing 
victory was gained, the alliance between external and 
internal Universalism was in most cases able to secure 
the restoration of the status quo. That alliance, indeed, 
was an important factor in checking the reaction. The 
external universalists, aiming at the preservation of 
peace and of the balance of power, remembered that the 
revolutionary war had originated in an attempt by the 
French to remodel their government. Resolved that 
no such war should occur again, they eagerly assisted 
the internal universalists to maintain their ascendancy. 
And in view of the prevalence of the desire to be 
ruled, in most lands, the efforts of the Quadruple 
Alliance, or of the three eastern powers, were usually 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 243 

sufScient to prevent any victorious assertion of internal 
Individualism. 

Thus the riots of the German students, such as that 
which occurred at the Wartburg Festival, only served 
to perpetuate the existing universahst system in the 
states of the Confederation. By the Carlsbad Decrees 
and by the Vienna Final Act, machinery was provided 
for the repression of all manifestations of liberaUsm, 
the further development of constitutional government 
was checked, the censorship of the press and the super- 
vision of the universities rendered more effective. The 
mihtary revolts in Naples and Piedmont were equally 
unsuccessful. Their organisers were handicapped by 
that dif&culty by which individuahsts are constantly 
faced; they found it hard to define their creed, to rally 
together the supporters of the desire to rule and to win 
over those who were vaguely opposed to the desire to be 
ruled. A demand for the " Spanish Constitution " was 
a singularly unconvincing cry with which to appeal to 
the Italians, a race long used to foreign domination, 
habituated to internal Universalism since the fall of the 
mediaeval city republics. It is not surprising that the 
mass of the population regarded the revolutionaries with 
apathy or aversion, that Austria proved fuUy equal to 
the task of restoring the absolute government of Ferdi- 
nand and of Charles Felix. Nor was the success oi 
the similar movement in Spain more than transitory. 
Though for a few years a liberal government was 
established, it gained no hold on the people, and t'.e 
eventual French expedition was so httle opposed as to 
be practically a mere parade to Cadiz. 

The desire to rule, however, is as permanent fx"A 
fundamental an emotion as is the desire to be ruled; 
and that it should displace the opposing theory in ii s 
ascendancy over the human mind was inevitable. The 



244 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

history of the thirty years following the Congress of 
Vienna is the history of the gradual development of 
the reaction against the prevalent Universalism. Fear 
of revolution, the longing for peace, grew weaker ; a wish 
to assert private judgment grew stronger. Whereas 
immediately after the fall of Napoleon only a feW students 
and soldiers were prepared to risk anarchy in their 
pursuit of liberty, at the end of a generation all classes 
of the community in every state were more or less 
infected by the revived Individualism. Whereas the 
Quadruple Alliance was, at the beginning of this period, 
apparently a firm and potent league, at its end it had 
been almost dissolved into its component elements. 

Even in the first years after the Congress of Vienna, 
Individualism, external and internal, achieved a measure 
of success, made some appreciable progress. Though 
military revolts in Spain and Italy failed more or 
less completely, the negotiations to which they gave 
rise revealed and emphasised the divergence of opinion 
among the allies. At the conferences of Troppau and 
Laibach, the reluctance of England to join in any scheme 
for the repression of liberalism was indicated. The dis- 
trust felt by Austria for Russia and the alarm with which 
she regarded any concessions to France became apparent. 
At the Congress of Verona, if the solidarit}^ of the eastern 
powers was confirmed, English isolation was confirmed 
also. The projected intervention of Europe on behalf 
of Spain against her revolted colonies was vetoed by 
England, and it became clear that the concert by which 
Napoleon had been overthrown was weakening, if indeed 
it was not already dissolved. That league which French 
aggression had called into existence, which the lingering 
fear of revolution had for a while maintained, had now 
in reality ceased to exist. Nor was the momentary 
adhesion of France to the cause of external Universalism 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 245 

any adequate compensation for the defection of England 
and the consequent disruption of the Quadruple Alliance. 
France was notoriously unstable. Individualism had 
always tended to be a characteristic of her foreign 
policy; it had led her to set the example of rejecting the 
authority of mediaeval Emperors, it had led her to limit 
the power of mediaeval Popes. And it was still alive 
within her in the first half of the nineteenth century. 

Europe found the problems presented to her by Italy 
and Spain difficult of solution. She was entirely unable 
to cope with that presented to her by the revolt of the 
Morea. If the battle of Navarino afforded an example 
of co-operation between the powers, the earlier and later 
stages of the struggle for Greek independence afforded 
much more significant examples of divergence. Alex- 
ander I, converted to Universalism by accidental circum- 
stances or by the ingenuity of Mettemich, had laboured 
to maintain that concert. The conferences of Czemo- 
witz and Petersburg had proved abortive; the Tslr had 
been threatened at the close of his reign by rebellion 
in Russia, where a tendency towards external Indi- 
vidualism was gaining strength and where there was 
consequently an ever-decreasing inclination to preserve 
the solidarity of Europe. Nicholas I gave way to the 
wishes of his people. He followed the example already 
set by England, when she recognised the Greek flag, and 
adopted an independent attitude towards the problems 
of the Near East. The concert, which had failed to 
solve those problems at the time of the Congress of 
Vienna, was in no real sense responsible for the establish- 
ment of the kingdom of Greece. In place of that per- 
manent alliance desired by the external universalists, a 
temporary league between England, Russia and France 
was formed, a league which resembled the occasional 
confederacies characteristic of the period prior to the 



246 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

French Revolution. Nor was it merely in the East that 
the growth of Individualism appears. At the moment 
when the Greeks were securing their independence, 
the futility of the recent restoration of absolutism in 
Spain was proved. Christina promulgated a constitution 
drawn up by Zea Bermudez; a regent, threatened by 
revolt, felt that her power could only be secured by 
concessions to the majority of her subjects, to the grow- 
ing individualist sentiment of her country. 

And in the next revolutionary outbreaks in Europe, 
the development of Individualism was still more obvious. 
It is true that, alike in Italy and in Poland, revolution 
met with no success, but elsewhere a decline of Universal- 
ism was evident. In France, the restored Bourbon 
monarchy was overthrown. Charles X had become the 
apostle of the desire to be ruled, at home and abroad. 
He was deposed, and the government of Louis Philippe, 
whatever may have been its real character, was at 
least ostensibly individuahst. Externally, though the ex- 
treme Individualism of Lafitte was rejected, the moderate 
Individualism of Casimir-Perier was adopted. Austria 
was checked in her universalist Italian policy; Portu- 
guese Individualism was definitely supported. Inter- 
nally, the royal title and the professed spirit of the 
administration were individualist. 

Nevertheless, though the desire to rule thus made 
some progress, the reaction was essentially imperfect. 
At home, the popular agitation for wider political rights 
was repressed with vigour ; the period culminated in the 
accession to office of Guizot, almost the embodiment of 
the desire to be ruled. Abroad, it is true that France 
showed little inclination to accept the ideas of the 
Quadruple Alliance. But that aUiance had been origin- 
ally formed against her; even during the most re- 
actionary period of the restored monarchy she had 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 247 

hardly been accepted as one of the great powers. And 
if her efforts under Louis Philippe were directed to pro- 
mote individualist movements, the basis of her policy 
was universalist. It rested upon peace and the Anglo- 
French entente; the extreme views of Lafitte did not 
prevail; his successor, Casimir-Perier, was a man of 
moderate opinions. France would give such help to 
continental liberalism as she might be able to supply 
without risking isolation; her external Universalism 
was only coloured by individualist tendencies. She 
was peaceful, even when she threatened war. 

A more interesting example of the degree to which 
Individualism succeeded and failed at this time is sup- 
plied by the case of Belgium. After the Congress of 
Vienna, those treaties by which the powers had effected a 
remodelling of Europe had become the gospel of external 
Universalism, just as the treaties of Westphalia and 
Utrecht had been at an earlier date; to their main- 
tenance the efforts of the exponents of the desire to be 
ruled were directed. Among the provisions of those 
treaties, one of the most important was that the former 
Austrian Netherlands and the former Dutch Republic 
should be united into a single kingdom under the House 
of Orange, in order that France might be the better held 
in check. From the very first, however, the union was 
unpopular in Belgium. The news of the fall of Charles X 
produced a revolution ; the kingdom was disrupted into 
its component parts, and the external universalists failed 
to prevent the acceptance of tYiefait accompli. 

So far, the movement may be regarded as a victory 
for external Individualism. Both in the case of France 
and in that of Belgium, the weakness of the European 
concert was exhibited. The first professed object of 
the Quadruple Alliance had been the restraint of France 
and the prevention of disturbance in that country; yet 



248 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

the allies had not dared to move when the elder branch 
of the Bourbons was driven out. They were equally 
unable to support the Dutch. England and France 
refused to coerce the Belgians; the eastern powers 
could not act alone. Even so, however, the triumph 
of external Individuahsm was limited. The government 
of Louis PhiUppe found itself obUged to consider the 
imiversalist susceptibilities of Europe ; its foreign poUcy 
found its basis only in a new alliance. And it was the 
two western powers, not the rebels themselves, that 
decided the Belgian question. England and France 
came to an agreement. Adopting the broad principle 
of the separation of the two states, they settled the 
details of that separation. Dutch and Belgians alike 
were compelled to acquiesce in the Anglo-French solution 
of the problems of Luxemburg and Limburg. 

And if external Individualism secured no complete 
victory, it is also true that internal Individuahsm did 
not do so. This fact was largely the result of the circum- 
stance that neither in France nor in Belgium was the 
revolution entirely individuahst.' To every episode in 
the secular conflict there must be an individuaHst and 
a universalist side, since neither desire can ever achieve 
complete victory, and the exponents of each must there- 
fore be in a greater or less degree dissatisfied with any 
existing system. In the period after the fall of Napoleon, 
this inevitable dissatisfaction was intensified, partly by 
the violence of feehng which had marked the revolution- 
ary period, partly owing to the especial incompleteness 
of the reaction. Both universalists and individualists 
tended to refuse to accept as final the external and 
internal settlement of Europe; both believed that a 
modification in that settlement would benefit the cause 
which they had at heart. Hence there was an inclina- 
tion on the part of the extreme exponents of either 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 249 

desire to combine against those who favoured the idea 
of compromise. Human nature, by reason of its very 
imperfection, leads men to reject counsels of moderation; 
no compromise can end the conflict, since no compromise 
can effect a revolution in the permanent character of the 
race. The very preachers of compromise have them- 
selves an inevitable bias towards one or other extreme. 
In no case can any man hold the balance exactly. 

And this hatred of moderation, of middle courses, is 
especially evident in the history of Europe during the 
generation following the Congress of Vienna. In France, 
successive ministers, Richeheu, Decazes, Martignac, and 
to a certain extent even Villele, laboured to effect a 
compromise. They were successively defeated by the 
force of human nature, which expressed itself in an 
alliance between the ultra-royalists and the ultra- 
liberals. And to this refusal of either party to pursue 
a moderate course the overthrow of the restored Bour- 
bons must be attributed. It may, indeed, be admitted 
that the actual revolution was not supported by the 
universahsts, but it would never have occurred had not 
the very universahsts themselves been dissatisfied with 
the restoration monarchy. The mere fact of the acces- 
sion of Louis Philippe indicates the strength of those 
who were possessed by the desire to be ruled. In place 
of a republic, the dream of the individualist, kingship 
was perpetuated. And in the Orleanist government the 
universalist element really prevailed. Even the " party 
of action," the more individualist of the two parties 
under Louis Phihppe, did not display any inclination to 
concede that degree of popular control over the adminis- 
tration which the advocates of the desire to rule supported. 

In Belgium, the alliance of the two extreme parties 
was more evident ; there the revolution was clearly both 
internally universalist and internally individualist. It 



250 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

was brought about by the union of clericals and liberals, 
of those who desired to be ruled and those who desired 
to rule. The former had hoped that the overthrow of 
Napoleon would be followed by their recovery of their 
former ascendancy ; they had been painfully undeceived. 
A more or less individualist regime was created; tolera- 
tion was proclaimed, education was to a great extent 
taken from the control of the Church. Yet, though the 
universaHsts were thus angered, their opponents were 
not contented. Preference was given to the Dutch in 
the use of their language, in the situation of the capital, 
in taxation and in representation. The two parties 
therefore combined, each hoping to find its own triumph 
in the destruction of the existing system. The kingdom 
of the United Netherlands was disrupted, not by the 
isolated action of the individualists, but by a league 
i:etween them and the universalists. 

Nevertheless, when a generation had passed, that 
ascendancy of external and internal Universalism which 
had prevailed since the fall of Napoleon was breaking 
down. Externally, such unity as existed between the 
great powers was becoming occasional rather than 
permanent. The Quadruple Alliance, the real Euro- 
pean concert, which was the universalist ideal, early 
failed; even the more restricted league of the three 
eastern monarchies did not endure. Each successive 
problem which demanded the attention of Europe 
produced new and temporary alliances, akin rather to 
the league of the eighteenth century than to the concert 
suggested in the Treaty of Chaumont. England, France 
and Russia combined to deal with the question of Greek 
independence; England and France joined to defend 
liberalism in the Iberian peninsula and to solve the 
Belgian difficulty. Yet there was no definite recasting 
of alliances. England and Russia intervened in the 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 251 

quarrel between Egypt and the Porte, devising a com- 
promise and enforcing its acceptance, though they were 
brought thereby into more or less direct conflict with 
France. Austria had not been generally associated with 
the western powers, but she joined England that she 
might save Mehemet Ah from complete destruction. In 
fact, love of peace, fear of revolution, was potent enough 
to prevent any open confhct between the powers, to 
secure a limnted degree of external Universalism. It 
was not potent enough to secure a complete universalist 
ascendancy, the maintenance of a permanent and 
effective concert. 

Internally, the ascendancy of the desire to be ruled 
was equally insecure. Even when fear of revolution was 
at its strongest, some had been eager for change, some 
had been restless under the absolutist regime. Secret 
societies were formed, with the object of modifying the 
existing system. The Carbonari in Italy, the Char- 
bonerie in France, the Freemasons in Spain, laboured to 
secure an increase of political liberty. Nor were these 
societies the less revolutionary because their programme 
was vague, because they tended to dissociate themselves 
from the principles of the French Revolution. They 
were always opposed to the existing absolutism, always 
individualist. And as time went on, their Individualism 
was emphasised; Mazzini's " League of Young Italy " 
frankly advocated the destruction of monarchical 
institutions and the creation of an Italian repubHc. 
Though the outbreaks organised by the secret societies 
failed, the programme for which they stood was yet in 
a measure adopted. France under Louis Philippe was 
ostensibly a liberal and popular monarchy; the ruler 
was " king of the French," not " king of France." In 
Portugal, political hberty was more or less established. 
In Spain, insecure as was the position of hberahsm, the 



25a THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

most obvious champions of absolutism, the Basques, 
were led to support Don Carlos by their very Individual- 
ism ; they wished to preserve their local immunities. 

The most significant indication of the decline of Uni- 
versalism, however, is to be found in the growth of the 
national spirit. Nationality is essentially individualist, 
and it had been disregarded or crushed by the dominant 
universalists at the time of the Congress of Vienna. But 
the disregard was vain, the coercion ineffective. The 
desire to rule was bound to continue; it was not less 
bound sooner or later to find expression. In the years 
after the Congress there was everywhere a gradual 
revival of nationalism; it became a vital force and 
supplied the real policy of the internal individualists. 
The Greeks asserted their independence, the Belgians 
followed their example. Even the deposition of Charles 
X may be regarded as an assertion of French nationality ; 
the Bourbons had been restored by foreign arms, and to 
foreign powers they were supposed to look for support 
in event of any conflict between them and their subjects. 

Still more noticeable was the development of nation- 
ality in Germany and Italy. Since the Middle Ages, 
those two countries had been politically divided; down 
to the time of the French Revolution, the tendency had 
been rather to perpetuate than to heal thejr divisions. 
But the victories of Napoleon obliterated existing 
boundaries ; his armies formed a school which tended to 
reconcile the northern with the southern Germans, in 
which north and south Italians learned to forget their 
differences and to realise their practical identity of race. 
At the time of the Congress of Vienna, the realisation of 
racial identity was still incomplete both in Germany and 
in Italy. In neither country was resistance offered or 
much resentment felt at their continued partition into 
independent states, at the fact that " Germany " and 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 253 

" Italy '' continued to be regarded as mere geographi- 
cal expressions. National feeling, however, had been 
aroused ; during the next generation it grew in intensity. 
An agitation for deliverance from foreign rule began, 
and presently supplied the inspiration of the individual- 
ists in each country. Nor was this agitation confined to 
Germany and Italy. The various races of the Austrian 
dominions began to claim recognition of their diversity, 
acknowledgment of their national existence. Magyars 
and Slavs alike were moved to resent the really foreign 
domination of the German Habsburgs. But this de- 
velopment of the national movement was merely an 
indication that the desire to be ruled was losing its 
ascendancy, that the inevitable reaction was making 
definite progress. 

The culmination of this reaction was reached in the 
series of revolutions inaugurated by the overthrow of 
the Orleanist monarchy. More or less serious outbreaks 
of disorder took place in most European countries; 
almost everywhere absolute government seemed to be 
trembling on the verge of dissolution. Both in the 
fact that a much greater area was affected, and in their 
essential character, these movements differed from those 
which had already occurred in the period since the 
Congress of Vienna. The earlier revolutionary attempts 
had at first been purely military ; they had later assumed 
a more political character; to leaders such as Morelli 
or Riego, men like Thiers had succeeded. But in most 
European countries the mass of the population had still 
remained subject to the desire to be ruled. At the time 
of the fall of Louis Philippe, a distinct change may be 
observed. Discontent with the existing system had 
become widespread; all classes of the community 
were infected by it. The desire to rule had secured 
numerous converts ; nationahsm, the expression of 



254 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

that desire, in many lands received the support of a 
majority. 

Yet when discontent at last developed into active 
resistance, only in Sardinia, perhaps, did Individualism 
secure a real triumph. Victor Emmanuel, despite the 
menaces and blandishments of Austria, there main- 
tained a liberal system and a limited monarchy. On 
the other hand, in Prussia, though a constitution was 
granted and survived, its character was rather universal- 
ist than individualist. The franchise was deliberately 
constituted to prevent any popular control of the 
administration; the changes made rather afforded an 
example of the generosity of despotism than asserted the 
right of the people to govern themselves. In France, 
though the Orleanist monarchy was destroyed and the 
Second Republic created, the victory of Individualism 
was transitory. The movement ended in the establish- 
ment of the Second Empire, of a government more 
autocratic than any which had existed since the fall of 
Napoleon. 

Elsewhere, the failure of the revolution was still more 
complete. In Italy, Austria recovered her possessions; 
the Roman and Venetian Republics were destroyed, 
absolutism was everywhere restored. And after the 
restoration, rulers, such as Pius IX, who had dis- 
played liberal tendencies, resorted to despotic methods; 
tyrannies became more tyrannical. The attempt to 
secure German unity was frustrated. After a brief and 
ineffective life, the Frankfort Parliament was dispersed, 
and its dispersal was hardly regretted even by the extreme 
individualists, so completely had it failed to impair the 
ascendancy of Universalism. In the Austrian Empire, 
the revolution at first achieved striking success, but 
ended in complete disaster. Magyars, Slavs and Rou- 
mans were alike brought once more under German 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 255 

control; the rule of Schwarzenberg was more, not less, 
universalist than had been that of Mettemich. 

Indeed, the revolutions would be relatively unimport- 
ant, were it not that there is a particular significance in 
the manner of their defeat. Generally speaking, that 
defeat was the result, not of the unaided efforts of the 
internal universalists, but of an alliance between the 
internal and external universaHsts. Even in France, 
where there was no trace of foreign intervention, the 
accession of Napoleon III must be attributed largely to 
the fact that he gained the support of the external 
xmiversalists. He declared that " The Empire is peace," 
and thereby made an effective appeal to those who 
dreaded international anarchy, who disbelieved in that 
individualist foreign policy which, rightly or wrongly, 
they imagined to be inevitably characteristic of republic- 
anism, or at least of French republicanism. To this 
party of peace, rather than to the individualists, rather 
even than to the internal universalists, the Second 
Empire owed its existence, little as it justified the 
expectations formed of a cessation of war. 

This alliance of external and internal Universalism is 
more obvious in other countries. Absolutism was re- 
stored in Italy by the arms of Austria and France. 
A threat of armed intervention from Schwarzenberg 
secured the final defeat of the revolutionary movement 
in Germany; the submission of Manteuffel at Olmiitz 
was not the result of the unaided efforts of internal 
Universalism, but of fear that the Habsburgs would 
impose their will by force, if persuasion proved ineffec- 
tive. Pursuit of Individualism seemed to threaten 
Prussia with foreign subjection, and therefore Prussia, 
in a sense, allowed the Confederation to fall for a while 
imder foreign rule, that by so doing she might preserve 
her own independence. The conquest of the Hungarians 



256 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

was equally made possible by the action of Russia. The 
weakness of internal Universalism within the Habsburg 
dominions was illustrated by the failure of the Unitary 
Edict, a definite attempt to secure that centralisation 
and consolidation which the universalists desired. Had 
it not been that Nicholas I, true to the universalist con- 
ception that the internal affairs of each state are the 
concern of all states^ lent military aid to Francis Joseph, 
the cause of Individualism in Hungary at least might 
have prevailed. 

But though the alliance between internal and external 
Universalism was thus triumphant for a time, the 
ascendancy of the latter was declining. Of the original 
members of the Quadruple Alliance, only Austria and 
Russia remained united. England had long since 
parted company with her. former allies; her sympathy 
with Individualism was notorious, and formed a factor 
aiding the internal reaction in every country. Prussia 
had long been the docile follower of the other eastern 
powers, but during the revolutions she had displayed a 
tendency to separate herself from them. Her king had 
even worn the red cap of liberty; he had become a 
wandering star in the firmament of sovereigns. Nor 
was the forced submission at Olmiitz calculated to per- 
suade her to join cordially with Austria or Russia in the 
future; rather, the disgrace was felt and remembered, 
though the time of vengeance might be postponed. And 
meanwhile the fear that any war was bound to lead 
to universal and unending strife was losing strength. 
Though renewal of conflict was still dreaded, the struggle 
between Austria and Sardinia in Italy suggested that 
the flames of conflict need not necessarily spread; the 
action of Schwarzenberg at Olmiitz indicated that war 
was felt on occasion to be a less evil than the sacrifice of 
national interest, that the champions of external Uni- 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 357 

versalism were sometimes prepared to adopt an exter- 
nally individualist attitude. Indeed, the lesson of these 
revolutions was that the prevalent love of peace among 
the powers alone maintained the ascendancy of the desire 
to be ruled, and that this love was growing cold. 

War actually followed upon the crushing of the revolu- 
tionary movements; that general peace which had pre- 
vailed since the fall of the first, was broken soon after the 
accession of the third, Napoleon. At Olmiitz, it had 
become clear that practical subjection was liable to be 
the outcome of external Uni versalism. Prussia, weak 
and unaided, had given way. She had accepted the 
humiliating terms dictated to her by Austria. But the 
submission of Manteuffel was the beginning of the end 
for the supremacy of the desire to be ruled. It needed 
only that the external universalists should attempt the 
coercion of some power capable of resistance, for re- 
sistance to be made, for war to begin. Such coercion 
was attempted in the case of Russia. She was forbidden 
to regulate her relations with the Porte according to her 
own will, and when she had displayed at least a Hmited 
readiness to concede this point, England and France 
proceeded further to attempt the regulation of her 
military and naval position in the Black Sea. The Hmit 
of endurance was thus reached ; Russia refused to submit 
and the Crimean War followed. For two reasons, that 
war was of paramount importance. In the first place, 
the unreahty of the European concert was revealed. 
The western powers had formed ideas as to the neces- 
sities of the Near Eastern situation, which did not 
com-mend themselves to Austria and Prussia. Conse- 
quently, though the four powers at first acted together, 
they soon ceased to do so ; in the attack on the Crimea, 
the two absolutist states had no part. In the second 
place, the war served to dissipate the existing fear of 

R 



258 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

conflict. Though first-class powers were engaged in it, 
it did not produce any general conflagration, nor was it 
greatly prolonged. For the future, war was the less 
dreaded; the ascendancy of the desire to be ruled was. 
proportionately weakened. 

The result soon appeared. External Universalism had 
owed its decided supremacy to the bitter memories of 
the revolutionary period; it was feared and expected 
that any disturbance of international peace would 
result in a prolonged, general war. And since the French 
Revolution had begun in a movement towards mere 
internal reform, any such reform movement was dreaded, 
as being likely to lead to an interruption of European 
tranquillity. The successive changes in the government 
of France had proved that this dread was largely illusory ; 
the Crimean War proved that a conflict between some 
of the great powers need not necessarily extend to the 
rest of Europe, need not necessarily be prolonged. 
Thus the ascendancy of external Universalism was 
impaired, as that of internal Universalism had already 
been impaired; the way was opened for a more rapid 
reaction towards Individualism both at home and 
abroad. 

The outcome was a new alliance of forces. As the 
exponents of the desire to be ruled had united, so now 
the exponents of the desire to rule united, and from this 
union resulted those national wars by which the second 
half of the nineteenth century was marked. In her 
foreign poHcy France is always potentially individualist, 
even in her most universalist moments; the French 
people are essentially human. And France, naturally 
less susceptible to fear born of the experience of the 
French Revolution, set the example of disregarding the 
supposed danger of individualist foreign poHcy. At the 
Congress of Paris, the powers, urged to consider the state 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 259 

of Italy, had replied by the expression of pious hopes 
of a change for the better. France presently went to 
the help of the Itahan nationalistb. A short war with 
Austria gave victory to the cause of Individualism; 
once more, no general conflict resulted, despite the 
murmurings of the universahsts, illustrated by Prussian 
mobihsation. 

And the defeat of Austria in Italy encouraged the 
individualists of Germany. Their agitation against 
practical foreign control grew in strength, and Prussia 
put herself definitely at the head of the national move- 
ment. Nor was this surprising. The very existence 
of the Prussian state depended upon her rejection of 
universalist ideas; she had been early obliged to free 
herself from Pohsh suzerainty, and her progress had been 
rendered possible only by denial of such obhgations 
as might result from the inclusion of Brandenburg in 
the Holy Roman Empire. She had been individualist 
during the period of the French Revolution; she had 
tended to pursue the same poHcy in more recent dis- 
orders, and by her attitude on the Schleswig-Holstein 
question had indicated her devotion to her own interest. 
Hence Prussia undertook the championship of German 
nationality, of Individualism. The Seven Weeks' War 
accomplished the extrusion of Austria from the Confedera- 
tion ; it secured the defeat of the champion of external 
Universahsm. 

The importance of these individualist wars, of this 
further decHne in external Universahsm, soon became 
apparent in the Austrian Empire. The German element 
had hitherto been enabled to triumph over the Magyar 
and Slav elements, owing to the universalist spirit in 
the army and the aid received from the external Uni- 
versahsm of Europe. France had not dared to inter- 
vene seriously in Italy, while Radetzky re-estabhshed 



26o THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

Austrian control; fear of a general European war had 
stayed her. The same fear had led Russia to intervene 
in Hungary. But the Crimean War had greatly weakened 
the forces of external Universalism ; no power was ready 
to support the Habsburgs when they were brought 
face to face with the individualist tendencies of the 
peoples over whom they ruled. The German element, 
the advocates of the desire to be ruled, were driven to 
rely only upon the strength of that desire within the 
Austrian Empire, and that desire, in. view of the extreme 
divergence of race, had to be, as it were, both external 
and internal, in order to be effective. It was therefore 
almost necessarily weak. All unitary attempts, indeed, 
were doomed from the moment of the victory of Napo- 
leon III. The individualists learned the weakness of 
the forces opposed to them; they realised their own 
strength, they refused any longer to be coerced. And 
their numbers were increased by the mere fact that the 
existing system had failed to hold its own against 
foreign aggression. Even before the Seven Weeks' War, 
it was inevitable that some concessions should be made 
to the local prejudices of the Magyars ; as a result of that 
war, dualism was adopted. 

And the establishment of union in Italy and of dis- 
union in the Austrian Empire were alike illustrations 
of the reaction against the ascendancy of the desire to 
be ruled. Italian unity implied the destruction of 
foreign control of the peninsula, and so far was an 
individualist triumph. Dualism involved the conces- 
sion of self-government to the Magyars; it meant the 
cessation of German domination over one of the races 
included in the Habsburg territories. But in each case 
the reaction was incomplete. If Italy, by the extinction 
of Austrian power in Lombardy and Venetia, was 
finally freed from external control, it was at the cost 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 261 

of the simultaneous extinction of the independence of 
the smaller Italian states; Naples and Sicily, racially 
distinct from Piedmont, were compelled to accept the 
rule of the House of Savoy. And though Hungary 
secured autonomy, the Slavs were left as much as ever 
under the control of races alien to them. Duahsm, in 
effect, was a bargain between the Germans and the 
Magyars for the joint repression of the other peoples 
of the Austrian Empire. 

Nor did the reaction ever attain completion. The 
culmination of the movement against the ascendancy 
of Universalism may be found in the Franco-Prussian 
War and in the events which preceded and followed that 
war. In it, no other nations took part ; the growth of 
external Individualism is indicated by the fact that the 
powers of Europe did not intervene either to prevent the 
conflict or to settle the terms upon which peace should 
be concluded. In other ways also the struggle illus- 
trated the increased influence of the desire to rule. 
Napoleon III aimed at the extension of French influence 
over southern Germany; his attempt, individualist from 
the point of view of France, from the contrary point 
of view amounted to an effort to estabUsh universalist 
control over the states which he wished to domin- 
ate, and led them to ally with Prussia in defence of 
their national existence. Prussia definitely became the 
accepted champion of the external Individualism of the 
German race. Her victory secured the deliverance of 
Germany from the danger of foreign control. Yet this 
victory of Individualism was bought at a price. The 
German Empire was established, and in it the ascendancy 
of Prussia was assured ; internal Universalism triumphed 
hardly less obviously than external Individualism. 

And the effect of the war upon France was also dual 
in character. The autocratic Second Empire was over- 



262 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

thrown, and in its fall internal Universalism fell also. 
But the Communards, the real representatives of Indi- 
vidualism, failed to secure the acceptance of their views ; 
the Third Republic was conservative in its very essence, 
leavened by a perceptible admixture of Universalism. 
The champions of the desire to rule had hoped that the 
fall of Napoleon III would produce a condition of things 
akin to that which had followed the fall of the ancien 
regime. They were disappointed, and the actual re- 
action was so imperfect as to leave to the executive 
almost as much power as it had possessed under the 
Second Empire. Nevertheless, the history of the period 
of the national wars is the history of a general reaction 
against that Universalism which had prevailed since the 
Congress of Vienna. 

And, as always, reaction bred a counter-reaction. No 
sooner had an apparent ascendancy been secured by 
external Individualism than external Universalism began 
to revive. Nor is it surprising that the very state which 
in its foreign policy had most gratified the desire to rule 
should be the first to tend towards the contrary extreme. 
The ideal of the Quadruple Alliance had been the main- 
tenance of the status quo by means of a permanent and 
invincible league between the great powers. The realisa- 
tion of that ideal had been rendered impossible by Prussia 
rather than by any other state, and Prussia was the first 
to dread the consequences of her own action, to attempt 
the reconstruction of that system which she had assisted 
to destroy. To her, the revival of external Universalism 
in the so-called League of Emperors must be attributed, 
and that league was really no more than a return to that 
attempted concert of Europe which Metternich had 
endeavoured to create at the time of the renewal of the 
Treaty of Chaumont. The new alliance was based upon 
the identical principle by which the Quadruple Alliance 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 263 

had been inspired. Fear of revolution determined once 
more the policy of the three eastern powers; love of 
peace was at the root of this new expression of external 
Universalism. 

The League of Emperors did not become permanent. 
Like the Quadruple Alliance, it was destroyed by the 
inevitable tendency towards external Individualism in 
its constituent states, by the conviction that the interests 
of different states were themselves different. Nor does 
the similarity in the history of these two universalist 
attempts end here. Like the earlier alliance, the League 
of Emperors was wrecked upon the rock of the Near 
Eastern Question. Russia adopted an independent 
attitude towards the Porte, and the degree of independ- 
ence in that attitude is the measure of the ascendancy 
of Individualism in her foreign policy. But even in 
Russia and in reference to the Eastern Question, the 
ascendancy was incomplete. She permitted the re- 
vision of the Treaty of San Stefano by the Congress of 
Berlin ; she subordinated her own will to that of Europe. 
External Universalism gained a victory. And the cir- 
cimistances of that victory afford another illustration 
of the fact that the state which has proceeded furthest 
towards the gratification of one desire is most prone to 
turn towards the gratification of the contrary desire. 
Prussia had defied the concert of Europe in order to 
gratify her desire to rule Germany. She also formed 
the League of Emperors that the example of international 
anarchy which she had set might not be followed. She 
arranged the Congress of BerHn that the sohdarity of 
Europe might not be wholly destroyed; she gave birth, 
in fact, to that new concert which, down to recent times, 
served instead of the Quadruple Alliance. 

And the conditions, illustrated by the Congress of 
Berlin, still exist. Externally, there has been a marked 



264 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

reaction from the Individualism which prevailed in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. There is a 
concert of Europe, however weak may be the bonds 
uniting its members. Since the Franco-Prussian War, 
it has sufficed to maintain continental peace, so far as 
confficts between the great powers are concerned. Yet 
the concert is no union of hearts. The ascendancy of 
the desire to be ruled is evidently limited. Each state 
arms against its neighbours; within the concert itself, 
mutually hostile alliances exist. An atmosphere of 
extreme distrust prevails; the action of the concert is 
slow and hampered at every turn by the suspicious 
jealousy of its members. Russia once proposed inter- 
national disarmament, and the Hague Conference was 
assembled. But the proposal of Nicholas II was regarded 
with as much scepticism as had been the Holy Alliance, 
nor is there any real evidence that nations are much 
nearer sincere agreement with each other than they were 
in the period immediately following the Congress of 
Vienna. 

From this mutual distrust, manifestations of indi- 
vidualist spirit have followed. Italy, however much she 
might endeavour to conciliate the opinion of Europe, 
remained firm in her resolve not to entrust her interests 
in Tripoli to the care of the concert. At the risk of 
producing a general war, she attacked the Ottoman 
Empire. A similar disregard for the peace of the conti- 
nent was displayed by the Balkan League. Not merely 
did they dare to raise the Near Eastern Question in 
its most acute form, but they showed a carelessness, 
amounting to contempt, for the preservation of the 
status quo, maintenance of which lies at the very root of 
the new external Universalism. Nor could the concert 
of Europe in either case do more than regulate somewhat 
the extent and duration of the conflict. It could induce 



THE CONFLICT IN EUROPE 265 

Italy not to conduct naval operations in the Adriatic ; it 
did not decide the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne. It 
could create an Albanian state and secure a voice in the 
disposition of the ^gean Islands; it could not enforce 
the observance of the Treaty of London, and the Treaty 
of Bukarest was due far more to the individualist action 
of Rumania than to the complaints and protests of the 
great powers. 

Internally, there is an apparent ascendancy of Indi- 
viduaHsm. Every state in Europe has adopted, at least 
professedly, representative institutions; there is no state 
in which the right of the people to a voice in their own 
government is explicitly denied. Yet the degree to 
which any actual influence is exercised is doubtful. The 
close organisation of parties, the rise of a class of 
professional politicians, almost ensures the practical 
impotence of the electorate, and the existence of that 
impotence has been realised in Switzerland, where a 
special device has been adopted to secure that the people 
should be able to determine legislation and policy. 
During the eighteenth century, the benevolent despots 
claimed to decide wherein lay the true good of their 
subjects. The benevolent despots have passed into 
oblivion. But in their place there are party leaders 
who are equally reluctant to submit their conduct to the 
judgment of those whose servants they profess to be. 
Nor have the people at large a much greater share in the 
determination of their fate than they had in the days 
of a Frederic the Great; they possess little more than 
the right to choose between two rival despots. 

In short, the present age is externally universalist 
and only internally individualist to a very limited extent. 
There is no permanent concert, such as was desired by 
those who secured the overthrow of Napoleon ; there is, 
however, a partial concert, the members of which regard 



266 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

each other with distrust, though ready to combine to 
preserve the peace of Europe. The theory that govern- 
ment is for the good of the governed prevails. But the 
right of the subject to determine what constitutes that 
good is but partially recognised; the ascendancy of 
internal Individualism is limited. The reaction from 
the Universalism of the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century is incomplete. Individualism has made pro- 
gress and has suffered reverses. The eternal conflict 
continues, and to neither side is complete ^ victory 
vouchsafed. 



THE CONFLICT IN ENGLAND 267 



XI 

THE CONFLICT IN ENGLAND 

Throughout the general history of Europe, from the 
dawn of civiHsation to the present day, the eternal con- 
flict between the desire to be ruled and the desire to rule 
may be traced clearly. But European nations have 
been subject to violent commotions, have been the 
scene of obvious revolutions ; their normal Hf e has been 
continually interrupted. England, on the contrary, 
has not experienced such decided changes; she has 
never known a French Revolution; for her, even the 
Reformation was placid and orderly. Her history is 
far less complex than that of any other land; for some 
fifteen hundred years its continuity has hardly been 
interrupted. The origin of many of her existing institu- 
tions may be traced back to the period at which the 
English first appeared in the island to which they gave 
their name; the origin of some may be found even in 
the earlier days during which the Anglo-Saxons still 
inhabited the districts of north-western Germany. It is 
hardly an exaggeration to say that, with the exception 
of one brief interlude of experiment, her government has 
always been a limited monarchy. In the most revolu- 
tionary periods of her history, and by the most revolu- 
tionary leaders, appeal has always been made to the 
experience of past ages. The creation of an ideal state 
by legislative enactment has never appeared practical 
to her statesmen; the most radical reformers have at 
least professed devotion to the institutions of their fore- 



a68 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

fathers. And if there were any exception to the uni- 
versahty of the conflict of desire, such an exception 
would assuredly be presented by England. In her 
history, if anywhere, the theory of persistent progress 
finds justification. If England has been the scene of 
unending strife between two ideals, with the implication 
of a tendency to return to the original starting-point, 
then certainly that strife would seem to supply the factor 
explanatory of History. 

And it may be asserted at once that England offers 
no exception to the general rule. On the contrary, the 
very simplicity and orderliness of her history makes the 
conflict appear rather more clearly than it does in the 
history of most, if not of all, other nations. It may be 
admitted that the conflict has perhaps been less violent ; 
the greater stolidity of the Anglo-Saxon race has freed 
them from the experience of those rapid reactions and 
counter-reactions which have been the lot of the French. 
Change from approach to one extreme to approach to 
the other has been more gradual; neither extreme has 
been so nearly reached. The executive in England has 
never been as despotic as was the French executive 
under Napoleon I ; it has never been so weak as was that 
of France after the promulgation of the Constitution of 
1791. The English villeins were probably never de- 
graded to a position as low as that occupied by the 
miserrimi populi Rutheniorum ; the English nobles 
certainly never attained to privileges such a5 were 
possessed by their peers under the ancien regime in 
France. England never came within the orbit of the 
Holy Roman Empire; she has never been wholly en- 
tangled in continental alliances. The authority of the 
Papacy was never so extensive as to constitute a serious 
limitation of the power of the government over its lay 
subjects; independence of attitude has always been a 



THE CONFLICT IN ENGLAND 269 

marked characteristic of the AngHcan Church. Uni- 
versalism and IndividuaHsm, external and internal, have 
never come so near attainment of complete supremacy 
as they have done in other lands. Yet, for all this, 
English history is as entirely a record of conflict as is 
that of every other nation ; in England, as in all other 
countries, the desire to be ruled and the desire to rule 
have been always battling for supremacy. 

At the moment when English history may be said to 
begin, after the Anglo-Saxon conquest, Individualism 
was supreme. The island was cut off from the continent 
and divided against itself. But the marriage of Ethel- 
bert of Kent to Bertha of Paris was followed by the 
mission of Augustine, and these two events inaugurated 
the process of breaking down the isolation of the country 
as a whole and of the units of which it was composed. A 
closer connection with western Christendom and internal 
consolidation went hand in hand; each made progress 
despite strenuous opposition and frequent repulses, 
until external and internal Universahsm secured a 
decided victory at the Norman Conquest. And the 
reaction towards gratification of the desire to be ruled 
culminated in the administrative monarchy of the 
Angevins, in the submission of Richard I to the Emperor 
Henry VI and in that of John to Pope Innocent III. At 
home, a practical despotism was established; abroad, 
England definitely admitted her inclusion in the Christian 
commonwealth. 

The inevitable reaction followed. England lost her 
continental dominions, largely because she made no real 
effort to retain them, and the consequent release from 
foreign entanglements forced or enabled her to pursue 
an individualist policy. Even the attempt to conquer 
France in the Hundred Years' War was rather an asser- 
tion of the desire to rule than a reversion to the contrary 



270 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

ideal. At home, that cosmopohtanism which had pre- 
vailed since the Norman conquest was destroyed; the 
power of the monarchy was reduced by successful re- 
bellion and by half -voluntary concessions. So great a 
hold, indeed, did Individualism secure upon the imagina- 
tion of the people that impatience of subjection produced 
anarchy. The Wars of the Roses, a period during which 
there was no foreign policy worthy of the name, marked 
the culmination of the revolt against governance, and 
at the same time expressed the growing conviction that 
governance was a necessity. If the Lancastrians owed 
much of their unpopularity to the attempted tyranny of 
the royal council, that unpopularity was enhanced by 
the very ineffectiveness of the tyranny; the ministers 
of Henry VI denied the right of self-government, but 
produced no satisfactory alternative. 

And as the combination of external and internal 
Individualism was found to produce incalculable evils, 
the nation gave rein to its desire to be ruled. The 
Yorkists initiated, the Tudors consolidated, a despotic 
system. In the progress of the reaction against Angevin 
Universalism, an interlude occurred, and to the fact that 
they governed vigorously, that they repressed all dis- 
orders, the Tudors owed their undoubted popularity. 
While in her relations with other states England, on the 
whole, preserved an individualist attitude, and even 
emphasised that attitude by the rejection of papal 
supremacy, at home the contrary ideal was favoured. 
The authority of the king was vastly increased, and the 
control of the executive over the people was assured by 
the creation of special courts, of which the deliberate 
aim was to hold in check such persons and districts as 
might tend to assert their independence. 

Yet, even under the Tudor " despotism,'' Individual- 
ism survived and found expression. If parliament were 



THE CONFLICT IN ENGLAND 271 

controlled, it was also used, nor are there wanting indica- 
tions of a tendency towards reaction. Each successive 
ruler encountered more or less opposition ; the Commons 
defended their privileges against royal aggression, and 
the cessation of payment of members suggests that 
parliament was felt to be something more than a mere 
instrument for the registration of the royal will. And 
no sooner had the Tudor regime freed England from the 
evils resulting from the extreme of Individualism than 
she began to fear the evils of the contrary extreme. 
Resistance to the will of the executive gradually de- 
veloped. The Tudors had been able to appeal success- 
fully to the national spirit among their subjects; their 
very Universalism conciliated Individualism. But with 
the accession of the Stuarts the strength of the crown 
seemed almost to involve alien rule, and, deprived of 
any individualist support, the executive was faced by 
difficulties which it was unable to overcome. 

The reaction, which produced successively the Great 
Rebellion and the Revolution of 1688, culminated in the 
triumph of doctrines of political, religious and economic 
liberty. The executive was deprived of its more danger- 
ous powers; the attempt of the legislative to establish 
a veiled tyranny was thwarted, and the successful 
agitation for parliamentary reform gave to the people 
at least a voice in the decision of their own fate. The 
dominant Church was compelled to admit the right of 
men to decide upon the way of salvation which they 
would follow ; the dominant mercantile class was driven 
to resign its right to dictate to the consumer where he 
should purchase his goods. Externally, the attitude 
of England was, on the whole, individualist. It was 
only with extreme reluctance that she consented to play 
her part as one of the powers of Europe, and though 
pressing dangers drove her momentarily to accept the 



272 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

idea of the Quadruple Alliance, she seized the earliest 
possible moment for freeing herself from foreign obliga- 
tions. Indeed, at the time when internal Individualism 
reached its high-water mark, England was almost 
reluctant to bear the burden of her colonial empire. 

Since that date, a reaction towards Universalism has 
occurred. Internally, the province of government has 
been extended. State interference has become more 
and more general ; the economic life of the country has 
been more and more carefully regulated. At the same 
time, the power of the cabinet has grown ; the increas- 
ingly strict discipline imposed upon the two great 
political parties has served to give the executive the 
direction of the details, as well as of the principles, of 
legislation. Externally, the duties of empire have been 
recognised; it has been contended that the interests of 
England must even be subordinated to those of her 
colonies, and that those colonies possess a specific right 
to share in the government of the whole empire. Towards 
foreign powers the attitude of England has become less 
individualist. The Hague Tribunal has, in a measure, 
been accepted as a body capable of performing functions 
similar to those performed by the mediaeval Papacy. 
International arbitration has made progress; there has 
been an increasing readiness to submit all disputes to 
the judgment of some external power. England, in 
short, has shared in that general reaction towards 
Universalism which has occurred on the continent since 
the close of the Franco-Prussian War. 



TENDENCIES OF THE PRESENT DAY 273 



XII 

TENDENCIES OF THE PRESENT DAY 

From the dawn of Greek civilisation to the present day, 
History has been a record of eternal conflict between 
the desire to be ruled and the desire to rule, a record 
of constant reactions and counter-reactions. Complete 
supremacy has never been attained by either desire ; the 
proximate victory of the one has been invariably followed 
or even anticipated by a reaction in favour of the other. 
And, if the fundamental characteristics of human nature 
remain immutable, it may be expected, it is indeed 
inevitable, that this series of reactions will continue, that 
History will always be the record of the same conflict. 
If, therefore, the historian can discover the prevailing 
tendency of the present, if he can decide whether 
ascendancy is for the moment enjoyed by Universalism 
or by Individualism, then it is in his power also to 
predict the nature of the next reaction. And if he can- 
not so predict, his work is of relatively less value. He 
may still both amuse and instruct. By recording the 
past, he may inspire men to emulate the good and to 
avoid the evil. He may supply to statesmen and to 
nations some warnings, vague indeed, yet salutary, 
suggesting at least the most obvious results Hkely to 
follow upon a given course of action. But if he can 
foresee the ultimate tendency of the age in which he 
lives, his work will forthwith be raised to a loftier plane. 
To foresee, to predict, is the highest, most permanently 
valuable function of the historian. History ceases to 

s 



274 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

be a dead science; it becomes instinct with vitality. It 
gives to man that for which man has always sought, 
whether by the path of religion, or by the more devious 
paths of occult sciences ; it gives to him some knowledge 
of the future destiny of the race. 

For the historian to be able so to predict, it is clearly 
the first necessity that he should be able to determine 
accurately whether Universalism or Individualism for 
the moment holds the ascendancy. Nor is such accurate 
determination difficult, since History is nothing more 
than the record of the interplay of the two desires, and 
since nothing is more certain than that the reaction from 
the one desire to the other proceeds with unfailing 
regularity. At the present moment, it is clear that 
externally the desire to be ruled prevails rather than the 
desire to rule. In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, and in the national wars of that period. Indi- 
vidualism reached a culminating point. Since that 
date, there has been a sufficiently effective concert 
among the powers to prevent any actual conffict in 
Europe, and the general wish to avoid war has been 
abundantly illustrated. By the creation of the Hague 
Tribunal to adjudicate in cases not involving the vital 
interests of states, an attempt has been made to revive 
something equivalent to the supreme arbiter of the 
Middle Ages, and one of the most noteworthy character- 
istics of the present day has been the growth of the 
movement in favour of international arbitration and the 
conclusion of arbitration treaties between different states. 

Even in such wars as have occurred, the influence of 
neutrals has been employed with effect to limit either 
the duration or the scope of the conflict. Spain, in her 
struggle with the United States, bowed to public opinion 
by refraining from the issue of letters of marque, the 
only method by which she might have injured her enemy. 



TENDENCIES OF THE PRESENT DAY 275 

refrained, that is, from exercising a right which she had 
expHcitly reserved to herself. During the war between 
Turkey and Greece, the Greeks, in deference to the 
powers, refrained from the use of their fleet. In the war 
between Russia and Japan, the former gave way to 
international opinion in the case of the Malacca, and 
submitted the action of the Baltic fleet to the judgment 
of a neutral court. More recently, Italy abstained from 
naval operations in the Adriatic or against the Darda- 
nelles. The Balkan states, despite the general Indi- 
vidualism of their attitude and their refusal to accept 
the decision of the powers in favour of the maintenance 
of the status quo, agreed to the creation of the kingdom 
of Albania and consented to leave the question of the 
^gean Islands in the hands of Europe. Thus, though, 
as might be expected, individuaHst tendencies may be 
discovered, yet the general attitude of the world is 
universaHst. 

Nor is this less true internally. Absolutism has in- 
deed disappeared; Russia has now received her duma, 
Turkey possesses a species of parHament. Nevertheless, 
there is a decided increase in the area of state control, 
a decided widening of the province of government. And 
this has occurred not only in every country, but also 
in every sphere of political life. Economic conditions 
have been generally regulated by the state. The direc- 
tion of policy and of legislation is in most cases more 
exclusively in the hands of ministers; the representa- 
tives of the people seem to tend everywhere to degenerate 
into mere delegates. And the growth of socialism is an 
indication of the strength of the desire to be ruled, since 
that creed, in so far as it proposes to nationahse the 
means of production, proposes also to make the state 
supreme over the regulation of that which is perhaps 
the most vital part of national Ufe in every state. 



276 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

If, therefore, human nature remains constant in its 
fundamental characteristics, an individuahst reaction, 
both externally and internally, may be anticipated with 
confidence. It can only be that when Universahsm has 
attained such a measure of supremacy, the satiation 
of desire should tend to produce the contrary desire. 
Nor are signs wanting that this expected reaction is 
occurring. Externally, the preoccupation of the powers 
in colonial questions has done much to preserve peace 
on the continent. States have been absorbed in the 
opening up of new markets and in the acquisition of 
over-sea possessions; they have gratified their desire 
to rule at the expense of the subject races. And it is 
significant that, as the favoured places in the world have 
been gradually occupied, the likelihood of European 
war has definitely increased. The very powers of the 
concert are mutually distrustful, armed against each 
other. Those states, which from material weakness 
have least to hope for from the modern doctrine of 
compensation, have shown an increasing tendency to 
act for themselves. It was Italy, the least powerful of 
the so-called great powers, that was the first important 
state to dare to enter upon an independent war in Europe 
after the Congress of Berhn. It was the lesser powers 
that destroyed the status quo in the Balkan Peninsula. 

Internally, there have been signs of a growing reluc- 
tance to submit to authority. Portugal has experienced 
a revolution; France, at the time of the separation of 
Church and State, trembled on the verge of civil war. 
In Germany, there is an ever-increasing agitation in 
favour of the estabhshment of really representative 
government; the dominance of the mihtary caste has 
been more and more resented. Russia has been the 
scene of constant Nihihst plots ; in Sweden, the exertion 
of power or of influence by a limited king produced 



TENDENCIES OF THE PRESENT DAY 277 

an anti-monarchical agitation. Throughout Europe, 
anarchist societies have been formed ; men have banded 
themselves together with the avowed object of destrojdng 
all constituted authority. 

But the tendencies of the present day may be gauged 
most accurately from the condition of England. In all 
the revolutions of the past, in all the changes to which 
pohtical society has been subjected, England has in 
general pointed the way, and other states have, though 
often unconsciously, followed the example which she has 
set. The Angevins created a strong monarchy, while the 
continent was still the seat of loosely united feudal 
states. Despite the early existence of modified repre- 
sentative institutions in Spain, England was the first 
country to adopt a parliamentary constitution. For such 
a measure of recognised Individualism as England 
enjoyed even under the Tudors, the continent in general 
was forced to wait for some two or three hundred years. 
The Great Rebellion established the doctrine of limited 
monarchy while other lands were still labouring to escape 
from almost mediaeval anarchy. The English Revolu- 
tion confirmed the results of the Great RebeUion a 
century before France, the most progressive state on 
the continent, threw off the trammels of despotism. 
Rehgious hberty, freedom of the press, the reform of 
the representative, were all accompUshed in England 
while such changes were as yet hardly foreshadowed in 
other lands. 

It is therefore to be expected that the prevaihng con- 
ditions in England at the present day will afford probably 
the clearest indication as to that which the future has 
in store for the generality of mankind. And both 
externally and internally, the signs of an approaching 
and even of an existing individualist reaction are obvious. 
Externally, despite the increase in the use of arbitration 



278 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

and despite the generally peaceful attitude of the English 
government, armaments are increasing, expectation of 
war is growing stronger. Still more significant is the 
decline of colonial sentiment. English imperialism, in 
its essence, partakes of the nature of Universalism ; it 
involves not so much the government of subject races 
as a league of almost independent states, and there is 
in it a tendency to subordinate the interests of the mother 
country to those of the colonies. The burden of such 
empire was borne with reluctance in the early nineteenth 
century; in recent years the heaviness of the burden 
has once more been suggested. A growing body of 
opinion holds that the establishment of complete inde- 
pendence in the self-governing colonies is not only a 
probable event, but would also be beneficial to England. 
The agitation in favour of colonial preference has made 
little or no progress; the majority of Englishmen, or 
at least of the English electorate, have declined more 
than once to risk penalising themselves for the real or 
supposed benefit of the colonial empire. It may be 
suggested that such success as the tariff reform crusade 
has secured has been due rather to individualist anti- 
pathy towards the foreigner than to universalist im- 
perialism. And an equivalent wish to free England 
from external obligations is to be seen in the suspicion 
with which alUances tend to be regarded. Though a 
universalist attitude may be discovered in the alliance 
between England and Japan and in the entente with 
France and Russia, yet it is becoming increasingly 
evident that the former is declining in popularity and 
that there is little wish that the latter should develop 
into any closer union. Its continuance may, indeed, 
be attributed to a certain dread that the individuahst 
reaction will culminate in war. 
Internally, there has been nothing more remarkable 



TENDENCIES OF THE PRESENT DAY 279 

in recent years than the rapid increase of a tendency to 
reject hitherto recognised authority. PoUtically, the 
agitation in favour of female suffrage has to a certain 
extent been organised dehberately on the basis of 
defiance of all law and order. MiUtancy owes its origin 
and its permanence to the growth of individualist 
sentiment. At an earlier date, the fact of resistance to 
the constituted government of the state would have been 
regarded as adequate ground for resort to the severest 
and most extreme penalties. At the present time, the 
most violent defiance produces only the most moderate 
retaliation. Though on a very different plane, the re- 
sistance of Ulster to the project of Home Rule can be 
traced only to the same growth of the individualist 
opinion of the age. That opinion has led the inhabitants 
of northern Ireland to decline to submit to the govern- 
ment of a majority of their fellow-countrymen, to 
announce beforehand and in no uncertain terms their 
refusal to obey the decisions of the imperial parliament. 
In this protest they have received the support of a large 
section of the EngUsh population. And it may be 
suggested that the extent of the agitation in favour of 
Home Rule itself is the measure of the Individualism 
of the other provinces of Ireland. 

Any consideration of the trend of economic move- 
ments affords further proof of the growth of Individual- 
ism. During the eighteenth century and until after the 
Industrial Revolution, the labouring classes were more 
than ready to submit to the control of their masters. 
But no sooner had the evils of such subjection become 
apparent, owing to the prevalence of sweating and the 
repression of every attempt on the part of the laboiuing 
classes to improve their lot, than a strong individuahst 
movement began. Trade unions came into being, and 
if they have a certain universaUst element in their 



28o THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

character, they are in essence individualist ; though the 
members of a union are in a measure restrained by their 
association, yet the union as a whole asserts the un- 
wiUingness of the employee to submit to dictation from 
his employer. And the frequency of strikes in recent 
years has indicated the existence of an almost cynical 
disregard for contracts, a pronounced inclination, that 
is, to refuse to admit any restriction upon freedom of 
action. 

* At the same time, the recent increase of state inter- 
ference with the hfe of the individual, itself the product 
of the universalist spirit of the age, has led to a reaction 
which might have been foretold. Prosecutions under 
the education acts have been frequent; prosecutions 
under the Shop Hours Act have been more frequent. In 
both cases individuals have claimed the right to refuse 
to receive either education or recreation in the manner 
provided by the state. And the admitted unpopularity 
of the Insurance Act has been due less to any real re- 
luctance to affix stamps on cards than to the feeling that 
government has exceeded its legitimate province in 
compeUing the citizens to take precautions against the 
accidents and casualties of this life. 

But nowhere is the spirit of revolt against authority 
seen more clearly than in the domain of intellectual 
activity. Just as the Reformation was in a measure 
heralded by a general rejection of hitherto accepted 
standards, so a similar rejection heralds the coming 
individuahst reaction of the present day. In rehgion, 
new creeds have arisen and are arising; the human race 
IS becoming more and more malcontent with those 
beliefs which it once accepted without question. In 
hterature, there is a tendency to rebel against the tacit 
prohibition of the discussion of certain topics ; the same 
tendency appears in the drama, and the agitation against 



TENDENCIES OF THE PRESENT DAY 281 

the dramatic censorship indicates the uneasiness of men 
under the curb of some moral code. In art, the modern- 
ist movement is equally pronounced; the futurists and 
the cubists deliberately outrage the once accepted canons 
of artistic construction. And in music, the art most 
affected by every trend of opinion, modernist tendencies, 
the revolt against the old, against authority, are still 
more evident. Wagner held at least to the recognised 
laws of beauty in the construction of his music; his 
modern successors tend to reject all laws, to pass from 
a wide liberty of expression to the most entire anarchy. 
But all this rejection of authority is nothing more than 
an expression of the individualist tendency in man, the 
assertion of the desire to rule against the desire to be 
ruled. It is nothing more than a phase in that eternal 
conflict which constitutes and which always has consti- 
tuted the very life of man. 

There is, then, every sign of a proximate individualist 
reaction ; that reaction would indeed seem to have begun 
already, and to be destined to continue until the desire 
to rule attains a supremacy at least equal to that which 
has been recently enjoyed by the desire to be ruled. But 
to the suggestion that such a reaction must necessarily 
occur, and still more to any suggestion that for all future 
time the same series of reactions will continue, one 
proviso must be added. The idea that because History 
has always been a record of conflict, therefore this 
conflict must always endure, depends upon the assump- 
tion that in its fundamental characteristics the nature 
of man is unchangeable, that man is always destined to 
be the prey of two contrar^^ emotions, the subject of 
strife between his desire to rule and his desire to be 
ruled. It is clear that great changes have occurred and 
are occurring in many spheres of activity. Knowledge 
in all its branches is to-day more widely diffused than 



a82 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

it has been in any other period. Civilisation is spread 
over a wider area; in all arts and sciences, notable 
advance has been made. It may well seem unreason- 
able to suppose that man's nature alone will remain 
immutable. 

At present, men act oftentimes irrationally; they fly 
from extreme to extreme ; they are unstable. Life is a 
perpetual conflict, in which no victory is ever gained, 
since, though some may delight in extremes, the majority 
weary of anything approaching complete gratification. 
And nations act as do individuals; they are equally 
unable to pursue a moderate course. But it does not 
therefore follow that this will always be so, nor are there 
wanting those who hold implicitly that a change will 
occur. 

For this change, some look to the gradual development 
of human intellect. A child cannot be expected to act 
with the considered judgment of a man; the human race 
has been, as it were, a child, but the race is growing up 
as a child grows up, so that every century sees an in- 
crease and a deepening of the human intellect. Event- 
ually, mankind will be more able to foresee the ultimate 
consequences of their actions. They will be able to 
avoid errors and to hold fast to the true path of happiness 
whether that path is to be found in the fullest possible 
gratification of one of man's two desires, or whether it is 
to be found in the blending of the gratification of each 
desire. 

Others hold a less optimistic view of the human 
intellect. The brevity of life gives to each individual 
but little time in which to train and to develop his mind. 
The present lack of all exact knowledge of the future 
suggests that man will never be able to gauge the ulti- 
mate consequences of his conduct. Yet many of those, 
who are thus pessimistic as to any development of 



TENDENCIES OF THE PRESENT DAY 283 

human intellect as a result of normal growth of the 
human mind or as the result of human effort, none the 
less anticipate a change. It will come, it may be indeed 
that it has already come, by the mighty working of the 
hand of God. Throughout the ages there have been 
some men who seem to have been beyond and apart 
from their fellows. Such men have experienced the 
influence of the divine will upon them ; they have been 
chosen out of the world to exemplify in their lives and 
even in their deaths the omnipotence of the Deity. As 
time passes, more and more men will be so influenced; 
mankind wiU be brought into closer and closer com- 
munion with God, until at last that which is divine in 
man triumphs over that which is earthly. 

And if human nature is so changed, then History will 
cease to be a record of conflict. Individuals and nations 
alike will act with reason and with wisdom; attaining 
happiness, they wiU have also the power to hold fast to 
that happiness. But in that case, though the world 
stiU endure, though individuals and nations still exist, 
there will be no History. For History, being a record 
of conflict, is also a record of mingled joy and sorrow, 
mingled success and failure, and a world of perfect joy 
could have no History. 



APPENDIX 

THE CONFLICT IN THE FUTURE: THE WAR OF THE 
TRIPLE ENTENTE 

History is the record of an eternal conflict between the 
desire to rule and the desire to be ruled, and in the 
existence of this conflict its explanatory factor is found. 
Herein lies the ultimate cause of all human action, of 
the conduct of every individual and of every nation. 
Herein, also, is to be found the true explanation of that 
real or apparent alternation of progress and retrogres- 
sion, discoverable in every sphere of man's activity. 
Between the causes of any two events superficial di- 
vergences may be detected, but of all events there is 
only one ultimate cause. Everything that has occurred, 
is occurring and will occur, while the nature of mankind 
preserves unchanged its secular characteristics, is nothing 
more than an expression of the undying strife between 
Universalism and Individualism. 

And in no period, perhaps, has this truth appeared 
more clearly than in the century which has elapsed 
since the fall of Napoleon. The First Empire was the 
expression of the external Individualism of France; it 
was made possible by the prior occurrence of an indi- 
vidualist reaction; it was destroyed by an alliance 
between the exponents of the two contrary desires. 
But of the two elements in the spirit of the Quadruple 
Alliance, one, Universalism, attained an ascendancy, 
with the result that, in the period immediately following 
upon the Congress of Vienna, the desire to be ruled 
appeared to have gained a victory more entire than any 

284 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 285 

which it had gained before. That victory, however, was 
incomplete. The despotism of governments at home, 
and the despotism of the three eastern powers abroad, 
ahke met with opposition; the inevitable individualist 
reaction found its expression in a series of national move- 
ments. Those movements produced violent external 
conflict. Europe was once more plunged into war, from 
which emerged united Italy and united Germany, stand- 
ing witnesses to the impossibility of maintaining perma- 
nently a universalist regime. 

But though men tend to hasten from one extreme to 
the other, they also tend to realise the evils resultant 
from their own violence. A weariness of self-assertion 
was produced by the frequency of armed conflict. A 
reaction towards external Universalism occurred, and 
became vigorous as soon as smaller nationalities at- 
tempted to emulate the achievements of the Italians 
and the Germans. The so-called ** League of the Three 
Emperors " was formed to check any further develop- 
ment of Individualism. The Congress of Berlin was 
summoned and, in obedience to the renewed ascendancy 
of the desire to be ruled, postponed for some forty years 
the satisfaction of the hopes and aspirations of the 
Balkan peoples. And in deference to this same spirit, 
a European concert was gradually evolved. The six 
great powers tacitly agreed that they would console 
themselves for the frustration of many of their own 
designs by coercing the weaker states. From the indi- 
vidualist maelstrom of the period of national wars, 
Europe passed into the universalist doldrums of the 
period of the concert. 

Yet the eternal conflict knew no real cessation. A 
reaction against the prevalent Universalism began almost 
before the concert had come into being. Actual war 
between the great powers was indeed prevented; little 



286 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

more than this was accomplished. The concert sufficed 
neither to solve those problems which undermined its 
own existence nor to maintain uninterrupted peace on 
the continent. In other words, it effected no revolution 
in human nature. The spirit of external Individualism 
endured, and its existence was rendered palpably obvious 
by the persistent dread of war, by the obviously intense 
jealousy with which power regarded power, by the 
elaborate preparations made on all sides for the antici- 
pated struggle. And within the concert itself, more 
intimate leagues were formed. The Triple Alliance was 
answered first by the Dual Alliance and then by the 
Triple Entente. The great powers ranged themselves 
in different camps; their professed unanimity became 
ever more unreal, and though external Universalism still 
preserved its ascendancy, that ascendancy trembled on 
the brink of overthrow. 

A fiction, which has once gained currency, is dispelled 
only with the greatest difficulty, nor is this less true of 
international politics than it is of internal politics or of 
the private life of an individual. In all ages, accepted 
myths have been exploded again and again; yet they 
have still won one credence. Even to-day thousands 
believe that Alfred allowed cakes to burn in the neat- 
herd's cottage, that the guillotine fell upon the neck of 
Louis XVI to the words, " Son of St. Louis, ascend to 
Heaven! " The fiction that the Roman Empire was 
eternal subsisted long after it had been deprived even 
of the merest simulacrum of truth. The fiction that 
an English king rules, as well as reigns, survived the 
Revolution and the Act of Settlement. The legend of 
Russian cunning has hardly yet died; the legend of the 
military virtue of the Ottoman Turks was only destroyed 
at Kirk Kilisse and Lule Burgas. And the pretence 
that the powers were filled with cordiality towards each 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 287 

other possessed surprising vitality. It was not killed 
even when the eirenicon of Nicholas II provoked only 
suspicion and an increase of military precautions. It 
was not until Italy had adopted an independent attitude 
towards the one question upon which concerted action 
was held to be most essential, that men began to ap- 
preciate the existence of an individualist reaction. It 
was not until the Balkan League had defied the powers 
with impunity that it was realised how impossible was 
any really united action by the would-be arbiters of the 
continent. The reaction from external Universalism, 
however, was not the less existent and vigorous because 
it was obscured or denied, because there were some who 
declared that a new and better age had dawned, that 
war between the great civilised states had become an 
impossibility. For human nature had not changed, and 
while it remains constant, reaction must succeed re- 
action, culminating from time to time in an outbreak of 
armed hostility, the supreme expression of the eternal 
struggle. And those who realised that an external 
individualist movement was in progress, were perforce 
driven to realise also that a general war was probable, 
if not inevitable. 

For individualist reactions against the ascendancy of 
external Universalism possess certain normal charac- 
teristics. Though the reaction is common to all states, 
yet it proceeds more rapidly in some than in others, and 
in any congeries of nations there wiU almost inevitably 
be one which is more intensely affected by the prevalent 
tendency than are others. The external Individualism 
of such a state will impel it to aggression ; asserting its 
own complete liberty of action, it will deny that liberty 
to others, for its pursuit of its own interest will cause it 
to discard all sympathy with or consideration for any 
other interest. This is, indeed, an almost invariable 



288 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

concomitant of Individualism. During the period of the 
Reformation, those who most earnestly proclaimed the 
right of private judgment, tended to deny the exercise 
of that right to such as were by it led to accept the 
domination of the Catholic Church. Calvin was every 
whit as intolerant as any papalist ; the narrow dogmatism 
of Geneva was relentlessly enforced, and the world has 
perhaps known no more bitter and cramping persecution 
than that which was conducted bj^ the Protestant ex- 
ponents of Individualism. The same illogical outcome 
of a demand for liberty has marked the development of 
international politics. With the breakdown of mediaeval 
Universahsm, England proceeded to attempt the im- 
position of her will upon France. At a later date, 
Louis XIV, the most extreme of external individualists, 
endeavoured to rivet the yoke of French ascendancy 
upon the states of Europe. His antitype appeared in 
Napoleon. After having passed through a period of 
external Universalism, France reverted to the Indi- 
\adualism of the ancien regime, and had her designs been 
accomplished, the continent would have been reduced 
to political slavery. It may be admitted that the 
appearance of such an aggressive state has not invariably 
characterised individualist reactions; it has, however, 
done so with sufficient frequency to render it not im- 
probable that the revolt against the system of the concert 
would be marked by an attempt on the part of some 
one country to secure for itself the domination of 
Europe. 

It is, however, clear that such gratification of the 
desire to rule partakes of the nature of Universahsm, 
The aggressor denies to others the liberty of action 
which he assumes for himself, and originally inspired to 
pursue a particular line of action by the spirit of Indi- 
vidualism, he meets with opposition from that same 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 289 

spirit. The French, who opposed the English invaders 
during the Hundred Years' War, were not less externally 
individualist than their enemies. Those states, by 
which Louis XIV and Napoleon were defeated, were 
not less individualist than was France. Indeed, in so 
far as they displayed no desire to dominate the continent, 
they were more fully actuated by Individualism. It is 
true that the Grand Alliance, viewed in one aspect, was 
a preliminary expression of that new theory of external 
Universalism which ultimately produced the doctrine of 
compensation and of the balance of power. In another 
aspect, in its original inception, it was the outcome of 
the desire to rule among its members ; they were resolved 
not to part with their freedom as independent and 
sovereign states. The Quadruple Alliance was always 
marked by a measure of universalist sentiment. When 
its triumph had been won, it became obviously the 
exponent of the desire to be ruled, and it is not im- 
probable that it was little more than doubt as to the 
eventual issue of the struggle which gave the indi- 
vidualist element in it a certain temporary weight. Yet 
that individualist element was present, nor can it be 
denied that the original purpose of the league was to 
prevent the extinction of European liberty. And here 
appears a second normal characteristic of external 
reactions in favour of the desire to rule. As one state, 
inspired by that sentiment, has often endeavoured to 
impose its will upon others, so whenever such an attempt 
has been made, it has been resisted by a league of other 
states. Those whom aggression has threatened have 
united in self-defence; being no less inspired by the 
desire to rule, they have refused to forego the gratifica- 
tion of that desire at the bidding of some would-be 
master. 
Any reaction towards external Individualism, then, 

T 



ago THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

will more probably than not find expression in the 
appearance of an aggressive state, in the consequent 
formation of an alliance to resist that state, and ulti- 
mately in armed conflict. And an illustration of this 
fact is supplied by the War of the Triple Entente. That 
struggle is the natural and normal, if not actually the 
inevitable, outcome of revolt against the external 
Universalism which prevailed in the period following 
the cessation of national conflicts. It is, as are all 
other events, an episode in the eternal strife between 
the desire to rule and the desire to be ruled, nor is this 
less true because the protagonists are all inspired by 
the individualist spirit. For when external Indivi- 
dualism has been exaggerated beyond a certain point, 
it partakes of the nature of Universahsm. 

France, under Louis XIV or Napoleon, demanded 
that she should be allowed to ignore the ambitions and 
interests, the rights and very liberty of all other states ; 
she was externally individualist. But if her policy be 
regarded from the standpoint of her opponents, she 
forthwith appears rather as externally universalist. 
The triumph of the desire to be ruled would unite all 
countries into some type of confederation. The trimnph 
of France would have produced the forced union of the 
continent imder her hegemony, and hence, though it 
is true that French policy in these periods was the out- 
come of the spirit of Individualism, it could have won 
acceptance elsewhere only if other countries had been 
inspired by an extreme external Universalism. Louis 
XIV and Napoleon, viewed in one aspect, were apostles 
of the desire to rule; viewed in another aspect, they 
were apostles of the desire to be ruled, and they failed 
because mankind was satiated with gratification of the 
latter desire. In the wars of the later seventeenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, both parties were in a sense 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 291 

externally individualist; in another sense, one party 
bordered at least upon external Universalism. 

And up to a certain point, the conditions of the periods 
of Louis XIV and Napoleon are exactly reproduced 
in the War of the Triple Entente. All the states of 
Europe, to a greater or lesser degree, are inspired by the 
desire to rule ; they are, however, so inspired in var5ang 
measure. Hence, on the one side, there is found a 
state aspiring to the completest liberty and implicitly 
denying liberty to others. On the other side, there is 
found a league of states formed to compel the would-be 
aggressor so to exercise his rights and to enjoy his liberty 
that he does not impede the concurrent exercise of like 
rights and the concurrent enjo3mient of like liberty by 
others. 

Germany, in short, occupies to-day a position analogous 
to that which France occupied in the days of Napoleon. 
Her external Individualism has led her to enter upon the 
path of aggression and to embark upon an attempt to 
subject the world to her will. She has pursued her own 
interest, or imagined interest, without consideration for 
the interests of others; she has displayed a cynical 
indifference towards the most sacred treaties and the 
most sanctioned conventions. Since international law 
was devised to impose some curb upon the free gratifi- 
cations of the desire to rule by any state, Germany 
has naturally disregarded that law, and as in not dis- 
similar circumstances Louis XIV seized Strassburg, so 
WilUam II violated the neutrality of Belgium. 

Nor is the Individualism of German policy really 
impaired by the fact that this policy is being prosecuted 
in harmony with alUed states. It is clear that in any 
alliance there is normally a certain universahst element. 
The very existence of an agreement involves some 
apparent limitation upon complete freedom of action,, 



292 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

some limited acceptance, at least, of the corporate con- 
ception of human society. But this is only true of 
alliances between equals, and the states which are allied 
with Germany are not united with her upon equal terms. 
Rather the relationship which exists may be more 
accurately paralleled in that which existed between 
Louis XIV and Bavaria, or between Napoleon and the 
Confederation of the Rhine. In her struggle against 
the Grand Alliance or the Quadruple Alliance, France 
in reality stood alone ; her friends were her dependants, 
and their support was rather that of subjects than of 
allies. The Bavarian government exercised but little 
influence upon the councils of the Bourbons. The 
princes of Germany were a source of weakness, rather 
than of strength, to Napoleon, since prestige demanded 
their protection and the resultant dissipation of energy 
probably served to hasten the defeat of France. 

In the present war, Germany enjoys a like embar- 
rassing predominance. Austria-Hungary has long been 
the subordinate ally of the court of Bmm. Her policy 
has been largely dictated to her; her independence of 
action has become negligible. The command of her 
armies has been taken out of the hands of her own 
generals; the plan of campaign has been dictated to her. 
The Dual Monarchy, indeed, has almost ceased to have 
a separate existence; it has experienced a foretaste of 
the meaning of German external Individualism. And 
this is stiU more true of the Ottoman Empire. Germany 
has secured both economic and political predominance 
at Constantinople; she has assumed control of the 
Turkish fleet and army, and the Sultan is hardly more 
independent of William II than is the king of Bavaria 
or the ruler of Lippe-Detmold. Indeed, the attitude 
of Austria-Hungary and of Turkey is due to the fact that 
those two states are not really actuated by the spirit of 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 293 

Individualism; it really affords an illustration of the 
truth that the extreme of external Individualism is akin 
to Universahsm. It was the weakness of the desire to 
rule in the peoples of those two countries which induced 
their acceptance of German control, as it was the 
strength of that desire among the Italians which dis- 
rupted the Triple Alliance. Germany is not less an 
exponent of the extreme of external IndividuaUsm 
because she is possessed of subordinate allies, because, 
in effect, she has already established her hegemony over 
Austria and Turkey. 

Nor are the enemies of Germany universalist in their 
spirit, despite the fact that they have made a certain 
concession to the ideal of Universahsm. In their 
original resistance, the powers of the Triple Entente 
were clearly inspired by the desire to rule. Had they 
refrained from opposition to Germany, they would have 
been subjected to the decisive influence of an ahen state. 
They could have refrained from opposition only if their 
peoples had been filled with the desire to be ruled, and 
hence for them so to refrain was impossible unless they 
had been unaffected by the prevalent reaction against 
Universahsm. But between the conception of external 
Individualism, of which Germany is the exponent, and 
that of which the allies are the exponents, there is a 
deep and fundamental difference. Each member of the 
Triple Entente claims liberty for itself ; each recognises 
the right of its allies to a like liberty. No one of the 
three powers aspires to curtail the others' ultimate 
freedom of action, nor can either Great Britain or France 
or Russia be regarded as the predominant partner in 
the league. They have not pressed their external 
Individualism to that extreme at which it partakes of 
the nature of external Universahsm. 

Even that element of Universahsm, which is discover- 



294 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

able in the conduct of the Triple Entente, is little more 
than the outcome of necessity, and is possibly insepar- 
able from any true alliance. The French have sub- 
ordinated their fleets to the English naval command 
both in the Atlantic and in more distant spheres of 
operations. The English have placed their expedi- 
tionary force under the ultimate command-in-chief of 
their allies. Such concessions, however, such seeming 
admissions of a universalist element, are essential to the 
efficient conduct of any joint operations; they evidence 
not the subservience of subordinates but the co-opera- 
tion of equals. Even the common declaration of the 
three powers that no one of them will conclude a separate 
peace is nothing more than the announcement of a 
conviction that the end in view can be attained only by 
the most complete unanimity of action, and since that 
end is externally individualist so the alliance is still an 
expression of the desire to rule. In short, the pro- 
tagonists in the War of the Triple Entente are all alike 
exponents of the reaction against external Universalism. 
But they have placed very different interpretations 
upon that reaction. In the past, when a people has 
destroyed a despotic regime, there has not infrequent^ 
been a certain tendency towards anarchy. There have 
been some who have appeared to confound liberty with 
licence, to have declined acceptance even of the most 
moderate restraint, to have become actual or potential 
criminals. They have been suppressed or held in check 
by their fellow-citizens. Yet those who have employed 
coercion have been individualists no less than tht 
coerced; they have only interpreted the reaction t(j 
mean that liberty must be accorded to all and held that 
this is an impossibility without a certain measure of 
government. And when a reaction towards external 
Individualism has occurred, there have normally been 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 295 

those who have regarded that reaction as complete only 
if it produces the most entire international anarchy; 
there have been others who have held it necessary to 
preserve some restraining influence. Both parties have 
been individualist, but their Individualism has not been 
of an identical type. To the one party, the desire to 
rule has implied a state of anarchy and hence the 
ultimate despotism of the stronger; to the other, it has 
implied a certain limitation of anarchy whereby the 
ultimate equality of all may be secured. 

To this divergence of interpretation the War of the 
Triple Entente must really be attributed, and it may 
be paralleled with apparent exactness from the past. 
The attempt of Germany to establish her hegemony 
over Europe has, at least to a certain extent, produced 
exactly the result which was produced by a similar 
attempt on the part of Louis XIV or of Napoleon. 
Under those rulers, France was actuated by external 
Individualism; the policy which she adopted was the 
illustration of this fact. And she owed her ultimate 
failure to the additional circumstance that the desire 
to rule prevailed also in other lands and hence impelled 
other states to oppose French aggression. Germany 
has provoked an identical opposition, and by that 
opposition she will be overcome. For the maintenance 
of an hegemony over the continent is possible only when 
mankind is actuated by the desire to be ruled. The 
Roman Empire, whether in its original form or as revived 
by Charles the Great, owed its maintenance to the fact 
that the spirit of external Individualism was weak. 
When that spirit had attained development, the union 
of Europe became an impossibility ; Charles V, Philip II, 
Louis XIV, Napoleon and Metternich successively failed 
to preserve harmony on the continent. And, at the 
present time, the desire to be ruled clearly possesses no 



296 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

ascendancy; even the mild authority of the concert 
aroused resistance. That hegemony to which Germany 
aspires would be far more complete than was the 
attempted hegemony of the six powers; it is essentially 
alien in conception from the dominant reaction, and the 
resistance to its establishment must therefore be crowned 
with success. If History teaches anything, it teaches 
that the War of the Triple Entente will end in the 
victory of the Allies. 

That victory will be the victory of states whose policy 
was originally inspired by external Individualism. But 
it does not necessarily follow that the victors will remain 
external individualists. At least at first sight, indeed, 
History would seem to teach that they will not do so. 
There have, in the past, been two cases when a state, 
moved to aggression by its external Individualism, has 
been met and overcome by an alliance, and in both of 
these cases the allies were seemingly converted to 
external UniversaHsm by their very success. When the 
Grand Alliance had defeated Louis XIV its members 
endeavoured to prevent the recurrence of those calamities 
which appeared to have resulted from the breakdown 
of the mediaeval system. They made no attempt, 
indeed, to return to that system; the conception of 
Europe as a federation of Christian states under a human 
vicegerent of the Deity was abandoned. But they did 
attempt to create a new system, externally universalist 
in character; they adopted the conception of a balance 
of power and the doctrine of compensation. 

When the Quadruple Alliance had defeated Napoleon, 
its members in turn attempted to organise Europe upon 
a basis of external UniversaHsm ; the Metternich system 
in effect proposed that the four great powers should 
govern the continent. In each case, experience of the 
possible outcome of gratification of the desire to rule 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 297 

produced a reaction in favour of the contrary desire. 
In each case, also, the reaction towards external Univer- 
salism had hardly culminated when a reaction towards 
external Individualism began. The period after the 
Treaty of Utrecht was marked by frequent wars, all of 
which served to illustrate the permanence of the desire 
to rule; the period after the Congress of Vienna ended 
in a renewal of strife, in national uprisings against the 
attempted domination of the powers. And in each case, 
the impossibility of organising international society 
upon a universalist basis was apparently proved the 
more completely since the very states, which had 
seemed to advocate such organisation, themselves 
contributed' to its overthrow. 

It is, therefore, not unreasonable to anticipate that 
the War of the Triple Entente, after the defeat oi 
Germany has been accomplished, will result in a reaction 
towards /external Universalism. The victorious allies 
may be expected to imitate the members of the Grand 
Alliance or of the Quadruple Alliance, and to attempt the 
evolution of a system under which they will possess the 
real control of the continent. In such circumstances, 
the ^ultimate result may also be anticipated. Sooner 
or later, gratification of the desire to be ruled will 
pi^oduce satiation. The inevitable reaction towards 
external Individualism will occur; the very conditions 
which have led to the War of the Triple Entente, will 
be reproduced, and experiencing the evils of the ascen- 
dancy of the desire to rule, the weary continent will 
once more seek refuge in a reversion to Universalism. 
There will be no cessation of that eternal conflict of which 
all History is the record. 

Such, indeed, is not merely a possible, and even 
protable, outcome of the conditions of the present time. 
It is more. It will indubitably be the future of the race. 



agS THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

if human nature remains unchanged, if its fundamental 
characteristics remain unaltered. From earliest child- 
hood to extreme old age, the mind of each one of us is 
the scene of never-ending strife between the desire to 
rule and the desire to be ruled. Seeking happiness 
always, we fail as perpetually to attain the coveted 
goal. And since our nature is thus imperfect, so is the 
nature of every nation likewise imperfect. The mind of 
each state is the scene of an identical struggle, and 
states tend, as do individuals, to seek deliverance from 
the evil of one extreme by flying to the contrary extreme. 
In their relations with one another, they have oscillated 
since the dawn of History between an excess of Uni- 
versalism and an excess of Individualism, and to all 
seeming the powers of Europe to-day are as little able 
to discover the true path of happiness as were the states 
of the continent in the ages of the past. It would 
appear, in very truth, that a consideration of History 
and of human nature can lead only to the regretful 
conclusion that the emergence of humanity out of 
darkness into light will remain for ever the idle dream 
of those optimists who blind themselves to the clearest 
truths. 

But in all ages there have been those who have held 
a less pessimistic view of the ultimate destiny of man- 
kind. They have declined to believe that man has been 
endowed with reason only that he may be unreasoning; 
they have refused to admit that human nature is not 
susceptible of betterment ; they have denied the asser- 
tion that it has not been bettered. On the contrary, 
they have declared that the race, however slowly, has 
advanced towards a truer appreciation of the ultimate 
source of happiness; they have declared that nations 
have displayed a gradual decrease of unwisdom, and 
that though the world is still far from perfect, its imper- 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 299 

fection has been sensibly lessened. They deny that 
the work of all the prophets and teachers of the past 
has been ultimately vain; they credit mankind with 
the potentiality of appreciating and obeying the dic- 
tates of reason. Those who have held such opinions, 
have in fact believed that the cessation of the secular 
conflict is a constant possibihty, They have looked 
for that cessation and they have expected a revolution 
in human nature as a resist of every great crisis in the 
world's history. To-day, such optimists hold that the 
occasion has at last arrived. They deny that the War 
of the Triple Entente will produce merely a reaction 
towards external Universalism to be followed by a 
further reaction towards external Individualism. They 
suggest an alternative outcome. They profess to foresee 
an enhghtenment of mankind, which will enable it to 
avoid those errors by which in the past its pursuit of 
happiness has been impeded. 

Nor is it enough for an historian to dismiss such 
opinions with the contemptuous remark that similar 
predictions of vast and salutary changes have hitherto 
been invariably falsified. It is not enough for him to 
point out that the end of war, the supreme expression of 
the secular conflict, has been in the past frequently and 
vainly anticipated. To deliver such an answer would 
be to fall into the vulgar error of arguing that whatever 
has been, will be. And that error is, perhaps, the most 
serious of which an historian can be guilty. It is 
necessary, before all things, that an historian, when 
attempting to fulfil the highest of his functions and to 
reveal something of that which the future has in store 
for mankind, should be prepared to consider all possi- 
bilities and to approach with an open mind the book 
of fate. If he permits his judgment to be warped by 
prejudice or by too easy acceptance of apparent cer- 



300 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

tainties, then he is unfit for the task which he has under- 
taken to perform and is unworthy of the name of 
historian. 

Hence, though it is abundantly clear that all History 
has been the record of conflict between Universalism 
and Individualism, though it may appear to be certain 
that the present situation will develop as did the situation 
in the days of Louis XIV and of Napoleon, it is vitally 
important for the historian to remember that this pre- 
supposes the constancy of human nature and for him 
to consider whether or no the study of the past affords 
any ground for doubting that premiss. For if reasons 
can be discovered for suggesting that though the con- 
flict has endured, yet its character has been gradually 
modified, and if moreover that modification were 
seemingly in the direction of a diminution of the inten- 
sity of strife, then the opinion of those who hold that a 
revolution in human nature is imminent or is indeed 
in process of accomplishment would acquire an added 
weight and an increased plausibility. 

And if the history of the past be carefully considered, 
there may appear to be grounds for the opinion that, 
even in its most fundamental characteristics, human 
nature is not entirely constant. It is assuredly true 
that the conflict of desire has persisted from the very 
earliest times; it may also be true that this conflict 
has undergone a certain modification. In the Middle 
Ages, the ascendancy of external Universalism was 
marked by a definite attempt to combine the states of 
the continent into a species of Christian federation under 
some definite head. The attempt ended in failure and 
the lesson of that failure was at least partially learned. 
That new type of external Universalism which appeared 
after the Reformation contained in it a certain indivi- 
dualist element, and that element has gradually increased 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 301 

in strength. Such success, indeed, as has attended 
efforts to discover a modus vivendi would appear to have 
been due to a mingling of the two opposing principles. 
In other words, a certain abandonment of extremes 
may be noted as a characteristic of the secular conflict. 
Thus, when after the Treaty of Utrecht the Triple 
Alliance was formed to prevent a recrudescence of 
anarchy, the members of that aUiance, though externally 
universalist in their ideals, were ready to make some 
concessions to external IndividuaHsm, and to the 
making of such concessions they owed the measure of 
success which attended their efforts. Mankind would 
appear to have grasped the fact that the organisation 
of international society upon a basis of extreme gratifica- 
tion of the desire to be ruled was an impossibility. At 
least, it was upon such assumption that the Triple 
Alliance acted. The projects of Alberoni and Ripperda 
were checked. But that they were checked without 
any serious outbreak of war was due to the fact that 
the wishes of Spain were not whoUy disregarded. If 
the two statesmen fell, their designs were not entirely 
frustrated; concessions in the matter of the ItaHan 
duchies fonned the price paid to Philip V for his 
abandonment of his claim to complete liberty of action. 
And it was the irreconcilable Universalism of the powers 
of Europe when brought into contact with the French 
Revolution that caused the final break-up of that 
system which had been created after the death of Louis 
XIV. As soon as the moderation of the originators 
of that system was abandoned, the human race revolted 
against the too complete ascendancy of the desire to be 
ruled. 

And in that universalist reaction, which followed the 
fall of Napoleon, the great powers, or rather the three 
eastern powers, fell into the error of refusing all considera- 



302 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

tion to the desire to rule. Their violence brought its 
natural retribution; it served to hasten the reaction 
towards external Individualism, and the vigour of that 
reaction was proportionate to the original completeness 
of the contrary reaction. To a certain extent, this fact 
would appear to have been understood. Neither the 
" League of the Three Emperors " nor the later concert 
of Europe attempted to exercise that degree of control 
over the continent which the Quadruple Alliance had 
demanded. Allowance was made for the existence of 
external Individualism and the success of the concert, 
like that of the Triple Alliance after Utrecht, was due 
to this readiness to regard the aspirations of all states. 
At the Congress of Berlin, though Russia was compelled 
to forego the realisation of her historical designs, and 
though the peoples of the Balkan peninsula were pre- 
vented from attaining independence, yet no attempt 
was made to preserve the status quo. In the case of 
Eastern Rumelia and again in the case of the rejection 
of Ottoman suzerainty by Bulgaria, the concert grace- 
fully accepted the fait accompli. When Crete revolted 
and the Hellenic government intervened on behalf of 
the rebels, the powers displayed at least a certain 
willingness to consider the national ambitions of the 
Greeks. And whenever the concert attempted to 
pursue a more purely universalist course, its efforts 
ended in failure. The powers proved to be unable to 
modify at all seriously either the policy of Great Britain 
in Egypt or of France in Tunis. Attempts to regulate 
affairs by means of international commissions have been 
almost notoriously unsuccessful. Nor has this truth 
been ignored. The nations of Europe have apparently 
realised with ever-increasing clarity that a universalist 
regime can be maintained only by a certain admixture 
of Individualism. 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 303 

But not only is it true that the necessity for a certain 
measure of compromise has thus been appreciated, it 
is also true that the significance of extremes has tended 
to be more clearly understood. When France under 
Louis XIV entered upon a policy of aggressive external 
Individualism, the other states of the continent were 
slow to realise the meaning of that policy. Though 
leagues were formed against her, they were both weak 
and transitory. The Triple Alliance accompUshed 
little, and its members, if roused for a moment to a 
sense of their danger, were easily lulled into a renewed 
feeling of security. The League of Augsburg was 
dissolved before its work was really accomplished. 
Even William III, keen as was his appreciation of the 
European situation, hardly understood at first the true 
meaning of French policy. If the Partition Treaties 
indicate his grasp of the fact that the peace of the con- 
tinent could be preserved only by making some con- 
cession to the external Individualism of France, they 
indicate also that he failed to understand that a state, 
resolved to gratify its desire to rule, cannot be held in 
check by any treaty, unless it is clear that to break that 
treaty is to court certain disaster. 

And in their attitude towards the French Revolution, 
the allies displayed an equal inability to understand the 
situation with which they had to deal. They showed 
themselves to be incapable of realising the supreme 
necessity of sincere co-operation, if they were effectively 
to resist the aggression of Napoleon, and successive 
coalitions were wrecked upon the rock of mutual dis- 
trust, itself the outcome of a mal-appreciation of the 
character of the struggle. It needed Jena and Wagram 
and Moscow to bring Europe to a realisation of the ex- 
tremity of its danger. Indeed, paradoxical as it may 
seem, it is almost true to say that of the causes of 



304 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

Napoleon's failure, his success was not the least 
potent. 

On the other hand, to-day the meaning of German ex- 
ternal Individualism has been far more readily grasped. 
Even before that Individualism had actually developed 
into positive aggression, the necessity of resistance to it 
was realised, and appreciation of its inevitable outcome 
appeared. The raison d'etre of the Triple Entente is 
to be found only in an understanding that the prevalence 
of the desire to rule in Germany constituted a menace 
to the remainder of the continent. And when war at 
last began, not only was the Entente speedily converted 
into an alliance, but its members marked their sense 
of the realities of the case by announcing their joint 
determination to prosecute the struggle in common 
until victory had been secured. It needed long experi- 
ence of the insatiable ambition of Napoleon to lead the 
powers to frame a similar declaration at Chaumont; 
at the present time, it needed no more than the mere 
revelation of Germany's resolve to wage an aggressive 
war. Nor has this accurate appreciation of the situation 
been confined to the Allies. Louis XIV and Napoleon 
never attained to understanding of the forces against 
which they had to contend. Germany fully attained 
such understanding. She realised even before the 
struggle had begun the certainty of the formation of a 
coalition to resist her, and all the efforts of her diplomacy 
and the whole conception of her strategy were directed 
to counteract this particular danger. 

It is, perhaps, possible to account to some extent 
for this feature of the present situation by the fact that 
to-day news is far more rapidly disseminated. In the 
past, communications between state and state were 
difficult and often defective. The action of a govern- 
ment was often rendered cautious by uncertainty as to 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 305 

the policy of potential friends and enemies. Negotia- 
tions proceeded slowly; a war developed gradually as 
its circumstances and character became gradually defined. 
At the present day, all this has been changed. News 
may be received from the most distant lands in the 
space of a few hours. Views can be rapidly exchanged. 
Hesitancy in a government is now rarely the result of 
inadequate information as to the facts of a situation. 
And there can be no reasonable doubt that improvement 
in means of communication has greatly expedited the 
progress of all international negotiations. 

Nevertheless it may well be argued that the increased 
rapidity with which decisions of pohcy tend to be 
reached is not the result only of greater facilities for 
the acquisition of information. The conduct both of 
individuals and of states is frequently irrational, but 
there is at least some colour for the suggestion that to- 
day it is on the whole less irrational than it was in the 
past. The dominion of unreason over the mind of the 
individual finds its most obvious expression in violence 
of all kinds, in the adoption of extreme opinions and in 
the performance of extreme actions. There is every 
ground for believing that at the present day there is 
a diminution of violence. The coarse language and the 
brutal conduct of an eighteenth-century squire would 
be almost impossible in the modern country gentleman. 
Though crimes of violence still occur, they are less 
common than they were a century ago, and this cannot 
be attributed solely to the efficiency of the police. It 
must be due in a measure to a greater exercise of reason, 
since even if a man refrains from crime merely from 
fear of punishment, the fact that he considered the 
probability of retribution argues that he was not the 
blind victim of his natural passions, that he has dis- 
played some self-restraint. Indeed, every decrease of 

u 



3o6 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

violence implies a decrease of irrationality; it indicates 
that the individual man is a more rational being to-day 
than were his ancestors a century ago. 

But nations are aggregations of individuals. If, there- 
fore, there is an increase of rationality in each individual, 
there will tend to be a similar increase of rationality in 
the whole nation, and hence there arises a probability 
that there will be a certain tendency towards the avoid- 
ance of extreme courses, both in internal and in external 
politics. This tendency to moderation seems actually 
to be present in modern times. Though reactions 
and counter-reactions still occur, though the race still 
oscillates between the gratification of Universalism and 
that of Individualism, yet there does appear to be a 
diminution of intensity in the conflict. It may be 
admitted that violence is still a characteristic of internal 
politics, and that violence of language has indeed 
increased. But the most violent language is rarely 
translated into action; revolutions and civil wars have 
become less frequent; partisans, however embittered, 
are content with the use of merely verbal weapons. 

And if the external aspect of the conflict be considered, 
a similar tendency towards greater moderation would 
seem to be discoverable. Extreme Individualism has, 
perhaps, always been regarded as impracticable; that 
extreme Universalism which produced the conception 
of an eternal and all-embracing empire has long been 
abandoned. Even when the desire to be ruled has 
achieved a temporary ascendancy, that ascendancy 
has been constantly more limited. If in the opinion 
of its most convinced supporters the function of the 
Quadruple Alliance after the Congress of Vienna was to 
dominate the continent, in actual fact its authority 
was from the very first greatly impaired by the " insu- 
larity " of England and the crypto-liberalism of Russia. 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 307 

The aspirations of the recent concert were far more 
modest; it secured httle more than the exercise of a 
discreet and moderating influence over the lesser states, 
since with the will to coerce it so clearly lacked the 
power. And the champions of external Individualism 
have been at pains to convince mankind of their detesta- 
tion of international anarchy, the logical outcome of 
their own creed. They have denied or have excused 
their disregard for the law of nations; they have 
felt or pretended a certain willingness to defer to the 
opinions of others. If the series of reactions has not 
been interrupted, yet the devotees of the desire to be 
ruled and the devotees of the desire to rule have alike 
indicated their readiness to conciliate their opponents. 

Nor are there lacking other arguments in favour of 
the view that the eternal conflict is losing, and has 
indeed already lost, something of its pristine intensity. 
Of that conflict, war is the supreme expression. Almost 
before one desire has attained supremacy, a reaction 
towards the contrary desire begins. The violence of 
that reaction is directly proportionate to the complete- 
ness of the ascendancy against which it is directed, and 
when that ascendancy is as nearly as possible entire, 
there is a probability, if not a certainty, that the attack 
upon it will be so vigorous as to produce armed con- 
flict. Accordingly, from the frequency or inf requeue}^ 
of war, the strength of the reaction and the degree to 
which nations have proceeded to logical conclusions, 
to extremes, may be gauged with comparative accuracy. 
In the last three centuries wars have become less frequent ; 
the percentage of years of peace has increased. More 
than half the years of the seventeenth century were 
years of war; in the eighteenth century more than half 
the years were years of peace. In the nineteenth century 
the general peace of the continent was only disturbed 



3o8 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

for the space of some twenty years. Between the death 
of Louis XIV and the final overthrow of Napoleon, 
there were more than thirty years of war; between the 
final overthrow of Napoleon and the outbreak of the 
War of the Triple Entente, only some ten. And if the 
conflicts which have occurred in Europe during the last 
hundred years be considered, it will be observed that 
no one of them has assumed the character and dimensions 
of a general war. It would obviously be unreasonable 
to insist too much upon these facts. The violence of 
conflict cannot be estimated solely from the space of 
time for which it endures. It may very often be that a 
brief war entails far more destruction and suffering, 
and is marked by far greater bitterness, than one which 
drags its weary course over a much longer period. But 
in the absence of any conclusive evidence to the contrary, 
the fact that the intervals of peace have increased in 
duration creates at least a certain presumption in 
favour of the view that the violence of the eternal 
conflict has been diminished, that in the nature of man- 
kind a sensible modification has occurred. 

And this presumption is perhaps supported by a 
consideration of the present economic organisation of 
the world and of the extent and character of modern 
civilisation. In the Middle Ages, as soon as a reaction 
against the original cosmopolitanism of that period had 
begun, the generality of mankind held it to be axiomatic 
that trade between lands owing a different political 
allegiance was a practical impossibility. John, after 
the French conquest of Normandy, permitted the almost 
unrestrained continuance of commerce between England 
and the lost province, and a clause in Magna Charta 
provides for the reasonable treatment of merchants 
even if subjects of an enemy country. Such conduct, 
however, was exceptional. The normal spirit of the 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 309 

age is more accurately illustrated by the case of Edward 
III, whose motive in embarking upon the Hundred 
Years' War was largely due to his concern for the trade 
with Aquitaine and Flanders. And at a later date 
the conviction that all foreign states were economic 
enemies was crystallised into a theory. It was the 
assumption that the profit of one state could only be 
the loss of another that formed the true basis of the 
mercantile system. 

At the present day, though there are some who incUne 
to beUeve that this assmnption possesses at least a 
substratum of truth, there are also many who hold it 
to be entirely false. They assert that international 
division of labour is as beneficial as internal division 
of labour and condemn as pernicious all barriers against 
the free exchange of the product of industry. Even 
those who regard some restraint upon the economic 
intercourse of nations as necessary, hardly go so far as 
to declare that identity of poHtical allegiance is a pre- 
requisite for such intercourse. Indeed, though the 
sentiment of nationaUty is assuredly no weaker to-day 
than it was in the past, though states are perhaps even 
more jealous of their sovereign rights, it has been very 
generally recognised that intimate economic relations 
do not necessarily impair poHtical independence, that 
the prosperity of one country does not necessarily imply 
the adversity even of its actual or potential enemies. 
Nor is this increase of economic toleration seriously dis- 
counted by the fact that most states have adopted a 
protective system. The intention of modern tariffs is 
not to prevent, but merely to regulate, external trade; 
their very existence may be regarded as indicative of the 
increased volume of commerce and of clearer recognition 
of the fact that no country can be wholly independent 
of the products of other countries. 



310 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

But inasmuch as the ultimate spring of all human 
activity, whether mental or physical, is to be found in 
the conflict between the desire to be ruled and the desire 
to rule, this modification of economic opinion argues a 
certain modification in human nature. The extreme of 
external Universalism would tend to produce complete 
free trade ; the extreme of external Individualism would 
tend to produce the cessation of all international trade. 
To-day the world attempts rather to preserve the mean 
between the two extremes, and thus into the eternal 
conflict there has entered a measure of moderation. 
Mankind appears to appreciate more accurately the evil 
of excessive gratification of either of its two prevailing 
desires, Universalism tends to be coloured by an admix- 
ture of Individualism; Individualism by an admixture 
of Universalism. 

A similar conclusion is suggested by a consideration of 
the extent and character of modern civilisation. In the 
last hundred years, in that period which has elapsed since 
the end of the last general war, the area of the civilised 
world has been vastly increased. Japan has entered the 
comity of nations; North America and Australia have 
been extensively colonised; Africa has been permeated 
by the influence of the white races. Regions, then unex- 
plored, are now pierced by railways; once trackless 
oceans are readily traversed; the whole surface of the 
habitable globe has been mapped with approximate 
accuracy. In the mid- Victorian era, the journey from 
London to Cornwall was regarded as something of an 
adventure; to-day the journey across the Atlantic is a 
mere incident. San Francisco is now nearer England 
than was the Riviera in the days of George III. All 
nations have been brought into closer contact with one 
another, and with the resultant increase of mutual 
knowledge, a better mutual understanding has arisen. 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 311 

The mere fact that civiUsation is more widely diffused 
suggests a probabiUty that the bitterness of the secular 
conflict will be diminished, since civiUsation in its very 
essence implies some restraint of passion and hence an 
increased reluctance to proceed to the extreme gratifica- 
tion of desire. 

Nor are grounds wanting for the behef that this 
probable result has actually been produced. Of all the 
activities of the mind, love and religion are those by 
which man is most profoundly influenced. If, therefore, 
he displays moderation in these two regards, it is hardly 
disputable that he will probably display a similar or even 
a greater moderation in all other regards. And there are 
noteworthy indications that in love and in reUgion man- 
kind is more prone to avoid extremes. The days when 
marriage was effected by rape or purchase have long 
since passed away. The days of excessive parental 
authority have also passed; the control of husband over 
wife has been limited by sentiment, and that sentiment 
has secured expression in legislation. The tendency of 
the age is in the direction of regarding marriage as a 
contract between equals ; it is far less commonly held to 
constitute any indissoluble bond. The efforts of man- 
kind have been directed to the discovery of a mean 
between the rigidity of the canon law and that licence 
which was advocated by the Hebertists or by the earlier 
Anabaptists. 

In the case of religion, the growth of moderation is 
still more apparent. Men no longer beUeve that those 
who differ from them in theological opinion should be 
persecuted to the death; they hardly condemn them 
even to social ostracism. It is no longer a recognised 
maxim of statecraft that identity of allegiance should 
necessarily involve identity of religious belief, or even 
of pubUcly professed belief. There is a certain inchna- 



312 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

tion to recognise the possible existence of a mean between 
the absolute negation of God and the unquestioning 
acceptance of dogmatic rehgion. Even the Roman 
Church, the most conservative and unchanging of all 
himian institutions, has modified in practice, if not by 
explicit admissions, her attitude towards various ques- 
tions. If the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals have not been 
actually repudiated, they are no longer paraded. The 
Papacy has silently allowed to fall into desuetude its 
mediaeval claim to the lordship of the western world. 
The famous Bull of Alexander VI would be impossible 
of issue at the present day; not merely is it certain that 
no sovereign state would recognise the validity of such 
an edict, but it is equally certain that no modem pope 
would advance claims so extensive. Formerly, a rigid 
insistence upon orthodoxy compelled the excommunica- 
tion of all heretic princes and the issue of commands for 
their immediate deposition. To-day the Papacy pursues 
a policy more akin to that of Innocent XI who assisted 
to finance the expedition of WilUam III. Benedict XVI 
is in nowise reluctant to enter upon friendly diplomatic 
intercourse with the Defender of the Faith, though that 
ruler owes his position to the Act of Settlement and to 
the explicit repudiation of the legitimate and Catholic 
heir. 

It is a curious and not entirely unimportant fact that 
in the present crisis the Bavarian claim to the English 
crown has not been raised. Germany has used every 
effort to enlist the sympathy of any disaffected or 
potentially disaffected elements in the British Empire. 
Her agents have been active in Egypt and in India; 
they have appealed to the extremists in Ireland and in 
South Africa. They have not attempted to win over the 
Cathohcs by urging them to support their co-religionist, 
the legitimist claimant. In the past such an appeal 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 313 

would in all probability have been an effective weapon ; 
it would at least have caused some heartburning among 
the loyal children of the Roman Church. That the 
appeal was not made therefore suggests an increase of 
moderation in Catholicism, and it suggests this the more 
strongly since the failure to advance it cannot be reason- 
ably attributed to any pecuHar insight into the minds of 
English Catholics. German statesmen and diplomatists 
have displayed an extraordinary incapacity for appre- 
ciating even the broadest characteristics of national 
temperament in other lands; they confidently antici- 
pated an Indian mutiny, an Irish civil war and a Russian 
revolution. The futility of urging the Bavarian claim 
must have been indeed obvious for it to have been 
realised at Berlin, and hence the increased political 
moderation of the Roman Church must also be con- 
siderable. 

And it is impossible to account for this indubitable 
growth of moderation in the attitude of mankind towards 
religion on the ground that the race has become coldly 
indifferent. Nothing could be more untrue than the 
assertion that the present age is more irreligious than 
the last. It has been marked by exceptional eccle- 
siastical activity. Renewed vigour has been shown by 
the older Churches. Missionary enterprise is general. 
The Anglicans assert that the number of their com- 
municants has increased; the nonconformist bodies do 
not deplore any decHne in their strength. It is the 
opinion of the most unprejudiced observers that in 
France the anti-clerical movement which produced the 
Separation Law has spent its force and that the Catholic 
Church to-day is there more popular and more powerful 
than it has been for many years. The frequent appear- 
ance of new sects indicates the continued interest of 
mankind in the problems and perplexities of theology. 



314 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

If the number of professed agnostics has increased, this 
is no proof of indifference. A man inclines naturally 
to adhere to that creed in which he has been born and 
bred; if he is indifferent, he is unlikely to discard ex- 
plicitly the faith of his childhood. Deliberate profession 
of agnosticism argues at least some thought upon the 
principles and implications of revealed religion; in a 
large number of cases, it is not improbably the result of 
prolonged and even of painful debate. 

There would, then, appear to be little ground for the 
suggestion that the existent increase of religious modera- 
tion is the mere expression of religious indifference. It 
is far more probably resultant from a growing distrust of 
extremes. But it cannot be denied that in the past men 
tended to gratify immoderately one or other of their two 
dominant desires; it is really indisputable that such 
tendency to excess has been most apparent in the 
attitude of mankind towards religion. Of all types of 
controversy, theological controversy has been the most 
embittered and the most violent. Of all forms of 
toleration, religious toleration has been most hardly 
attained. Persecution for conscience' sake was almost 
introduced into the world by the Christian hierarchy; 
it has never assumed a more thorough and vindictive 
character than when devised and carried out by saintly 
ecclesiastics. If the race displays greater moderation 
in its attitude towards religion, if in this particular aspect 
the conflict has become less intense, then there is at least 
considerable justification for the belief that human 
nature has experienced a sensible and an important 
modification. 

It is, in short, permissible to suggest that in those 
mental activities by which he is most profoundly moved, 
man is displaying a greater conviction of the merit of 
some intermingling of Universalism and Individualism. 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 315 

There is a tendency to seek for some mean between that 
view of marriage which was held by the mediaeval 
canonists and that which was preached by the Ana- 
baptists of Miinster. There is a tendency to seek for 
some mean between Catholicism and atheism. The 
generality of mankind believes more impUcitly that in the 
middle path true happiness must be sought ; it displays 
less incapacity for seizing and holding fast to the golden 
mean. But if in its fundamental characteristics human 
nature is not whoUy immutable, if it is susceptible even 
of the slightest modification, there is at once a presump- 
tion in favour of the opinion that to such modification 
there is no assignable limit. A possibility arises that in 
the life of each individual the conflict may become less 
intense ; there is even a possibility that the conflict may 
entirely cease. Nations, however, are aggregations of 
individuals ; their conduct ultimately corresponds to the 
conduct of every individual. It therefore follows that 
there is also a possibility that the conflict in the life of 
nations will cease; it is by no means certain that the 
world will for all time continue to experience that series 
of reactions and counter-reactions which have filled the 
record of the past. 

At first sight, indeed, the study of History clearly 
suggests that the eternal conflict will continue in all its 
intensity. It would appear to be certain that in the 
future, as in the past, mankind will tend to hasten 
from one extreme to another, that the world will ever 
waver between the exaggeration of Universalism and 
the exaggeration of Individualism. The unwisdom of 
humanity has hitherto been far more patent than its 
wisdom; man's capacity for error is far more clearly 
proven than is his capacity for right judgment. There 
are innumerable instances of foUy both in nations and 
in individuals. The most earnest strivings of the race 



3i6 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

have been constantly misdirected; they have been pro- 
ductive of no apparent results commensurate with the 
energy expended, and the results produced have been as 
often evil as good. A philosopher, contemplating the 
long vista of past centuries, may well be impressed 
rather by the essential littleness, than by the achieve- 
ments, of his fellow men. He may well permit himself 
to smile at the futility of human endeavour or to mourn 
over the calamitous results of human unreason. Since 
the dawn of History, ability has been constantly misused. 
Elaborate schemes have been formed and carried out, 
only to reach the fruition of a foredoomed failure. Those 
very institutions, upon the perfection of which most 
effort has been exerted and in which men have taken 
most pride, have not infrequently proved to be pernicious, 
detrimental to the ultimate well-being of the race. The 
wisdom of one age has only too often proved to be the 
folly of the next. 

It is little wonder that some are tempted to cry with 
the prophet of old that they are no better than their 
fathers. It is little wonder that some theologians have 
pointed an apparently obvious moral, declaring that the 
whole past history of the world conspires to justify those 
who have asserted that the betterment of mankind can 
occur only through the personal intervention of an 
almighty God. It is still less surprising that maiiy 
should declare that out of the present evil times no 
permanent good can come. Even those who admit that 
the War of the Triple Entente must affect profoundly 
the future of the world can see Httle hope of any sub- 
stantial advance towards better things. They may 
anticipate some transitory respite from armed conflict, 
some local advantages for themselves or for others. 
They anticipate far more confidently a repetition of the 
errors of the past. They are assured that a brief inter 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 317 

lude of comparative happiness and calm will culminate 
only in a renewal of turmoil and misery. For whether 
the teaching of History as to the character of nations, 
or its teaching as to the character of individuals, be re- 
garded, there seems to be abundant reason for the beUei 
that it is probable, that it is indeed certain, that the 
eternal conflict will endure, its intensity undiminished. 
And in this event men and nations aUke will continue to 
prosecute vainly the search for happiness, will continue 
to gratify unwisely their desire to rule and their desire 
to be ruled. 

But it would be a fatal error for an historian to accept 
without the closest investigation an apparent truth. It 
is his primary duty to test all things, to bow to no 
authority save that of his own intimate conviction. And 
the record of the past affords abundant proof that the 
superficially probable has constantly not occurred. 
Nothing appeared to be more unhkely than that the 
Swiss could resist successfully the power of the Habs- 
burgs,or that the Dutch could carry their cause to victory 
despite the strength of Spain. While the world yet 
accepted the dogmatism of the Middle Ages, it seemed 
improbable that the human intellect could be deUvered 
from thraldom, that there could ever be such intel- 
lectual activity as characterised the epoch of the 
Renaissance and the Reformation. It was improbable 
that the preaching of an obscure Augustinian could avail 
to shake the mighty fabric of the Papacy and to imperil 
the very existence of an ecclesiastical system, sanctioned 
by centuries of acceptance, supported by the most 
powerful interests, and but recently triumphant over a 
movement which had commanded the assent of many 
of the princes of the Church. It was improbable that the 
rancour and bitterness of the so-called Wars of ReUgion 
could culminate in the dawn of an era of even comparative 



3i8 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

toleration. While France was yet ruled by Louis XV, 
while her very sages and prophets were tainted by the 
corrupting influence of the court and were ready to 
prostitute their talents to the adulation of a worthless 
king and of his effete associates, it might well have 
seemed to be impossible that her sons should presently 
arise and preach to the world a new gospel of political 
liberty. In the face of these and of many other examples 
of the frequency with which the improbable has occurred, 
it would be unwise for an historian to assert that an 
event will not have a particular outcome because that 
outcome appears to be unhkely. For him to make any 
such assertion would, indeed, be for him to display the 
most crass ignorance of the very elements of his subject. 
And thus an historian cannot with justice declare it to 
be certain that the War of the Triple Entente will be 
followed by results identical with, or even by results 
similar to, those which have followed the general wars 
of the past. 

And if the history of mankind be more closely con- 
sidered, reason appears for the belief that any such 
declaration would be indicative of ignorance of human 
nature. Man is to-day, as man has always been, the 
plaything of two dominant passions; he submits 
alternately to the dominion of one or of the other. 
Seeking for happiness and content, he tends to gratify 
to excess either his desire to rule or his desire to be ruled. 
His mind is the scene of a perpetual conflict, not the less 
real because often unconscious. But while it is true 
that this conflict has endured through all the ages, since 
man first became man, there are not wanting indications 
that its character has not remained as constant as might 
be supposed. There are grounds for the belief that 
human nature has been modified, and hence is susceptible 
of further modification. If a greater appreciation of the 



WAR OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 319 

evil of extremes, and a consequent increased readiness to 
consider different points of view, be a good, then there 
is ground for beUeving that the modification has been 
for the better. History has always been a record of 
ceaseless oscillation, but it would seem that this oscilla- 
tion has grown less violent. There has been an increas- 
ing tendency for the pendulum of human thought to 
come to rest at some point midway between the extremes 
of Universalism and IndividuaUsm. 

In the past the appearance of such a tendency has 
proved to be merely the prelude to more violent oscilla- 
tion. It may be that herein lies the true explanation of 
this apparent tendency to-day. But it may be that the 
pendulum is indeed coming at last to rest. It may be 
that the long conflict is at last drawing to its close. It 
may be that we who now Uve are destined to witness 
the final cessation of that weary quest which has occupied 
the race since the dawn of History, a cessation due, not 
to the abandonment of hope, but to the glad attainment 
of the long-sought goal. 

The value of History lies most truly in the fact that 
through its medium alone can man lift even the veriest 
corner of that dark veil which hides the future from our 
eyes. Theologians, astrologers, all who in sincerity or 
fraud profess to be able to reveal the destiny of mankind, 
are but idle speculators. Men may prophesy, but their 
words are vain and idle, unless they are inspired by the 
light which comes from true understanding of the past. 
All men may guess ; the historian alone can know. His 
mission, therefore, is lofty ; it is sacred, not lightly to be 
undertaken. For its due fulfilment, care and patience, 
sincerity and zeal, are needed, freedom from prejudice 
and from the tyranny of preconceptions. And at no 
time were these qualities more needed than they are 
to-day. The world is in travail; the pangs of birth 



330 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 

affiict humanity, and the desire of nations is to know 
what shall be brought forth, 'the historian alone can 
approach to an answer of this question; to answer it is 
his highest privilege, his noblest function. If he answers 
carelessly, if he permits his judgment to be clouded by 
his private longings, by pessimism or by optimism, he 
commits a crime against his kind, he sins against the 
light of reason. He must beware of dogmatism; he 
must hesitate lest by haste he plunges some into despair 
or buoys up any with vain hopes. And hence, if he 
deals faithfully and truthfully with his present task, he 
must declare this message to the world; that though 
History seems to teach that the War of the Triple 
Entente will end in the mere repetition of those errors 
by which man has been distressed and perplexed in the 
past, yet it does not teach this so clearly as to preclude 
the possibility that the War will end in the dawn of a new 
era, in which the race will be delivered from the dominion 
of unreason and, triumphing at last in its search for 
happiness, enter upon a bright age of peace and goodwill. 



INDEX 



Aachen, coronations at, 79 
Abdul Hamid II, sultan of Turkey, 

43 
Abraham Lincoln, quoted, 10, 210 
Achaean League, the, individualist 

resistance to, 63 
Acte Additionel, the, individualist 

character of, 240 
Adriatic Sea, the, 215, 265, 275 
iEgean Isles, question of the, 265, 

275 

Africa, 310; Roman province of, 68 

Agilulf, king of the Lombards, 70 

Agnosticism, an expression of Indi- 
vidualism, 20-21, 30; per- 
manence of, 196; no proof of 
irreligion, 313, 314 

Aistulf, king of the Lombards, 71 

Aix-la-Chapelle, conference and 
treaty of (1748), i77, 178, i79 

Albania, kingdom of, 265, 275 

Alberoni, Cardinal, Spanish states- 
man, 176, 301 

Albigenses, the, individualist 
character of, 93, 105, 120 

Alexander the Great, 60, 63; 
successors of, 7 

Alexander VI, pope, in, 124; 
Bull of, 312 

Alexander I, Tsar, 44, 238, 245 

Alfred the Great, 286 

Algiers, expedition of Charles V 
against, 133 

America, North, 179, 311 

American Independence, War of, 
1^2, 206 

Amphictyonic Council, the, an 
expression of Universalism, 60 

Anabaptists, the. Individualism of, 
128, 129, 311, 315 

Anarchy, the extreme of Indivi- 
dualism, 37, 276, 277 

Anastasius I, Byzantine emperor, 
67. 68 

Ancona, Pius II at, 114, 130 

Angevins, the, 269, 277 

Anglicanism, illogical character of, 



21 ; independence of, 268, 269 ; 

continued success of, 21, 313. 

[Cp. ReUgion, etc.) 
Anglo-Japanese AlUance, the, 278 
Anglo-Saxons, the. Individualism 

of, 267-269 
Antalcidas, Peace of, 41, 
Anthemius, Roman emperor, 68 
Antonines, age of the, 7, 61 
Apprentices, Act of, 40 
Aquitaine, 67, 73, 74, 309 
Aragon, 117. {Cp. Spain) 
Arbitration, idea of international, 

tmiversalist, 36, 37 
Argos, Individualism of, 63 
Arianism, 65, 71 
Aristides, 2 
Aristotle, internal Universalism of, 

59, 64, 125 
Armada, the Spanish, 2 
Armagnacs, the, 117 
" Armorican " Republic, the, 69 
Arnold of Brescia, Individualism 

of, 92, 93 
Amulf, king of Germany, yy 
Article XIII of the constitution of 

the Germanic Confederation, 

240 
Asceticism, importance of, in early 

Middle Ages, 65, 66 
Asia Minor, 59 ; pillar saints of, 66 
Athanasius, persecution of, 65 
Athaulf, king of the Visigoths, 67 
Athens, individualist resistance to, 

63 

Augsburg Confession, the, 151 

Augustus, Roman emperor, 73 

Austerlitz, battle of, 230 

Australia, 310 

Austria, Universalism and Indi- 
vidualism in, 170, 171, 177- 
181, 188, 189, 200, 207, 212, 
227, 230-239, 244, 246, 251- 
261, 292, 293 

Austrian Succession, War of, 176- 
178 

Auvergne, autonomous state in, 69 



321 



322 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



Avignon, residence of the popes at, 
44, 103, 104, 109 

" Babylonish Captivity " of the 
popes, 103-105, III, 114 

Balance of Power, theory of, basis 
of a theory of external Uni- 
versalism, 160, 161, 289; in 
the Grand Alliance, 170-172; 
in Treaty of Utrecht, 173, 174 ; 
difficulty of maintaining, 179- 
182, 206-208; relation of the 
coalitions to, 228; 230, 232, 
236 

Balkans, the, 44,276, 302; Balkan 
League, 264, 265, 275 

Balkan Wars, the, 264, 265, 275, 
287 

Baltic Fleet, the Russian, case of, 

275 
Baltic Provinces, the, 147 
Basle, Council of, iii, 112 
Basle, Treaty of, 228, 230 
Basques, the, Universalism and 

Individualism of, 184, 188, 252 
Bavaria, 73, 74, 292; electoral 

prince of, 171; claim of, to 

England, 312, 313 
Becket, Thomas, 40 
Belgium, revolution in, 208, 233, 

240; independence of, 247, 

248, 252; violation of, 291. 

{Cp. Netherlands) 
Belisarius, Byzantine general, 68 
Benedict XVI, pope, 312 
Beneventum, duchy of, indivi- 
dualist character of, 73 
Benevolent Despotism, theory of, 

relation to Universalism, 191- 

195, 265 
Berlin, Congress of, 263, 276, 285, 

302 
Bertha, wife of Ethelbert of Kent, 

269 
Bertrand de Born, the younger, 105 
Black Sea, the, 257 
Bohemia, Individualism in, 106, 

113, 115, 146. {Cp. Hussites) 
Bonapartism, creed of, universalist, 

226 
Boniface VIII, pope, 103, 109, no, 

112, 115, 148, 155, 158 
Boso, king of Provence, Individual- 
ism of, 116 
Bourbons, the, individualist prior 



to their accession, 142 ; gener- 
ally internally universalist 
and externally individualist, 
41-43,179,187,225,292; not 
benevolent despots, 193, 213, 
246, 248, 252; of Spain, 215 

Brabant, county of, 165 

Brandenburg, externally indivi- 
dualist and internally uni- 
versalist, 117, 153, 259. {Cp. 
Prussia) 

Brienne, Cardinal Lomenie de, 
French financier, 209 

Britain, conversion of, aided exter- 
nal Universalism, 75 

Bukarest, Treaty of (19 14), 265 

Bulgaria, Individuahsm of, 302 

Burgundy, county and duchy of, 
evidence of Universalism, 115- 
117 

Cabochins, the. Individualism of, 
118 

Calvin, John, reformer; Univer- 
salism of, 18; less consistent 
than Luther, 124, 125; more 
universalist than Luther, 124, 
125; gave the Reformation 
its more positive form, 132- 
133; intolerance of, 288 

Calvinism, as dogmatic as Catho- 
licism, 18, 20, 288; the posi- 
tive form of Protestantism, 
132, 133; political theory of, 
127-129, 140; favoured in- 
ternal Individualism in Ger- 
many, 146 ; permanence of , in 
Germany, 150; existence of, 
not essential to Protestantism, 
151; 138. {Cp. Huguenots, 
Protestantism, Reformation) 

Cambrai, League of, 168 

Campagna, the, 80 

Capetians, the, 83, 85, 100, 101 

Caracalla, Roman emperor, edict 
of, 60, 64 

Carbonari, the. Individualism of, 

251 

Carlsbad Decrees, the, a univer- 
salist triumph, 243 

Carolingians,the,72,75; empireof, 
100. {Cp. Charles the Great) 

Casimir-Perier, Jean Paul, French 
statesman, moderate Indi- 
vidualism of, 246, 247 



INDEX 



323 



Castile, 117. {Cp. Spain) 
Catalonia, Individualism of, 184, 

187 

Catherine II., Tsarina, external 
Individualisni and internal 
Universalism of, 181, 188, 192, 
194, 201, 207, 233 

Catherine de Medici, queen of 
France, Universalism of, 143 

Catholicism, an expression of Uni- 
versalism, 18, 19, 30; does 
not depend on Papacy for 
existence, 151, 152; perman- 
ence of, 151, 152, 196; in- 
crease of toleration in, 288. 
{Cp. Church, Papac}') 

Catholic League, the, in France, 
157; in Germany, 145, 146 

Chalcedon, Council of, 107 

Chambers of Reunion, the, 167, 
168, 214 

Charbonerie, the, Individualism of, 

251 

Charles the Great, emperor, Uni- 
versalism of, 72-76, 80-83, 99, 
100, 133, 134, 153, 215, 225, 
295; empire of, 74, 75, 81, 
225, 295 

Charles the Bald, emperor, Uni- 
versalism of, 75 

Charles III, the Fat. emperor, 75, 
82, 83, 116 

Charles V, emperor, Universalism 
of, 134-136, 158, 161, 187, 295 

Charles VI, emperor, Universalism 
of, 172, 177, 187 

Charles the Bold, duke of Bur- 
gundy, mingled Universalism 
and Individualism of, 115, 116 

Charles VII, king of France, 118 

Charles IX, king of France, 143 

Charles X, king of France, 246, 
247, 252 

Charles ll, king of Spain, 166, 170, 
171 

Charles III, king of Spain, 188, 192, 
194 

Charles IV, king of Spain, 215 

Charles Felix, king of Sardinia, 

243 

Chateaubriand, Frangois Rene, 
vicomte, French statesman 
and author, leader of the 
Romantic Movement, 237 

Chaumont, Treaty of, 236, 250, 



262, 304. {Cp. Quadruple 
Alliance) 

China, empress- dowager of, 43 

Chlodovech, king of the Franks, 
universalist, 67, 100 

Christian Commonwealth, idea of 
nations as a, an expression of 
external Universalism, 44, 46; 
prevalent in the Middle Ages, 
35, 40, 44, 81, 82, 98, 100, 159, 
161, 296, 300; advocated by 
the Church under the Roman 
Empire, 50, 61, 62; emperor 
claims headship of, 62, 66, 68, 
70-77, 78-81, 102, 108, 109, 
113, 114; pope claims head- 
ship of, 70-77, 92, 102-104, 
109 ; pope ceases to be regard- 
ed as head of, 111-113; cos- 
mopolitanism of, 105 ; ascend- 
ancy of idea, we^ened by 
quarrel of empire and Papacy, 
76-78, 87, 88 ; emphasised by 
the Crusades, 88, 89; not 
destroyed by fall of Hohen- 
staufen, 98; degraded for 
political purposes, 100; im- 
paired by vices of popes, 103- 
107; threatened by heretics, 
104-106, and by nationalism, 
104-106,112,115; apparently 
revived at Constance, 108; 
attitude of Renaissance to- 
wards, 122; impaired, but 
survived the Reformation, 
130, 152; rejected by Charles 
V, 133; new idea of, put for- 
ward by Charles V and Phihp 
II, 133-136; destroyed at 
WestphaUa, 148, 150, 154-156, 
182; not the basis of later 
external Universahsm, 161, 
182; does not appear in the 
Napoleonic empire, 225; ac- 
cepted by Richard I and John 
in England, 269 

Christianity, see Religion 

Christina, queen of Sweden, Uni- 
versalism of, 149 

Christina, queen-regent of Spain, 
246 

Church, the Christian, universalist 
character of, 18-20, 50, 288, 
312; opposed to Individual- 
ism, 197 - 199 ; extra - terri- 



324 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



torial character of, 78; some- 
times assists Individualism, 
52,65,66; political theory of, 
imder Roman Empire, 61, 62, 
71-73 ; converted Roman 
Empire into a veiled theo- 
cracy, 61 ; assisted to preserve 
external Universalism in 
Middle Ages, 75-77; import- 
ance of missionary success of, 
75, 76; decline of prestige, 
owing to quarrel of empire 
and Papacy, 100; corruption 
of, in Middle Ages, 93, 94; in 
eighteenth century, 197-199; 
effect of Friar movement on, 
93-96, of Conciliar movement 
on, 106-113; attitude of 
Renaissance towards, 121- 
124; attacks of Voltaire and 
Rousseau on, 202-204; as- 
sociation of, with monarchy, 
204; French Revolution and, 
218-221; Napoleon and, 223, 
226; revival of, after fall of 
Napoleon, 236, 237; increas- 
ing toleration of, 312-314. 
{Cp. Catholicism, Papacy, Re- 
formation, etc.) 

Civil Constitution of the Clergy, 
the, individualist character of, 
219 

Claremont, Council of, 88 

Clement VII, pope, 104 

Clement XIV, pope, 200, 201 

Colbert, Jean Baptiste, French 
statesman, 157, 184, 186 

Coligny, Admiral, Huguenot 
leader, 143 

Colonna, the, family of, 103 

Communards, the. Individualism 
of, 262 

Communion in One Kind, doctrine 
of, expression of Universalism, 
106, 113 

Compensation, theory of, relation 
to external Universalism, 163, 
164, 295; difficulties of, 179- 
181; effect on smaller states, 
181, 182 

Comuneros, the, revolt of, 131 

Concert of Eiurope, the, character 
of Universalism of, 44, 264, 
265, 285-287, 302, 307 

Condliar Movement, the, attempt 



to revive Universalism, 106- 
108, 111-112, 123 

Concordat, the, of Napoleon, Uni- 
versalism of, 222, 223, 226 

Constance, Council of, imxeal 
revival of Universalism at, 
108-115 

Constantine the Great, Roman 
emperor, 7, 65, 99; " Dona- 
tion of," 92 

Constantine VI, Byzantine em- 
peror, 71, 73 

Constantinople, emperors of, 68- 
71 ; fall of, 120, 122, 129 

Constantius II, Roman emperor, 

65 

Constitution, French, of 1791, 
Individualism of, 209, 213, 
217,268; of 1793, Individual- 
ism of, 217, 221; of the Year 
III (Directory) , Universal- 
ism of, 221, 222; of the Year 
VIII (Consulate), Univer- 
salism of, 222, 223 

Constitution, Spanish (1812), In- 
dividuahsm of, 235, 243; 
(1833), 246 

Cosmopohtanism, relation of, to 
Universalism, 34; of the 
Church, 78 

Council of Ten, in Venice, Uni- 
versalism of, 117, 189 

Councils, General, of the Church, 
106-108 

Counter- Reformation, the, Uni- 
versalism of, 20, 124, 137-141, 
151, 226. (Cp. Jesuits, Refor- 
mation) 

Crete, 302 

Crimean War, the, effect upon 
Universalism, 257, 258, 260 

Crusades, the, an expression of 
Universalism, 88-90 ; the first, 
88; later, 88-90; the fourth, 
88-89; of Frederic II, 89; 
cause of end of, 89, 90, 159; 
against the Albigenses, 93; 
attempted, of Pius II, 114, 130 

Cujus regio, ejus religio, doctrine of 
individualist, 154 

Czechs, the. Individualism of, 113, 
120 

Czernowitz, Conference of, 245 

Dante, Universalism and acci- 



INDEX 



325 



dental Individualism of, 102, 
119, 120 

Danton, Georges, French revolu- 
tionary, 210 

Dardanelles, the, 275 

Darius, king of Persia, 63 

Decazes, Due de, French states- 
man, 249 

De Civitate Dei, of St. Augustine^ 66 

Defoe, Daniel, 9 

De Jure Belli et Pacts, of Grotius, 
149, 159, 160 

De Monatchia, of Dante, 102, 119, 
120 

Desire to be ruled, the, see 
Universalism 

Desire to rule, the, see Indi- 
vidualism 

Devolution, theory of, 165 

De Vulgari Eloquentia, of Dante, 
120 

Diderot, Denis, French savant, 202 

Diocletian, Roman emperor, 7, 61 

Diplomatic- Revolution, the, ex- 
pression of Individualism, 
178, 179 

Directory, the, in France, Univer- 
salism of, 221, 222 

Divina Comedia, of Dante, 120 

Divine Right, Theory of, expres- 
sion of Universalism, 129, 190 

Dominicans, the, 95 

Dominus et Redemptor, Bull, 200 

Don Carlos, claimant to Spanish 
throne, 252 

Dual Alliance, the, indication of 
Individualism, 286 

Dualism, in Austria- Hungary, 
mingling of Universalism and 
Individualism in, 260, 261 

Dutch Republic, Universalism and 
Individuahsm in, 40, 41, 136, 
142, 144, 149, 152, 154, 162, 
166, 170-175, 189, 206, 207, 
247, 250, 317. {Cp. Nether- 
lands) 

Eastern Question, the, 44, 238, 263, 

264 
Eastern RumeUa, 302 
Edict of Restitution, the, 146 
Education iVcts, in England, 280 
Edward I, king of England, 13 
Edward III, king of England, 13, 

309 



Egmont, Count, Flemish patriot, 

144 

Egypt, ancient, 59; modem, 251, 
302; hermits of, 66 

Elagabaius, Roman emperor, 61 

Elba, return of Napoleon from, 238 

Electors, ecclesiastical, in Holy 
Roman Empire, importance 
of, 86 

Ehzabeth, queen of England, 13, 
40, 136 

Emperor, deification of, an expres- 
sion of Universalism, 60, 61 

Emperor, Holy Roman, exponent 
of Universahsm, 35; claimed 
headship of Christian Com- 
monwealth, 62, 67, 68, 70-81, 
100, 102, 108, 109, 113, 114; 
weakness of, 79, 80, 83-85, 96, 
97. 245 ; quarrel with Papacy, 
76-78, 87, 88; anti-emperors 
created, 86; fail to maintain 
anti-popes, 87; territoriahsm 
of later, 102. (Cp. Holy 
Roman Empire) 

Encyclopasdists, the French, Indi- 
vidualism of, 202 

England, Universalism and Indi- 
viduahsm in, 267-274, 277- 
282; character of history of, 
267, 268 ; tendencies of mod- 
em, 277-282; 7, 32, 40, 44, 
78, 83, 103, 109, 140, 142, 158, 
169, 175, 179, 199, 206, 207, 
227, 231, 233, 236, 238, 239, 
244, 247, 248, 250, 251, 256, 
257, 288, 289, 293, 294, 302, 
306 

Enghsh Revolution, the, 42, 271, 
277, 286 

Epicureans, the, promote Univer- 
salism, 64 

Erasmus, Desiderius, scholar, 
moderate Individualism of, 
123, 124 

Ethelbert, king of Kent, 269 

Eugenius IV, pope, 112, 113 

Factory Acts, the, in England, 40 
Fathers, the Early, 122, 125 
Feast of Reason, the, an expres- 
sion of Individuahsm, 220, 22 1 
Female Suffrage, mihtant agita- 
tion for, individualist, 279 
Ferdinand I, emperor, 134 



326 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



Ferdinand II, emperor, Univer- 
salism of, 145, 146 

Ferdinand the Catholic, king of 
Spain, 117, 131, 168 

Ferdinand, king of Naples, 243 

Festival of the Supreme Being, an 
expression of Universalism, 
221, 224 

Feudalism, an expression of Indi- 
vidualism, 81, 82, 97, 98; an 
attitude of mind, 81 ; served to 
protect smaller states, 180, 
181 

Filiogue Clause, the, 105 

Flanders, cities of, 117, 309 

Florence, republic of, 117, 131 

France, Universalism and Indi- 
vidualism in, 7, 32, 33, 41, 42, 
75, 78, 93, 98, 100-103, 117, 
118, 127, 130, 142-144, 149, 
150, 152, 157-167, 175-179, 
183-188, 193, 200, 202, 206, 
208-240, 244, 246-251, 253- 
255, 258-262, 268, 269, 276, 
277, 284, 288-295, 302-304, 
308, 313, 317, 318. {Cp. 
French Revolution) 

Francis I, king of France, 127 

Franciscans, the, 95 

Francis Joseph, emperor of 
Austria, 256 

Franco- Prussian War, zenith of 
Individualism in, 261, 264, 
272 ; imiversalist reaction 
after, 261, 264 

Frankfort Parliament, the, an 
expression of Individualism, 

254 
Franks, the, 67, 69, 70 
Frederic I, Barbarossa, emperor, 

Universalism of, 41, 44, 84, 86, 

133 

Frederic II, emperor, a typical 
Universalist, 84, 86-90, 102, 
103, 108, 115,148, 155 

Frederic III, emperor. Individual- 
ism of, 114-116, 130 

Frederic, elector palatine, 146 

Frederic II, the Great, king of 
Prussia, internal Universal- 
ism and external Individual- 
ism of, 177-179, 188, 191-193, 
201, 206, 265 

Frederic William, of Brandenburg, 
the Great Elector, 188 



Frederic William I, king of 
Prussia, 188 

Frederic William IV, king of 
Prussia, Individualism of, 256 

Freemasons, the. Individualism of, 
in Spain, 251 

French Revolution, the, the epi- 
tome of History, 227; com- 
plexity of, 209-211; an ex- 
pression of the conflict be- 
tween Universalism and Indi- 
vidualism, 2 1 1-2 12; not only 
directed to secure liberty, 209, 
or centralisation, 209, or to 
remove abuses, 210; not a 
rising of masses against 
classes, 210; not a mere poli- 
tical movement, 210; dual 
aspect of, 223-225; spirit of, 
illustrated by Robespierre and 
Napoleon, 223-226; not an 
isolated event, 227; internal 
Individualism in, 239 ; left an 
aftermath of violence, 240; 
inculcated evils of anarchy, 
240; 32,33,42,182,185,187, 
189, 201, 206, 208, 241, 242, 
246, 251, 252, 258, 259, 267, 
288,303,318 

Friars, the, importance of, 93-96; 
cosmopolitanism of, 94, 95; 
doctrine of apostolic poverty, 
94-96, 123; observant, 94,95 

Fronde, the, expression of Indi- 
vidualism, 149, 157, 185 

Fiirstenbund, the, resistance to 
Universalism, 206 

Gaiseric, king of the Vandals, Indi- 
vidualism of, 67 
Galileo, condemnation of, 198 
Gallo- Romans, position of, 67 
Gaul, Roman province of, 68, 83 
Geneva, Church of, 20, 132, 288 
George William, elector of Bran- 
denburg, Individualism of, 146 
Germany, Universalism and Indi- 
viduahsm in (the old empire), 
7, 75, 77, 80, 100, 102, 116, 
117, 128, 133, 140, 142, 145- 
148, 150, 154, 183, 206, 214, 
215, 232; (Germanic Con- 
federation), 240, 243, 252-255, 
259, 285; (modern German 
Empire), 261, 263, 267, 276, 



INDEX 



327 



285, 291-293, 295-297, 304, 

312, 313; princes of, 84-87, 
153, 292 ; students in, 242, 243 

Gibbon, Edward, quoted, 16 

Girondists, the, 213 

Gladstone, W. E., statesman, 2 

Godfrey of Bouillon, leader of first 
Crusade, 89 

Granada, conquest of, 117 

Grand Alliance, the, resists ex- 
treme Individualism of Louis 
XIV, 171-173, 289, 292, 296, 
297 

Great Britain, see England. 

Great Interregnum, the, in the 
Empire, 87, 102 

Great Rebelhon, the, in England, 

271, 277 

Great Schism, the, in the Papacy, 
44, 104, 105, 108, 114 

Greece (ancient), 7, 41, 122; 
(modern), 245, 246, 250, 252, 
275, 302; political theories of 
ancient, 59, 60; city states of 
ancient, 60, 190 

Gregory I, the Great, pope, 70 

Gregory VII (Hildebrand), pope, 
79, 102 

Gregory IX, pope, 102 

Gregory XI, pope, 104 

Grotius, Hugo, Dutch thinker, 
supplies basis for new Univer- 
saiism, 149, 159, 160, 182 

Guises, the, family of, individual- 
ists, 142, 143 

Guiifot, Frangois Pierre, French 
statesman, 246 

Gunthar, king of the Burgundians, 
67 

Gustavus III, king of Sweden, 
Universalism of, 56, 189, 208 

Gustavus Adolphus, king of 
Sweden, Individualism of, 
147, 150 

Habsburgs, the, external Indi- 
vidualism of, 109, 130, 172, 
179, 255 ; external Universal- 
ism of, 133, 134, 212, 230; in- 
ternal Universalism of, 146, 
157, 184, 188, 189, 193, 234, 
253, 260; 41, 127, 164, 312; 
of Spain, 169 

Hague Conference, the, of Nicholas 
II, 264, 287 



Hague Tribimal, the, an expres- 
sion of Universalism, 35, 272, 
274. 

Hanseatic Towns, the, 102 

Hebertists, the. Individualism of, 
221, 311 

Henry III, emperor, 86, 87 

Henry IV, emperor, 86, 102 

Henry VI, emperor, 269 

Henry VII, emperor, 102 

Henry II, king of England, 44, 99 

Henry IV, king of England, 13 

Henry VI, king of England, 270 

Henry VIII, king of England, 13, 
40 

Henry II, king of France, 127 

Henry IV, king of France, 157, 185 

Henry the Fowler, king of Ger- 
many, 77 

Heresy, an expression of Indivi- 
dualism, 105-106; relation to 
nationalism, ibid. 

Historian, function and necessary 
quahties of, i, 4, 273, 274, 299, 
300, 317-320 

History, the record of conflict be- 
tween Universalism and Indi- 
vidualism, II, 31-38, 39-57, 
284-286, 297-300, 315-317 
and passim ; the explanatory 
factor of, this conflict, 5, 31-38, 
268 and passim ; meaning of, 
1-5; theories of, optimistic, 
6-8, 298-300; pessimistic, 8- 
10; conflict of progress and 
reaction, 11-14; continuity 
of, 3, 4; importance of the 
human element in, 10, 15-31 
and passim ; complexity of, 
35, 54, 55 ; will be a record of 
conflict as long as it endures, 
281-283, 317-320; prevalence 
of fictions in, 286-287; the 
French Revolution the epi- 
tome of, 226, 227 

Hobbes, Thomas, 45 

Hohenstaufen, the, emperors, Uni- 
versalism of, 85-92, 109, no, 
158 

Hohenzollerns, the, external Uni- 
versalism of, 213 

HoUand, 145, 189. {Cp. Dutch 
Repubhc, Netherlands) 

Holy Alliance, the, abortive Uni- 
versahsm of, 238, 264 



328 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



Holy Roman Empire, the, out- 
come of external Universalism, 
71.73; creation of, 72, 73; 
revival of, by Otto, 'jy ; quar- 
rel of, with Papacy, 78 et seq., 
119; weakness of, 83-85; 
effect of fall of Hohenstaufen 
on, 87, 88 ; effect of weakness 
on other states, 99, 100; effect 
of decline of, in Germany, 102 ; 
attempted revival of, by Sigis- 
mund, 108, 109, 114; imder 
Frederic III, 114, i34; really 
ends with Frederic II, 115, 
148 ; under Maximihan 1,134; 
under Charles V, 133, 134; 
effect of Westphalia on, 148, 
153, 154; formal ^.nd of, 228; 
50, 52, 180, 181, 206, 259, 268, 
286 

Home Rule, character of opposi- 
tion to, 279 

Hubertsbiirg, Treaty of, 179 

Hugh Capet, king of France, 100 

Huguenots, the. Individualism of, 
127,142-144,157,186; politi- 
cal theories of, 127-129, 190, 
191; effect of the Great Dis- 
coveries on, 142. {Cp. Cal- 
vinism, Protestantism) 

Himdred Days, the, 238 

Hundred Years' War, the, 118, 
269, 270, 289, 309 

Himgary, Individualism in, 115, 
189, 255, 256, 260, 261. {Cp. 
Magyars) 

Hunold, duke of Aquitaine, Indi- 
vidualism of, 74 

Hus, John, reformer, Individualism 
of, 90, 106, 113 

Hussites, the. Individualism and 
nationalism of, 106, 120; 
concessions to, 113 

Iberian Peninsula, see Spain 
Iconoclastic Controversy, the, 71 
Ignatius Loyola, St., fovmder of 

the Jesuits, 218 
Illyrian Provinces, the, 215, 225 
India, 179, 313 
Individualism : the desire to 

rule: explanation of the term, 

36 
In general : in religion, 19 et seq., 
311-315; in love, 23 et seq., 



311-315; conflict of, with 
Universalism in the life of 
the individual, 25 et seq. ; not 
peculiar to religion and love, 
28; dual aspect of the con- 
flict in the life of the indi- 
vidual, 29-30; conflict largely 
sub- conscious, 30 ; conflict of, 
with Universalism in the life 
of the nation, 31 et seq. ; re- 
action for or against may be 
insensible or rapid, 32; con- 
flict is eternal, 32 et seq. ; 
part of human nature, ibid. ; 
supplies the factor explana- 
tory of History, 33, 285; has 
a dual character, 32-33; ex- 
ternal aspect of, 37; internal 
aspect of, 37 ; anarchy, logical 
extreme of, 37-38; com- 
plexity of the conflict of, 
with Universalism, 39 et seq. ; 
general character of the con- 
flict of, with Universalism, 39 
et seq. ; tendency to complete 
ascendancy of, 41-42; rela- 
tionship of, with patriotism, 
43; arguments in favour of, 
45 et seq. ; arguments against, 
45 ei seq. ; permanent factors 
in conflict of, with Univer- 
salism, 48 et seq. ; relation- 
ship of, with institutions, 48- 
49 ; complex action of factors 
favouring, 52 et seq. ; rela- 
tionship of commerce with, 
54; cause of complexity of 
conflict of, with Universalism, 
54-55; no immutable course 
for the conflict, 55; probable 
normal course of the conflict, 
55-59 ; French Revolution 
an expression of this conflict, 
211-212; intensity of the 
conflict during the period of 
the French Revolution, 211- 
212; dogmatic religion essenti- 
ally hostile to, 219-220; con- 
flict part of human nature and 
must continue while human 
nature is unchanged, 273, 
296-298 
Prior to the coronation of Charles 
the Great, 58-73 

In general : conflict with 



INDEX 



329 



lodividualism — continued 

Universalism existent, but 
not apparent in earliest times, 
58-59; defined after Univer- 
salism, 58; slow development 
of, 64 

External : prevalence of, in 
ancient Greece, 60, 62-63; 
impaired by victories of Rome, 
60; by Christianity, 61-62; 
not assisted by barbarian 
invasions, 66-68; or by de- 
cline of the Roman Empire, 
68-69; opposed by growth of 
papal power, 70 et seq.; not 
assisted by imsurpation of 
Irene, 71-73; or by creation 
of Holy Roman Empire, 

72-73 

Internal; existent in ancient 
Greece, 63-64; opposed by 
Greek philosophers, ibid. ; 
slight progress of , under Roman 
Empire, 64; preparation for, 
imder Roman Empire, 65-66; 
progress of, after barbarian 
mvasions, 69; in barbarian 
kingdoms, 69-70 
From the coronation of Charles 
to the fall of the Hohenstaufen, 
74-90 

External : slow develop- 
ment of, after creation of 
Holy Roman Empire, 75 et 
seq. : definition of, partly 
due to Papacy, 76 et seq. ; 
assisted by incompetence of 
emperors, yj et seq. ; reaction 
in favour of, after Otto the 
Great, 78 ; relation of feudal- 
ism to, 81-82; beginning of 
conflict of, with Holy Roman 
Empire, 82-83; reason for 
absence of conflict of, with 
Papacy, 83 ; supports Papacy 
against the Empire, 83; 
growth of, in France, 83; in 
Italy and Germany, 83-87; of 
the Italian cities, 84 ; assisted 
by quarrel of Papacy and 
Empire, 87-90 

Internal : prevalent after 
Charles the Great, 74; in 
conflict with the Holy Roman 
Empire, 80 et seq. ; effect of 



the Saracens and Northmen 
on, 81; relation of feudalism 
to, 81-82; growth of, in 
Germany, 84-85 
From the Jail of the Hohenstaufen 
to the Peace of Westphalia, 
91-149 

External : allied with the 
Papacy against the Empire, 
91-92; opposed to Papacy 
after fall of Hohenstaufen, 
92; advocated by Arnold of 
Brescia, 92-93; assisted by 
Albigenses, 93 ; indirectly 
assisted by the Friars, 93-96; 
growth of, after fall of Hohen- 
staufen, 96; assisted by dis- 
organisation of civil society, 
97; effect of, on mediaeval 
France, loi; influence of 
dif&culty of communication 
on, loi ; retards development 
of national states, 101 ; marks 
the policy of later mediaeval 
popes and emperors, loi- 
102; causes failure of Boni- 
face VIII, 103; encouraged 
by the " Babylonish Cap- 
tivity " and Great Schism, 
104-105; relation of nation- 
alism and heresy to, 105; 
Hussite movement an expres- 
sion of, 106; assisted by 
Conciliar Movement, 107-108, 
and by its failure, 1 12-113; 
progress of, after Constance, 
114; real victory of, at Con- 
stance, 115; influence of, on 
internal Individualism, 117, 
118; progress of, aided by 
independence of thought, 119, 
by Dante, 1 19-120, and nega- 
tively by " First " Renais- 
sance, 120; expressed in the 
later Renaissance, 119, 120 
etseq. ; advocated in spiritual 
matters, 124 ; of Reformation, 
126, 128 et seq. ; appears in 
most movements of Reforma- 
tion period, 129-130; causes 
failure of Charles V, 135, of 
Philip II, 135-137; promoted 
by disorder in the Church, 
137; influence of Great Dis- 
coveries on, 141-142; in 



330 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



Individualism — continued 

Dutch Republic, 144-145; in 
Thirty Years' War, 146-149; 
of Gustavus Adolphus, 147; 
triumph of, at Westphalia, 149 
Internal : assisted by ex- 
ternal Universalism, 96-97 ; 
effect of difficulty of commu- 
nication on, loi; of Charles 
the Bold, 115; continuance 
in later Middle Ages, 116 et 
seq. ; assisted by external 
Individualism in later Middle 
Ages, 117; decline of, in 
France after Hundred Years' 
War, 118; not really extin- 
guished by Louis XI, 1 1 8- 1 19; 
negatively assisted by" First " 
Renaissance, 120; expressed 
in the later Renaissance, 119, 
120 et seq.; of Reformation, 
126, 128 etseq. ; in Social Con- 
tract theory, 129 ; prevalence 
of, during Reformation period, 
130-131; opposed to Charles 
V, 133-135, to PhiUp II, 135- 
137 ; used by the Jesuits, 140 ; 
decline and revival of, 141 et 
seq.; influence of Great Dis- 
coveries on, 141-142; Wars of 
Religion an expression of, 
142 etseq.; of Huguenots, 143- 
144; in Dutch Republic, 144- 
145; in Thirty Years' War, 
146-149; disappearance of 
mediaeval type of, at Peace of 
Westphalia, 148 
From the Peace of Westphalia to 
the French Revolution, 150-208 
External : Protestantism 
an expression of, 151-153; 
victory of Protestantism a 
victory for, 152; of the Ger- 
man princes, 153; of the cen- 
tralised monarchies, 155; war 
the most extreme expression 
of, 155; of France under 
Louis XIV, 157-158; im- 
possibiUty of continued supre- 
macy of, 160; share of, in 
leading to resistance to Louis 
XIV, 160; international law 
intended to limit, 160-161; 
balance of power intended to 
Mmit, 161-162; extreme of, 



tends to become Universalism, 
162; of Louis XIV, arouses 
opposition, 162, and produces 
alliances against France, 165 
etseq. ; prevents maintenance 
of Peace of Westphalia, 165- 
166; responsible for the 
poUcy of Louis XIV, 167-168; 
partially recognised in Parti- 
tion Treaties and Grand 
Alliance, 172-174; extreme, 
of Louis XIV, 172-173; aban- 
doned by France after Louis 
XIV, 174-175; made wars of 
Louis XIV possible, 174-175; 
recognition of the danger of, 
if extreme, 176 et seq.; as- 
serted in Wars of Polish and 
Austrian Succession, 176-178; 
prevents the ascendancy of 
the new type of external Uni- 
versahsm, 178-179; character 
of, in the powers of Europe, 
178-179; not entirely preven- 
ted by new theory of external 
Universalism, 179; of the 
stronger states, 182; limited 
by self-interest, 183; impedes 
progress of internal Universal- 
ism, 185; losing ground on 
eve of French Revolution, 206 
Internal : Protestantism as 
an expression of, 151-153; 
triumph of Protestantism a 
victory for, 152; effect of 
Peace of Westphalia upon 
mediaBval conception of, 153- 
154; continuance of, after 
Westphalia, 155; anarchy 
the extreme expression of, 
155; disappearance of medi- 
eval conception of, 183 ; exist- 
ence of, in Catalonia, 187, in 
Prussia, 188, in Russia, 188, 
in Habsburg dominions, 188, 
in Poland, 189; evolution of 
a new theory of, 1 90 ^^s^^f.; ele- 
ment of internal Universalism 
in new theory of, 190; rela- 
tion of theory of Social Con- 
tract to, 190-191, and of bene- 
volent despotism to, 191 et 
seq. ; opposed by Church, 196- 
197; growth of critical spirit 
assists, 195-197; effect of in- 



INDEX 



331 



Individualism — continued 

vention of printing on, 197; 
attack of, on the Church, 197 
etseq. ; victory of, in suppres- 
sion of the Jesuits, 200-202; 
of Voltaire and Rousseau, 202- 
204; effect on, of attack on 
Church, 204 ; completeness of 
theory of, in eighteenth cen- 
tury, 204-205 ; of the Physio- 
crats, 204-205 ; Rousseau's 
Social Cotitract the gospel of, 
205 ; differences between that 
of eighteenth century and that 
of the Middle Ages, 205-206; 
clearness of eighteenth- cen- 
tury conception of, 205-206; 
progress of, on eve of French 
Revolution, 207-208 ; vitality 
of, 208 
From the French Revolution to 
the Present Day, 209-266 

External : alternate victory 
and defeat of, during French 
Revolution, 212; growth of, 
among revolutionaries, 213- 
214; of Napoleon, 214-215, 
225; interaction of, with 
UniversaUsm, 226-227 ; of 
France, produced by coali- 
tions against her, 228 ; revolu- 
tionary war an expression of 
the conflict of, vnXh. Univer- 
salism, 228; revival of, in 
Europe owing to failure of 
coahtions, 228; of Prussia, 
228; extreme character of, 
during revolutionary period, 
228 ; triumph of, in France, a 
triumph of nationalism, 229; 
causes of adoption of, by 
powers of Europe, 229-230; 
of Prussia, 230, of Austria, 
231, of Spain, 231; defeated 
in the national wars against 
France, 230-231 ; partial, of 
Russia after Congress of 
Vienna, 239; reaction to- 
wards, influence of alUance of 
external and internal Univer- 
salism upon, 242-243; reac- 
tion towards from Congress of 
Vienna to 1848, 244; in- 
creased by mutual distrust of 
- powers at conferences of 



Troppau and Laibach, and at 
Congress of Verona, 244-245; 
normal attitude of France, 
245; of Lafitte and Casimir- 
Perier, 246-247 ; relation of, to 
Belgian independence, 247 ; no 
complete victory for, in 1830, 
248 et seq. ; reasons for lack of 
complete victory, 249; rela- 
tion of, to nationalism, 252 ei 
seq. ; in the Crimean War, 257- 
258; alliance of , with internal 
IndividuaUsm, 258-259; neces- 
sary to Prussia throughout 
her history, 259; growth of, 
illustrated by non-participa- 
tion of other powers in Franco- 
Prussian War, 261; Prussia 
champion of, in Germany, 
261 ; national wars an expres- 
sion of, 262; reaction against, 
after national wars, 262 et 
seq.; checked by League of 
Emperors, 262, and at Con- 
gress of Berlin, 263; decline 
of, after Congress of Berlin, 
264; examples of, since Con- 
gress of Berlin, 264, in Italy, 

264, in Balkan states, 264- 

265, of Rumania, 265 
Internal : existence of, in 

French monarchy offended 
internal universalists, 211; 
alternate \'ictory and defeat 
of, in French Revolution, 212 ; 
of French Revolution alarms 
the powers, 212-213; gradual 
growth of, diuing the Revolu- 
tion, 216 etseq.; demand for a 
constitution in France an 
example of, 216; Constitu- 
tion of 1 79 1 a victory for, 
216-217; Constitution of 
1793 a triumph for, 217; 
forced to attack the Church, 
218-219; Civil Constitution 
of the Clergy an example of, 
219; opposed to recognition 
of the Supreme Being, 220; 
and the Cult of Reason, 220- 
221 ; final victory of, in Feast 
of Reason, 220-221; Robes- 
pierre represents an extreme 
of, 224-225 ; Reign of Terror 
the result of, 224; of Robes- 



332 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



Individualism — continued 

pierre tends to Universalism, 
225 ; interaction of, with Uni- 
versalism, 226-227; allies with 
external Universalism, 232; 
existent in all states, prior to 
French Revolution, 232-233; 
assists progress of revolution- 
ary armies, 232-233; causes 
acceptance of partial Univer- 
salism, 234-235 ; impaired by 
fear of revolution, 235; not 
extinguished after Congress of 
Vienna, 239; increased in 
France by fall of Napoleon, 
239-240; of the Acte Addi- 
tionel, 240; in the United 
Netherlands, 240, in Germany, 
240 ; preserved by general vio- 
lence of opinion after Congress 
of Vienna, 240 ; anarchy, the 
extreme of, discredited by 
French Revolution, 240-241; 
in armies after Congress of 
Vienna, 241-242; of Ger- 
man students, 242-243; re- 
action towards, checked after 
1 81 5 by alliance of external 
and internal Universalism, 
242-243; character of, in 
movements of 1820, 243; 
reaction towards, from 1830 to 
1848, 244; aided by distrust 
of powers at Conferences of 
Troppau and Laibach, and at 
Congress of Verona, 244-245; 
in France, under Louis Phi- 
hppe, 246-247; in Portugal, 
246; in Belgium, 247; no 
complete victory of, in 1830, 
248-249; reasons for absence 
of complete victory, 249; of 
the "party of action" limited, 
249; alUance with internal 
Universalism in 1830, 248 et 
seq.; character of, in Italy, 
France, Spain and Portugal, 
251-252 ; of the Basques, 252 ; 
relation of, to nationalism, 
252 et seq. ; in France, after 
fall of Louis Philippe, 253 et 
seq.; general development of, 
after Congress of Vienna, 253- 
254; in Portugal, 254; in 
France, under Second Repub- 



lic and Second Empire, 254; 
failure of, in 1848, in Italy, 
Austria and Germany, 254- 
255; causes of this failure, 
255 ; causes of its rejection by 
Prussia, 255; defeated in 
Hungary, 256; favoured by 
England, 256; indications of , 
in Prussia, 256-257; reaction 
towards, hastened by Crimean 
War, 258; alliance of, with 
external Individualism, 258- 
259; aided in Germany by 
Franco- Austrian War, 259; 
progress of, in Habsburg 
dominions, 260-261; dualism 
partly the result of, 260-261; 
ascendancy of, in Habsburg 
dominions incomplete, 260- 
261; represented by Com- 
mimards in France, 262; 
national wars an indication of 
progress of, 262 et seq.; re- 
action against, after national 
wars, 262; apparent ascend- 
ancy of, after Congress of 
Berlin, 265-266 
In England, 267-272; external 
and internal, never so vio- 
lently in conflict with Univer- 
salism as on continent, 268- 
269; external and internal, 
supremacy of, at time of 
Anglo-Saxon conquest, 269; 
external, assertion of, in 
Hundred Years' War, 269- 
270; internal, during the 
Hundred Years' War, 270; 
internal, during Wars of 
Roses, 270; external, preva- 
lent after loss of France, 270 ; 
evil effects of, in Lancastrian 
period, 270; external, of the 
Tudors, 270-271 ; internal, 
during Tudor period, 270-271 ; 
reaction towards internal, 
under Stuarts, 271 ; indicated 
in Great Rebellion and in 
Revolution of 1688, 271; ex- 
ternal, general ascendancy of, 
since the Tudor period, 271- 
272; external and internal, 
culminate in Victorian period, 
272 ; subsequent reaction 
against, 272 



INDEX 



333 



Individualism — continued 
At the present day, 273-283 

External : ctilminated in 
national wars, 274; of the 
Balkan League, 275 ; tenden- 
cies towards, 275-277; re- 
action towards, inevitable, 
276-277; signs of reaction 
towards, ibid.; of Italy and 
the Balkan states, 276; re- 
action towards, in England, 
277 et seq. ; probable culmina- 
tion of reaction towards, in 
war, 278; fear of such cul- 
mination maintains entente 
with France and Russia, 278; 
expectation of such a general 
reaction, 278 

Internal : extent of, 275- 
276; reaction to, inevitable, 
276-277; signs of reaction 
towards, ibid,; of Portugal, 
276, of France, 276, of Ger- 
many, 276, of Russia, 276, 
of Sweden, 276; nihilism an 
expression of, 276; anarchism 
an expression of, 276-277; 
found earUest in England, 
277; signs of reaction to, in 
England, 277 et seq. ; militant 
sufeagist agitation an ex- 
pression of, 279; Ulster 
movement an expression of, 
279; illustrated by trade 
unions, 279-280; by strikes, 
280; by resistance to acts of 
parliament, 280; by objec- 
tion to censorship of plays, 
280; „ in religion, literature, 
art and music, 280-281 
In the War of the Triple Entente, 
284-320; clearness of the con- 
flict with Universalism since 
the fall of Napoleon, 284; 
attempts to check, in League 
of the Three Emperors, 285, 
302, and concert of Europe, 
285, 302; failure of these 
attempts, 285-287; character- 
istics of reactions in favour of, 
287-290; of France, under 
LoTois XIV and Napoleon, 
284, 290, 291, 303, 304; of 
opposition to France, 300, 
301 ; of modem Germany, 291- 



293, 304; German alliances 
not opposed to, 291-293; of 
the Triple Entente, 293, 294; 
two interpretations of reac- 
tions towards external, 294, 
295; divergences of interpreta- 
tion caused war, 290, 295, 296 ; 
victory of AUies will be vic- 
tory for, 296; possibility of 
reaction against, 296-298; 
possibility of cessation of 
series of reactions, 298- 320; 
in French Revolution, 284, 
303; extreme of, impractic- 
able, 306; war the ultimate 
expression of, 307; violence 
of conflict with UniversaUsm 
perhaps declining, 298-320; 
at the present day more 
mingled with Universalism, 
298-320 

Industrial Revolution, the, 279 

Innocent III, pope, 103, no, 158, 
269 

Innocent XI, pope, 167, 312 

Insurance Act, the, in England, 
resistance to, 280 

International Law, an expression 
of Universalism, 35, 37, 159- 
162, 291, 307 

Ireland, 140, 313 

Irene, Byzantine empress, impor- 
tance of usiirpation of, 71-73 

Isabella the Catholic, queen of 
Spain, 117, 131 

Isthmian Games, the, 60 

Italy, Universalism and Indi- 
vidualism in, 8, 67, 68, 70, 71, 
77, 100, 116, 117, 200, 215, 
225, 228, 233, 239, 243-246, 
251-256, 259-261, 264, 265, 
276, 285, 287, 293; city re- 
publics of, 41, 84, 102, 117, 
130, 131, 180; duchies of, 
176, 301; wars of, 161, 168 

Jacobins, the, 233, 241, 242 
Jacquerie, the. Individualism of, 

118 
Jagiello, House of, 18^ 
Jansenists, the. Individualism of, 

200 
Japan, 275, 3io 
j J assy. Treaty of, 207 
1 Jena, battle of, 230, 303 



334 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



Jesuits, the (Society of Jesus), 
exponents of LFniversalism, 
138-140; share in promoting 
the Counter - Reformation, 
ihid. ; made use of Indi- 
vidualism, ibid. ; political 
theory of, 140; original 
virtues and later corruption 
of, 199, 200; attacked by the 
Jansenists and by Pascal, 
200; suppression of, 194, 
200, 201, 237; importance of 
the suppression of, 200-202; 
restoration of, 237. [Cp. 
Counter- Reformation) 

John XXII, pope, 108 

John, king of England, 269, 308 

John, Don, of Austria, victory of, 
at Lepanto, 2 

John George, elector of Saxony, 
Individualism of, 146 

John Sobieski, king of Poland, 
UniversaUsm of, 164, 165 

Joseph II, emperor, internal Uni- 
versalism of, 189, 192-194, 
206, 207, 213, 234 

Joseph Bonaparte, king of Spain, 

215 
Julius II, pope, 124 
Julius Caesar, 2 
Justification by Faith, doctrine of, 

individualist, 126, 131, 132 
Justification by Works, doctrine of, 

universaUst, 125, 126 
Justinian I, Byzantine emperor, 

Universalism of, 68, 70, yy 

Kirk Kilisse, battle of, 286 
Koln, archbishop of, 86 

LacedaBmon, 41, 63, 64; possible 
constitutional opposition in, 

63 
Lafitte, Jacques, French states- 
man, Individualism of, 246, 

247 

Laibach, Conference of, 244 

Laissez-faire, doctrine of, indi- 
vidualist, 205 

Lancastrian dynasty, Individual- 
ism imder, 7, 13, 270 

Laon, 100 

La Rochelle, 149 

Latin, importance of, in promoting 
Universalism, 119, 120 



Laurentius Valla, scholar, Indi- 
vidualism of, 121, 123 

Lausanne, Treaty of, 265 

La Valette, Jesuit administrator 
of Martinique, 200 

Law, John, Scotch financier, 186 

" League of the Three Emperors," 
the so-called, directed against 
IndividuaUsm, 262, 263, 285, 

304 

Legnano, battle of, 41, 84 

Leipsic, battle of, 232 

Lepanto, battle of, 2 

Leo I, Byzantine emperor, Uni- 
versalism of, 68 

Leo III, pope, Universalism of, 
72,76 

Leo X, pope, 124 

Leoben, Preliminaries of, uni- 
versalist defeat, 215 

Leopold I, emperor, 164, 169, 171 

Leopold II, emperor, 189, 207, 234 

Levant, the, 130 

Lewis the Pious, emperor, 74, 81 

Lewis the German, king of Ger- 
many, 75 

Liberation, War of, Universalism 
in, 232 

Limburg, duchy of, 248 

Lippe-Detmold, principality of, 
292 

Lits de Justice, the, 186 

Livy, 121 

Lombards, the, 70, 71 

Lombardy, Austrian province of, 
260 

London, Treaty of (1718), 176, 
178; (i9i3),265 

Lorenzo de Medici, 8, 130 

Lorraine, duchy of, 177, 179 

Lothar I, emperor, 75 

Lothar II, king of Lorraine, 76 

Lotharingia, mediaeval kingdom 
of, 116 

Louis XI, king of France, internal 
Universalism of , 115, 118, 185 

Louis XII, king of France, 168 

Louis XIV, king of France, internal 
UniversaUsm and external 
IndividuaUsm of, 7, 42, 149, 
157-175, 183-187, 193, 214, 
225, 288-296, 300-304, 308 

Louis XV, king of France, decline 
of internal UniversaUsm under 
42, 77, 186, 193, 194, 318 



INDEX 



335 



Louis XVI, king of France, in- 
ternal IndividuaKsm under, 
43, 187, 208-210, 217, 286 

Louis Philippe, king of the French, 
Universalism under, 246-249, 

253 

Louvois, marquis de, French 
statesman, 157 

Love, analysis of the character of, 
22-25; relation to religion, 
23 ; origin of, 24, 25 ; private 
judgment in, 24; conflict in, 
25, 311-315 

Lule Burgas, battle of, 286 

Luther, Martin, reformer. Indi- 
vidualism of, 90, 121, 133; 
attacks doctrines of the 
Church, 124; relation to 
Erasmus, 124; tendency of, 
to Universalism, 128, 131, 
132, 202; inconsistency of, 
131, 132; represents destruc- 
tive side of Reformation, 131 ; 
analogy of methods of, with 
those of the Jesuits, 139; did 
not create Protestantism, 151 

Lutheranism, Individualism in, 
138, 153; tendency to Uni- 
versalism, 18-20; illogical 
character of, 20; rather de- 
structive than constructive, 
131; permanence of, secured 
by Westphalia, 150; exist- 
ence of, not essential to 
Protestantism, 151, 152. [Cp. 
Protestantism, Reformation) 

Luxemburg, duchy of, 248 

Luxembm-g, house of, 109 

Machiavelli, Niccolo, Italian 
writer, expressed Individual- 
ism of his age, 130, 159 

Magna Charta,individuahst clauses 
in, 308 

Mainz, archbishop of, 86 

" Malacca," the, case of, 275 

Manteuffel, Count, Prussian states- 
man, submission of, 255, 257 

Marat, Jean-Paul, revolutionary, 
210 

Marcus Aurelius, Roman emperor, 
political philosophy of, 65 

Maria Theresa, empress, external 
Individuahsm and internal 
Universalism of, 177, 178, 189 



Marie de Medici, queen-regent of 
France, 149 

Marjorian, Roman emperor, Uni- 
versalism of, 68 

Marozia, " senatrix of the Ro- 
mans," corrupting influence 
of, 78 

Martignac, M. de, French states- 
man, 249 

Martin V, pope, 108, no, 112, 113, 
124 

Martina, Byzantine empress, 71 

Massaniello, rebellion of, at Naples, 
149 

Matthias Corvinus, king of Hun- 
gary, IndividuaUsm of, 115 

Maupeou, M. de, French states- 
man, 187 

Maximihan I, emperor. Individual- 
ism of, 130, 134 

Maximilian, duke of Bavaria, 
Universalism of, 145, 146 

Maximinian, Roman emperor, 
61 

Mayors of the Palace, the, in 
France, 100 

Mazarin, Cardinal, French states- 
man, 149, 157, 185 

Mazzini, Giuseppe, Italian revolu- 
tionary, 251 

Medici, the, in Florence, 117, 

131 
Metternich, prince, Austrian 

statesman, Universalism of, 

43, 232, 238, 245, 255, 262, 

296 
Metz, bishopric of, 167 
Milan, repubhc and duchy of, 117, 

131 
Mirabeau, Gabriel Honore, comte 

de, French statesman, 210, 

222 
Missi Dominici, the, in the empire 

of Charles the Great, 74, 80, 

81 
Mohammed II, sultan, 129 
Monarchy, theories of, 190-195. 

{Cp. Benevolent Despotism) 
Monasticism, effect of, on L^niver- 

salism, 65, 66 
Montesquieu, Charles, baron de, 

French thinker, 202, 205 
Morea. the, 245 
Morelli, Neapolitan revolutionary, 

353 



336 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



Moscow, burning of, 303; patri- 
archate of, 188 

Munster, Anabaptists of, 128, 311, 
315 

Nantes, Edict of, revoked owing 
to internal Universalism, 184, 
186, 187 

Naples, kingdom of, 103, 131, 149, 
168, 243, 261 

Napoleon I, emperor of the 
French, internal Universalism 
and external Individualism 
of, 32, 188, 214, 215, 221, 223, 
225, 226, 230-232, 237-242, 
244, 248, 250, 254, 256, 265, 
268, 284, 288-292, 295, 300- 
304, 308 

Napoleon III, emperor of the 
French, 255, 260-262 

Napoleonic Catechism, the, uni- 
versahst, 226 

National Assembly, in France, 213 

Nationalism (Nationality), an ex- 
pression of Individualism, 37, 
43, 45, 47, 53, 105, 106, 113, 
285; relation to heresy, 105, 
106,120; relation of language 
to, 119, 120; causes wars, 
259-261, 285, 290; strength 
of, 309; in the Middle Ages, 
113, 115, 120; in the Con- 
ciUar Movement, in, 112; in 
the Reformation period, 134- 
136, 147, 150, 154; after 
WestphaUa, 158; in the 
French Revolution, 228-232; 
of Stadion, 230, 231; in 
Spanish resistance to Napo- 
leon, 231; in War of Libera- 
tion, 232; development after 
fall of Napoleon, 252-260; in 
Germany, 252, 253, 259; in 
Italy, 252, 253, 258-260; in 
Austria and Hungary, 253, 
259, 260; of the Greeks, 245, 
246, 252; in Belgium, 252; 
championed by Prussia in 
Germany, 259-261 

Natural Frontiers, theory of, pro- 
duced by Universalism, 214, 

215 
Navarino, battle of, 245 
Netherlands, the (Spanish), 165;^ 

(Austrian), 179, 189, 207, 213, 



247; (United, kingdom of), 
240, 247, 248. {Cp. Belgium, 
Dutch Republic) 

Nicaea, Council of, 107 

Nicephorus I, Byzantine emperor, 

73 
Nicholas I, pope, 76 
Nicholas I, Tsar, 245, 246 
Nicholas II, Tsar, 44, 264, 287 
Nimeguen, Treaty of, 166-169 
Norman Conquest, the triumph of 

Universalism, 269, 270 
Normandy, duchy of, 98, 308 
Northmen, invasions of, effect on 

Universalism, 52, 75-77, 97 

Odo, count of Paris, 82 

Odovacar, the Herulian, " patri- 
cian " in Italy, 67 

Oldendorp, jiu"ist, 159 

Olmiitz, submission of Manteuffel 
at, 255-259 

Olympic Games, the, 60 

Orange, House of, Universalism of, 
149, 207, 247 

Oriental Monarchies, the ancient, 

59 

Orleans, Philippe, duke of, regent 
of France, individualist, 175, 
186 

Ostrogoths, kingdom of, in Italy, 
68 

Otto I, the Great, emperor, ex- 
ponent of Universalism, 75, 
77, 78, 84, 99, 100, 109 

Otto II, emperor, 83 

Ottoman Empire, see Turks 

Papacy, the (Popes), exponent of 
Universalism, 18, 71-73, 76, 
196-198, 245; as head of 
Christendom, 70-77, 92, 102- 
104,109; represents external 
Universalism in the Middle 
Ages, 35, 39, 40, 76, 272; 
indirectly promotes Indivi- 
dualism, 54, 91, 92, 119; rise 
of political power of, 70, 71; 
aids creation of Holy Roman 
Empire, 72, 73; degradation 
of, in the early Middle Ages, 
52, 76, 77; reform of, by 
Otto, 78 ; strength and weak- 
ness of, in early Middle Ages, 
76-78; quarrel of, with em- 



INDEX 



337 



Papacy — continued 

pire, 53, 78, 88, 119; advan- 
tages of, against the empire, 
78-80; importance of elective 
character, 79; value of ex- 
communication to, 80, 196; 
relation to feudalism, 82, 83; 
relations with princes of Ger- 
many, 85, 86; creates anti- 
emperors, 86, 87; not harmed 
by anti-popes, 44, 87; effect 
of Crusades on, 88-90; results 
of victory over empire, 87-92 ; 
mistaken policy towards em- 
pire, 91 ; unreality of victory 
over empire, 91-93 ; mediaeval 
ends with Boniface VIII, 102- 
104, 108, 115, 148; policy of, 
after fall of Hohenstaufen, 92, 
102-104; weakness in Rome, 
92; basis of political claims, 
92; attacked by Arnold of 
Brescia, 92, 93, by the Albi- 
genses, 93 ; effect of the Friars 
on, 94-96 ; effect of wealth of, 
95,96; declining power of, 96 ; 
degrades conception of Chris- 
tian commonwealth, 100; 
territorialism of, 102, no; 
effect of Babylonish Captivity 
on, 103, 104, of Great Schism, 
104, 106-108; decline of, 
assists Individualism, 104- 
116; Conciliar Movement and, 
106-108, 111-113; after re- 
turn from Avignon, 1 09-1 11; 
nepotism in, no, in, 124; 
policy changed after Con- 
stance, 109, no, 130; weak- 
ness after Constance, 113,114, 
116; threatened by Renais- 
sance, 123-125; doctrine of 
justification by works and, 
126; attack of Reformation 
on, 124-128; Charles V and, 
134; Philip II and, 136; 
effect of Counter- Reformation 
on, 137, 138, 141; Richelieu 
and, 150; did not create 
Catholicism, 151, 152; rela- 
tion to despotism, 152, 153; 
protest against Westphalia, 
154; decline after Westphalia, 
154, 156, 182, 208; Louis 
XIV and, 167, 312; eigh- 



teenth-century attacks on, 
197-204; danger of criticism 
to, 198; effect of suppression 
of Jesuits on, 200, 201; 
reached its nadir imder Cle- 
ment XIV, 201; French 
Revolution and, 218-221; 
Napoleon and, 223, 226; tem- 
poral power of, destroyed by 
Napoleon, 228, and restored 
after his fall, 236, 237; revival 
of, after fall of Napoleon, 236, 
237; importance of restora- 
tion of Jesuits to, 237 ; power 
of, in England, 268, 269; 
increased toleration of, at 
present day, 312 

Paris, 109, 144, 152; Parliament 
of, 149, 157, 186, 187, 208, 209 

Paris, Congress of (1856), 258, 259 

Parliament, the English, 270, 271 

Parma, duchy of, 179 

Partition Treaties, the, expressions 
of Universalism, 171-173, 303 

Pascal, Blaise, French writer, 
attacks Jesuits, 200 

Passaro, Cape, battle of, 178 

Patrimony of St. Peter, the, no, 
130 

Pays de droit coutumier, in France, 
184 

Pays de droit ecrit, in France, 184 

Pays d'etats, in France, 184 

Peace Society, the, 40 

Peasants' War, the, in Germany, 
Individualism of, 128, 129 

Persia, ancient kingdom of, 41; 
war of, with the Greeks, 63 

Persian Letters, the, of Montes- 
quieu, 202 

Peter the Great, Tsar, 188 

Petersburg, Conference of, 245 

Philip II, king of Spain, Univer- 
salism of, 135-137, 144, 152, 
158, 187, 295 

Philip V, king of Spain, 187, 302 

Philip II, Augustus, king of 
France, 88, 99 

Philip IV, the Fair, king of France, 
90, 103 

Philopoemen, general of the 
Achaean League, 63 

Physiocrats, the, Individualism of, 
204, 205 

Piedmont, see Sardinia 



338 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



Pippin, the Short, king of the 
Franks, 71, 72, 74, 100 

Pisa, Council of, 104 

Pitt, William, the younger, Eng- 
lish statesman, 233 

Pius II, pope, abortive crusade of, 

114, 130 

Pius VII, pope, resistance of, to 
Napoleon, 237 

Pius IX, pope, 254 

Plantagenets, the, 7 

Plato, internal Universalism of, 59, 
64, 123 

Podiebrad, George, king of Bo- 
hemia, Individualism of, 115 

Poland, extreme internal Indivi- 
dualism of, 115, 140, 149. 158, 
176, 177, 189, 207, 215, 217, 
224, 238, 259; first partition 
of, 181, 182; second partition 
of, 189 

Polish Succession, War of the, 176- 
178 

Politiques, the, Universalism of, 

143 
Polytheism, persistent tendency 

towards, 122 

Pombal, marquis de, Portuguese 
statesman, 194, 200 

Pomerania, duchy of, 147 

Poor Law of Elizabeth, in Eng- 
land, 40 

Porte, the, see Turks, 

Port Royal, headquarters of the 
Jansenists, 200 

Portugal, kingdom of, 142, 194, 
200,246,251; republic of, 276 

Pragmatic Sanction, the, of Charles 

Prague, 106; umversity of, 106 

Praguerie, the, individualist out- 
break in France, 118 

Predestination, doctrine of, 132 

Pressburg, Treaty of, 230 

Private J[udgment, right of, ex- 
pression of Individualism, 19 
etseq.; 125,128,129,139,288 

Prokop, Hussite leader, 113 

Protestantism, expression of Indi- 
vidualism in religion, 19, 20, 
125, 126, 136, 151-153; rela- 
tion to agnosticism, 19, 21; 
occasionally universalist, 18, 
20, 132, 133; in France, 127, 
X43-144, 147, 184, 186; politi- 



cal theories of, 127, 129, 190, 
191; in Germany, 128, 129, 
134, 145-148; Anabaptists an 
extreme form of , 128, 129; re- 
lation of the Peasants' War to, 
128; inconsistency of, 131- 
133; Council of Trent and, 
137, 138; morality and, 138; 
preserved against the Counter- 
Reformation, 140-144, 152- 
156; in Dutch Republic, 144; 
after Thirty Years' War, 150- 
153, 156; creeds not essential 
to, 151-153; permanent char- 
acter of, 151-153, 156, 196; 
corruption of, in eighteenth 
century, 199. {Cp. Calvinism, 
Lutheranism, Reformation) 

Provencal language, aided Indi- 
vidualism, 120 

Provincial Letters, the, of Pascal, 
200 

Prussia, general external Indivi- 
dualism and internal Univer- 
salism of, 181, 184, 188, 192, 
193, 212, 227, 228, 230, 234, 
236, 238, 239, 254-259, 261. 
263. {Cp. Germany) 

Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, the, 
92, 312 

Pulcheria, sister of Theodosius II, 
Byzantine emperor, 71 

Quadruple Alliance, the (1814-15), 
Universalism of, 44, 236-239, 
242-247, 250, 262, 272, 284, 
289, 292, 296, 297, 306 

Radetzky , Count, Austrian general, 

259 

Ravenna, exarchs of, 70 

Reason, Cult of, in French Revolu- 
tion, individualist, 220, 221 

Reccared, king of the Visigoths, 70 

Reformation, the, an expression of 
Individualism, 125-129, 226, 
280; results still felt, 3; found 
in embryo in Albigenses, 93; 
inevitable, 113; character of, 
due partly to Eugenius IV, 
113; relation to Renaissance, 
124, 125 ; more extreme than 
Renaissance, 124, 125 ; politi- 
cal side of, 126-129; religious 
side of, 125, 136; political 



INDEX 



339 



Reformation — continued 

theories of, 127, 128, 140; 
opposition of rulers to, 127; 
caused popular outbreaks, 
128, 129; Peasants' War and, 
128; tended to produce 
anarchy, 128; Anabaptists 
represented extreme side of, 
129; partial UniversaUsm in, 
131-133, 226, 288; destroyed j 
moral basis of Holy Roman I 
Empire, 133, and idea of ' 
Christian Commonwealth, 159; I 
spread of, partly due to acci- • 
dent, 137, 138, to abuses, 138; ■ 
stood for personal service, 138 ; j 
advocated intellectual acti- j 
vity, 138; right of private I 
judgment in, 139; Jesuits I 
and, 138-140; Great Dis- j 
coveries and, 142; Thirty j 
Years* War and, 145, 150; j 
Wars of Religion and, 142- j 
144; Dutch Republic and, 1 
144, 145; greater than the I 
creeds it produced, 151; ! 
theory of monarchy and, 190, { 
191; relation to eighteenth- | 
century writers, 197, 202; } 
printing and, 197; Voltaire | 
the logical outcome of, 202; ] 
completed in the Counter- j 
Reformation, 226; Holy Ro- j 
man Empire survived, 228; | 
shakes prestige of Papacy, { 
236, 237; in England, 267; | 
heralded by rejection of | 
accepted standards of criti- 
cism, 280. {Cp. Calvinism, 
Counter- Reformation, Luther- 
anism, Protestantism) 

Reform Bill, the (1832), i, 12, 13, 
271 

Religion, dogmatic, analysis of, 17- 
22 ; a fundamental acti^'ity of 
the human mind, 16, 17, 311; 
origin of, 17-19, 218-220; 
gratifies desire to be ruled, 19, 
218-220; origin of opposition 
to, 19-20 ; opposition to, grati- 
fies desire to rule, 19-21; 
Catholicism, logical form of, 
20, 21, 150-152; Agnosticism, 
logical form of opposition to, 
20, 31, 150-152 ; middle creeds 



illogical, 21; conflict in, 21, 
22, 25-30; kinship with love, 
22, 23; feminine element in, 
23; conflict not peculiar to, 
28; necessarily imiversaUst, 
50, 71; patriotism and, 65; 
Christian, cosmopolitan, 71 ; 
barbarian, individualist, 51; 
private judgment in, denied 
by Catholics, 76, by Protes- 
tants as anarchical, 13J-133; 
supported by Albigenses, 93, 
and by Protestants up to a 
certain point, 125-128; private 
judgment in, leads to anarchy, 
128, 131; pagan Renaissance 
and, 121, 123; polytheism in, 
122 ; Christian Renaissance 
and, 123-125 ; Reformation 
and, 124-126; heresy and, 
127; conformity in, basis of 
Philip II's policy', 135, 136, 
153; relation of, to Wars of 
Religion, 142-147; localism 
of, after Westphalia, 148, 150, 
182; controversy about, an 
expression of the eternal con- 
flict, 152; determined often 
by political considerations, 
152, 153; not the basis of 
later external Universahsm, 
157-159, 161, 182; conformity 
of, in France, 184, 186; accept- 
ance of authority in, 195, 196; 
rejection of authority in, 196- 
204 ; eSect of printing on, 197 ; 
corruption of, in eighteenth 
centviry, 198 - 200; French 
Revolution and, 210, 218-223, 
226; revival of, after fall of 
Napoleon, 236, 237; influence 
of, in Belgian revolution, 250; 
toleration, in England, 271, 
277; modem innovations in, 
280, 313 ; view of, as to human 
nature, 282, 283; decline of 
violence in, at present day, 
311-315 

Religion, Wars of, result of the 
conflict between UniversaUsm 
and IndividuaUsm, 7, 142-147, 
150, 151, 183 

Religious Orders, tendency of, to 
corruption, 200 

Renaissance, the " First," an in- 



340 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



dividualist movement, 119, 
120 

Renaissance, the, individualist, 
1 1 9- 1 24; character of, 120- 
124; cause of, 120, 121; pagan 
side of, 121, 122; Christian 
side of, 121-125; permanent 
importance of, 123; relation 
to Reformation sometimes 
friendly, sometimes hostile, 
123-125, 130 

Rhine, the, ecclesiastical states on, 
56, 233; Confederation of, 
292; frontier of, 214 

Richard I, king of England, 88, 269 

Richelieu, Cardinal, French states- 
man, external Individualism 
and internal Universalism of, 
118, 143, 147, 149, 150, 157, 
185 

Richelieu, Due de, French states- 
man, 249 

Riego, Rafael del, Spanish revolu- 
tionary, 253 

Rights of Man, Declaration of the, 
individualist, 217, 220 

Ripperda, Baron, Spanish states- 
man, 176, 178, 301 

Robespierre, Maximilien, French 
revolutionary, external uni- 
versalist and internal indi- 
vidualist, 210, 223-225 

Rois FainSants, the, in France, 100 

Romagna, the, no 

Roman Empire, the, external Uni- 
versalism represented by, 53, 
295; tendency to internal 
Individualism in, 53; con- 
verted into a veiled theocracy, 
62 ; lack of patriotism in, 64 ; 
significance of so-called end 
of, 67 ; hope of revival of, 100 ; 
cause of acceptance of, 135; 
myth of continuance of, 286, 
{Cp. Holy Roman Empire) 

Roman Republic, the (1848-49), 

254 

Romantic Movement, the, expres- 
sion of Universalism, 237 

Rome, 70, 76, 77, 79, 80, 87, 99, 
104, 114, 122, 134; senate of, 
72 

Romulus Augustus, Roman em- 
peror, 67, 68 

Roumans, the, 254 



Rousseau, Jean Jacques, French 
writer, Individualism of, 44, 
202-205, 218, 222, 237 
Rudolf, king of Burgundy, 116 
Rumania, individualist action of, 

265 
Russia, Universalism and Indi- 
vidualism in, 8, 177, 181, 188, 
192, 207, 230, 233, 236, 238, 
239, 244, 245, 250, 251, 256, 
260, 263, 264, 275, 276, 286, 
293, 302, 306 
Russo-Japanese War, the, 275 
Ruthenians, the, depression of, 268 
Ryswick, Treaty of, 169-171 

St. Augustine, of Hippo, 60, 122 

St. Augustine, of Canterbury, 269 

St. Bartholomew, massacre of, 143 

St. Dominic, 93 

St. Francis, of Assisi, 93 

St. Paul, the apostle, 50, 61, 123, 

214 
St. Peter, the apostle, 61, 70, 76, 

108; apocryphal letter of, 72 
St. Thomas Aquinas, 125 
Salamis, battle of, i 
Salian emperors, the, 85 
San Stefano, Treaty of, 263 
Saracens, the, influence of in- 
vasions of, 75, 97 
Sardinia, kingdom of, 243, 254, 

256, 261 
Saxony, 153, 238; elector of, 128 
Scanderbeg, (George Castriot), 

Albanian chieftain, 129 
Scandinavia. 140, 142. {Cp. 

Sweden) 
Schism, the Great, see Great 

Schism 
Schism of Eastern and Western 

Churches, 105 
Schleswig-Holstein Question, the, 

259 
Schwarzenberg, Count, Austrian 

statesman, 255, 256 
Scotland, 140 
Separation Law, the, in France, 

313 
Settlement, Act of, 286, 312 
Seven Weeks' War, the, 259 
Seven Years' War, the, 192 
Seville, Treaty of, 176, 178 
Sforzas, the, family of, in Milan, 

131 



INDEX 



341 



Shop Hours Act, the, 280 

Sicily, 261 

Sieyes, Abbe, French revolution- 
ary, 210 

Sigismund, emperor, Universalism 
of, 108, 109, 114 

Silesia, conquest of, by Prussia, 
177-179, 192, 207 

Sistova, Treaty of, 207 

Slavs, the, 106, 253, 254, 259, 261 

Social Contract, theory of the, ex- 
pression of Individuahsm, 129, 
190, 191 

Social Contract, the, of Rousseau, 
205 

Socialism, relation toTJniversalism, 

34, 35 

South Africa, 312 

Spain, Universahsm and Indi- 
vidualism in, 2, 41, 68, 70, 78, 
83, 89, 117, 130, 131, 142, 143, 
144, 152, 162, 170-179, 184- 
189, 192, 194, 200, 206, 215, 
230-235, 239, 243-246, 250- 
252, 274, 277, 301 

Spamsh-American colonies, the, 
244 

Spamsh-American War, the, 274, 

275 

Spanish Succession, War of the, 
187 

Stadion, Count, Austrian states- 
man, Individualism of, 230, 

231, 234 

Stanhope, Earl, English states- 
man, 174 

Stanislas Leszczjmski, king of 
Poland, 178 

States General, the, in France, 118, 

157, 209, 227 

Status Quo, idea, of maintaining the, 
imiversaUst, 162-168, 242, 262, 
264, 275, 276, 302 

Stein, Freiherr vom, Prussian 
statesman, 193, 232, 234 

Stoics, the, assist Individualism, 64 

Strassburg, seized by Louis XIV, 
169, 291 

Stuarts, the, 7, 43, 271 

Suleiman, the Magnificent, sultan, 
127 

Supremacy, Act of (1558), 40 

Sweden, general internal Indi- 
viduahsm of, 41, 147, 150, 153, 

158, 189, 192, 207, 208, 276 



Switzerland (the Swiss), 40, 56, 

154, 180, 265, 317 
Syagrius, so-called kingdom of, 69 
Syria, 59 

Tassilo, duke of Bavaria, Indi- 
viduahsm of, 74 

Ten, Council of, in Venice, uni- 
versahst, 117, 189 

Terror, Reign of, in France, its 
character, 222, 224, 241 

Theatines, order of the, 138 

Thebes, 63 

Theodoric, king of the Ostrogoths, 
67 

Thiers, Adolphe, French states- 
man, 253 

Thirty Years' War, the, 8, 145-148, 
150, 151, 183 

Time of the Troubles, the, in 
Russia, 8, 181 

Toul, bishopric of, 167 

Toulouse, county of, 93, 105 

Trafalgar, battle of, 2 

Transubstantiation, doctrine of 
universaUst, 132 

Trent, Coimcil of, 137, 138 

Trier, archbishop of, 86 

Triple Alhance (1668), against 
extreme Individualism, 165, 
166, 169, 303 

Triple AUiance (1717), universaUst, 
175, 176, 301, 302 

Triple Alhance (1788), imiversaUst, 
207, 213, 227 

Triple Alhance (1883), sign of 
Individuahsm, 286, 293 

Triple Entente, of England, France 
and Russia, individuahst, 286 ; 
directed against the extreme 
Individuahsm of Germany, 
293, 294, 304 

Triple Entente, War of the, against 
the extreme Individuahsm of 
Germany, 284-320; probable 
outcome of, 296-320 

Troppau, Conference of, 244 

Troy, siege of, 60 

Tudors, the, external Individual- 
ism and internal Universal- 
ism of, 270, 271, 277; 7, 13 

Tunis, expedition of Charles V 
against, 133 ; French and, 302 

Tm'co-Greek War, the, 275 

Turco-ItaUan War, the, 275 



342 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



Turgot, baron de, French states- 
man, 208, 209 

Turks, the (Ottoman Empire, 
Turkey), 127, 134, 158, 192, 
207, 239, 251, 257, 264, 275, 
286, 292, 302 

Tuscany, duchy of, 179 

Ulster, agitation concerning, indi- 
vidualist, 279 

Ultramontanism, an expression of 
Universalism, 237 

Unitary Edict, the, in Austria, 
universalist, 256 

United States, the, 274 

Universalism: the desire to be 
ruled: explanation of the 
term, 35 
In general : in religion, 17 et seq. ; 
in love, 23-25; conflict of, 
with Individualism in the life 
of individuals, 25 et seq. ; not 
pecuUar to religion and love, 
28; dual aspect of the con- 
flict, 29-30; conflict largely 
sub-conscious, 30; conflict of, 
with Individualism in the life 
of the nation, 31 et seq.; re- 
action towards or against, may 
be insensible or rapid, 32; 
conflict is eternal, 32 et seq. ; 
part of human nature, ihid., 
287; supplies the factor ex- 
planatory of History, 33, 284; 
has a dual character, 32-33; 
relation of, to cosmopolitan- 
ism, 34, to socialism, 34-35; 
external aspect of, 35-36; 
external aspect in Middle 
Ages and modern times, 35; 
internal aspect of, 36; com- 
plexity of the conflict of, with 
Individualism, 39 et seq.; in 
the Middle Ages, 39-40; 
general character of conflict 
of, with Individualism, 39 et 
seq.; tendency to complete 
supremacy of, 41-42 ; relation- 
shij) of, to despotism, 39, 43, 
to ideal of united Christen- 
dom, 44; arguments in favour 
of, 45 et seq.; arguments 
against, 45 et seq.; perma- 
nent factors in conflict of, 
with Individualism, 48 et seq. ; 



relationship of, to institutions, 
48-49, to simplicity of mind, 

49, to the Roman Empire, 49- 

50, to the Christian Church, 
50; attitude of barbarian in- 
vaders to, 50-52; relationship 
of Holy Roman Empire to, 50 ; 
effect of imperial taxation on, 
51; complex action of factors 
favouring or opposing, ^2 et 
seq.; relationship of com- 
merce with, 54; cause of the 
complexity of conflict of, with 
Individualism, 54-55; no im- 
mutable course for the con- 
flict, 55; probable normal 
course of the conflict, 55-59; 
French Revolution an ex- 
pression of this conflict, 211- 
212; intensity of the conflict 
during the French Revolution, 
211-212; conflict part of 
hiiman nature, 273; must 
continue till human nature is 
changed, 273; possibility of 
such change, 281-283; end of 
conflict means end of History, 
283 

Prior to the coronation of Charles 
the Great, 58-73 

In general : conflict with 
IndividuaHsm existent, but 
not apparent in earhest times, 
58-59; defined before Indi- 
vidualism, 58; not defined in 
ancient oriental monarchies, 
59 ; incomplete supremacy of, 
in ancient Greece and under 
the Roman Empire, 62-63 

External : lack of, in ancient 
Greece, 60, 63; effect of 
Roman victories on, 60; 
effect of Christianity on, 61- 
62; of barbarian invasions, 
66-68; attitude of later em- 
perors towards, 68; causes 
of continuance of^ after fall 
of Roman Empire, 68-69; 
assisted by the Papacy, 70 
et seq. ; effect of usurpation of 
Irene on, 71-73; effect of the 
creation of Holy Roman 
Empire on, 72-73 

Internal : defined by Greek 
philosophers, 59-60; strength 



INDEX 



345 



Universalism — continued \ 

of, in ancient Greece, 60; j 
under the Roman Empire, 60, 
69; in the barbarian mon- 
archies, 69-70 
From the coronation of Charles to 
the fall of the Hohenstaufen, 
74-90 

External : effect of the 
coronation of Charles on, 74; 
survives Charles the Fat, yy- 
78; under Otto the Great, 77; 
reaction against, after Otto 
the Great, 78 ; undermined by 
feudalism, 82-83 ; decline dur- 
ing the Middle Ages, 83 etseq.; 
weak in Italy after Frederic 
Barbarossa, 84, and in Ger- 
many, 84-88; ascendancy of, 
impaired by the quarrel be- 
tween Empire and Papacy, 
87-90; the crusades an ex- 
pression of, 88-89; embodied 
in Frederic II, 89 

Internal : lack of, in Caro- 
lingian Empire, 74; in the 
Holy Roman Empire, 83-86 
From the fall of the Hohenstaufen 
to the Peace of Westphalia, 91- 
149 

External : papal supremacy 
depended on, 91 ; attacked by 
Arnold of Brescia, 92-93; by 
Albigenses, 93 ; exemplified 
by the Friars, 95; results in 
maintenance of internal Indi- 
vidualism, 96-97; assists de- 
velopment of feudalism, 98; 
its strength checks the normal 
development of mankind, 99- 
100 ; effect of, upon mediaeval 
France, loo-ioi; checks de- 
velopment of national states, 
loi ; ascendancy of, impaired 
by policy of mediaeval popes 
and emperors, 103; effect 
of " Babylonish Captivity " 
upon, 103-104; effect of 
Great Schism upon, 104-105; 
opposed to nationalism, 105; 
opposed to heresy, 105 ; con- 
flict of, with Papacy, 106 et 
seq.; Conciliar Movement an 
expression of, 106 et seq.; 
expected revival of, by 



Council of Constance, 108- 
109; attempted revival of, 
by Sigismimd, 109 ; weakened 
by policy of Papacy after 
Constance, no; by nepotism 
of popes, iio-iii; by poUcy 
of popes towards Conciliar 
Movement, 111-113; resisted 
by Hussites, 113; diminished 
after Constance, 114 et seq.; 
of Charles the Bold, 115 116; 
continuance of, during later 
Middle Ages, 116; value of 
common language to, 119-120; 
opposed and supported by 
Dante, 119-120; relation of 
nationallanguagesto,ii9-i2o; 
attitude of " First " Renais- 
sance towards, 1 19-120; rela- 
tion to later Renaissance, 120 
et seq,; rejected in spiritual 
matters after Renaissance, 
124; of Papacy, opposed to 
Reformation, 126-127; ap- 
parently extinct during Re- 
formation, 130; of the Re- 
formers, 131-133; of Charles 
V, 133-135; of Philip II, 135. 
137; Counter- Reformation an 
expression of, 137 et seq.; 
championed by Jesuits, 138- 
140; declin in g during Re- 
formation period, 144; asso- 
ciation of Ferdinand II with, 
147-148; mediseval type of, 
ends at Peace of Westphalia, 
148; development of a new 
type of, 148-149; relation of 
international law to, 149 

Internal : progress of, after 
fall of Hohenstaufen, 96-99; 
slow growth of, 98-101; pro- 
gress of, in later Middle Ages, 
101 etseq., 116 etseq.; in Italy, 
117; in Germany, ibid.; in 
France, 117-118; assisted by 
external Individualism, 118- 
119; opposed by Renaissance, 
121 etseq.; favoured by artis- 
tic side of Renaissance, 121- 
122; of Catholicism, opposed 
to Reformation, 126-127; 
questioned by Reformers, 128 ; 
of Reformers, accidental, 131- 
133; of Philip II, 135-137; 



344 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



Universalism — continued 

championed by Jesuits, 138- 
140; triumph of, in Wars of 
Religion, 144; progress dur- 
ing the Reformation, 144-145 ; 
in Dutch Republic, 144-145; 
in Thirty Years' War, 145 et 
seq. ; supported by Catholic 
party in Germany, 145-146; 
by Wallenstein, 146; pro- 
gress of, in Germany at Peace 
of Westphalia, 148; triumph 
of, at Peace of Westphalia, 
149 
Ffom the Peace of Westphalia to 
the French Revolution, 150-208 
External : Catholicism an 
expression of, 15 1-153 ; victory 
of, is victory of Catholicism, 
152; effect of Peace of West- 
phalia on mediasval, 153-154; 
effect on, of doctrine of cujus 
regio, ejus religio, 154; con- 
tinuance of, after Westphalia, 
155 ; search for a new form of, 
at first half-hearted, 156; 
search for new form of, 
hastened by Peace of West- 
phalia, 156-157, and by policy 
of Louis XIV, 157-158; of 
opponents of Loviis XIV, 158- 
159; rehgion not the basis of 
new form of, 159, but inter- 
national law, 159-160; balance 
of power an expression of, 
161-162; concessions of, to 
external Individualism, 162; 
in alliances against France, 
162 ; doubt as to new form of, 
162-164; new form of, de- 
fined during period of Louis 
XIV, 164; limits on new, 164- 
165; failiue of, to maintain 
Peace of Westphalia as basis 
of European poUty, 165-166; 
expressed in Treaty of Nime- 
guen, 166-167, but fails there, 
167-168; revision of new 
theory of, owing to failure of 
Treaty of Nimeguen, 168; 
compensation, part of new 
theory of, 168 et seq.; ex- 
pressed in League of Augs- 
burg, 169-170, by William III, 
170-171, in Partition Treaties, 



ibid. ; leads to Treaty of Rys- 
wick, 170-171; expressed in 
Grand Alliance, 171-174; new 
theory of, defined at Utrecht, 
173-174; accepted in France, 
174-175; in Triple Alliance of 
1717, 175-176; character of, 
after Peace of Utrecht, 176 
et seq.; influence of, in Wars 
of Polish and Austrian Succes- 
sion, 176-179; ascendancy of, 
prevented by external Indi- 
vidualism, 178 et seq. ; fails to 
prevent wars of aggression, 
179; considers only selfish 
interests, 179 et seq. ; effect of 
internal Universalism on, 180 
et seq. ; originally considered 
smaller states, 1 80-1 81, but 
ceases to do so, ibid. ; partial 
in larger states, 181 et seq.; 
leads to partition of Poland, 
181-182; has no idea of a 
Christian commonwealth, 182; 
element of Individualism in, 
182-183; ascendancy of, 
assists internal Individual- 
ism, 185; aided by Jesuits, 
201-202; gaining ground at 
time of French Revolution, 
206 ; expressed in alliances of 
later eighteenth century, 206- 
207 ; on eve of French Revolu- 
tion recalls the Middle Ages, 
207 ; vitality of, 208 

Internal : expressed by 
Catholicism, 151-153; victory 
of, is victory of Catholicism, 
152; in Germany during 
period of Westphalia, 153; of 
Christina of Sweden, 153; in 
supposed centralised mon- 
archies, 155; in France, 
limited, 157; influences ex- 
ternal Universalism, 180 et 
seq. ; apparent triimiph of, 
after Westphalia, 183; pro- 
moted by Wars of Religion 
and Thirty Years' War, 183; 
not complete in France under 
Louis XIV, 183-184; character 
of, in Prussia, Spain and Aus- 
tria, 184; incomplete victory 
of, complicates the conflict 
with Individualism, 185; 



INDEX 



345 



Universalism^ — continued 

causes of slow progress of, 185 
et seq. ; impeded by its ap- 
parent ascendancy, 185 ets eg. ; 
character of, in France, 185- 
187, in Spain, 187-188, in 
Prussia, Russia and Austria, 
188-189, in Venice, Dutch Re- 
public and Sweden, 189; in- 
complete ascendancy of, on 
eve of French Revolution, 
189-190; benevolent despot- 
ism an expression of, 191 et 
seq. ; causes emphasis on 
de?potic character of mon- 
archy, 195; reaction against, 
resulting from benevolent 
despotism, 195; accepted in 
religion and economics, 195 ; 
strength of, 195 ; weakness of, 
195 et seq. ; favoured by the 
Church, 196-197; effect of 
invention of printing on, 197; 
in Protestant Churches, 197; 
aided by Jesuits, 201-202; 
attack of Voltaire and Rous- 
seau on, 202-204; denial of 
economic liberty by, 204: 
declining on eve of French 
Revolution, 208 
Fronir the French Revolution to 
the Present Day, 209-266 

External : triumphant and 
defeated in turn, during 
French Revolution, 212; of 
the revolutionaries, 212-213; 
of the powers afiects French 
Revolution, 212-2x3 ; asserted 
in Constitution of 1791, 213; 
abandoned by France under 
Napoleon, 215; extreme of, 
represented by Robespierre, 
223-224; interaction of, with 
Individualism during French 
Revolution, 226-227; preva- 
lent at beginning of French 
Revolution, 227; expressed 
in Triple Alliance of 1788, 227 ; 
causes intervention of powers 
in French Revolution, 212- 
213,227-228; in conflict with 
Individualism of France, 228; 
of the Habsbiurgs, 230-231; 
revival of, owing to failure of 
national resistance to France, 



231-232; causes defeat of 
Napoleon, 231-232; allied 
with internal Individualism, 
232; strengthened by violence 
of French Revolution, 235- 
236 ; illustrated by revival of 
Church, 236-237; basis of 
settlement of Vienna, 236; 
general ascendancy of, after 
fall of Napoleon, 237, but in- 
complete, ibid. ; causes of its 
ascendancy, 237-238; failure 
of, in Quadruple Alliance, 238- 
239 ; ascendancy of, impaired 
by distrust of powers after 
Congress of Vienna, 238; only 
partially championed even by 
Austria, 239; of Russia, after 
1815, 239; of England, 
different from that of her 
allies after 1815, 239; im- 
portance of alliance of, with 
internal Universalism after 
Congress of Vienna, 242-243; 
evidence of decline of, at con- 
ferences of Troppau and Lai- 
bach, 244, and at Congress of 
Verona, ihid. ; supported by 
France, 244-245; decline of, 
illustrated in War of Greek 
Independence, 245-246 ; of 
France, under Louis Philippe, 
246-247; decline of, illus- 
trated by French and Belgian 
Revolutions of 1830, 247-248; 
breaking down in period from 
Congress of Vienna to 1848, 
250-251; of powers, becomes 
occasional, 250-251; relation 
of, to nationalism, 252 et seq. ; 
causes defeat of internal Indi- 
viduahsm in 1848, 255 ; allied 
with internal Universahsm, 
255-256; partial association 
of, with Individualism after 
1848, 256-257; effect of sub- 
mission of Manteuffel at 
Olmiitz on, 257; impaired by 
CrimeanWar,257-258; danger- 
ous to Prussia throughout her 
history, 259; defeated in 
Seven Weeks' War, 259; 
value of, to Austria, 25^-260; 
reaction against, culmmated 
in Franco- Prussian War, 261 ; 



346 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



Universalism — continued 

reaction towards, after the 
national wars, 262-263; re- 
vived by Prussia in League of 
Emperors, 262-263; illus- 
trated in Congress of Berlin, 
264; concert of Europe sup- 
ports a form of, 264-265; 
maintenance of status quo, 
basis of concert, 264; limited 
after Congress of Berlin, 265- 
266 

Internal : of French mon- 
archy, too great to satisfy 
Individualists, 211; trium- 
phant and defeated in turn 
diuringthe French Revolution, 
212; at first accepted by re- 
volutionaries, 216; rapid de- 
cline of, during French Re- 
volution, 216-221; of the 
Church causes revolutionaries 
to oppose the Church, 218-219; 
Constitution of 1793 and 
Feast of Reason produce a 
reaction towards, 221; ex- 
pressed in the Committees of 
Public Safety, 221, in Conven- 
tion, ibid., in Festival of 
Supreme Being, ibid.; revival 
of, from fall of Hebertists to 
the Consulate and Empire, 
221-222; incomplete char- 
acter of, in Constitution of 
Year III, 221-222; triumph 
of, in Constitution of Year 
VIII and of the Empire, 222- 
223 ; of the Empire, different 
from that of the Bourbons, 
223 ; expressed by Napoleon, 
225-226; interaction of, with 
Individualism, 226-227; re- 
vived in Europe, owing to 
violence of French Revolu- 
tion, 233-234 ; concessions by, 
to Indivfdualism, 234-235 ; 
general character of, during 
Napoleonic period, 234-235; 
strengthened as a result of 
the French Revolution, 235- 
236; revival of, after 1815 
illustrated by revival of 
Church, 236-237; expressed 
in Romantic Movement and 
Ultramontanism, 237; seen 



in re-establishment of Jesuits, 
237; great ascendancy of, 
after Congress of Vienna, 237, 
but incomplete, ibid., 239 et 
seq. ; diminished in France 
after fall of Napoleon, 239- 
240; defeated in France by 
the Revolution, 240; effect 
on, of violence after French 
Revolution, 240; extreme of, 
discredited by Napoleonic 
despotism, 240-241 ; ques- 
tioned after Congress of 
Vienna, 241; maintained by 
fear of revolution, 241; re- 
sisted by German students, 
243; importance of alliance 
of, with external Universal- 
ism, 242-243, 255-256; victory 
of, in 1820, 243; Alexander I 
converted to, 245 ; of Austria, 
in Italy, checked, 246; in 
France, under Louis Philippe, 
246-247; alhance of, with in- 
ternal Individualism in 1830, 
248 et seq.; decline of, from 
1830 to 1848, 250-251; in- 
secure ascendancy of, 251 et 
seq.; relation to nationalism, 
252 et seq. ; in France, under 
Second Empire, 254; trimnph 
of, in Germany after 1848, due 
to help of external Universal- 
ism, 255-256; weak in Habs- 
burg dominions, 256; im- 
paired, as result of Crimean 
War, 257-258; defeated in 
Austria, 260-261 ; partial pre- 
servation of, in Austria, 260- 
261; prevalence of, in Ger- 
many owing to Franco- Prus- 
sian War, 261 ; decline of, in 
France owing to Franco- Prus- 
sian War, 261-262; some, in 
Third RepubUc, 262 ; reaction 
towards, after the national 
wars, 262-263 
In England, 267-272; external 
and internal, ascendancy of, 
never so complete as on the 
continent, 268-269 ; victory 
of external and internal, at 
Norman Conquest, 269; ex- 
ternal, culminates in sub- 
mission of Richard I to Henry 



INDEX 



347 



Universalism — conhnued 

VI, 269, and of John to 
Innocent III, 269; internal, 
of the Angevins, 270, of the 
Yorkists, 270, of the Tudors, 
270-271; internal, of the 
Tudors conciliates individu- 
alists, 271 ; internal, reaction 
against, under Stuarts, 271, 
illustrated in Great Rebellion 
and Revolution of 1688, 271; 
reaction in favour of external 
and internal, during Victorian 
age, 272 

At the present day, 273-283 

External : prevalent after 
close of national wars, 274; 
illustrated in Spanish-Ameri- 
can War, 274-275, in Turco- 
Greek War, 275, in Russo- 
Japanese War, Turco-Italian 
War, Balkan Wars, 275; re- 
action against, inevitable, 276- 
277, and indicated, t6«rf.; effect 
of colonial expansion on, 276 ; 
relation of English imperial- 
ism to, 278; relation of 
colonial preference to, 278 

Internal : extent of, 275- 
276; state interference an 
expression of, 280 

In the War of the Triple Entente, 
284-320; clearness of conflict 
of, with Individualism, since 
Napoleon, 284; incomplete 
victory of, after Napoleon, 
284, 285, 301, 302; in the 
Quadruple Alliance, 284, 
289; reaction towards, after 
national wars, 285, expressed 
in Congress of Berlin and the 
concert of Europe, 285 ; weak 
during the concert, 285-287; 
normal character of reactions 
against, 287-290; attacked by 
France vmder Louis XIV and 
Napoleon, 284, 290, 291, 303, 
304; in resistance to Louis 
XIV and Napoleon, 289, 301; 
in the Triple Entente, 293, 
294 ; in the War of the Triple 
Entente, 291; German success 
depends on, 295 ; weakness of, 
at present day, 295, 296; war, 
supreme expression of conflict 



with Individualism, 287, 294; 
extreme Individualism akin 
to, 288, 289, 293, 302 ; possible 
reversion to, after end of War 
of Triple Entente, 296, 297; 
present in all aUiances, 291- 
294; extreme of, impossible, 
285, 297; evil of extreme, 
reaUsed, 285; character of, at 
present day, more moderate, 
302-320; character of, differ- 
ent from that of other periods, 
288-301; more mingled wth 
Individualism, 298-320 
Urban II, pope, 88 
Urban VI, pope, 104 
Ursulines, order of the, 138 
Utraquists, the, individualist, 

"3 
Utrecht, Treaty of, 173-176, 247, 

297, 301 
Utrecht, Union of, 145 

Valens, Roman emperor, 65 

Valois, House of, 41, 115 

Vandals, the. Individualism of, 
51,68 

Varennes, flight of Louis XVI to, 
210 

Vasas, the, in Sweden, universalist, 
41 

Vauban, marshal of France, indi- 
vidualist, 149 

Venice, republic of, externally 
individualist and internally 
universalist, 69, 73, 117, 130, 
169, 189; partition of, 215, 
228; Austrian province of, 
260; republic of (1848-49), 
254 

Verdun, Treaty of, 75; bishopric 
of, 167 

Verona, Congress of, 244-245 

Versailles, 174, 187 

Victor Emmanuel II, king of Italy, 

254 
Vienna, 115, 164, 187; treaty of 
(1731), 176, 178; Congress of, 
56, 236, 237, 241, 244-252, 264, 
284, 297, 306; Final Act of, 

243 
Villele, M, de, French statesman, 

249 

Visconti, the, in Milan, 117 
Visigoths, the, in Spain, 68-70 



348 THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 



Vladislav, king of Poland, Indi- 
vidualism of, 115 

Voltaire, Frangois Marie Arouet 
de, French writer, individu- 
alist, 202, 203, 205, 237 

Wagner, Richard, German 
musician, individualist, 281 

Wagram, battle of, 303 

Waldrada, mistress of Lothar II, 
case of, 76 

Wallenstein, Albrecht von, Ger- 
man general, vuiiversalist, 145, 

Wallia, king of the Visigoths, um- 

versalist, 67 
Wars of the Roses, the, 270 
Wartburg Festival, the, 243 
Waterloo, battle of, i 
Westphaha, Peace of, 115, 148- 

150, 153-156, 163-167, 180, 

182, 183, 188, 206, 208, 228, 

236, 247 
William I, king of England, loi 



William III, king of England, uni- 
versalist, 169-171, 173, 303 

William II, German emperor, 291, 
292 

William the Silent, stathalter of 
Holland, 144, 150 

Winkler, jurist, 159 

Wittelsbach, house of, 145, 146 

Wittenberg, 20 

Xerxes, king of Persia, 63 

Young, Arthur, agriculturist, 

quoted, 193 
Yoimg Italy, League of, 251 

Zachary, pope, 100 

Zea Bermudez, Spanish dramatist 

and statesman, 246 
Zeno, Byzantine emperor, 67 
Ziska, Hussite leader, 113 
Zurich, creed of, 20 
Zwinglians, the, individualists, 20, 

151 



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